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Six 'uniquely' human traits now found in animals
by New Scientist
Thanks to Peter Waine for the link.
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/dn13860-six-uniquely-human-t
Six 'uniquely' human traits now found in animals
Kate Douglas
To accompany the article So you think humans are unique? we have selected six articles from the New Scientist archive that tell a similar story. We have also asked the researchers involved to update us on their latest findings. Plus, we have rounded up six videos of animals displaying 'human' abilities.
1. Culture
Art, theatre, literature, music, religion, architecture and cuisine – these are the things we generally associate with culture. Clearly no other animal has anything approaching this level of cultural sophistication. But culture at its core is simply the sum of a particular group's characteristic ways of living, learned from one another and passed down the generations, and other primate species undoubtedly have practices that are unique to groups, such as a certain way of greeting each other or obtaining food.
Even more convincing examples of animal cultures are found in cetaceans. Killer whales, for example, fall into two distinct groups, residents and transients. Although both live in the same waters and interbreed, they have very different social structures and lifestyles, distinct ways of communicating, different tastes in food and characteristic hunting techniques – all of which parents teach to offspring.
Read the original article: Culture shock (24 March 2001)
Hal Whitehead, Dalhousie University writes:
"Since our 2001 review, people have often considered culture as a potential explanation of the behavioural patterns that have turned up in their studies of whales and dolphins.
"Our own work has concentrated on the non-vocal forms of sperm-whale culture. The different cultural clans of sperm whales, although in basically the same areas, use these waters very differently, and are affected very differently by El Niño events. They also have different reproductive rates.
"In sperm whales, and likely other whales and dolphins, culture has the potential to affect population biology, and so issues as diverse as genetic evolution and the impacts of global warming on the species."
2. Mind reading
Perhaps the surest sign that an individual has insight into the mind of another is the ability to deceive. To outwit someone you must understand their desires, intentions and motives – exactly the same ability that underpins the "theory of mind". This ability to attribute mental states to others was once thought unique to humans, emerging suddenly around the fifth year of life. But the discovery that babies are capable of deception led experts to conclude that "mind-reading" skills develop gradually, and fuelled debate about whether they might be present in other primates.
Experiments in the 1990s indicated that great apes and some monkeys do understand deception, but that their understanding of the minds of others is probably implicit rather than explicit as it is in adult humans.
Read the original article: Liar! Liar! (14 February 1998)
Marc Hauser, Harvard University, writes:
"The tamarin work didn't pan out, but there are now several studies that show evidence of theory of mind in primates, including work by Brian Hare, Josep Call, Mike Tomasello, Felix Warneken, Laurie Santos, Justin Wood, and myself on chimps, rhesus monkeys and tamarins. There is nothing quite like a successful Sally-Anne test, but studies point to abilities such as seeing as a form of knowing, reading intentions and goals."
3. Tool use
Some chimps use rocks to crack nuts, others fish for termites with blades of grass and a gorilla has been seen gauging the depth of water with the equivalent of a dipstick, but no animal wields tools with quite the alacrity of the New Caledonian crow. To extract tasty insects from crevices, they craft a selection of hooks and long, barbed tapers called stepped-cut tools, made by intricately cutting a pandanus leaf with their beaks. What's more, experiments in the lab suggest that they understand the function of tools and deploy creativity and planning to construct them.
Nobody is suggesting that toolmaking has common origins in humans and crows, but there is a remarkable similarity in the ways in which their respective brains work. Both are highly lateralised, revealed in the observation that most crows are right-beaked – cutting pandanus leaves using the right side of their beaks. New Caledonian crows may force us to reassess the mental abilities of our first toolmaking ancestors.
Read the original article: Look, no hands (17 August 2002)
Gavin Hunt at the University of Aukland, writes:
"The general aim of our research on New Caledonian crows is to determine how a 'bird brain' can produce such complex tools and tool behaviour. Since the New Scientist article appeared in 2002, our team has focused on continuing to document tool manufacture and use in the wild (New Zealand Journal of Zoology, vol 35 p 115), the development of tool skills in free-living juveniles, the social behaviour and ecology of NC crows on the island of Maré, experimental work investigating NC crows' physical cognition and general intelligence, and neurological work.
"Some of this work is being undertaken collaboratively with laboratories in Germany (neurology) and New Zealand (genotyping). A very similar study is also being carried out independently at the University of Oxford. This parallel research has produced findings that are both confirmatory and conflicting."
Alex Kacelnik, University of Oxford, adds:
"We now know for sure that genetics is involved in the tool-making abilities of new Caledonian crows. We raised nestlings by hand and found that chicks that had never seen anybody handle objects of any kind started to use tools to extract food from crevices at a similar age to those who were exposed to human tutors using tools (Animal Behaviour, vol 72, p 1329). Clearly, observing others is not necessary for the tool use. However chicks exposed to tutoring exhibit a greater intensity of tool-related activity. Not surprisingly, genes and experience show a complex interaction.
"We have also developed a new technique, consisting of loading tiny video cameras on free-ranging birds, so as to see what they see and document the precise use of tools in nature. We have discovered that they use tools in loose soil, that they use a kind of tool not previously described (grass stems), and that they hunt for vertebrates (lizards). All of this, together with laboratory analysis of their cognitive abilities is forming a richer picture of what the species can do."
4. Morality
A classic study in 1964 found that hungry rhesus monkeys would not take food they had been offered if doing so meant that another monkey received an electric shock. The same is true of rats. Does this indicate nascent morality? For decades, we have preferred to find alternative explanations, but recently ethologist Marc Bekoff from the University of Colorado at Boulder has championed the view that humans are not the only moral species. He argues that morality is common in social mammals, and that during play they learn the rights and wrongs of social interaction, the "moral norms that can then be extended to other situations such as sharing food, defending resources, grooming and giving care".
Read the original article: Virtuous nature (13 July 2002)
Marc Bekoff, University of Colorado, writes:
"Work published this year showed that animals are able to make social evaluations and these assessments are foundational for moral behaviour in animals other than humans. Francys Subiaul of the George Washington University and his colleagues showed that captive chimpanzees are able to make judgments about the reputation of unfamiliar humans by observing their behaviour - whether they were generous or stingy in giving food to other humans. The ability to make character judgments is just what we would expect to find in a species in which fairness and cooperation are important in interactions among group members (Animal Cognition, DOI: 10.1007/s10071-008-0151-6)."
5. Emotions
Emotions allow us to bond with others, regulate our social interactions and make it possible to behave flexibly in different situations. We are not the only animals that need to do these things, so why should we be the only ones with emotions? There are many examples of apparent emotional behaviour in other animals.
Elephants caring for a crippled herd member seem to show empathy. A funeral ritual performed by magpies suggests grief. Was it spite that led a male baboon called Nick to take revenge on a rival by urinating on her? Divers who freed a humpback whale caught in a crab line describe its reaction as one of gratitude. Then there's the excited dance chimps perform when faced with a waterfall – it looks distinctly awe-inspired. These days, few doubt that animals have emotions, but whether they feel these consciously, as we do, is open to debate.
Read the original article: Do animals have emotions? (23 May 2007)
6. Personality
It's no surprise that animals that live under constant threat from predators are extra-cautious, while those that face fewer risks appear to be more reckless. After all, such successful survival strategies would evolve by natural selection. But the discovery that individuals of the same species, living under the same conditions, vary in their degree of boldness or caution is more remarkable. In humans we would refer to such differences as personality traits.
From cowardly spiders and reckless salamanders to aggressive songbirds and fearless fish, we are finding that many animals are not as characterless as we might expect. What's more, work with animals has led to the idea that personality traits evolve to help individuals survive in a wider variety of ecological niches, and this is influencing the way psychologists think about human personality.
Read the original article: Critters with attitude (3 June 2001)
For an update on animal personalities and how research in this area is throwing light on human behaviour read The personality factor.
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/dn13860-six-uniquely-human-t
Six 'uniquely' human traits now found in animals
Kate Douglas
To accompany the article So you think humans are unique? we have selected six articles from the New Scientist archive that tell a similar story. We have also asked the researchers involved to update us on their latest findings. Plus, we have rounded up six videos of animals displaying 'human' abilities.
1. Culture
Art, theatre, literature, music, religion, architecture and cuisine – these are the things we generally associate with culture. Clearly no other animal has anything approaching this level of cultural sophistication. But culture at its core is simply the sum of a particular group's characteristic ways of living, learned from one another and passed down the generations, and other primate species undoubtedly have practices that are unique to groups, such as a certain way of greeting each other or obtaining food.
Even more convincing examples of animal cultures are found in cetaceans. Killer whales, for example, fall into two distinct groups, residents and transients. Although both live in the same waters and interbreed, they have very different social structures and lifestyles, distinct ways of communicating, different tastes in food and characteristic hunting techniques – all of which parents teach to offspring.
Read the original article: Culture shock (24 March 2001)
Hal Whitehead, Dalhousie University writes:
"Since our 2001 review, people have often considered culture as a potential explanation of the behavioural patterns that have turned up in their studies of whales and dolphins.
"Our own work has concentrated on the non-vocal forms of sperm-whale culture. The different cultural clans of sperm whales, although in basically the same areas, use these waters very differently, and are affected very differently by El Niño events. They also have different reproductive rates.
"In sperm whales, and likely other whales and dolphins, culture has the potential to affect population biology, and so issues as diverse as genetic evolution and the impacts of global warming on the species."
2. Mind reading
Perhaps the surest sign that an individual has insight into the mind of another is the ability to deceive. To outwit someone you must understand their desires, intentions and motives – exactly the same ability that underpins the "theory of mind". This ability to attribute mental states to others was once thought unique to humans, emerging suddenly around the fifth year of life. But the discovery that babies are capable of deception led experts to conclude that "mind-reading" skills develop gradually, and fuelled debate about whether they might be present in other primates.
Experiments in the 1990s indicated that great apes and some monkeys do understand deception, but that their understanding of the minds of others is probably implicit rather than explicit as it is in adult humans.
Read the original article: Liar! Liar! (14 February 1998)
Marc Hauser, Harvard University, writes:
"The tamarin work didn't pan out, but there are now several studies that show evidence of theory of mind in primates, including work by Brian Hare, Josep Call, Mike Tomasello, Felix Warneken, Laurie Santos, Justin Wood, and myself on chimps, rhesus monkeys and tamarins. There is nothing quite like a successful Sally-Anne test, but studies point to abilities such as seeing as a form of knowing, reading intentions and goals."
3. Tool use
Some chimps use rocks to crack nuts, others fish for termites with blades of grass and a gorilla has been seen gauging the depth of water with the equivalent of a dipstick, but no animal wields tools with quite the alacrity of the New Caledonian crow. To extract tasty insects from crevices, they craft a selection of hooks and long, barbed tapers called stepped-cut tools, made by intricately cutting a pandanus leaf with their beaks. What's more, experiments in the lab suggest that they understand the function of tools and deploy creativity and planning to construct them.
Nobody is suggesting that toolmaking has common origins in humans and crows, but there is a remarkable similarity in the ways in which their respective brains work. Both are highly lateralised, revealed in the observation that most crows are right-beaked – cutting pandanus leaves using the right side of their beaks. New Caledonian crows may force us to reassess the mental abilities of our first toolmaking ancestors.
Read the original article: Look, no hands (17 August 2002)
Gavin Hunt at the University of Aukland, writes:
"The general aim of our research on New Caledonian crows is to determine how a 'bird brain' can produce such complex tools and tool behaviour. Since the New Scientist article appeared in 2002, our team has focused on continuing to document tool manufacture and use in the wild (New Zealand Journal of Zoology, vol 35 p 115), the development of tool skills in free-living juveniles, the social behaviour and ecology of NC crows on the island of Maré, experimental work investigating NC crows' physical cognition and general intelligence, and neurological work.
"Some of this work is being undertaken collaboratively with laboratories in Germany (neurology) and New Zealand (genotyping). A very similar study is also being carried out independently at the University of Oxford. This parallel research has produced findings that are both confirmatory and conflicting."
Alex Kacelnik, University of Oxford, adds:
"We now know for sure that genetics is involved in the tool-making abilities of new Caledonian crows. We raised nestlings by hand and found that chicks that had never seen anybody handle objects of any kind started to use tools to extract food from crevices at a similar age to those who were exposed to human tutors using tools (Animal Behaviour, vol 72, p 1329). Clearly, observing others is not necessary for the tool use. However chicks exposed to tutoring exhibit a greater intensity of tool-related activity. Not surprisingly, genes and experience show a complex interaction.
"We have also developed a new technique, consisting of loading tiny video cameras on free-ranging birds, so as to see what they see and document the precise use of tools in nature. We have discovered that they use tools in loose soil, that they use a kind of tool not previously described (grass stems), and that they hunt for vertebrates (lizards). All of this, together with laboratory analysis of their cognitive abilities is forming a richer picture of what the species can do."
4. Morality
A classic study in 1964 found that hungry rhesus monkeys would not take food they had been offered if doing so meant that another monkey received an electric shock. The same is true of rats. Does this indicate nascent morality? For decades, we have preferred to find alternative explanations, but recently ethologist Marc Bekoff from the University of Colorado at Boulder has championed the view that humans are not the only moral species. He argues that morality is common in social mammals, and that during play they learn the rights and wrongs of social interaction, the "moral norms that can then be extended to other situations such as sharing food, defending resources, grooming and giving care".
Read the original article: Virtuous nature (13 July 2002)
Marc Bekoff, University of Colorado, writes:
"Work published this year showed that animals are able to make social evaluations and these assessments are foundational for moral behaviour in animals other than humans. Francys Subiaul of the George Washington University and his colleagues showed that captive chimpanzees are able to make judgments about the reputation of unfamiliar humans by observing their behaviour - whether they were generous or stingy in giving food to other humans. The ability to make character judgments is just what we would expect to find in a species in which fairness and cooperation are important in interactions among group members (Animal Cognition, DOI: 10.1007/s10071-008-0151-6)."
5. Emotions
Emotions allow us to bond with others, regulate our social interactions and make it possible to behave flexibly in different situations. We are not the only animals that need to do these things, so why should we be the only ones with emotions? There are many examples of apparent emotional behaviour in other animals.
Elephants caring for a crippled herd member seem to show empathy. A funeral ritual performed by magpies suggests grief. Was it spite that led a male baboon called Nick to take revenge on a rival by urinating on her? Divers who freed a humpback whale caught in a crab line describe its reaction as one of gratitude. Then there's the excited dance chimps perform when faced with a waterfall – it looks distinctly awe-inspired. These days, few doubt that animals have emotions, but whether they feel these consciously, as we do, is open to debate.
Read the original article: Do animals have emotions? (23 May 2007)
6. Personality
It's no surprise that animals that live under constant threat from predators are extra-cautious, while those that face fewer risks appear to be more reckless. After all, such successful survival strategies would evolve by natural selection. But the discovery that individuals of the same species, living under the same conditions, vary in their degree of boldness or caution is more remarkable. In humans we would refer to such differences as personality traits.
From cowardly spiders and reckless salamanders to aggressive songbirds and fearless fish, we are finding that many animals are not as characterless as we might expect. What's more, work with animals has led to the idea that personality traits evolve to help individuals survive in a wider variety of ecological niches, and this is influencing the way psychologists think about human personality.
Read the original article: Critters with attitude (3 June 2001)
For an update on animal personalities and how research in this area is throwing light on human behaviour read The personality factor.
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Posted: Friday, May 23, 2008 | PermalinkComments 1 - 38 of 38 |
Reload Comments | Back to Top | Page Numbers2. Comment #183993 by mordacious1 on May 23, 2008 at 11:23 am
I thought all these traits were given to us by god and that's what makes us unique. I mean other animals with morality, come on. That would mean we're not as special as we think. hmmmmOther Comments by mordacious1
3. Comment #183997 by EeekiE on May 23, 2008 at 11:29 am
Any more info on the Magpie funeral? Other Comments by EeekiE
4. Comment #184005 by Robert Maynard on May 23, 2008 at 11:47 am
EeekiE,This is the original article mentioned under the emotions section, containing the story of the magpie funeral and others. The incident is anecdotal, but it's touching anyway. :P
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/life/mg19426051.300-do-animals-have-emotions.html
Other Comments by Robert Maynard
5. Comment #184013 by Theo on May 23, 2008 at 12:07 pm
As someone who is very familiar with pets and small farm animals, these facts were known to me for quite a while (and cherished!)As a theist, I didn't know it was supposed to be a bad thing. Damn you Sparky!
Other Comments by Theo
6. Comment #184017 by Border Collie on May 23, 2008 at 12:16 pm
I fed, watered and otherwise interacted with from two to fourteen urban fox squirrels in Texas almost every day for five years. They each had their own personalities, behaviors, etc. I know this is anecdotal and that they were just squirrels and they had many similar/same behaviors but they were also very different in many ways. I've found it astounding what one can learn from simple observation, without preconceived notions getting in the way. When I would sit on the patio and eat a sandwich, Blanche, the dominant female squirrel, and mother of most of the others, would find a pecan and come sit by me. I'd eat my sandwich, she'd eat her pecan. It was enormous fun.Other Comments by Border Collie
7. Comment #184036 by s.k.graham on May 23, 2008 at 1:18 pm
It is interesting that, despite so much Darwinian Evolution inspired rejection of quaint religious superstition and dogma, that the field of biology has clung to the "humans are special" bias for so long. Claims of animal intelligence, creativity, emotions, and so forth are treated as "extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary proof". If anything, it should be the other way around (which is not to say that there are not crackpots out there who do make outlandish claims about animal mental abilities). Given our understanding of evolution we should be very suprised if we *don't* find all of our "special" human traits among other species -- it is only a matter of degree.Adding my own anecdote: my dog shows an extraordinary ability to 'read' me from the most subtle cues. He is generally able to tell that I am about to take him for a walk long before I have done anything to intentionally signal it, like saying "walk" or picking up the leash.
Other Comments by s.k.graham
8. Comment #184040 by mordacious1 on May 23, 2008 at 1:24 pm
If I speak German to my dog, she goes nuts. I can say anything in English and she is fine, even if I'm using vocab she hasn't heard before, but one sentence in German and bark bark bark bark bark. I tried it with Russian and Spanish too. bark bark bark Weird.Other Comments by mordacious1
9. Comment #184046 by torcant on May 23, 2008 at 1:30 pm
It's all a matter of degree. Animals have less morals, less personality, less tool use, etc. But they have them to a certain degree.So, nothing special about humans!
http://torcant.blogspot.com
Other Comments by torcant
10. Comment #184069 by robotaholic on May 23, 2008 at 2:11 pm
One trait I wish anamals would have is being embarrased when farting. Other Comments by robotaholic
11. Comment #184091 by Mozglubov on May 23, 2008 at 2:55 pm
I think many of these have been known (although perhaps intuitively and not rigorously like I'm sure they are presented in the research) by pet owners for years...In regards to comment #184069, perhaps you just haven't met the right non-humans. When I was growing up my dog used to get awfully embarrassed when she stunk up the room (so much so that she'd often slink out of the room... although I think part of that might have just been a search for fresh air).
Other Comments by Mozglubov
12. Comment #184098 by Mitchell Gilks on May 23, 2008 at 3:39 pm
I think that since evolution is a gradual process that it is foolish to think that we have any traits that are completely unique to us, and since evolution in no way has aimed for humanity, it is also foolish to think that all of these traits must be a degree less in other animals than humans. Beyond abstract thought, and intelligent, I do not think it is justified to think off the cuff that all of our traits are more intense than other animals.
More cognitive and intellectual abilities varies within the human species. Does emotioal ability, and personality traits also? I'm not so sure that they are linked. I am not sure if it is justified to assume that all such traits are contingent on ones cognitive abilities.
I am over the opinion that it is far more parsimonious and far more in conformity with evolutionary theory to assume that we have no, or at least very few completely unique traits. Also that all because we have some traits that are more developed does not imply that all of our traits are more developed. I see absolutely no reason why other animals couldn't possess more developed traits than humans. Seems like human narsissism to suppose otherwise.
Other Comments by Mitchell Gilks
13. Comment #184101 by Cyboman on May 23, 2008 at 3:47 pm
"It's all a matter of degree. Animals have less morals, less personality, less tool use, etc. But they have them to a certain degree.So, nothing special about humans!"
Even still, most people believe it is justifiable to use animals for painful experimentation and to raise them in cruel factory farms where they're treated like farm equipment.
Other Comments by Cyboman
14. Comment #184105 by Simonw on May 23, 2008 at 4:00 pm
Stumbling on Happiness - Daniel GilbertChapter 1, paragraph one, starts with a long disclaimer about psychologists who write sentences starting "The human being is the only animal that....", and how they come to regret it, before he goes on to write one like that himself. Great read.
I think the phrase we need is humans are specialized, not special. We are different from the other great apes, but if we weren't that different we'd probably never have wandered off far enough to become a distinct species.
Other Comments by Simonw
15. Comment #184106 by Mitchell Gilks on May 23, 2008 at 4:03 pm
That isn't saying much Simonw, that is true of all distinct species. Other Comments by Mitchell Gilks
16. Comment #184109 by DavidJGrossman on May 23, 2008 at 4:08 pm
One of my cats is very sneaky and plots to escape when I open the patio door to feed the cats outside. He'll walk casually when I'm looking at him but as soon as I take my eyes off him, he sneaks around the TV entertainment center and waits for the door to open and makes a calculated run for it.
He's been outside a lot in the past but too much trouble with parasites and injuries led me to keep him inside.
Many people like to think of how different humans are from animals but there are many more similarities. Who can honestly say that they find more differences between humans and monkeys than they do similarities?
Let's face it, intelligence is not a good separator between humans and monkeys since there are some monkeys that are more intelligent than some humans. (e.g. Ben Stein) And, better looking! (e.g. Ben Stein)
- Dave
Other Comments by DavidJGrossman
17. Comment #184124 by Ed-words on May 23, 2008 at 5:52 pm
More on the magpie funerals.Some magpies become funeral directors,
and charge 10,000 gruntle seeds for their
services. Really!
Other Comments by Ed-words
18. Comment #184150 by calyx on May 23, 2008 at 7:42 pm
New Caledonian crow. To extract tasty insects from crevices, they craft a selection of hooks
Does anyone remember that crow video that was posted the other day, showing the crow in the lab making a hook out of a piece of wire and using it to get some food out of a pipe? In the video it was suggested that the crow had figured out that a hook was the instrument that needed to be used and then made one, it seems that these birds have been making hooks in the wild, it's quite a bit less remarkable. (Although the video is pretty cool)
Am I wrong about this?
Other Comments by calyx
19. Comment #184167 by Godless Savage on May 23, 2008 at 8:15 pm
One trait I wish anamals would have is being embarrased when farting.
They're no different from my husband, actually. ;) And I've always thought horses took an inordinate amount of joy in farting, loudly.
I really like this article. I have no doubt that animals feel and act much they same as we do, in many ways. It's just a matter of recognizing our similarities. I've known many animals over the years, and they enjoy deep emotional and psychological lives just as we do...of that I am sure.
Other Comments by Godless Savage
20. Comment #184186 by King of NH on May 23, 2008 at 9:14 pm
I think this connection with other species, that somehow we're not so special, is why B.F. Skinner and behavioralism was so easily dismissed by many psychologists. I am not in this field so I can't back this, but: I think Skinner was dead on. Other Comments by King of NH
21. Comment #184210 by Serdan on May 23, 2008 at 11:54 pm
@calyx:Does anyone remember that crow video that was posted the other day, showing the crow in the lab making a hook out of a piece of wire and using it to get some food out of a pipe? In the video it was suggested that the crow had figured out that a hook was the instrument that needed to be used and then made one, it seems that these birds have been making hooks in the wild, it's quite a bit less remarkable. (Although the video is pretty cool)
Am I wrong about this?
I actually think that it makes it more remarkable that all crows intuitively know how to make such a useful (and quite complex) tool. Most people from the "civilised" world would be absolutely clueless if they were left on some deserted island and would take a long time to figure out even the simplest of things.
EDIT: It would seem that most americans are overweight or obese. They would probably just sit down and whine.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obesity#Prevalence
Other Comments by Serdan
22. Comment #184248 by HappyPrimate on May 24, 2008 at 6:27 am
Most of what we know about using tools and surviving day to day is taught to us, handed down learning - which also can and does occur in other species. But I found a story told by President Carter and his wife amazing regarding a trip to Africa where the people were plagued by eye disease caused by flies. These people were then taught to simply wash their faces regularly and this was enough to drastically reduce the disease. These people just accepted the flies without coming up with the simple solution of washing. They had to be taught washing. We humans do not have a great number of hard-wired skills for survival, we depend more on being wired post birth. That is the biggest difference I see between us and the other animals.
For myself, I much prefer to live with my 3 cats and 4 dogs than with other humans. I receive much more emotional nurishment from them than from most humans I know. After a day working with humans, coming home to my cats and dogs is such a relief.
Other Comments by HappyPrimate
23. Comment #184249 by the great teapot on May 24, 2008 at 6:51 am
Whatever next.Blacks and fags have feelings too?
Other Comments by the great teapot
24. Comment #184300 by MPhil on May 24, 2008 at 12:16 pm
Consciousness may be primarily a phenomenon of sociality: While generally we wouldn't say that other people can know what we are thinking without us telling them, we can all agree on what belongs to "consciousness": beliefs, thoughts, perceptions, decisions, remebering etc. Is there anything I can have of which the others cannot agree that such a category of what belongs to consciousness does even exist? I don't think so, deception in animals is cunning - proving representative and intentional information-processing, but does by far not reach the structured plans, hypotheses, predictions - and the logical structure of this. Our capacity for rationality is evidenced for example by our ability to construct formal systems - like set theory, number theory, predicate logic etc. We have metalinguistic capability, we can think about thinking, conceptualize speech, analyse it's logical structure, make rational investigations into the world. I think the level of complexity of mind is certainly mirrored in comlpexity of sociocultural interactions - we have various sciences, philosophy, art of various kinds with exhibitions, planned social events, complex economy and structured politics etc. That this is possible and actual is definitely reflective of the general capabilities of the human mind - morality as in social behaviour following having certain restrictions - with some actions being rewarded and "taught" and others shunned and resulting in negative response from the social group, thus eliciting certain behavioural and emotional reactions in the individual who did the action of the "forbidden" kind - in that sense any group of agents has morality. But morality as something that is conceptually constructed, revised, an explicit belief-system checked against criteria of logic (consistency), rationality and applicability in a group, where even hypothetical models and theories are constructed (the investigations of the ethics branch of philosophy - also political philosophy) and compared - even the explicit morality that is a subject of intellectual discourse - ascribing this to animals would be going beyond the evidence - it would be unparsimoneous as explanations of the data, the evidence we have. Yes, animals have mentality, some more complex than others, but compared to humanity, all fairly rudimentary - as evidenced by rudimentary (compared to us) culture, tool use, evidence for planning. But people tend to make the wildest comparisons because of this - that the mentality of animals is comparable in level of complexity to ours. If you mean comparable like a 1940s computer is to a modern supercomputer then yes, of course they are comparable - but comparable in the sense of "fairly close/very similar", then no. Through our high-level cognition, our ability to analyze our situations, make predictions about the future consciously and integrate memory, situation analysis and predictions all contribute to the complexity and overall nature of our emotions (emotional situation), our personality, our morality, our society and culture. And the evidence clearly points to the level of complexity being much higher, thus allowing genuinely new phenomena - like science and philosophy, or discussions, debates - social interactions that require and are based upon certain explicit standards of rationality, or methodology in general.
Other Comments by MPhil
25. Comment #184346 by gr8hands on May 24, 2008 at 5:59 pm
MPhil, I would say that you appear to have very little experience on a day-to-day basis with animals, based on the erroneous statements you're making.Clearly animals analyze their situations, make predictions about the future consciously and integrate memory. They have a society, morality and culture (the main point of the article).
While not as developed in some aspects as most humans, I would say that the empathy of any household dog is substantially higher than the empathy of president bush for the dying soldiers and civilians, for those poor people who actually suffer because of his policies, etc. bush, his mother, cheney, and many others come to mind immediately -- not as a political statement, but a statement of factual observation.
By writing "deception in animals is cunning" you've just chosen to use a dismissive word to describe their capabilities so you can ignore how similar they actually are to human capabilities.
We've seen examples of primates who don't know how to swim jump into the water to save another creature from a different species -- and drown in the effort. That altruism exceeds those humans who stand by watching someone drown and do nothing , even if they know how to swim!
No, I would have to say that you are choosing to ignore the obvious, either out of ignorance (and I would suggest you get a rescue dog, which would be instructive), or poor science, or a puffed up sense of humanity's importance.
Other Comments by gr8hands
26. Comment #184355 by MPhil on May 24, 2008 at 6:44 pm
gr8hands, I think your pre-theoretical, emotionally charged postitions on this cloud your scientific judgement. I did not use a dismissive word (at least it wasn't meant dismissive in any way.)
The examples you give are about the strength of certain relations (bounds) between individuals - I was talking about intellectual capacity and mental complexity. And our empathy certainly receives a broader in our mental framework with conceptual cognition, even sometimes expressively formal (constructing arguments, analysing them) cognition, with broad knowledge not only of the know how, but of the "knowing that", the propositional kind.
Propositional knowledge requires propositions, which in turn have both a logical structure of information, the relational rules if you will, and semantic content through intersubjective agreement (tacit and induced through learning of the rules both of construction/analysis and refering) about the conventions of reference. No propositional beliefs without propositions - no propositions without any form of conscious representation of the content of the "it is the case that" statement. ie logical/grammatical language (the logical requirement is the requirement of being able to communicate/describe/express relations and properties) with uniform rules for refering. The being conscious of, the analysis and modelling of descriptions itself (such as what science does)requires a means of representation/expression/description that has a meta-level structure. (This is also what talking about talking, analysis of language is)
We have no scientific or indeed broadly epistemic justification for the assumption that any animal other than humans have any genuinely grammatical language, much less with meta-level structure.
Other animals show great possession of know-how (though still by many orders of magnitude not approaching the complexity of know-how and social interaction in development and realization required to devise and build a particle-accelerator for example), but propositional knowledge? Planning yes - meaning future prediction. Even intensional, self-refering communication (but we know this only of our nearest encephalically-related entities, some small part of the great apes, and only then through the teaching of rudimentary sign-language).
The complexity in and thus the mental complexity required for the rudimentary sign-language not even a handful of study-subject apes could master is light-years away from any complexity (from logical structure alone - for example explicit self-refering in the context of communication) of any communication we observe naturally in animals. But the expressive force and actually realized content of human language-use, including mathematics, physics, philosophy, political language, discussions, rational debates etc - is again light-years away from what these handful of apes who mastered sign-language are able to communicate, express, think. Their language is not expressive enough to even model such things.
Then we have the case of apes being able to press numers displayed on a touch-screen in a grid-matrix in correct numerical progression faster than human subjects. The only thing that can be reasonably extrapolated from this is that these subjects grasp the concept of symbolic representation (which is a huge thing in itself, distinguishing the complexity of the minds of these animal by several orders of magnitude from those of, say, turtles or fish.) and progression.
That is a lot, but it's -again- still light-years away from modern mathematics, or even the maths an normal person learns in school, or even the expressive capacity of the idiolect of the average person, light-years away from the complexity of phsyics or philosophy, of math or drama-plays, of construction (through society) and descriptions of economy, economic processes and states-of-affairs, from the development of and theorizing about politics. The complexity of a human society, with such complex relations as between individuals, certain functional roles they fulfill, certain personal relationships, their relations even to artificial social constructs such as governments and instiutions, conscioulsy constructed and structurally/institutionally regulated artifacts as laws, political parties, companies - their respective connections, the role of the artifact of many in its myriad possible relations to myriads of things - this is a complexity completely unseen in nature - nothing we see outside of human sociality comes close.
Other animals do have such things as roles, as interaction, hierarchical structure (determined by social roles of individuals) and even such things as social reward and punishment - but compared to the above - (political parties, companies, economy, science etc) it is absolutely rudimentary.
Honestly, you're making a fool of yourself by attacking me with such weak arguments. You are furthermore attacking strawmen and failing to bring up any argument against the position I was actually taking.
I actually am informed in the cognitive neurosciences, work with some cognitive neurosceintists and the nature and structure of the mind, its composition, implementation, structure and working is my field of research - I think I can claim to know what I am talking about.
And by this statement:
or a puffed up sense of humanity's importance.you're displaying exactly the kind of false thinking I was attacking. Yes, we are not different from animals in principle, yes their minds work on the same basis as ours - but what I wrote in my last post about intellectual capacity and mental complexity still remains true. Scientific judgement involves not hypothesizing beyond what the evidence tells us, and using minimal explanations (parsimony). From all the data we have, the conclusions of my last post are absolutely substantiated.
Yes, dogs have strong relations to other individuals (we also bread for that during domestication of wolf to dog), but that does not contradict anything I say.
Want a more direct scientific explanation? You can have it. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the entire cerebral cortex (most decisively the neocortex), and the Broca's and Wernicke's areals are the brain-areals whose structural complexity make complex mentality/intellectual capacities like ours even possible. Among that is the faculty for explicit multi-level conceptual thinking, which is in essence systematic, logically structured representation and manipulation of information (ie grammatical language). Some of these areas are not existent in other animals, and the others are substantially rudimentary compared to ours.
People with a position like yours generally ignore (or don't know) both this and the fact that I mentioned in the above comment - that outer criteria for the complexity of mentality is also the complexity of social artifacts and interaction. And animals just don't have anything as complex as theater plays, computers, programming, particle-accelerators, science in general, philosophy etc, or even just grammatical language capable of expressing and thus communicating meta-level thinking.
To downplay or just (as you seem to do) ignore that there is an amazing, incredible difference of level of complexity between this and anything and everything we see in animals is a) downright wrong and b) quite disrespectful toward the accomplishments of rational thought, of science and philosophy.
It's of course a good thing to show where and how we are similar to animals in behaviour, what we have in common, because for too long (especially due to the three great monotheistic religions) we have thought of ourselves as different in ESSENCE from animals (as having a soul and a "free will") and of animals as enitrely incapable of mentality. But not acknowlidging what I have laid out - that is how far the similarity goes, and where the differences lie, is - overdoing it (in addition to being dismissive of the achievements of science for example)
In light of the above elaboration, I think you ought to retract your last statement (the last two lines specificially), neither is true and both are insulting towards me, among other things because my field of study is actually the mind.
____________________________________________
*EDIT: Substantial Additions for clarification and provision of further examples and arguements.
Other Comments by MPhil
27. Comment #184403 by Alrischa on May 25, 2008 at 2:23 am
This is exactly what I thought about this article: Wow. It's wonderful, really, to have interspecies appreciation and communication.I guess I shouldn't be surprised. I have a cocker spaniel who is something like a big baby with a distinct personality from rest of the dogs. And dogs aren't even one of the most intelligent animals. My dog isn't allowed upstairs; there was no tangible barrier, but he seemed to have understood when we told him. One night, my family and I were watching movie in the AV room when we heard frantic footsteps on the stairs; the noise of the impact clearly created by claws instead of feet. We opened the door, looked downstairs and saw him looking guiltily at us and rolled on his back. We deduced that he snuck upstairs, but chickened out. He certainly isn't good at being subtle.
Other Comments by Alrischa
28. Comment #184405 by mjwemdee on May 25, 2008 at 2:35 am
One trait I wish anamals would have is being embarrased when farting.
Oh, I do so agree.
Other Comments by mjwemdee
29. Comment #184407 by eofor on May 25, 2008 at 3:03 am
Just curious, but is there any evidence to suggest that animals show any signs of religious behaviour? If so what?Other Comments by eofor
30. Comment #184482 by gr8hands on May 25, 2008 at 1:14 pm
MPhil, you are in error in a number of places. Here are a few:1. My statements are not "pre-theoretical" but are in fact what the articles referenced by the New Scientist are about. Perhaps you might consider reading them prior to commenting on them.
2. Dismissing my comments as "emotionally charged" is inaccurate, puerile, and does not counter their accuracy.
3. You are clearly ignorant of the research demonstrating that a number of animals have language and grammar (elephants, dolphins, just to name two) -- this is old news.
4. You are also confused about humans and grammar -- it is not innate, but taught. Perhaps you are ignorant of the fact that feral children do not spontaneously develop grammar, and in fact if they are not re-introduced back into human society by a certain age, they are unable to develop or use human grammar correctly.
5. Your information on the prefrontal cortex is (to be kind) not entirely correct. I suggest you study it further.
6. You are clearly confusing all communication with human speech/language/writing -- again demonstrating a puffed up sense of human capability.
7. You are confused about what the results of the ape touch-screen tests convey. Surely there are more interpretations than the single one you gave. The researchers themselves gave more. Unless you didn't really read their research. The fact they do it faster than humans says significantly more than the fact they can do it at all.
8. You're confused about the capability of doing math at the level of some humans (not all humans can do more than simple arithmetic), and the capability of doing any kind of calculation at all -- which a number of animal species have demonstrated time and time again.
9. Your biggest mistake is the use of "but compared to the above" and then conclude that animals don't have it. My statements, and those of the New Scientist article, are that animals do have these capabilities, albeit in most cases quite rudimentary.
10. You need to review what a strawman is, as I have not created one. Perhaps you have my post confused with someone else's post.
11. You are very confused when you claim that animals don't "think about thinking" -- how can you possibly know that? That's like thinking blind deafmutes must not either, since they don't communicate, can't read, etc. (I think Hellen Keller had a thing or two to communicate about that.)
12. I don't doubt that you can "claim" to know what you're talking about, but the evidence shows otherwise -- which is exactly what the New Scientist article was about. Of course, you can "claim" that the article is completely wrong, which, I suppose, is what you're doing, but you'd have to do better than toss around buzzwords that you aren't using very well.
Imagine that instead of animals, you use the the example of feral children, or blind deafmutes. Would that alter your statements? Or would they apply equally, because the subjects wouldn't be able to communicate to you in a way you understood as communication, cognition, etc.?
It doesn't take much effort to see that while you have some points, they do not lead to the conclusions you've written. Your arguments are not persuasive, and clearly you are irritated to be called on it, because you've resorted to name-calling.
No, MPhil, I was not inaccurate in my last two lines, so I will not retract them. Your long-winded and erroneous reply has not changed the errors of your previous post, it has only compounded it.
I am sorry if hearing that truth has insulted you. (It's clear you are unaware of some of what I've pointed out, so that means the "ignorance" comment was accurate. Your confusion about grammar, etc. supports my comment about "poor science". Just because you're working with scientists, doesn't automatically mean you're on the right track. Failing to accept that, is another symptom of "poor science".)
Perhaps you are in the wrong line of work if you have learned so little, and arrive at such wrong conclusions -- I do not write that maliciously. Not everyone is suited to their chosen profession.
Perhaps you might show our interchange to the researchers you work with, without comment, and see what they say about it. That would also be instructive.
Other Comments by gr8hands
31. Comment #184617 by MPhil on May 25, 2008 at 9:01 pm
1. My statements are not "pre-theoretical" but are in fact what the articles referenced by the New Scientist are about. Perhaps you might consider reading them prior to commenting on them.
What I said was that the "arguments" you brought up were unscientific, pretheoretical (the examples you mentioned show nothing of consequence to my position) and (in response to 2) very much emotionally charged.
3. You are clearly ignorant of the research demonstrating that a number of animals have language and grammar (elephants, dolphins, just to name two) -- this is old news.
Indeed, I am unaware of research demonstrating grammatical language in animals - because as far as anyone source I am aware of knows, grammatical, logical language has never been observed naturally occurring in animals. You claim it - you prove it. Grammatical means having discernible syntactic functions, linking individual, atomic expressions, in logical ways - thus being able to describe logical relations. There is no evidence that any form of animal communication can do that. We have to be able to discern logical, grammatical structure (and everything that is necessary for it - logical connectives, reference, order of strings, behavioural link to certain environmental situations etc) in order to ascribe it to a certain language. Nothing like this was ever observed in animals - an ascription thereof is thus unwarranted.
You're also misrepresenting me. I never said grammar was innate - I said that the cognitive capacieties requried for learning and making use of grammatical language are a) only observed in humans, and b) for all science tells us dependent on the functional (informational) complexity of the brain, specificially the areas I meantioned. So you did construct strawmen. I never even addressed the question where grammar comes from - merely what cognitive operational complexity is required for it.
5. Your information on the prefrontal cortex is (to be kind) not entirely correct. I suggest you study it further.
I suggest you don't just make these assertions, but go into detail and provide arguments. I got the information from very recent textbooks from cognitive neurosciences and neurophilosophy.
6. You are clearly confusing all communication with human speech/language/writing -- again demonstrating a puffed up sense of human capability.
Your ad hominem attacks are quite unnecessary, and certainly not impressive. Furthermore, that's another straw-men. I never said anything to that effect. I didn't say all communication was verbal. You evidently did not get the point about propositions and logical structure - which can only be expressed in language with grammatical structure, including logical connectives and functional elements playing the role of logical connectives and expressing relations.That's what I said: Constructions, evaluations and communications of propositions requires logical, grammatical language. Nothing like this has ever been observed in animals (except for the sign-language we taught a handful of them).
Ad 7. : Again you failed to get my point. From the experiment, nothing can be rationally inferred about the ability of scope and complexity of operations their mind can process beyond their being able to implement a tacit concept of progression and symbolic expression. Whatever else can be inferred, it is logically true that without further initial premises (with individual arguments - meaning other research - which haven't been given) in order to infer anything concerning the operational/functional complexity of their mind - ie the scope and complexity of operations it can do.
8. You're confused about the capability of doing math at the level of some humans (not all humans can do more than simple arithmetic), and the capability of doing any kind of calculation at all -- which a number of animal species have demonstrated time and time again.
I didn't say animals couldn't potentially employ know how of addition - thought the reasearch shows that the capability is rudimentary. I said that a) we have no evidence, no justification for believing that animals have any expressive formal systems with axioms and inference rules, with proof and proof theory. No capability of doing formal proofs or constructing logical arguments - and that b) this is a capacity far beyond anything we have ever observed animals to be capable of. The fact that not all humans can perform the highest-level thinking we observe in humans is irrelevant. Humans have been observed to have the capability for formal language, rational argument, science, deduction, discussion, explicit formal systems etc. Animals have never been observed as having anything like that.
9. Your biggest mistake is the use of "but compared to the above" and then conclude that animals don't have it. My statements, and those of the New Scientist article, are that animals do have these capabilities, albeit in most cases quite rudimentary.
No, my arguments demonstrate this quite clearly, because you did infact (contrary to what you state in number 9) shoot down strawmen (some even unsuccessfully). Neither your statements nor any research I am aware of (and I am reasonably up to date) shows that animals have such things as artificial formal languages - with axioms and inference rules - in which they can formulate theorems and do formal deduction. They have no language with discernible logical particles at all (unless we teach them sign-language). You are very simply wrong in stating that. Of course you can convince me of the opposite by directing me towards research where from the observation it can be logically inferred that animals have such language - logical, grammatical language. That requires having distinct and discernible functional elements for fulfilling the "name" function, logical particles, ascriptions of properties, expressing logical relations etc.
You completely betray that your attack against my position is unwarranted by this:
11. You are very confused when you claim that animals don't "think about thinking" -- how can you possibly know that? That's like thinking blind deafmutes must not either, since they don't communicate, can't read, etc. (I think Hellen Keller had a thing or two to communicate about that.)
You're doing what theists do - attempting to shift the burdon of proof to the one saying there is no evidence that warrants this assumption. You claim that an entity does meta-level modelling ("thinking about thinking"
is a very coarse description), you have to provide evidence for that. The only thing that can be evidence for that (if there can be evidence for something like this at all) is either by direct communication in some form of logical language, where the individual in question can describe meta-level models - or indirect evidence (which has to be evaluated extra-critically because it is indirect) - for example the individual performing an action that can ONLY be explained by assuming that it can think about thinking. Of course any such argument has to make a separate, forceful argument that no other explanation is possible and probable - and here Ockam's Razor again applies, meaning the explanation that posits the least complexity which can stilla account fully for the phenomena is the rationally most tenable.
With deafmutes, the above is possible.
And this is the main fault with your position - it's unparsimoneous.
Unless we have conlusive evidence that an ascription of what I deny animals have (and in various cases, you seem to have a false idea of what I am denying or asserting) is necessary for the most parsimoneous explanation. As long as this is not demonstrated, the belief that asserts what I deny is irrational.
Again - I do not deny that animal minds are in substance/essence different from ours. Of course they aren't - it's the function of the neural network. My position is that the human neural network is for all we know capable of far more complex operations than any other neural network we know of. Both the evidence from the cognitive neurosciences (the complexity and functional contribution of the Broca's and Wernicke's areals, the neocortex and the ventromedial prefrontal coretex) and the evidence from behavioural observation absolutely supports my thesis. I do not deny that there is graduality there - the neural networks of dolphins and chimps are certainly capable of far more complex operations than the neural networks of fish or insects.
Our cultural complexity and mainly the complexity of logical language and especially science (which requires logical language and explicit methodology) and philosophy -shows that these are operations more complex by several orders of magniture than anything we observe in other animals. To deny this would be ludicrous. No one I have ever heard of actually denies this. It is logically true.
Comparing the highest and most complex cognition we observe in humans (science, deductive proofs, devising a particle-accelerator for example) and the most complex cognition we observe in animals (such as the research we refered to shows), we see that the former is actually incredibly more complex than the latter - and it follows that evidence only warrants my position: That the complexity/(operational power) of human cognition is far beyond the complexity of cognition observed in any other animal.
Ad 12. As shown above, the evidence does support my position. I'm not just throwing around buzzwords - I am providing a logical analysis of the sitation.
Imagine that instead of animals, you use the the example of feral children, or blind deafmutes. Would that alter your statements? Or would they apply equally, because the subjects wouldn't be able to communicate to you in a way you understood as communication, cognition, etc.?
That's what I meant with emotionally charged. All I'm saying is that the ascription of certain faculties - certain complexity of cognition for example, needs evidence. You claim it, you provide it.
So, are you claiming that there is no evidence and that none is required?
It is you who has to provide evidence. I'll help you - it has to have the following form:
1. Show that certain behaviour has been observed and that the occurance is statistically significant. (By reference to peer-reviewed publications for example, or by direct evidence) - The empirical, inductive side of the argument
2. Show that the observation(s) warrant ascription of the cognitive faculties (level of cognitive complexity in question). - The deductive side of the argument
This has to be done by a) Stating your premises (those can be individually criticised if necessary)
b) Stating the inference rules
c) Integrating the empirical data
d) Construct a deductive, consistent, non-question begging argument showing that the best (or perhaps only) explanation for the observation requires the ascription of the cognitive complexity
in question
My conclusions follow from my premises - I think you are either mistaken about what exactly my position is (which specific things I deny we have justification for believing animals have) or you are in fact simply dogmatic and unable to recognize what I lay out.
You honestly don't manage to show what you are trying to show - that my position is wrong. The ad-hominems won't help, the misrepresentations won't help - the non-sequiturs wont help.
Either you provide an argument as I have laid out above - or you will have to accept (if you don't want to be entirely irrational) that the most parsimoneous, scientific explanation for the phenomena does not warrant the ascription of mental operational complexity on the level I have laid out IN DETAIL above.
There is no doubt that the cognitive tasks I have described are operationally incredibly more complex than anything we observe in animals. So that means you either provide an argument showing exactly that animals have such complex cognition (formal language, meta-level thinking, deduction, inference - in fact even just grammatical language able to express propositions of at least first order predicate logic, which is after all what is required for any logical cognition we oberve in humans.) - or you accept that it is unwarranted to ascribe this to animals.
Of course you also completely neglected to address the argument from complexity of neural network - unless you want to claim that mentality is something different than the working of the brain (for which you would have to argue seperately), you have to show how the brain of the animal - where the functional areas responsible for the functions in question (which I am denying) are mostly either extremely rudimentary or not there at all - can perform such operations.
Again, I am asking you - politely - to stop making ad hominems, and I still think an apology for the insulting comments you made would be appropriate, as a matter of decency.
This:
I am sorry if hearing that truth has insulted you. (It's clear you are unaware of some of what I've pointed out, so that means the "ignorance" comment was accurate. Your confusion about grammar, etc. supports my comment about "poor science". Just because you're working with scientists, doesn't automatically mean you're on the right track. Failing to accept that, is another symptom of "poor science".)
Perhaps you are in the wrong line of work if you have learned so little, and arrive at such wrong conclusions -- I do not write that maliciously. Not everyone is suited to their chosen profession.
Perhaps you might show our interchange to the researchers you work with, without comment, and see what they say about it. That would also be instructive.
Is so full of patronizing, derisive language and infantile ad-hominems that I really had to chuckle. Even just the first statement - honestly, that reads just like theistic drivel.
If that indeed wasn't malicious, it was incredibly arrogant.
Provide sufficient evidence and logically sound arguments and I will immediately agree. But I will not relax the standards of epistemology, of warranted logical inference and limits thereof when it comes to scientific explanations. It seems you are doing this - or, as I said above, you might be severely mistaken about my position.
Since I myself am not malicious, I simply assume you got my position wrong - what specificially I assert and what I deny. I do not deny that animals have mentality, I do not deny that they have social behaviour, or can use tools, or do cognitive tasks. I am merely saying that the cognitive tasks (leading to complexity of intersubjective phenomena like science, literature, philosophy etc) humans are capable of is far beyond what animals can do - in the specific ways explained above.
All that I'm claiming is that we cannot infer anything from the available evidence, and that thus the above is all we have justification for believing. Perhaps we can even agree on this?
There is nothing in current science that contradicts this, in fact in light of the above explanations anyone can see that my position is absolutely justified.
Also it's a bit cheap criticizing someone for being "long-winded" when that person merely lays out arguments in detail to respond to a criticism which that person thinks is invalid. You bring up several points - then you cannot criticize your opponent for actually responding to them.
Your conduct in this exchange however has been less than admirable.
I think we can do this on a more civilized level...
Other Comments by MPhil
32. Comment #184847 by gr8hands on May 26, 2008 at 9:39 am
Sorry, MPhil, but you need to look up "ad hominem" because you are confused about what it means.You claimed that animals do not "think about thinking" when there is no possible way you can know that -- without actually being able to communicate with them about the concept.
If you have evidence to support that extraordinary claim (that only humans think about thinking), I know a few hundred researchers who would be glad to know of it.
All your discussion about language/grammar/etc. is based on the presumption of the human concept of language/grammar. It is arrogant to think that it would or should apply to any other species. More simply put, because you don't understand the communication of any other animal, then it must mean that they aren't using grammar or anything else.
Without knowing what animals are communicating to each other (and we've only very recently discovered that elephants communicate in subsonics that humans can't even detect without special equipment), we can't tell if they're having philosophical discussions, religious discussions, or any other kind of discussions.
You are also arrogant to believe that such communication would be obvious to scientists. There was a woman in Washington state who was in a mental institution for 60 years -- because she was grunting like an animal, incoherent, raving as a lunatic. It was only after 60 years that someone visiting a relative heard her and recognized an obscure language. The woman had been institutionalized because no one recognized that she was speaking a foreign language. They locked her up because not one doctor, nurse or researcher thought she was speaking a human language. This was in the last 20 years!
We know a number of animals show obvious signs of grieving over the death of their members. It isn't "emotionally charged" (I think you like to inappropriately use that as a dismissive statement) to say that.
You are also still confused about "straw man".
Your comments about language and grammar show an astounding lack of education about the topic -- but, again, you'll twist that into an accusation of an ad hominem attack (the repeated improper use of words/phrases supports my "ignorance" description).
Pretty much the rest of what you wrote can be summed up as the "because I said so" argument, which is supportive of my "poor science" description.
If you were to take a cognitive test given in a language you do not understand, where the instructions were complex and completely foreign to you, you would fail. You would be labeled as having only rudimentary intelligence. You would be labeled as not having meta-linguistic capabilities, or demonstrating grammar, etc. I hope you can see how that would be erroneous.
If you were to observe the proverbial wise man sitting on the mountaintop, you would not see tool use, or technology, or science, or theatre, or art, or music -- but none of this would tell you the truth about that person's capabilities. Surely this is instructive and germane.
You are confused about cognitively incapable and physically incapable -- a dolphin may not have the hands to write literature, but you cannot prove that they do not have the cognitive capability to learn a written language -- in fact, there is tons of evidence that they do understand written symbols. The problem is that we don't have a way to translate from their language to ours and vice versa.
As for "the cognitive tasks humans are capable of is far beyond what animals can do" there are cognitive tasks animals are capable of that humans are not -- as one example, try navigating thousands of miles to a place you've only been once without any technology or understanding of astronomy.
A point of order is that you started the name calling, so "your conduct in this exchange however has been less than admirable" while mine has been explained several times. Pointing out where you have been wrong is not insulting you, even if you feel insulted by it.
Your statement "All that I'm claiming is that we cannot infer anything from the available evidence" does not match your statements that animals do not have certain capabilities -- a clear inference and conclusion.
Anyway, I have to go to a movie now.
Other Comments by gr8hands
33. Comment #185101 by MPhil on May 27, 2008 at 12:02 am
gr8hands, Your disregard for parsimony and evidence are astounding.
Your entire post is one big non sequitur.
I have a very good idea what propositional knowledge is, and how complex logical structure in communication is required to express complex relations. You are seemingly unaware of these connections, yet you make bold claims about it.
You claimed that animals do not "think about thinking" when there is no possible way you can know that -- without actually being able to communicate with them about the concept.
If you have evidence to support that extraordinary claim (that only humans think about thinking), I know a few hundred researchers who would be glad to know of it.
You are willingly abandoning the most basic principles of science here: Parsimony and the demand for conclusive evidence. The ascription of such cognitive faculties is not the most parsimoneous and the evidence is not conclusive.
I'm sorry, I don't ususally do this - but I have no other choice here: Your comments are quite arrogant, and you show a deep lack of understanding concerning the connection between propositional knowledge, high-level cognition and language.
All your errors are shown in this statement:
Your statement "All that I'm claiming is that we cannot infer anything from the available evidence" does not match your statements that animals do not have certain capabilities -- a clear inference and conclusion.
I said we cannot infer from the evidence available that they have cognition that approaches our own in complexity. We have no evidence means we have no justification for assuming it.
We have no evidence to suggest animals can do meta-level cognition of the complexity required for, say, empirical science, mathematics or philosophy. We do however have evidence that humans can do it. Logical conclusion: From the current state of evidence, we are justified in believing that only humans have meta-level cognition of the specified complexity, or approaching the specified complexity.
Since you are evidentally unable to apply the principle of Ockam's razor and evidence being required for an assertion (like I have provided, you however haven't), I wonder how you can keep a straight face while accusing me of "bad science" - honestly.
Add to that things like sattelites and particle-accelerators, and we have evidence that complex investigation into the world is something we can do and animals can't.
we can't tell if [elephants are] having philosophical discussions, religious discussions, or any other kind of discussions.
Statements like these shouldn't be criticiszed, only underlined.
One of the most ridiculous things I've ever read.
Philosophical discussions, or discussions about mathematics etc require extremely complex thinking, require complex language, grammatically structured, capable of expressing complex relations. It requires concepts of abstract entities, a concept of "evidence", "justification" , "argument", it requires a very high complexity of the areas of the brain responsible for cognition and communication. Unless we have evidence for that, we have no justification whatsoever for ascribing it.
And we certainly have no evidence that any animal has understanding of such concepts, much less can implement them.
My position is scientific - it allows for the construction of tests to evaluate animal cognition.
Just one example - it is quite universally agreed that tool-use is reflective of cognition. If we saw the construction and use of tools approaching in complexity our own - that would be sufficient evidence for cognition approaching our own.
If we saw animals inventing something with the function of an abacus, that would be pretty conclusive evidence for intelligence in the vicinity of humans at the time they used abaci.
If we saw developing technology - that would be further evidence.
Of course other behavioural tests can be done - but they can only prove a capacity for the complexity of cognition they test for - and that is, compared to the complexity of human cognition we can observe, very rudimentary.
The studies done with crows and great apes do not warrant the ascription of near-human cognitive capacity. They warrant ascription only of the cognitive capacity they test for, obviously. And that still is far below the complexity we observe in humans discussing philosophy, doing scientific investigation etc. This should be really obvious
You accuse me of bad science? Give me a break. We have no evidence for propositional thinking in animals, much less for complex meta-level thinking.
We have evidence for basic self-awareness, basic problem-solving (abstract planning) etc, but not for propositional thinking and complex meta-level cognition.
You are basically saying (see the elephant-philosophy example) that we can ascribe it without sufficient evidence, because we cannot prove it isn't so? I cannot prove that deep inside Jupiter there isn't a hidden civilisation with amazing technology. Do I have justification for asserting that it is so? Evidentally not.
You are confused about cognitively incapable and physically incapable -- a dolphin may not have the hands to write literature, but you cannot prove that they do not have the cognitive capability to learn a written language -- in fact, there is tons of evidence that they do understand written symbols. The problem is that we don't have a way to translate from their language to ours and vice versa.
If there's tons of evidence, that's fine by me then - as long as it raises the epistemic probability of "dolphins can understand [specific symbol-string x]" above 50%. But you are claiming that we can infer far more - namely that it warrants ascription of cognition approaching in complexity of informational operation our own.
That is unwarranted.
But in most cases, there is no such evidence - and you again neglect that there is a huge difference between being able to understand basic, low-complexity symbolic expressions (a card with a picture for food for example), and being able to form, analyze and understand complex, high-level symbolic language expressing descriptive propositions.
I have to say this again: We know that humans can do it... we have no evodence that animals can do it, therefore the only justified position is "From the available evidence we have no reason to believe that animals can do that"
Another thing you don't understand is that grammatical language with logical operators is essential for propositional thinking. And that is what I was talking about all along.
If you were to take a cognitive test given in a language you do not understand, where the instructions were complex and completely foreign to you, you would fail. You would be labeled as having only rudimentary intelligence. You would be labeled as not having meta-linguistic capabilities, or demonstrating grammar, etc. I hope you can see how that would be erroneous.
Let's assume that aliens who know nothing about human cognitive capacities had to judge the level of cognition humans are capable of. Without sufficient evidence to show propositional thinking, they would have no reason to assume that we have it. But there is sufficient evidence, especially in our communication. Completly foreign languages can be understood - it is possible for someone not understanding a language to investigate its logical structure. By investigating linguistic response to stimuli, including such tools as ostension, you can begin to translate - still, there is of course always underdetermination. We can find out about representating "entities"(names, descriptions) in entirely foreign languages, and also about the logical structure.
Of course the language might be too complex or too alien for us to understand at a given time,(although I see no reason to suggest that we can never possible recognize the structure and representations of any language) but this means that unless there is other behavioural evidence for high-level complex thinking, we have not enough evidence.
Also, you are again neglecting the evidence from the cognitive neurosciences. We know about the function of various brain-areals acroos species.
Elephants may communicate with subvocal oscillations - but their brains don't have the complexity in the structures required for language and propositional thinking. If you claim they have it nevertheless, it's your task to show this, in the course of which you have to refute the well-established neuroscientific evidence.
Anyway, unless the aliens I talked about have sufficient evidence, such as of the logical structure of our languages (our arificial formal languages like set theory, mathematics and logic would be perfect evidence), of highly complex technology - particle-accelerators for example, they have no justification for ascribing high-level cognition.
Surely you can see how a stick as an extension warrants little ascription of cognition while a particle-accelerator warrants the ascription of much more complex cognition.
Again, denying this would be ludicrous.
What it comes down to: There are means to test for propositional knowledge and high-level cognition. The logical and representative structure of language is of tantamount importance
If you were to observe the proverbial wise man sitting on the mountaintop, you would not see tool use, or technology, or science, or theatre, or art, or music -- but none of this would tell you the truth about that person's capabilities. Surely this is instructive and germane.
Since we are talking about a human being, and from our experience we make the judgement that prima facie, any human we encounter is capable of certain cognition. You're forgetting the principles of science again: If it wasn't for this prima facie judgement, I would have at first no reason to ascribe high-level cognition.
We need evidence to ascribe that. We don't have it when it comes to animals. We have evidence for some cognition (including planning - the studies with ravens are fascinating) - but the evidence is entirely insufficient to ascribe propositional knowledge and meta-level cognition. This is what you just don't seem to get - where you are ascribing faculties far beyond what the evidence shows.
As for "the cognitive tasks humans are capable of is far beyond what animals can do" there are cognitive tasks animals are capable of that humans are not -- as one example, try navigating thousands of miles to a place you've only been once without any technology or understanding of astronomy.
That is evidence for know how, not propositional cognition... ascribing the latter is not warranted by the evidence. All this shows is that certain animals have faculties we don't - big deal. We also know that the most prominent role in this capacity is played by their senses - a far superior echolocation in bats, smell dogs and cats - magnetic orientation and the like.
You might as well say that a bat echolocating a fast moving, small animal and catching it is evidence for complex cognition.
Surely you can see that this does not warrant ascription of propositional knowledge or meta-level propositional thinking.
In science, we always look for the most parsimoneous explanation - and with the evidence from cognitive neuroscience and behavioural biology, we are justified in ascribing to animals certain cognitive faculties - the studies on crows for example warrant ascription of planning (and the cognition required for that) on the level observed but not beyond - this is certainly evident to you. But we have no evidence to suggest meta-level thinking or propositional thinking at all in animals.
Get over it. To everyone reading this (and I think I am going to show this to the neuroscientists I am working with) it is evident that you are ascribing faculties beyond what the evidence shows.
(on a side note, though this is of course not meant as an argument of any kind, if you watch the
interview with Richard Dawkins by Paula Kirby, in the Q&A session, you will see Richard agreeing that the level of human consciousness is unique - Dennett (another expert on the mind) agrees as well)
I think there is little question that scientific thinking and philosophical thought are among the most complex cognitive tasks (perhaps the most complex) we have ever observed.
Meta-leve language is absolutely essential for that. You need a means of communication by which you can talk about the descriptions, the models and methods.
There is no evidence for that in animals - no evidence, no justification in asserting that they are able to do it.
Let me quote wikipedia:
The following properties of human language have been argued to separate it from animal communication:
* Arbitrariness: There is no rational relationship between a sound or sign and its meaning. (There is nothing "housy" about the word "house".)
* Cultural transmission: Language is passed from one language user to the next, consciously or unconsciously.
* Discreteness: Language is composed of discrete units that are used in combination to create meaning.
* Displacement: Languages can be used to communicate ideas about things that are not in the immediate vicinity either spatially or temporally.
* Duality: Language works on two levels at once, a surface level and a semantic (meaningful) level.
* Metalinguistics: Ability to discuss language itself.
* Productivity: A finite number of units can be used to create a very large number of utterances.
Research with apes, like that of Francine Patterson with Koko, suggested that apes are capable of using language that meets some of these requirements.
In the wild chimpanzees have been seen "talking" to each other, when warning about approaching danger. For example, if one chimpanzee sees a snake, he makes a low, rumbling noise, signalling for all the other chimps to climb into nearby trees.
Arbitrariness has been noted in meerkat calls; bee dances show elements of spatial displacement; and cultural transmission has occurred with the offspring of many of the great apes who have been taught sign languages, the celebrated bonobos Kanzi and Panbanisha being examples.
However, these single features alone do not qualify such instances of communication as being true language.
Meta-level communication has never been observerd. The fact that we are able to understand animal communication to the degree that we can know that a certain sound is used to elicit the proper response to an approaching danger (snake) and another sound to another danger is telling. We can investigate animal language.
Perhaps we will observe meta-level communication ( I doubt it, for neuroscientific reasons, and because no behaviour we see in animals requires this), but until we do, we have no justification for ascribing the faculty of meta-level thinking.
To make myself clear, I will again restate the exact content of my proposition:
(i. We have no justification for ascribing a faculty, assuming the existence of an entity or occurrance of a process/event without sufficient evidence)
(ii. The methodological rule of parsimony applies)
(these two should go without saying)
1. I do not deny that we have sufficient evidence to assume that animals have minds.
2. I do not deny that we have sufficient evidence to assume that some animals (mostly great apes) have basic self-awareness. (mirror-test)
3. I do not deny that we have sufficient evidence to assume that animals have communication
4. I do not deny that we have sufficient evidence to assume that some animals (mostly great apes, but also crows, cretacians etc) have a (varying and basic compared to an educated adult human) ability for abstract planning.
5. I do not deny that we have sufficient evidence to assume that animals have empathy (according to recent studies, empathy is based on mirror-neural activity - where there are mirror-neurons integrated into a neural network that is also engaged in social activity, there most likely is empathy)
6. I do not deny that we have sufficient evidence to assume that animals have social norms (moral behaviour)
7. We do not have sufficient evidence to assume that any species except ours has language that fulfills the complete definition given in the wikipedia entry
8. We have no evidence at all to suggest that the most complex cognitive tasks we know of (science, philosophy for example) are possible without a lanaguage as described above.
9. We have no other behavioural evidence to suggest that any species except ours engages in cognitive activity of the complexity required by (for example) empirical science, philosophy, mathematics, set-theory etc.
10. Our knowledge of the functions of brain-areas, especially the Broca's area and the neocortex leads to the conclusion that the complexity (size of area together with density of neurons and neuronal-layers and number of synapses) are essential for the cognitive power of the neural system.
11. The respective areas (Broca's area, neocortex) are not present or rudimentary in other species. The overall size of the area, the density of neurons and neural layers plottet against the total number of synpases in the respective areas are far higher in humans than in animals (where these areas are at all present).
12. In conclusion: The functional complexity of the neural network determines the cognitive capactiy of the oraganism.
13. Thus we can conclude that the operational
capacity of the neural networks of other species are below those of humans in general. The functional complexity of the neuronal strucutres responsible for orientation for example, for processing of smell, echolocation etc are at times far greater in certain species. But the overall capacity of the neural network is still greatest in human. The human brain is the most complex structure we know of in the entire universe.
Also, in the areas we know are responsible for propositional thinking, for meta-level cognition and complex communication - human neural networks far surpass those of any other species.
The evidence for my position is so far insurmountable, especially the neuroscientific evidence.
A "puffed up sense of humanities importance" is nowhere to be found. Only hard evidence and adherence to the standards of science, specifically parsimony.
If you claim that I am wrong - you have to disprove each strand of evidence - which will be extremely hard when it comes the neuroscientific evidence, and extremely hard when it comes to the conceptual evidence about language and cognition.
Of course you are making assertions that we can ascribe faculties without sufficient evidence (the ridiculous elephants and philosophy example - man that really made my day. I needed that laugh), so you proven beyond doubt that it is you who is doing extremely bad science.
Good day.
Other Comments by MPhil
34. Comment #185111 by MPhil on May 27, 2008 at 2:04 am
I should add that in general, researchers investigating animal cognition are extremely cautious. Even with the most sucessful and insightful studies, they are modest about their conclusions. For example Uller's study investigating "theory of mind" in animals maximally would show that certain animals have an understanding of intentionality on the level of human infants. But 1. the human infant level of cognitive understaning is not that of an educated adult, and 2. Uller herself said that more evidence is required before claiming that chimpanzees understand intentions (on the level investigated).Humphrey was one of the first to suggest that social interaction requires theoretical understanding. This is a basic assumption of many researchers, but i) assuming this is true, the theoretical understanding we have evidence for ascribing is only ever at the level we test for (usually not surpassing human infants) and ii) this basic assumption is questionable, and has been criticized by many academics who study the mind and/or cognition in one way or another (see for example Carruthers).
In the "theory of mind" studies of animal cognition (most notably the "Sarah" study of Premack and Woodruff in 1987), they infer from certain behaviour that animals succesfully performing the tast have an "ability to predict and explain behaviour by attributing mental states". I could very well live with that, provided that one's interpretation of that does not exceed the evidence. This does not show understanding(explanation) as cognitive operations on the level adult humans use, but maximally on the level of pre-educated human infants. But anyway, this interpretation is now out of favor - it is not parsimoneous enough. The most scientifically warranted interpretation is that Sarah attended to the goal of the actors in the experiment, not their mental states. This is by the way also the interpretation Premack, the original researcher, now endorses (Premack 2003)
It should interest you that one of the people involved in the evalution of all the important research on animal cognition was/is Daniel Dennett, who is just as cautious about ascription of animal cognition as I am (as every sceintist should). He does not deny what I do not deny, but does deny what you assert above what I assert.
He was even involved in constructing better tests for animal cognition, for example together with Bennett in 1987, when they proposed that a (to be specified) coordination problem requiring the adaptation of one's own behaviour in expectation of what another subject will do is a far better test than that of the Sarah-study. A good coordination problem might require that the subject evaluates a false belief of another subject. But Dennett also recognizes that any ascription of cognitive faculties by such a test hinges on our ability to determine the content of predictions the test-subject (chimps) might make. And this is very problematic indeed.
It is generally recognized in the studies of animal cognition that it is extremely hard to develop a good nonverbal test for a theory of mind. This lowers the justification for attributing the faculties in question - meaning that nonverbal tests are always open to warranted interpretations not requiring the ascription of cognitive faculties. But I'm not that skeptic - I think nonverbal tests can be sufficient. But I still agree with Dennett (and others) that for an ascription of certain cognitive capacities of arrays of nonverbal tests to be warranted, is has to be the most parsimoneous interpretation and must not ascribe capacities beyond what it actually tests for, meaning that interpretations have to be minimal. This is of course basic scientific pracitice, guided by the rule of parsimony, because otherwise the probability of the interpretation will sink very low for reasons of arbitrariness when not observing parsimony.
Dennett's suggestions were taken up by researches studying the theory of mind in children (see e.g. Wimmer & Perner 1983) (this was the famous "Maxi"-test, which has gained popularity even among laypeople). Such false-belief tests usually show that human subjects under the age of 4 are incapable of such a theory of mind. Similar tests have not succeeded for animals - because we don't know how to get animals to tell us under which box they think Maxi will look.
Also, the entire array of studies relies on the acceptance of folk psychology as a theory or as a simulation. Here I agree with the Churchlands (and others) that given the evidence provided by modern neurosciences (and artificial neural network research) tells us that the ontological commitments of folk-psychology are unwarranted.
Anyway, such distinguished researchers as Heyes (1998), Tomasello (et al, 2003), Hare (et al 2000) and Uller (2004) have reevaluated investigation into animal "theory of mind" from nonverbal paradigms. This lead to the abandoning of investigating whether or not we can ascribe a general theory of mind - rather, researchers now test for simpler, more isolated cognitive tasks and whether animals can perform them, such as understanding perceptual states, goals and intentionality.
Studies by e.g. Plooij in 1978, Whiten & Byrne in 1988, Goodall in 1986, Povinelli and Eddy in 1996, and Hare et al in 2000-20001 suggest (such studies of course never prove, only suggest, but that's enough for me) that chimpanzees can integrate into their behaviour-guiding mechanisms a basic understanding of perception and intentionality.
Studies by Emery and Clayton in 2004 suggest that certain scrubjays who have been put through certain learning-experiences engage in experience projection.
Andrews and Hare recognize that there are severe epistemological problems in drawing inferences about the mental capacity of animals from such experiments. But even taken at face value, they provide no evidence whatsoever that the cognitive faculties of the best test-subjects approaches that of an average adult human. An ascription of cognitive complexity approaching our own is simply not warranted, and all these researches know that.
The experience-projection, understanding of perception and intentionality these animals show is still far below what an average human adult can do.
One other difference in cognitive faculties between humans and other animals is that all the tests have shown are certain animals being able to functionally integrate a certain projection in situations of natural need (acquiring sustenance or averting danger for example). Humans are the only species of which we know that they can engage in cognition unrelated to their underlying drives - the acquisition of food, mating behaviour, establishing and maintaining social order, caring for infants etc. We see no evidence whatsover for cognitive behaviour unrelated to such things in animals - high-level complexity cognitive tasks such as philosophy, theoretical physics, set-theory, empirical investigations into the structure of spacetime, the fundamental particles etc are i) several orders of magnitude more complex than anything we observe in other species and ii) fundamentally beyond what is required for "mere" social survival (including establishment and maintenance of social structure) (and this is aside from the fact that these require language with meta-level capacity).
In a very recent study (2006) performed by Warneken & Tomasello, it was shown that for certain nonverbal requests (such as picking up a dropped sponge or opening a box), chimpanzees and 18 month-old infants did equally well - but that the human infants were able to perform far more complex tasks. Also, studies by Call et al demonstrated that chimpanzees are unable to distinguish between a person being unable to perform a tast and being unwilling to perform a task. - A capacity exhibited by human infants.
Even more than chimpanzees, dogs show social acuity in being responsive to intentional human actions - because we bread for their responsiveness to our needs.
Still, none of these studies warrant ascription of human-like complexity in cognition - in fact, many studies show positively, not only negatively, that the cognitive capacity of animals is far beyond that of adult humans or even human infants.
Some species (dolphins, rhesus monkeys, great apes) even show behaviour that warrants attribution of basic awareness of limited epistemic state - (Hampton 2001, Smithe et al 1995, Call & Carpenter 2001). This is fascinating, but again does not show near-human complexity. This is also shown by the fact that the test-stimuli that are ambiguous in the way that the subject is unable to categorize them (no above-chance correct categorization) to animals are not neraly as ambiguous in adult humans of average intelligence, showing that the cognitive faculties for categorization are far more developed in adult humans.
Furthermore, the inferences drawn from these (arguable most intersting) tests have been criticized by Carruthers, who argues that second-order reasoning is not necessitates by the experiment. Operating over beliefs and desires of different strengths on a first-order level is sufficient. This rival interpretation lowers the justification for ascribing the faculties in question. In fact, for ascription to be warranted, experiments would have to be devised that do not allow for more parsimoneous interpretation that does not ascribe second-order reasoning.
But I am not as skeptic as Carruthers, although I recognize that I am far less educated in this field than he is. I would be willing to ascribe this faculty. Still, the warranted ascription is again by several orders of magnitude less complex than than certain human behaviour we observe.
Now, having not only layed out the conceptual and meta-scientific requirements in my last post, but also having examined here what the actual experiments have shown, my position stands as strong as ever - while yours is clearly shown to be "bad science", unwarranted ascription of faculties beyond the evidence.
Other Comments by MPhil
1. Comment #183985 by BeyondBelief on May 23, 2008 at 11:05 am
She KNOWS what she is doing is wrong (or at least will have consequences) and she actively chooses to hide to avoid the consequences. Amazing.
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