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Monday, January 8, 2007 | Reason : Science of Religion | print version Print | Comments

Document Reason, Unfettered by Faith

by Lawrence M. Krauss, The Chronicle

Reposteed from:
http://chronicle.com

The Harvard University faculty and Pope Benedict XVI might be considered unlikely intellectual allies, but both have recently promoted an odd — and, I would suggest, oxymoronic — connection between reason and faith in the context of the university. That has already caused problems for both the pope and Harvard.

In a speech at the University of Regensburg, where he once taught, the pope emphasized the role of theology in correlating faith with reason. He argued that within the university it should be accepted without question that "it is still necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason."

That speech created an uproar in the Muslim world — not because of the pope's contentions regarding theology, but because of his reference to a 14th-century dialogue in which a Byzantine emperor questions Islam's reliance on holy war, and implies that because spreading faith through violence is unreasonable and "not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature," Islam is both unreasonable and ungodly.

Given the history of Christianity since at least the First Crusades, that was a case of the pot calling the kettle black, and it is not at all clear what the pope's logic was in recalling the provocative comment. Especially if taken out of context, it is not surprising that the reference would offend some Muslims. But though I am not a Muslim, as a college professor, I too am troubled by the reference.

A few weeks after the pope's speech, Harvard University's Task Force on General Education issued a report that proposed new general-education requirements for Harvard undergraduates. Among the new requirements listed was "reason and faith." The rationale was that secular institutions are not giving students sufficient preparation to deal with issues of faith in modern society.

That would have been a remarkable shift, making Harvard, one of the world's pre-eminent universities, perhaps the first secular institution to require undergraduates to study faith within the context of a core curriculum. But Harvard has apparently decided to drop the requirement, according to a letter from the task force to faculty members in mid-December. The university now says the requirement is not needed because religion-related courses will be offered in other areas of the curriculum. However, it is nonetheless remarkable that Harvard has considered juxtaposing reason and faith, as if they are in some sense equivalent.

The paradox behind Harvard's original proposal and the pope's more-general statements is that faith often is fundamentally irrational: It can involve a belief in something for which there is no objective evidence.

Consider how religious faith is transmitted from one generation to the next. Even though extremist religious indoctrination, like that shown in the recent documentary Jesus Camp, is isolated, throughout the world children are generally introduced to religion — in churches, synagogues, and mosques — long before they are old enough to develop sophisticated analytical-reasoning skills.

The philosophical and metaphysical issues associated with the possibility of divine intelligence are well beyond the cognitive powers of most young children. Many of them are exposed to those notions by their parents, however, because the parents feel it is essential for their children to come to believe in their religion's version of God before they have enough experience to seriously question that belief. That type of what, in another context, would be called brainwashing may be done for altruistic reasons — for example, from a sense that such beliefs will instill morality in their children's actions, or secure them a safe haven after death. But promoting religious faith in that way is certainly not done by recourse to reason.

Of course one may attempt to apply reason to the study of faith, as the pope remarked. Because of my own efforts to defend science against religious attacks, I have had the opportunity recently to learn a tremendous amount from distinguished theologians. For example, I find fascinating the intellectual machinations that the Roman Catholic Church has used to accept historical facts associated with the evolution of life and, at the same time, to insist that the facts are consistent with a divine plan and free will.

But such analyses are esoteric at best. Why should college students or the religious faithful be held accountable for connecting reason and faith when reason is as irrelevant to the experience of religious faith as it is to, say, romantic love? As the French have known since Blaise Pascal's day, nearly four centuries ago, "the heart has its reasons which reason does not know."

It is true that religious faith has profoundly affected human history, and that students need to understand the role of religion in both the past and the present — for example, its impact on current American politics. But if Harvard feels that its graduates need such knowledge, should the university not expect them to get it through required courses in world or American history?

Steven Pinker, a professor of psychology at Harvard, voiced similar concerns in The Harvard Crimson shortly after the Task Force on General Education released its report. Religious faith may have been a powerful historical force, but, Pinker argues, "so are nationalism, ethnicity, socialism, markets, nepotism, class, and globalization. Why single religion out among all the major forces in history? ... For us to magnify the significance of religion as a topic equivalent in scope to all of science, all of culture, or all of world history and current affairs, is to give it far too much prominence. It is an American anachronism."

But Pinker's principal reservation, and my own, is more basic. As he puts it: "The juxtaposition of the two words makes it sound like 'faith' and 'reason' are parallel and equivalent ways of knowing, and we have to help students navigate between them. But universities are about reason, pure and simple. ... It may be true that more people are knowledgeable about astrology than about astronomy, and it may be true that astrology deserves study as a significant historical and sociological phenomenon. But it would be a terrible mistake to juxtapose it with astronomy, if only for the false appearance of symmetry." To equate reason with faith at an institution that defines itself in terms of the former rather than the latter does a disservice to its goals.

Similarly, I would argue that for the pope to equate theology and faith by demanding that deeply religious individuals base their faith on rationality is inappropriate and fundamentally illogical. His motivation may be to produce a peaceful, more tolerant world, but history suggests that his approach simply won't work. Even scholars with years of training in theology and history have trouble combining the possible existence of divine purpose with a universe governed by natural laws.

Indeed, it is not uncommon for religious leaders to advocate acting on faith in the face of reason — as when Catholic priests forbid married women to use condoms even when their husbands are infected with AIDS. If we accept that the priests believe following such an irrational dictate will ultimately guarantee salvation, how can we criticize the irrationality of Muslim clerics who dogmatically advocate jihad?

Of course we can hope that people will act reasonably, but those actions would be based on reason, independent of faith. One definition of sanity is accepting the reality of the world around us, as evidenced by our senses. In the modern world, our senses are aided by modern science, so the reality of the universe includes such things as the historical facts of evolution and the age of the earth. Whatever their religious convictions, rational people accept those facts.

The physicist Steven Weinberg, of the University of Texas at Austin, has said: "With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil, but for good people to do evil — that takes religion." No doubt some would consider that too extreme a condemnation of religion. But while I recognize my own biases, as both an educator and a scientist — albeit one who has come to better appreciate the significance of faith in everyday life — I remain convinced that reason must be unfettered by faith if we are to truly educate our children and our students, and if we as a society are to overcome violence committed in the name of religion.

Lawrence M. Krauss is a professor of physics and astronomy at Case Western Reserve University and, for this academic year, a visiting professor of physics and astronomy at Vanderbilt University. His most recent book, Hiding in the Mirror: The Quest for Alternate Realities, From Plato to String Theory (By Way of Alice in Wonderland, Einstein, and The Twilight Zone), was published in paperback last year by Penguin Books.

http://chronicle.com
Section: The Chronicle Review
Volume 53, Issue 19, Page B20

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1. Comment #16815 by JohnC on January 9, 2007 at 1:11 am

 avatar
One definition of sanity is accepting the reality of the world around us, as evidenced by our senses. In the modern world, our senses are aided by modern science, so the reality of the universe includes such things as the historical facts of evolution and the age of the earth.

And that's as good a starting point as any for dialogue with the obdurately religiose American public as you'll find. Krauss, as I have pointed out before, is a genuine activist for the defence of biology in the US education system, though he himself is a physicist. By activist, I mean someone who goes through the tiresome business of meetings, forming coalitions, schmoozing people who you really don't like, placards and leaflets, etc. He should be one of our heroes, so it is probably apposite to remind people of the somewhat churlish reception his critical, but positive review of TGD received at this site:
http://richarddawkins.net/article,238,Sermons-and-straw-men,Lawrence-M-Krauss--Nature

Other Comments by JohnC

2. Comment #16819 by Sancus on January 9, 2007 at 1:44 am

Consider how religious faith is transmitted from one generation to the next. Even though extremist religious indoctrination, like that shown in the recent documentary Jesus Camp, is isolated, throughout the world children are generally introduced to religion — in churches, synagogues, and mosques — long before they are old enough to develop sophisticated analytical-reasoning skills.


Just when does this author think people are "old enough" to think about the "sophisticated" reasoning of religious doctrine?

Does he think there is any sophisticated reasoning at all regarding faith? Atheism will prejudge youth only to the expense of itself. A condescending attitude toward youth gives totally wayward credit to religion.

There is nothing sophisticated about religious thinking, but there is nothing childish about it either. It runs clear across all ages, cultures, nations, sexes, ethnicities, classes, and more.

Atheists need to get rid of their ageism, or they're just pretending to care.

The philosophical and metaphysical issues associated with the possibility of divine intelligence are well beyond the cognitive powers of most young children.


The philosophical and metaphysical issues with the possibility of divine intelligence are well beyond the cognitive powers of most people. Period. There is no need to narrow it to youth.

This association between religion and children among New Atheists has got to stop before it becomes insufferably ignorant.

Other Comments by Sancus

3. Comment #16820 by denoir on January 9, 2007 at 1:49 am

 avatarKrauss' general position is that religion can be made extinct through better education. This in a way puts him in a different camp than Dawkins and especially Harris. The latter likes to point out that for instance suicide bombers are usually well-educated.

A significant difference is also that Krauss aims for a system wide solution while Dawkins is specifically rallying American closet atheists. As their target audience is different, so is the approach.

If you haven't seen it, look up the "Beyond Belief 2006" conference on Google video. Krauss explains his view and position during the first session (second lecture).

As for the pope's comments on reason and faith, I think it was pretty clear what he said: Christianity is based on reason while other religions like Islam are not. He said it in a way as to promote understanding between religions, but what his real aim was remains a bit of a mystery. The Muslims got pissed, although not because they were being called "unreasonable", but because the pope used a quote that said that "nothing good ever came out of Islam". Provocation or thoughtlessness? You tell me. Given how much he had to apologize afterwards I tend to think that it was sheer stupidity and not so much a provocation.

In that same speech the pope criticized scientists for being too rational. To the best of my knowledge there were no riots by scientists following that statement.

Other Comments by denoir

4. Comment #16822 by zoro on January 9, 2007 at 2:30 am

Kudos to Krauss, but I wish he wouldn't "buy into" the clerics' terminology: the confrontation is not between faith and reason, but between faith and science. Worst is his quotation from Pinker: "universities are about reason, pure and simple." That just ain't so! The foundation of every science department in every university is not reason but data -- or better, the scientific method.

Of course reason (or logic) is a great tool. But reason isn't based (as Aristotle claimed) on some untestable assumptions: A is identical to A and not identical to not-A are scientific principles supported by data from an incomprehensibly huge number of experiments. When's the last time you found that a tree limb was a banana?

Further, reason is a tool of limited utility -- and so easily misused. Deductive logic never yields new knowledge: it leads only to information that's consistent with the premisses. [Even Einstein's E = mc^2 necessarily followed from his premisses that the speed of light was independent of the speed of the observer (an experimental result) and that the "laws" of mathematics were consistent with A is A, etc. (also confirmed experimentally)]. Meanwhile, as Hume so ably showed, inductive logic doesn't lead to new knowledge: the inference that the Sun will rise tomorrow must, in the end, be confirmed experimentally.

Thus, although I totally agree with Krauss not to "buy into" any cleric's suggestion that faith and reason are compatible [because, for example, the essence of any miracle is that A is not equal to A; therefore, all claimed "miracles" (the foundations of all the dominant and domineering religions) are illogical], yet if religious stupidity is to be purged, I'm convinced that it's necessary to take our stand based on the scientific method: "Show me the data!" What evidence supports the weird speculation that some giant Jabberwock in the sky controls the universe? Show me how you determined that all invisible flying elephants are pink! What predictions follow from your hypothesis? How can they be tested?

Other Comments by zoro

5. Comment #16824 by JohnC on January 9, 2007 at 2:33 am

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In that same speech the pope criticized scientists for being too rational. To the best of my knowledge there were no riots by scientists following that statement.

LOL, denoir.

I might just add what I think could be a more pertinent difference. RD is an ideologue, which allows him to make the disinction between battles (eg ID) and the war (religion). Krauss, in the American traditon, is a pragmatist who would regard the distinction as self-defeating (you win the war by winning the battles). The effect of which is, for instance, a quite different approach to religious "moderates". And here, I am with Krauss. Ken Miller is school biology's best friend. And quite frankly I don't care what he's thinking about when he eats his communion wafer, given his role as a powerful advocate for the teaching of science in general, and biology in particular.

But the record shows both approaches working in tandem may deliver results. I certainly have been surprised by TGD's success in the US, which has got to be a good thing ...

Other Comments by JohnC

6. Comment #16836 by captain underpants on January 9, 2007 at 5:24 am

 avatarIn a recent interview on German TV, the Poop said he feared that we were undergoing a "mini-Enlightenment" and turning away from God, which was the first time I'd encountered the rather curious notion that enlightenment might be something undesirable. The Poop also refused to address the issue of condoms and AIDS.

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7. Comment #16843 by veganmaster on January 9, 2007 at 6:37 am

Ha, that's classic, the religious fear of enlightenment! "Oh no, some of the sheeple are starting to think for themselves." The horror!

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8. Comment #16850 by briancoughlanworldcitizen on January 9, 2007 at 7:21 am

 avatarBut the record shows both approaches working in tandem may deliver results. I certainly have been surprised by TGD's success in the US, which has got to be a good thing ...

It's basically a God cop, Godless cop routine:-) Dawkins and Harris are the Godless cops, forcing the weaker perps to turn to the God cops for help, but they have to narc on the hardcore perps to get that help.

Bascially the routine will hopefully drive the "moderates" to agressivley disavow their more extremist brethern, choking off finances, PR and support.

It also shifts the centre of the discussion, people who beleive in the rapture and the literal return of Christ and other nonsense, should eventually be driven from office by public disapproval. It needs to be constantly highlighted that these people are demonstrably dangerous, potentially delusional, and simply cannot be trusted in positions of power. Especially not military power.

Keep up the pressure!!!

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9. Comment #16853 by Pilot22A on January 9, 2007 at 7:55 am

Better questions might be, who at Harvard came up with this insane idea? How did this get to the curriculum?

Harvard, of all schools, should know better.

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10. Comment #16864 by JohnC on January 9, 2007 at 9:30 am

 avatarThe original taskforce report (pdf) is here:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~secfas/Gen_Ed_Prelim_Report.pdf
and does not read as something obviously whacky, although it has got some odd things, such as under the Religion and Science heading the suggested topic of "Einstein's critique of quantum physics". (What would RD say?)

And there is some semblance of reason in its justifications:
Ninety-four percent of Harvard's incoming students report that they discuss religion "frequently" or "occasionally," and seventy-one percent say that they attend religious services. When they get to college, students often struggle—sometimes for the first time in their lives—to sort out the relationship between their own beliefs and practices, the different beliefs and practices of fellow students, and the profoundly secular and intellectual world of the academy itself.

So the proposal was not "insane", but simply a wrong-headed response to a real issue: namely, the unbelievably religiose environment that is the USofA.

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11. Comment #16880 by Quine on January 9, 2007 at 11:12 am

 avatarBasic logic: A false premise implies any conclusion.

Standard religious ploy: Get them to accept your premise on faith, and then use 'reason' to get to anywhere you want.

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12. Comment #16882 by jeepyjay on January 9, 2007 at 11:22 am

 avatarIn response to zoro who wrote: "Kudos to Krauss, but I wish he wouldn't "buy into" the clerics' terminology: the confrontation is not between faith and reason, but between faith and science."

In fact many people, myself included, understand "reason" to mean a combination of logic and empiricism, not just logic alone. Thus "reason" includes "science" but is wider, including philosophy and mathematics as well as natural philosophy (as science used to be called).

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13. Comment #16890 by zoro on January 9, 2007 at 12:41 pm

In response to jeepjay (#16882) and agreeing with Quine ((#16880):

I understand your point, but still I recommend that we refuse to play the clerics' word game.

Here are a dozen definitions of reason, from http://thinkexist.com/dictionary/meaning/reason/.

1. (v. t.) To find by logical processes; to explain or justify by reason or argument; -- usually with out; as, to reason out the causes of the librations of the moon.
2. (v. t.) To overcome or conquer by adducing reasons; -- with down; as, to reason down a passion.
3 (n.) Ratio; proportion.
4. (n.) To converse; to compare opinions.
5. (n.) A thought or a consideration offered in support of a determination or an opinion; a just ground for a conclusion or an action; that which is offered or accepted as an explanation; the efficient cause of an occurrence or a phenomenon; a motive for an action or a determination; proof, more or less decisive, for an opinion or a conclusion; principle; efficient cause; final cause; ground of argument.
6. (n.) Due exercise of the reasoning faculty; accordance with, or that which is accordant with and ratified by, the mind rightly exercised; right intellectual judgment; clear and fair deductions from true principles; that which is dictated or supported by the common sense of mankind; right conduct; right; propriety; justice.
7. (v. t.) To persuade by reasoning or argument; as, to reason one into a belief; to reason one out of his plan.
8. (n.) The faculty or capacity of the human mind by which it is distinguished from the intelligence of the inferior animals; the higher as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, sense, imagination, and memory, and in contrast to the feelings and desires. Reason comprises conception, judgment, reasoning, and the intuitional faculty. Specifically, it is the intuitional faculty, or the faculty of first truths, as distinguished from the understanding, which is called the discursive or ratiocinative faculty.
9. (n.) To exercise the rational faculty; to deduce inferences from premises; to perform the process of deduction or of induction; to ratiocinate; to reach conclusions by a systematic comparison of facts.
10. (n.) Hence: To carry on a process of deduction or of induction, in order to convince or to confute; to formulate and set forth propositions and the inferences from them; to argue.
11. (v. t.) To support with reasons, as a request.
12. (v. t.) To arrange and present the reasons for or against; to examine or discuss by arguments; to debate or discuss; as, I reasoned the matter with my friend.

From such definitions and the familiar meaning of "the scientific method", I think it's clear that 'reason' is vastly weaker than the scientific method: with the scientific method (in which, of course, reason is employed), knowledge is gained (and consistently, the word 'science' is Latin for knowledge). Thereby, I reject your suggestion (as I'm sure all scientists would) that 'reason' includes 'science'.

And by suggesting that we refuse to play the clerics' word game, I mean that, even though we might go along with their claims that their concoctions are "reasonable" (in the sense that, as was mentioned by Quine, their arguments might be logically sound -- but they're based on faulty premisses), yet I would recommend that, after such an acknowledgment, we then hit such fools (as all the popes) with the figurative club: "Reasonable, yes; logically consistent, yes; scientifically sound, NO!"

Other Comments by zoro

14. Comment #16911 by Michael on January 9, 2007 at 3:01 pm

Despite Krauss'lukewarm review of TGD, this article is a clear and closely argued piece to keep religion out of science in Harvard.

It is clear that his audience is very different from that that of TGD and Harris' books.In his academic circles it is necessary to know the 'enemy' well to counter their academic arguments gently and concisely. To tell them that they are simply arseholes is counterproductive. A cudgel might be the right tool for the Ted Haggards of this world but not academic theologians.

I therefore rather disagree with Zoro. To counter the cleric you must understand him (seldom her). Reason,at least in some of the many definitions offered, is essential in the interpretation of scientific data and planning the next experiments to test the hypotheses suggested by the data. This same reasoning must be used to prevent religion becoming a core part of Harvard or any other academic institution.

I also think Quinne is being too simplistic by suggesting that a false premise allows any conclusion. I would agree that the conclusion has to be wrong but reason does not allow any conclusion. It is dangerous to think that people like the pope are unintelligent. Wrong yes, but stupid no.

Other Comments by Michael

15. Comment #16921 by Quine on January 9, 2007 at 3:52 pm

 avatarTo Michael (#16911):

I also think Quinne is being too simplistic by suggesting that a false premise allows any conclusion. I would agree that the conclusion has to be wrong but reason does not allow any conclusion.


Please do not confuse terse for simple. That a false premise implies any conclusion is not a "suggestion" it is a foundational law of formal logic that, sadly, most people do not know. It comes about because the validity of implication rests on the assurance that the case of a given premise being true and the implied conclusion simultaneously being false, will not happen. If the premise is always false, this can never happen, so it does not matter what the conclusion is (true or false). Thus, a false premise implies any conclusion.

If you get people to believe that angels exist, you can make anything up as to how many can dance on the head of a pin. If there are no angels, you will never have the case in which the count on the pin will prove you wrong. Given a foundation of beliefs that cannot be tested, you can proceed to construct great castles of reason, as did Aquinas and Kant, and impress people so much with the construction that they accept your conclusions. (note: neither Aquinas nor Kant were stupid)

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16. Comment #16928 by Electric Monk on January 9, 2007 at 4:16 pm

Zoro:

10. (n.) Hence: To carry on a process of deduction or induction, in order to convince or confute; to formulateand set forth propositions and the inferences from them; to argue.

- sounds a lot like the scientific method to me.
Deductive tests (hypothesis test etc.) are great for some types of study but do not work for others. (test the hypthesis that the Mona Lisa is a great painting) - in matters of oppinion the scientific method has nothing to say. Whether or not there is god is clearly NOT a matter of oppinion it is a matter of fact (which is why RD says that it is a scientific question).
The problem with most (if not all) theological reasoning is that it begins with the premise that god exists, and tries to work out what he/she/it is like. Most theological arguments never address the question of whether or not there is a god at all. In the above article the Pope is not asking that we question wherther god exists through reason, but what god is like given that we know he exists. Like Quine said above - you are expected to accept the premise on faith.

Other Comments by Electric Monk

17. Comment #16936 by zoro on January 9, 2007 at 4:35 pm

Michael: No! Doubly no! First, recall the beautiful story (which you can find on the web):

"When Bertrand Russell claimed to a colleague that from a false statement he could prove anything, he was challenged as follows: 'Prove that if 0 = 1, then you are the King of England.'

"To this he replied, 'Simple. If 0 = 1, then, adding 1 to each side, 1 = 2. Since the King and I are two, it follows that the King and I are one, and hence I am the King of England'."

Second, don't treat the damn clerics gently. Think of all the miseries and murders their stupidities have caused. They don't belong in academia. Would you mind if I quoted Richard Dawkins?!

"A dismally unctuous editorial in the British newspaper the Independent recently asked for a reconciliation between science and 'theology.' It remarked that 'People want to know as much as possible about their origins.' I certainly hope they do, but what on earth makes one think that theology has anything useful to say on the subject?

"Science is responsible for the following knowledge about our origins. We know approximately when the universe began and why it is largely hydrogen. We know why stars form and what happens in their interiors to convert hydrogen to the other elements and hence give birth to chemistry in a world of physics. We know the fundamental principles of how a world of chemistry can become biology through the arising of self-replicating molecules. We know how the principle of self-replication gives rise, through Darwinian selection, to all life, including humans.

"It is science and science alone that has given us this knowledge and given it, moreover, in fascinating, over-whelming, mutually confirming detail. On every one of these questions theology has held a view that has been conclusively proved wrong. Science has eradicated smallpox, can immunize against most previously deadly viruses, can kill most previously deadly bacteria. Theology has done nothing but talk of pestilence as the wages of sin. Science can predict when a particular comet will reappear and, to the second, when the next eclipse will appear. Science has put men on the moon and hurtled reconnaissance rockets around Saturn and Jupiter. Science can tell you the age of a particular fossil and that the Turin Shroud is a medieval fake. Science knows the precise DNA instructions of several viruses and will, in the lifetime of many present readers, do the same for the human genome.

"What has theology ever said that is of the smallest use to anybody? When has theology ever said anything that is demonstrably true and is not obvious? I have listened to theologians, read them, debated against them. I have never heard any of them ever say anything of the smallest use, anything that was not either platitudinously obvious or downright false. If all the achievements of scientists were wiped out tomorrow, there would be no doctors but witch doctors, no transport faster than horses, no computers, no printed books, no agriculture beyond subsistence peasant farming. If all the achievements of theologians were wiped out tomorrow, would anyone notice the smallest difference? Even the bad achievements of scientists, the bombs, and sonar-guided whaling vessels work! The achievements of theologians don't do anything, don't affect anything, don't mean anything. What makes anyone think that 'theology' is a subject at all?"



In sum, your way has been tried for hundreds if not thousands of years, and yet the parasites still infect places such as Harvard. I therefore recommend that we follow Voltaire's lead -- who may be the primary reason why Europe is farther ahead than the U.S. in eliminating religious stupidity -- and try eradicating the clerics with insults, ridicule, mockery, and laughter. As Mencken said: "One horse-laugh is worth ten thousand syllogisms. It is not only more effective; it's vastly more intelligent."

Other Comments by zoro

18. Comment #16938 by zoro on January 9, 2007 at 4:44 pm

Sorry, I missed Quine's perfect reply (#16921).

Electric Monk (#16928):

"10. (n.) Hence: To carry on a process of deduction or induction, in order to convince or confute; to formulate and set forth propositions and the inferences from them; to argue.

- sounds a lot like the scientific method to me."

Good heavens. Check out the meaning of the scientific method! Data anyone?

Other Comments by zoro

19. Comment #16944 by MelM on January 9, 2007 at 5:31 pm

The idea of referring to angeology as "rational" really grates! If "ultimately based on sense data" or some such qualification is left out of the concept of reason, it seems the concept becomes synonomous with "deduction" and we can't convey the meaning of science without having to add "based on sense" to be clear. Also, in ordinary affairs, we'd have to change "irrational" to "unscientific" and we'd have no concept to refer to reality based thinking. "Be rational Jack!", just wouldn't work.

Deduction from dogma or feelings is just junk; I can see no justification for elevating such a procedure to the stature of reason thus confusing the whole issue of rationality and allowing enemies of reason to get away with equivical arguments.

Since rejecting the "deduction only" concept of reason just because I don't like it would be irrational (or should I say "unscientific"?), I think this is a very very important issue for futher study on my part.

The Consise Oxford dictionary definition of reason is: "the intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premises".

So, since the proper definition of reason belongs to the science of epistemology, I've got some work ahead to figure this out. But, for now, I'm not going to give an inch to the purveyors of holy prattle by identifying their worthless rubish as "rational." Sorry, I just can't; no way!

P.S. The Dawkins quote from zoro is absolutely fabulous; I've never seen the facts stated so well! I just love it!!!

------------
Faith is a vice!

Other Comments by MelM

20. Comment #16953 by Electric Monk on January 9, 2007 at 6:24 pm

zoro (#16938)

The scientific method is an example of a deductive process in that testability (by reference to data collected) follows deductive logic. - read Popper.

By the way - also love your quote from RD

Other Comments by Electric Monk

21. Comment #16959 by zoro on January 9, 2007 at 7:17 pm

Electric Monk (#16953):

Well, thank you for the good suggestion, but not only have I read many of Popper's tremendous contributions, I lived Popper's principle, working in and teaching science for more than 30 years.

I tell you what: if you'll read the first 35 chapters of my (free) online book (at www.zenofzero.net, a book expressly written for my 16-year-old granddaughter to try to help her and other kids slough off their religious indoctrination), and I especially recommend that you read the chapters dealing with the scientific method and logic, then by the time that you're finished learning that material, I'm quite confident that I'll have posted the chapters (now in draft form and being posted at the rate of one per week) in which I describe (and critique) Popper's ideas.

Beyond that, I'm pleased to report that even some elementary kids in the U.S. are now being taught that the scientific method is "guess, test, and revise" (or "and guess again" or "test again" or "re-assess"). As well, there's Feynman's great definition: "[It's] simply a way of trying not to fool yourself."

Other Comments by zoro

22. Comment #16962 by Electric Monk on January 9, 2007 at 7:52 pm

zoro (#16959)

Hey the only point i was trying to make was that science is a deductive process... that's its power and justification. Scientific Hypotheses are deductive arguments. I'll agree that not all deductive reasoning is science but all science is deductive. We're on the same side here.

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23. Comment #16982 by JohnC on January 10, 2007 at 12:29 am

 avatarI hate to interrupt this epistemology love-fest, but it seems clear that this article was couched in terms of "faith and reason" because that was the name of course component in question (and one reason I referenced the original document in my earlier post).

As Professor Krauss is also the only physicist ever to have been awarded the highest awards of all three major US physics societies, I am sure he would have an informed view on the relationship between science and reason. Suggesting his article is somehow buying into "clerics' terminology" by not entering into a disquisition on the matter is a preposterously long bow to draw, even if it did provide some pleasant diversions :-)

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24. Comment #17031 by zoro on January 10, 2007 at 8:06 am

Yes, but no & no. "Yes" to the "long bow" analogy -- but this war won't be won using just darts.

"No" to the claim that "all science is deductive" (using "deduce" in either its primary or secondary sense, viz., "to arrive at a fact or conclusion by reasoning; draw as a logical principle"), since science can be equally said to be "inductive". Further, at least since since the time of Archimedes, science can be intuitive ("Eureka!"), always (we hope!) it's logical, for Dirac it was "simply" beautiful, and so on. So, turn it around: not that science is some limitation, but that science is all the above, and more. Alternatively (and again), as Feynman said: "Science is simply a way of trying to make sure we're not fooling ourselves."

But more forcefully, no to the "preposterous…" suggestion that Krauss is buying into the clerics' terminology. Once again defending him, JohnC may be "sure" that Krauss hasn't, but based on the data (his article), the opposite conclusion seems more obvious. Making an inference from his awards is inadequate. Nonetheless I admit, on the other hand, that I didn't google him to determine what else he has written. Perhaps he has made the distinction elsewhere, but it seems appropriate for me to start with (and address) what was posted. Further, going beyond personalities, I maintain that there are (at least) two important points, not only to make but to hammer home. Popper introduced one well:

"In science, we take care that the statements we make should never depend upon the meaning of our terms. Even where the terms are defined, we never try to derive any information from the definition, or to base any argument upon it. This is why our terms make so little trouble. We do not overburden them. We try to attach to them as little weight as possible. We do not take their 'meaning' too seriously. We are always conscious that our terms are a little vague (since we have learnt to use them only in practical applications) and we reach precision not by reducing their penumbra of vaugueness, but rather by keeping well within it, by carefully phrasing our sentences in such a way that the possible shades of meaning do not matter. This is how we avoid quarrelling about words.

"Our 'scientific knowledge', in the sense in which this term may be properly used, remains entirely unaffected if we eliminate all definitions; the only effect is upon our language, which would lose, not precision, but merely brevity… There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between this view of the part played by definitions, and Aristotle's view. For Aristotle's "essentialist definitions" [i.e., in which words are burdened with "capturing the essence" of some thing or process] are [imagined to be] the principles from which all our knowledge is derived; they thus [are imagined to] contain all our knowledge; and they [are imagined to] serve to substitute a long formula for a short one. As opposed to this,… scientific… definitions do not contain any knowledge whatever, nor even any 'opinion'; they do nothing but introduce new arbitrary shorthand labels; they cut a long story short.

"The problem of definitions and of the 'meaning of terms' is the most important source of Aristotle's regrettably still prevailing intellectual influence, of all that verbal and empty sholasticism that haunts not only the Middle Ages, but our own contemporary philosophy [and all religions!]… The development of thought since Aristotle could, I think, be summed up by saying that every discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian method of definition [such as any religion!] has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, and that the degree to which the various sciences have been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of this essentialist method."

I heartily agree with Popper (and therefore find distasteful all bickering over words, such as with "reason" vs. "logic" vs. "science", "inductive vs. deductive", and so on). Further, I expect that with training similar to mine, Krauss has developed a similar distaste -- and therefore I wouldn't be surprised if he wouldn't worry about the difference between "reason vs. faith" and "science vs. faith", since to scientists, it's all silly word games. Notice, however, the first two words of the above quotation from Popper: "In science…" In politics, in contrast (and therefore, in all religions), words matter. And to make political progress in booting all religion into the dustbin of human mistakes, it's imperative that we not let the damn clerics get away with definitions that promote their cause. From that perspective and toward my second point, therefore, consider again what (the fool) Pope Benedict XVI said at the University of Regensburg on 12 Sept. 2006:

"The university [of Regensburg] was also very proud of its two theological faculties. It was clear that, by inquiring about the reasonableness of faith, they too carried out a work which is necessarily part of the "whole" of the universitas scientiarum, even if not everyone could share the faith which theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole. This profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled, even when it was once reported that a colleague had said there was something odd about our university: it had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God. That even in the face of such radical scepticism it is still necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason, and to do so in the context of the tradition of the Christian faith: this, within the university as a whole, was accepted without question…

"I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition… of part of the dialogue carried on… by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both… The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Qur'an… It is not my intention to discuss this question in the present lecture; here I would like to discuss only one point… which, in the context of the issue of "faith and reason", I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue… "The emperor… goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable… "God", he says, "is not pleased by blood - and not acting reasonably… is contrary to God's nature. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly…"

"And so I come to my conclusion. This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we are all grateful for the marvellous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos, moreover, is… the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which belongs to the essential decisions of the Christian spirit. The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application. While we rejoice in the new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them. We will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.

"Only thus do we become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the world's profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions. A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures. At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology. Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought - to philosophy and theology. For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding… The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur - this is the programme with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time. "Not to act reasonably… is contrary to the nature of God", said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university."

My response, again, is don't buy it! This foolish pope sticks his foot out, trying to arrest a slamming door. He claims that his religion (but not Islam) has always been a religion of reason (aka logos). But his ploy is familiar: he plans to manipulate words. He claims that reason is more than the scientific method ("We will succeed… only if… we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable"). Yet, it's the scientific method that's more general: it not only contains reason, it goes vastly beyond it. Who finds quantum mechanics "reasonable"? Both Einstein and Feynman admitted that they found it not only unreasonable but even incomprehensible. Yet, it's predictions have been tested so many times, who doubts that it must be approaching a correct description of nature?

Let me try to put it another way. The basis of reasoning is a few simple principles of science (i.e., discoveries of "the nature of reality") that were established by fish, monkeys, and people, ages ago, and that finally Aristotle identified. From such principles (which, actually, have their limitations), classical logic -- reasoning -- follows. But subsequently, perhaps a hundred other scientific principles have been discovered, usually identified with the discoverer's name (Galileo, Newton, Coulomb, Darwin, Faraday, Darwin, Maxwell, Boltmann, Plank, Einstein, Heisenburg, Dirac,…). And now, this foolish pope would have us subsume all such science, all such principles, not only under "reason" but of course subsume both reason and science under his grander umbrella of "faith". My response (I've spend a lifetime trying to be polite; it doesn't work with the damnable clerics): "Blow it out your ear, you nincompoop; you've got it back asswards!"

Looked at one way, first came the foolishness of his kind, with their "faith" in magic and miracles; next came Aristotle with his simplistic reasoning (but what an enormous contribution he made!); of late, courtesy the likes of Bacon, humanity is making progress via science. But look at it, also, in another way. The "realists" -- the scientists -- have always been with us, usually unsung (and commonly persecuted) by "the faithful". Way, way back, somebody figured out (probably by herself) how to start a fire. About 6,000 years ago in Mesopotamia, somebody else figured out (probably by himself) how to make a wheel spin on an axle. And so on it went. Oh, to be sure, these brilliant, unsung heros had "faith" (or better "trust" or "confidence") -- in themselves! And no doubt they used reasoning ("Hmmm, I guess there ain't no way that the bush is gonna start burning -- let alone talking -- on its own"). But above all, the prime reason for their success was undoubtedly their use of the scientific method: "guess, test, and re-assess".

And now what? The "talking- and burning-bush boys" are back (or better, they're trying a new con): the damnable excuses for humans who used fire to burn the "unbelievers" and who used the wheel to torture the "infidels", the clerical fools who (2,000 years ago) used Hero's steam engine to con the Ancient Egyptian people into carrying their useless carcasses, the same fools who today don't see that their stupid birth-control policies, in fact, destroy human dignity,… they now want in on the game -- so that we can help them con the people into carrying their useless carcasses still longer. They now say: "Yes, yes, we like being cozy by the fire, we like the wheels on our limousines, we like all the scientific achievements, but don't you see, we've always been on your side: science is part of reason, and reason has always been part of our glorious faith."

No! In fact, religion is just primitive science -- the part that long-since has been debunked. And I heartily agree with H.L. Mencken: "The scientist who yields anything to theology, however slight, is yielding to ignorance and false pretenses…" So, no: don't yield to them. Kick them out of the universities. By definition, "theology" is the study of "the gods". Relying on evidence (or better, the lack thereof), my estimate is that the probability of the existence of any god is less than one part in a google (and I expect that it's closer to 10^-500.) That's vastly smaller than the probability that all invisible flying elephants are pink. Based on that and what Steve Eley wrote (replacing his "Unicorns" with "Elephants")

"Invisible Pink [Elephants] are beings of awesome mystical power. We know this because they manage to be invisible and pink at the same time. Like all religions, the Faith of the Invisible Pink [Elephants] is based upon both logic and faith. We have faith that they are pink; we logically know that they are invisible because we can't see them."

that is, given such reasoning, such logic, such "glorious faith" in Invisible Flying Pink Elephants (IFPE), surely all schools of theology in all universities should be transformed into schools of IFPEology -- to indoctrinate the students, so they'll carry the useless carcasses of another generation of foolish clerics.

Finally, re. the complaints about my calling all clerics "fools", I rely simply on the idea that anyone who doesn't try to correct his errors when he's shown a method (in the case at hand, the scientific method, viz., a way of trying not to fool yourself) is a fool. And in case they need more help in applying the scientific method to their field, then I'll give them two hints: first, collect all relevant data; second, in those rare cases in which not even the tiniest shred of data can be found, choose a new field.

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25. Comment #17075 by jeepyjay on January 10, 2007 at 3:54 pm

 avatarI'm finding this "epistemological love-fest" as JohnC calls it, fascinating. I hesitate to spark off zoro again, but zoro, what's your take on infinity in mathematics? Is it just fantasy in the same way that angels are? Do the different varieties of infinity, countable, continuum, etc, exist in reality? Or is it all a mathematicians Platonist religion? (I incline to think that it is.)

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26. Comment #17079 by savroD on January 10, 2007 at 4:17 pm

 avatarI just readan interview witj Francis Collins in Discover magazine. He is billed as the top geneticist in the US. He claims to be a Christian and in the middle between the RD camp and the fundamentalist religious camp. Actually for a reasonably smart guy like this to claim that just because he believes in evolution, understands genetics and microbiology he is in the middle of these camps is absurd. I guess he just hasn't studied christianity as much as he's studied genetics. I tend to frown upon these people who claim the middle. They would be absolute fools if they denied the science; yet in the same breath, they stroke their pet delusion. I blame these folks for making the world safe for the fundamentalist extremists. Nobody I know would deny anyones right to believe in what they desire; however, when they champion even part of the same foolishness and call themselves, "in the center", it only shows how even relatiely intelligent people can have no common sense.

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27. Comment #17080 by savroD on January 10, 2007 at 4:19 pm

 avatarMy apologies on the spelling

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28. Comment #17089 by iamb_spartacus on January 10, 2007 at 5:16 pm

In a recent interview on German TV, the Poop said he feared that we were undergoing a "mini-Enlightenment" and turning away from God, which was the first time I'd encountered the rather curious notion that enlightenment might be something undesirable.


Let's not confuse enlightenment with "The Enlightenment." There are very intelligent and thoughtful critiques on the role of the latter as it contributed to monism and totalitarianism. See, for example, Isaiah Berlin, who built on John Stuart Mills' ideas of Positive and Negative Liberty.

The Enlightenment was a social movement, and as susceptible to groupthink, dogma, hubris, and error, as any other social movement. Sometimes "enlightenment" means recognizing there isn't always a solution to every problem.

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29. Comment #17098 by Veronique on January 10, 2007 at 7:23 pm

 avatarSancus - comment 16819

'The association between religion and children among New Atheists has got to stop before it becomes insufferably ignorant.'

I looked through http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0421-09.htm
and read an article on Patrick Henry College in Virginia. It's founder Michael Farris of Home School Legal Defense Association boasts that it only took 10 years to get home schooling into 50 US states. Unlike legitimate teachers who are required to have a BA or MA and a teacher's certificate in order to teach, the home school parents are exempted from this requirement 'on religious grounds'.

If home schooled chidren go to a legitimate college they will face a very different science than the creationist science taught them by their parents.

If they go to Patrick Henry College (PHC) they will be groomed to take their place in US politics with the same creationist bent that they were taught at their parents' knee.
With the decision at Dover on ID being thrown out as science, a lot of evangelical parents may now have the excuse to bypass the public education system altogether. That means more children will be taught creationist 'science', more will go to PHC and the number of PHCs will proliferate. These colleges are funded by the religious right and so the annual tuition fees are far lower than are needed to go to a normal college. Don't forget Liberty College either.

I think that the association between religion and children is growing exponentially throughout the US and is now infecting the UK in its 'faith schools' that are also privately funded.

I think it is impossible to ignore this association and I find it very frightening. I am not a New Atheist (I am 63) and I think that ALL people should make themselves aware of the incipient subversion of children that belong to my grandchildren's age group.

Please check out the above link.

Regards V

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30. Comment #17136 by zoro on January 11, 2007 at 5:11 am

jeepyjay (#17075): I apologize for the "sparking"; it was a long day, straining my tolerance -- which even on "short days", isn't very high. [Somewhat as an aside: For me, Socrates' assessment "There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance" continues to be powerful (and also, Goethe's even more powerful "There is nothing more evil than ignorance in action"). Both describe the clerics of the world so well. But then, in a interview at an American radio station about a year ago, Dawkins made a good point. I won't dig out his exact statement, but it was similar to: 'I'm ignorant about many things.' In that regard, of course everyone is similar, which then leads to my quandary: how to incorporate the idea that everyone is ignorant about many thing within the wisdom summarized by Socrates. I wonder if the Greek word that Socrates actually used doesn't really mean "ignorance" but something similar to "refusal to learn". That is, did Socrates really say something similar to "There is only one good, willingness to learn, and one evil, refusal"? Can someone enlighten me?]

Re. "infinity" -- naw, that's beyond me. :) One of my minors for my Ph.D. was applied math, which I subsequently taught for more than a decade, but "applied math" is an entirely different "animal" from "pure math". Realize that pure mathematicians aren't scientists: they don't use the scientific method. All topics in pure math are "simply" logical constructs -- and more power to them, especially since many of their constructs have been extremely useful in science (e.g., Einstein just "borrowed" their theories for his general relativity, and string theoreticians are now doing similar). Therefore, I think that your "Is it [infinity -- and actually, as you point out, pure mathematicians have an infinity of infinities] just fantasy...?" is right, in the sense that all infinities are meaningless to scientists -- because none of them can be measured. And therefore, I agree with your suggestion that "it's all a… Platonic religion". But again, more power to them: as far as I know and unlike so many clerics of the world, they don't demand that we think as they do and they don't seek to dominate anyone.

Some other thoughts, which you might think are relevant, come to mind. One is related to an article entitled "New Survey: Scientists 'More Likely Than Ever' to Reject God Belief" (by an unidentified author and that was posted at http://www.atheists.org/flash.line/atheism1.htm). The article deals with the survey (reported in Nature) on "God Belief" among members of the National Academy (I think it means members of the U.S. National Academy). Here's one paragraph:

"The follow-up study reported in Nature reveals that the rate of belief is lower than eight decades ago. The latest survey involved 517 members of the National Academy of Sciences; half replied. When queried about belief in 'personal god', only 7% responded in the affirmative, while 72.2% expressed 'personal disbelief', and 20.8% expressed 'doubt or agnosticism'. Belief in the concept of human immortality, i.e. life after death, declined from the 35.2% measured in 1914 to just 7.9%. 76.7% reject the 'human immortality' tenet, compared with 25.4% in 1914, and 23.2% claimed 'doubt or agnosticism' on the question, compared with 43.7% in Leuba's original measurement. Again, though, the highest rate of belief in a god was found among mathematicians (14.3%), while the lowest was found among those in the life sciences fields – only 5.5%."

Besides the disgrace that 7% of the surveyed members of the Academy still "believe" in something for which there's zero evidence (Do they similarly "advise the government on public policy" on the basis of zero evidence?! And re. the post by savroD, Collins is probably one of them -- I agree, he's an embarrassment to science -- and to humanity), my point, here, is to call attention to the result for the mathematicians: 14%, ~ twice as bad as the average. To me it seems consistent: pure mathematicians (as I bet most of the Academy mathematicians are) build logical edifices on premisses that in many cases aren't supported by science; thereby, they're probably more prone to accept the clerics' constructs, none of whose premisses are supported by data.

The most familiar example of mathematical edifices constructed on untested or even untestable premisses is, of course, Euclid's assumption that parallel lines would never intersect (i.e., a claim about infinity). The history of challenges to that untestable premiss, the basis of all "Euclidean geometry", is amazing -- of course eventually leading to development of non-Euclidean geometry. But I saw in a recent article by Guth & Kaiser (Science 307, 11 Feb. 2005, p. 884) that our universe does seem to be Euclidean: with the value unity if it's "flat", the latest experimental results show the value to be between 0.990 and 1.03 .

In addition, you might want to explore another fundamental premiss of math, which I've never seen anyone do (but probably someone has). Russell's famous attempt (with Whitehead) to develop algebra from logic (leading to the huge Principia Mathematica, about which he famously quipped that it proved there were three feet in a yard!) was of course based on Aristotelean logic, in turn based on the scientific results (discovered by fish and monkeys) that things exist (A is A) and are distinct (A is not not-A). From that, and definitions about numbers, algebra follows.

Meanwhile, though, in reality, things don't necessarily remain distinct. Applying Aristotle's logic to people, for example, runs into brick walls -- because we change: you are, and simultaneously you're not, the same person you were a minute ago. As you can find on the web, many advances have been made in understanding how to modify logic to account for such changes (in fact, if you think about it, that's the thrust of calculus), but even for inanimate things, they needn't remain distinct -- so our Aristotelean logic (and resulting algebra) fails.

For example, if you have one apple and then get another apple, you have two (distinct) apples, but if one cosmic Black Hole merges with another, then how many are there? Or simpler: if you have one hole in your jeans and then get another hole in your jeans adjacent to the first hole, then how many holes do you have in your jeans? In such cases, 1 + 1 = 1. Admittedly they're bigger "holes", but if a Black Hole is actually a reconstruction of the "total nothingnes", then you'd have 1 + 1 = 0 -- or in that case, would it be the inspiring result 0 + 0 = 0 ? I don't know if there's a branch of pure math (which, then, actually, should be a branch of applied math!) developed to handle such cases. Can anyone enlighten me on that, too?

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31. Comment #17169 by jeepyjay on January 11, 2007 at 11:47 am

 avatarIn common with many others, zoro claims: "Deductive logic never yields new knowledge: it leads only to information that's consistent with the premisses." I don't think this is true. Euclid's Elements sets down a series of very simple assumptions and by a chain of deductive reasoning arrives at the Pythagorean Theorem (and many others). Is this not new knowledge? It may indeed be implied by the assumptions, but the implication is by no means obvious.

Whether the Pythagorean theorem is true in the "real" world (as opposed to the mathematical fantasy world of Euclidean Geometry) of course is another matter. Who has seen a "point" with no dimensions, or a line of no thickness? Applied mathematics sets up an approximate correlation between the mathematical model and reality, where points are dots and lines are paths of light rays for instance. A lot of other aspects of the mathematical model are discarded or ignored (for instance that between any two points there is an infinite continuum of other points).

The point I was trying to make about mathematics is that if we allow that it is a legitimate way of thinking, of use to science, then how can we disallow other uses of reason, applied to abstract concepts as opposed to empirical data?

For instance metaphysical or philosophical musings about the nature of the universe or of human society, ethics and so on? Even about hypothetical gods? So long as the hypothetical nature is recognised.

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32. Comment #17200 by John Phillips on January 11, 2007 at 6:49 pm

Jeepyjay: If the theologians worked on the premise that what they were 'theologising' about was a hypothetical god there would be no problem. The problem is that theology takes the a priori premise that god exists and then tries to rationalise or reason that premise in light of what science tells us about the real world. Even worse, believers then take this a priori premise of the existence of their god a stage further in using it to build a world view they wish imposed on all.

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33. Comment #17222 by zoro on January 12, 2007 at 5:44 am

jeepjay: As Popper recommended, don't get hung up on words. Deduction certainly can lead to new insight or new understanding or even new knowledge -- for the individual. But insofar as it's correct that there's an objective reality "out there", upon which we can all eventually come to agreement, then "objective knowledge" of it can't be increased via deduction. To do that requires science.

The essence of deduction is: "if these generalities (or premisses), then the following particulars." For example, if Euclid's axioms (along with his definitions), then... (including Pythagoras' theorem, which by the way, was known to the Sumerians, ~2,000 years before Pythagoras). As another example, if Galilean invariance and if the speed of light is the same for all observers (plus, importantly, if the premisses of algebra, such as associativity, commutativity, etc.) are right, then E = mc^2 (and atomic bombs should work). Certainly new "insight" can result from deductive arguments: not even Einstein had the insight to see that the experimental result that the speed of light was the same for all observers implied that E = mc^2, but in fact, such "objective knowledge" was there, in the premisses, waiting for someone as smart as an Euclid or an Einstein to "deduce" the details.

Meanwhile, the essence of induction is the opposite: "if these particulars, then the following generalities." For example, given that the sun has risen every morning, then it'll similarly rise every morning. As another example, if (as Michelson and Morley found) the speed of light was independent of the speed for one observer, then it's true for all observers.

But beware! Both these cases of inference (both deduction and induction) are extremely dangerous. The dangers of induction are obvious and can be horrible, e.g., I met three people who were misers, they were Jews, therefore, all Jews are misers. Similarly, the dangers of deduction are obvious and can be equally horrible, e.g., Allah told Muhammad…, therefore, crash the airplanes into the Twin Towers.

The scientific method is the only way known to try to avoid such dangers (and to gain new knowledge about "the objective reality"). For deduction, the challenge of science is to determine if the premisses are "true"; for induction, the challenge is to determine if the generalities are "true". But the huge difficulty (as Popper showed) is that we can never determine what's "true" -- we're stuck with just testing to determine which premisses and which generalities are false.

But in addition, in cases in which some premiss or some generality can't be tested (such as the premiss that any god exists), then the only sensible procedure is to toss the premiss into a wastebasket labeled "stupidity". And although it takes a little while to show, yet since I expect that you'll consider the result to be obvious, let me add the following. The reasons why "the god idea" can't be tested, are, first, because another principle that seems to be correct is "if an idea contains no information, then there's no way to test it" and second, in fact, the statement "God exists" contains no information (because "existence" has only phenomenological meaning, e.g., to determine if a tree "exists", kick it).

And thus Phillips' point and also the reason why I describe all clerics as "damnable deducers". They posit a premiss that contains no information (and therefore is untestable), and from that premiss deduce atrocities: God exists… therefore… physically abuse your children ("He who hates his child spares the rod"), mentally abuse them (indoctrinate them in the God garbage, so the clerics can continue their parasitic existence), treat your women as dirt, label homosexuality a "sin", murder the infidels, and on and on, continuing on for thousands of years. All of which leads to Dawkins' question "What makes anyone think that 'theology' is a subject at all?" -- and to my exclamations: "Enough's enough! Throw all the damnable clerical deducers out on their dumb asses!"

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34. Comment #17349 by jeepyjay on January 13, 2007 at 2:21 am

 avatarzoro: First you said: "Deductive logic never yields new knowledge: it leads only to information that's consistent with the premisses." Now you concede: "Deduction certainly can lead to new insight or new understanding or even new knowledge" thanks for that.

You go on: "But insofar as it's correct that there's an objective reality "out there", upon which we can all eventually come to agreement, then "objective knowledge" of it can't be increased via deduction." This again is clearly wrong.

Supposing that we accept Newton's law of gravitation as established then we can use it to deduce Kepler's laws of planetary motion. Similarly if we accept Maxwell's electromagnetic equations we can use them to deduce many practical results concerning the operation of electromagnetic equipment.

I agree with you and Dawkins that theology is a vacuous subject. There's no need to argue that with me. All I'm arguing against is your thesis that seems to regard "reason" as somehow unscientific.

To suppose that theorems (such as those of Pythagoras, Appollonius, Menelaus etc) are inherent in Euclid's assumptions (axioms, definitions etc) and ignore the deductive process by which they can be proved seems to be a sort of irrational mysticism on your part.

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35. Comment #17375 by zoro on January 13, 2007 at 5:20 am

jeepyjay: Sorry, but from my viewpoint, you're playing word games. Among scientists, that's silly. On the other hand (and to repeat my original point re. Krauss' article), when confronting theologists, scientists must be careful with words.

Re. "Deductive logic never yields new knowledge." Okay: I yield that the wording could be better. Maybe it would be better to say "Deductive logic never yields new information" -- using information in the sense of "entropy". But that wording can also cause difficulties, because "entropy" can also be interpreted either as a property of the system (in Boltzmann's sense) or as a measure of the observer's knowledge of a system (in Shannon's sense). In view of that and following Popper's ideas (that in science, definitions are just short-hand notation and all such short-hand can be eliminated), let me offer a (long-hand) analogy for the point that I was trying to make.

What I meant by "deductive logic never yields new knowledge" is that using deductive logic is like baking a cake. All the knowledge/information is in the recipe. Once the recipe is specified (including exact amounts for all ingredients, mixed exactly in a specified manner, cooked at exactly the specified temperature, for exactly the right time), then the outcome is "baked in the cake". Similarly, in the case of deductive logic, once all the premisses are specified (Euclid's axioms, Newton's principles, Maxwell's equations, Einstein's ideas, whatever is appropriate), including all the premisses inherent in the mathematics that are used, then the outcome is "baked in". At the end of the deductive process, you may say: "Wow, I sure didn't expect the cake to taste this great!" -- and so, for you (or Einstein or...), that's "new information"(or better, "new knowledge"), but in reality, the information about how the cake would turn out was already contained in the recipe. E had to equal mc^2.

Next, re. your criticism of my use of "objective knowledge", my view is that again you're looking for too much "information" in my short-hand. As an analogy for what I was trying to say, it's like the woman who drives her car into the shop and says: "It goes 'clunk-clunk' every time I turn left." The service attendant takes her car out for a drive and says "I think the trouble is in the differential or the transmission." When the woman returns two days later, worried sick that the repairs will cost thousands, the mechanic says: "Nah, it was just crud in the left-front wheel bearing; the seal was leaking; I cleaned it out, repacked it, and replaced the seal."

What I meant by "objective reality" was like the car with the bad seal. Corresponding to that reality, there's a certain amount of "information" (or entropy). Before he worked on the car, the mechanic didn't change the (Boltzmann) entropy of the system. Further, for the mechanic, knowledge of the system didn't change (no change in Shannon entropy), because he immediately knew what the problem was. The mechanic is my "objective observer" (maybe better, "knowledgeable observer") of the "objective reality".

Thus, what I was again trying to say was: once a competent mechanic looks at your car, once the recipe is dictated, once the premisses are specified, then the rest follows: you won't get a bill for thousands of dollars (if your other premisses are correct, such as the honesty of the service department), the cake will be as it's destined to be, and you will get E = mc^2. The premisses dictate the outcome; the objective reality doesn't change -- although granted, different people's "knowledge" of it does.

Finally, re. your statement "all I'm arguing against is your thesis that seems to regard 'reason' as somehow unscientific", my response is "Great! Then there's nothing to argue about, because if I ever wrote that, I certainly didn't mean to!"

My "thesis", instead, is that reason is a subset of science. And since I seem to be on an analogy kick (which is something I usually try to avoid), let me try the following. Scientific progress is like a wheel being pushed, with great difficulty, up a very steep and maybe endless hill. (Or better: many wheels -- 'cause I sure can't keep up with the wheels that other disciplines are pushing -- but let me skip that.) The rim of the wheel is a circle of inferences: a bunch of particulars, linked to a proposed generalization or hypothesis via induction, leading to deductions (from the generalizations), leading to predictions, leading to new particulars, etc. Thus, the rim of the wheel is reasoning. Holding the rim in place is a host of spokes (intelligence, instrumentation and analysis capabilities and their developments,… peer reviews, publications, perseverance,…), the hub is honesty, and the hill up which we're slowly advancing is a mountain of data!

Thus, the scientific method -- the entire process of gathering data, trying to make sense of the data, proposing hypotheses (by induction, by intuition, by a Dirac's desire for "beauty", however the Einsteins of the world do it), cutting the hypotheses to their essentials (with Occam's razor), trying to make sure that every hypothesis is consistent with well-established scientific principles (not because they're "true", but because if yours violates, for example, the second principle of thermodynamics, then you've hugely magnified your problems of trying to convince other people that your hypothesis is right), deducing predictions from the hypotheses, designing and conducting experiments to test the predictions, developing new instrumentation and new analysis capabilities, gathering data, trying to make sense of the data, and so on, without end (and oh yes, by the way, there are the minor problems of trying to get your research funded and your results published!) -- is hugely more than "reason".

Is it all "reasonable"? I certainly hope so; empirically, it seems to be so. But is it all just "reason" (viz., "logic", viz., based on A is identically A and not identically not-A)? Of course not! That would be a case of "irrational mysticism". And that was my original point: giving kudos to Krauss but concerned that he was yielding to the clerics' attempting to put science under reason (of course, in turn, under their glorious "faith"), which is totally back asswards.

Enuff said. I gotta get back to work on my book -- which, in case I haven't advertised it enough (cause I can't get that stupid Google crawler to read beyond the welcome page!) is at www.zenofzero.net. [Hmmm. There's another analogy waiting to be drawn: clerics are a lot like computers -- they can't think for themselves, they're programmed with exact instructions, their premisses must be inviolate, their ritual must be exactly so,... Stupid, damn computers! Anybody with half a brain can see that you're supposed to just... Talk about bad links!]

Other Comments by zoro

36. Comment #18315 by cavecanuma on January 19, 2007 at 3:39 pm

As a computer science software architect, I look at Reason as a segment of the Human Thought System. The Intellect is also a segment. A segment is the standard term for what we at JPL in spacecraft systems call a subsystem. Let me give you an example. A Spacecraft Ground System is composed of the following:

1. Telemetry
2. Command
3. Communications
4. Sequencing
5. Science Data
6. User Interface Subsystems

In The Human Thought System, therefore, the Reason and the Intellect are subsystems. Whether a person acts in a rational manner, that is, in a predictably acceptable manner, depends on many factors. The most important of these are a) whether the Thought System is properly partitioned and b) that all of the subsystems are present (hardware availability); second to these is that the Human Thought Process is allocated and well programmed. It is the Intellect as a subsystem that accesses the database containing Rules (a large dynamic database).

Whether the Human Thought System is in a contemplative mode (with the Internal Sensing subsystem providing the input) or in an interactive mode (with the External Sensing subsystem providing the input), the other subsystems of the Human Thought System dynamically project the subjective data onto the Reason subsystem where it is assembled into as complete an Object as is possible with the data available to the Human Thought System.

The WILL is the large dominant and physical Operating System driven by two physical drivers:

1. Personal survival (the need to eat and live)
2. The survival of the species (the need to breed and kill off competition).

Rarely, according to Schopenhauer, does the Reason have the ability to override the WILL, regardless how powerful an argument the Intellect has given to the Reason.

The word Logic is so often misused. Consider this quote from the article:

"...by demanding that deeply religious individuals base their faith on rationality is inappropriate and fundamentally illogical .."