Morality as self-division

By ZELIG
Updated: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 18:55:44 UTC

My principal concern here is to argue that "unselfishness" (as commonly understood) is, quite literally, impossible for any organism, whether ant or human. Very many people have an understandable aversion to this notion, since it goes against traditional moral thinking which is wedded to the illusion of distinct moral opposites. This moral ontology is, in my view, groundless.

The notion that a human being (or any organism) can literally act against its own interest is only apparently paradoxical as long as we focus ONLY on the effects or intended effects on the welfare of others, and ignore or overlook the motivation and constitution of the subject in question. As soon as we seek to account for the subject's own motivation we are struck by the fact that, say, the apparently "self-sacrificial" ant is actually behaving in a way that is as much "egotistical" as it is "self-sacrificial". It is "egotistical" in that it is behaving in a manner that is perfectly consistent with the resulting configuration of its physiology and "psychology". And how could it, or any human being, possibly do otherwise? How is it even theoretically possible to act against our own nature? Any thought or feeling within us that acts as a veto on performing a certain action is itself part of our constitution, and in order to exercise this veto status it must, by definition, be among our most powerful constituent and determining parts (i.e our interests).

Human beings are infinitely more complicated than ants, of course, but the basic schema remains the same. It is easy to think otherwise; but all honest and self-aware Christians (to take but one example), no matter how eager for martyrdom, no matter how self-loathing, no matter how altruistic, no matter how ascetic, are seeking the approval and protection of a being more powerful than themselves, and in this way are simply pursuing a more circuitous and more prudent "egoism".

The "egoism" present in all of us at every moment is obscured by not only the effects or intended effects of our actions on others, but by our own internal multiplicity and fracturing, by the fact that we inevitably contain a host of apparently contradictory and hostile parts. This multiplicity and internal fracturing means that it is impossible to predict how we will respond to circumstances, given the contingency of our "nature" and the contingency of the external world. But however we respond, it will inevitably be in a manner that reflects our strongest needs, desires and aversions, since we are constitutionally incapable of doing otherwise.

These words of Nietzsche get to the heart of what i'm getting at:

"Morality as the self-division of man.

A good author, who really cares about his subject, wishes that someone would come and destroy him by representing the same subject more clearly and by answering every last question contained in it. The girl in love wishes that she might prove the devoted faithfulness of her love through her lover's faithlessness. The soldier wishes that he might fall on the battlefield for his victorious fatherland, for in the victory of his fatherland his greatest desire is also victorious. The mother gives the child what she takes from herself: sleep, the best food, if needs be her health, her strength.

But are these all unegoistic states?

Are these acts of morality miracles because they are, to use Schopenhauer's phrase, "impossible and yet real"? Is it not rather clear that in all these cases, man is loving something of himself, a thought, a longing, an offspring, more than something else of himself; that he is thus dividing up his being and sacrificing one part for the other? Is it something essentially different when some obstinate man says, "I would rather be shot at once than move an inch to get out of that man's way".

The inclination towards something (a wish, a drive, a longing) is present in all the above‑mentioned cases; to yield to it, with all its consequences, is in any case not "selfless." In morality, man treats himself not as an "individuum," but as a "dividuum." (HAH.57).

Anyone hostile and unconvinced by these arguments is invited to offer instances (theoretical or actual) of "genuine" (i.e. literal) "selflessness"?