I take Spinoza's arguments against a free will to be sound. The issue is whether humans have an infinite capacity of self-determination, i.e., can function as the causal ground of action. There is a further question about whether and how this capacity or ground interacts with, or is exempt from, the natural causal order. (The rejection of free will generally rests on a rejection of the possibility of exemption from the natural causal order.)

There are some neo-Hegelians (I guess you can call them that, anyway) who have good arguments for there being such a capacity. (See: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=10904 and http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15445 )

But there is something to be said for the distinction between a free will and a non-free one being merely verbal. (That is, amounting to nothing more than an insistence that in ordinary parlance we should keep talking as if we have a free will even if scientific evidence points to that claim being false... this is generally what the compatibilist view amounts to... though they may disagree with such a cynical assessment.)

Anyway, it's also true that complex nervous systems generate emergent degrees of freedom, but this doesn't stem from the will, but from computational power and related powers of self- and future-representation.

It's not identical, nor fallacious. My claim involves the following analogy:

Pasteurization doesn't remove all bacteria, it just kills enough (i.e., most) of it to make things safer for general consumption.

Likewise, vaccines are weakened/dead versions of often lethal viruses, set up, like pasteurization, to make things (in a more general sense) safer in general.

The claim that pasteurization can be done without (i.e., the weakening or killing off of sufficient bacteria to make things safe for general consumption) is exactly analogous to saying that we should just forgo vaccination since what we might call unvaccinated/"raw" experience, as in unpasteurized/raw milk, boosts immunity (even if a certain percentage of people will die as a result in either case).

The argument is not fallacious because it follows quite clearly by analogy, unlike the original fallacious argument, which doesn't.

By that logic, we should stop immunizing people against things because, at least if you don't die, you'll be building up your immunity (and the collective immunity of the human race).

The premise "There are risks with everything [you eat]." has nothing to do with an argument for drinking unpasteurized milk. In that regard, it is a red herring---it diverts attention away from the very claim it is intended to refute, namely that you shouldn't drink unpasteurized milk because you could die.

You could run a probability argument here to counter their claim, but it's unnecessary since the argument isn't that you shouldn't drink unpasteurized milk because it's more likely that you'll die from drinking it than from eating/drinking anything else, but rather that it's stupid to choose to drink unpasteurized milk when pasteurization is already the norm.

I don't know if this has been mentioned yet, but "philosophical apologetics" is a contradiction in terms.