1. The Out Campaign

Comment #59897 by krogercomplete on July 31, 2007 at 3:47 am

Wee Flea,

I had a thought, something to do with pots and kettles, but it escapes me now. More to come if I can remember the reference.

2. Insurance for Sex Abuse: A policy tailor-made for the Catholic church

Comment #57562 by krogercomplete on July 19, 2007 at 10:33 pm

Question -- why are they able to settle out of court in the first place? Isn't rape a criminal offense, persecuted by the state/DA? They should not have been able to get away with this no more than a killer could "settle out of court" with the victim's family.

The optimal scenario would be a lengthy imprisonment AND a hefty fine (pay out by insurance if you must), as ordered by the court. This would show no one is above the law. Anything less reeks of injustice.

The state can bring criminal charges against the individual priests if there is probable cause to do so, but the above article is dealing with civil suits against the catholic church based on the misconduct of its employees. These suits are all about getting money to the victims and have nothing to do with imprisonment or fines collected by the state.

3. Sean Hannity with Christopher Hitchens

Comment #56416 by krogercomplete on July 15, 2007 at 4:56 pm

"You also have the infinite regress and a whole bunch of other conceptual problems to deal with. You practice self-deception and wishful thinking better than anyone I have encountered. That's not a compliment."

Your belief that God does not exist or that consciousness does not continue after death may be your own self-deception and wishful thinking.

You're a dummy head!

No, YOU'RE a dummy head!!!

4. Hitler Was an Atheist Who Killed Millions in the Name of Atheism, Secularism?

Comment #56403 by krogercomplete on July 15, 2007 at 3:46 pm

anticipated response: "Hitler certainly was not a Christian because he betrayed the teachings of Christ; just look at all the bad stuff he did."

5. An Atheist Responds

Comment #56289 by krogercomplete on July 14, 2007 at 7:22 pm

I think Iraq is one topic that Hitch should steer well clear of if he wants to be taken seriously, given his unwavering support for the war. I find it ridiculous the way he shrugs off the whole disaster with "well it would have worked if it wasn't for those pesky religious nutjobs!".

Certainly we can evaluate all of Hitchens' claims about Iraq independently without impeaching his credibility on the entire subject area. Your caricature of his position notwithstanding, what role do you feel the pesky religious nutjobs are playing in Iraq?

6. The US map of faith

Comment #55896 by krogercomplete on July 12, 2007 at 7:30 pm

Broshiesq,

My point was just that Oregon only has 2 of the 4 cool Netherlands attributes. Actually, just 1.5 (weed only legal medically). We have a long way to go.

7. The US map of faith

Comment #55844 by krogercomplete on July 12, 2007 at 3:00 pm

Broshiesqe,

Look at the four issues: euthanasia, same-sex marriage, marijuana use and prostitution.

Just to be clear, same-sex marriage is prohibited by the Oregon Constitution and prostitution is illegal (though, it may be true that Portland police place it relatively low on their priority list).

8. The US map of faith

Comment #55664 by krogercomplete on July 11, 2007 at 11:23 pm

Not to rain on anyone's parade... just an observation... but since the colours are based on PERCENTAGE by district, not on actual population numbers... what you're seeing is going to be skewed by the number of people that live in that area.

I am not sure I understand. I think everyone here has the right idea: the map shows the proportion of religious belief in each part of the country. The yellow sections have a smaller number of religious believers per capita than the red sections. Am I reading the map wrong?

Oregon might LOOK "less religious"... but that is probably at least in part due to the fact that it has less people.

It should also feel that way if it has a smaller number of religious believers per capita.

9. The US map of faith

Comment #55635 by krogercomplete on July 11, 2007 at 7:30 pm

One more thing about Oregon, most strip clubs and adult shops per capita. Amen for our liberal first amendment jurisprudence!

As for the gas thing, a major pain in the ass. Not sure what jshuey means about the second amendment. I know that my 17 year old brother was able to walk into a little gun shop in Philomath and purchase an AK-47 and double barrel shotgun without any hassle at all.

10. The US map of faith

Comment #55566 by krogercomplete on July 11, 2007 at 2:36 pm

I too am from Oregon, and I had heard before that it was the "least churched" state in the union. That is not necessarily saying much, though, because there are churches EVERYWHERE. I currently live in Eugene (one of the more liberal cities around), and there must be at least 20 large scale churches within a 3 mile radius of my house.

11. For Muslim Extremists, Religion Matters

Comment #54364 by krogercomplete on July 6, 2007 at 2:23 pm

I have to point out to Pieter that the system of the dhimmis, as unfair as it is, proves one point: that the 'kill the unbelievers wherever you find them' has a context: during ongoing war. Please look it up.

Define "ongoing war."

12. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52542 by krogercomplete on June 27, 2007 at 8:29 am

Dianelos, thanks for the response in post #841, I just skimmed through it. I may not have time to respond for awhile. I will reread it when I have time and try and think of something to say :)

13. Look Forward to Anger

Comment #52350 by krogercomplete on June 26, 2007 at 8:18 pm

As an Australian, I'm not quite sure what you're referring to in your comment. How is Australia "less free" than the UK?

Wondering the same thing (as a US citizen).

14. Look Forward to Anger

Comment #52349 by krogercomplete on June 26, 2007 at 8:17 pm

Martha,

Well then Christopher, why did you become a citizen of the USA, if you don't like Rage Boys - like George W Bush?

Say what?

15. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52344 by krogercomplete on June 26, 2007 at 8:03 pm

. . . assuming he doesn't presume to launch divine headbutts . . .

God help us all if that happens.

16. The Stupidity of Fox News is Truly Beyond Belief

Comment #52286 by krogercomplete on June 26, 2007 at 4:11 pm

My favorite part was at the very beginning when the dude introduced the subject: as soon as he said the word "atheist," the blonde goes "hmmmmmm" with a cute shit eating grin on her face. I actually shit when I saw it.

17. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52249 by krogercomplete on June 26, 2007 at 3:13 pm

steve99,

You are trying to have it both ways. You are trying to claim that our reason is a poor way to investigate reality, but then you are using your judgment of what is absurd! Can't you see the contradiction? By your own reasoning, you can't judge what is possibly absurd about reality.

I think you have slightly mischaracterized DG's position (but I am sure DG will correct me if I am about to mischaracterize it too). I think what he means to say is this: our reason is only suspect if we subscribe to naturalism, because naturalism could not have possibly given us reliable mental faculties (in terms of deciphering objective reality). BUT, according to DG's theism, God creates our conscious experience and presumably has given us the tools to decipher objective reality (the true objective reality, which is not the physical world naturalists mistakenly believe it to be). Everyone has the potential to see the truth, but naturalists are getting it wrong (apparently for some pretty obvious reasons). We need only access the other tools God has put in our toolbox, as the scientific method is incapable of getting us all the way home. The problem of defective cognitive faculties cannot be hurled at DG because this defect is a product of naturalism which he does not subscribe to :)

18. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #52029 by krogercomplete on June 26, 2007 at 1:30 am

Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in . . .

I understand Plantinga's argument as follows:

a) Naturalists believe that the natural, physical world is the whole of objective reality.
b) Naturalists believe that evolution is wholly responsible for the evolution of our cognitive functions.
c) We cannot be sure that evolution would produce in humans the ability to reliably decipher objective reality.
d) Therefore, we cannot trust any belief we hold about the supposed "real world."

Of course none of this disproves naturalism (this much should be obvious to anyone lurking around this thread still). The physical universe could be all there is, and here we sit with our faulty cognitive faculties, postulating brains in vats, alligator dream worlds, and alien computer simulations, utterly bewildered and wondering what the hell is going on. Or, evolution actually did provide us with reliable cognitive functions (reliable in terms of deciphering objective reality), and all the naturalists are correct. What Plantinga's argument does do is undermine our confidence. After all, we could really be living in the Matrix. How can we get around that possibility? As I understand your position Dianelos, we actually do live in God's Matrix.

So, where do we go from here? This debate has left me with the same feeling I had after the first day of my freshman philosophy course in college when the professor dropped the brain-in-a-vat theory on everyone and concluded that the probability of objective reality actually being as we perceive it is virtually zero (given the infinite number of possible alternatives). Holy shit, I thought. Where I really get hung up, though, is why the alternative you propose should be any different than any one of the infinite possibilities my professor proposed. Your theory should ultimately be just as likely as naturalism, if we want to play this brain-in-a-vat game. It reminds me of Shermer's "militant agnosticism": I don't know, and you don't either!

I suppose you could retort with the following: well, if you subscribe to naturalism then there is no reason to trust our cognitive faculties and any one of these crazy possibilities would be equally likely, BUT according to my worldview, God has given us the necessary tools to decipher objective reality! I think the operative phrase here is "according to my worldview." I am reluctant to take you seriously because it appears that, in the face of all this uncertainty, you just went ahead and made something up to provide objective pillars of knowledge, ethics, etc.

The following passage is from the last paragraph of the naturalism.org article, and I think it is instructive:

None of this, of course, will cut the least bit of ice for Plantinga and other supernaturalist rationalists (such as John F. Haught), since their commitment isn't to explanatory transparency but to discovering unimpeachable foundations for reason (and ethics, another story). Such foundations, they argue, cannot be supplied by a world whose ultimate constituents are inherently mindless. Only in god can we trust. So be it. Some people want certainties of the sort that god can deliver, some don't.

I suppose one final response to Plantinga's argument would be, "so what?" So what if naturalism would not necessarily produce brains able to reliably decipher objective reality? What on earth does this have to do with whether or not naturalism is true? Why is it that that objective reality should even be ascertainable? I understand the desire to craft a worldview where we do in fact have the necessary tools to figure out the true nature of the world, but this is not a necessary condition.

19. Bill O'Reilly and Kirk Cameron on Atheism

Comment #51190 by krogercomplete on June 21, 2007 at 10:28 pm

I love the argument from design:

All designed things are designed, therefore all things are designed. Say what? The argument might as well be: all red things are red, therefore all things are red.

20. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #51119 by krogercomplete on June 21, 2007 at 2:31 pm

We are going in circles here.

DG: Here is a list of my presuppositions and here is a worldview that fits all of them.

Everyone else: These presuppositions are either wrong or based on unreliable, subjective data.

DG: No they are not wrong and they are not based on unreliable data.

Everyone else: Yes they are.

DG: Here is a list of my presuppositions and here is a worldview that fits all of them.

. . . and on the record spins.

21. An Inquisition in science's name

Comment #51059 by krogercomplete on June 21, 2007 at 10:19 am

I conclude by suggesting that the proponents of faith and the proponents of science should agree on at least one vital point: The rights of human beings to freedom of conscience and expression should never again nor in the future be abrogated in the name of either faith or science. Do you agree?

I think we can probably ditch the first part of the article and just keep this last quote.

22. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50977 by krogercomplete on June 20, 2007 at 7:37 pm

Steve99, to refresh your memory :) the answers thus far have been:

1) I have a very strong and clear intuition that morals are objective and no other justification

2) Everyone knows that objective morality and naturalism are contradictory (without further elaboration)

23. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50945 by krogercomplete on June 20, 2007 at 3:17 pm

I strongly believe in the proposition "there is an objective reality out there that causes my experiences" . . .

. . . I don't have any evidence that justifies this intuitive belief; in fact there can't be any evidence for it, for the simple reason that all evidence is based on some experience, and this belief is about whether there is a reality behind my experiences, a reality that causes them . . .

. . . So, solipsism contradicts the abovementioned intuitive belief of mine, and therefore I have reason to reject it. And as I have a very high level of confidence to that intuitive belief I have very strong reason to reject it . . .

. . . Similarly I have a very high level of confidence in the truth of the proposition "gratuitous torture is objectively wrong" and as naturalism contradicts that proposition I have very strong reason to reject it . . .

. . . But what is reasonable for me need not be reasonable for everybody else . . .

I understood the first time you explained it. We really have hit the wall here. You have strong intuitions about certain things, and you reject worldviews that conflict with them. Other people have different intuitions, and it is reasonable for them to reject worldviews that conflict. Worldview X makes sense to you, and worldview Y makes sense to me. I think progress has slowed in this discussion.

. . .Incidentally, I personally have no problem abandoning the intuition that the physical universe is objectively real . . . it's easy to understand why so many people have the intuition that the physical universe is objectively real: it's the simplest way to make sense of our experiences.

I guess the only question I am left with is how you pick and choose between intuitions. Some you feel "confident" about, and some you have no trouble rejecting. Some you cannot comprehend being incorrect (i.e. objective morality), but with others you can understand how you may be mistaken (i.e. objective reality of the physical universe). Of course, there is an alternate approach: forget about intuition. This is something you clearly are doing to a degree already: the fact that you pick and choose implies a higher evaluative standard. Outside evidence has convinced you that your, admittedly strong, intuition about objective physical reality is mistaken. In the case of objective morality, are you simply unconvinced by the arguments already proposed in this thread? Why hasn't your faith in intuitions generally been shaken?

24. Debate between Sam Harris and Chris Hedges

Comment #50940 by krogercomplete on June 20, 2007 at 2:50 pm

But if indeed the terrorists are reacting to gross oppression, --here I mean jackboot on the face oppression, not just some vague sense of "humiliation",--then the root cause of the violence is the oppression that triggers the response in the first place, no matter how indefensible the reactions are . . . There is something hypocritical in putting the primary onus on the victims of oppression because they are not like the Daila Lama.

All this quibbling about what is the "root cause" is unimportant. If we can all agree that both oppression and religious doctrine are important contributors to suicide bombing in this context, do we need to spend time arguing about which factor is the most potent? I would never advocate complete disregard of one or the other.

As far as putting the primary onus on oppressed muslims: the burden of not deliberately murdering hordes of innocent civilians should be placed squarely on the shoulders of each and every person, regardless of oppression. I certainly do not blame oppressed people for lashing out simply because they are lashing out.

I don't see the moral difference between shooting missiles into a crowded residential area from a safe distance and walking into the said residential area and blowing yourself up at the same time. It is just a difference in technology, some people are under armed embargo even for rifles and don't have U.S. made state of the art attack helicopters so they can only use themselves as delivery systems. I think the reason that suicide attack is singled out as uniquely evil, even on military targets like U.S. marine barricks in Lebanon, is that technologically advanced armies can no longer take for granted their one sided advantage bestowed by science when the enemies don't fear death. This messes up all the conventional wisdom on war.

I really do not think people single suicide bombing out as "uniquely evil" because of the practical problems associated with combating it. The suicide part of it is problematic for practical reasons (i.e. way more difficult to guard against), but the part of it that gets singled out as uniquely evil is the deliberate killing of innocent civilians. The moral difference between suicide bombing of civilians and "collateral damage" comes from the fact that the SINGLE purpose of a suicide attack is to kill innocent civilians. Now, you may not think there is a significant difference between suicide bombing and collateral damage (after all, there is blame to be laid at the feet of those who launch an attack knowing full well that innocents will die), but there is a difference. It is a difference of intent.

25. Debate between Sam Harris and Chris Hedges

Comment #50888 by krogercomplete on June 20, 2007 at 10:16 am

I am not saying that cherry picking is worse. I am merely saying that again, Chris Hedgse as a moderate is defending religion and in the process defends fundamentalists to a degree. ie, saying religion is not the problem.

Moderates may not actually be "worse" than fundamentalists, they are just f***ing annoying.

26. Debate between Sam Harris and Chris Hedges

Comment #50745 by krogercomplete on June 19, 2007 at 7:18 pm

Well if oppression is the key I think he should ask why people are oppressed instead of asking why they don't take it lying down like Jains. I don't know if "oppression" is the only reason as it is not very specific. But if that is what Harris thinks, belief system should be a secondary issue.

I am not sure exactly what role Sam thinks oppression/despair/poverty plays. I think we can be certain he believes that blind adherence to specific religious doctrines (i.e. martyrdom and jihad) is an important factor that can lead to specific forms of violence. He would probably concede that people are helped along by other elements, but he probably also believes that blind adherence to these doctrines, at least in some cases, is all you need. It has been some time since I read the End of Faith, so I do not want to put words in Sam's mouth.

As far as Jains not "taking it lying down," I hope you were not trying deliberately to be so offensive (I hope I am reading too much into the comment). The next time a suicide bomber detonates himself in a crowded marketplace and kills 100 innocent civilians, I will be reassured to know that at least he/she was not taking his/her oppression "lying down." Regardless of the oppression taking place, this type of reaction is problematic, and we should pay attention to religion to the degree it is responsible for that reaction.

27. Debate between Sam Harris and Chris Hedges

Comment #50731 by krogercomplete on June 19, 2007 at 6:05 pm

Riley, upon further reflection, I take your point:

to argue that poverty is not a factor because a disproportionate number of attackers are not themselves impoverished is a fatally flawed argument.

I think Sam's argument is stronger when he argues: poverty/despair/oppression is a motivator, but peoples' beliefs shape their reaction to those conditions. His distinction between oppressed Jains and oppressed Muslims has merit.

28. Can we really learn to love people who aren't like us?

Comment #50700 by krogercomplete on June 19, 2007 at 2:03 pm

Yeah, I had a good laugh at the infinity - 1 comment. Sounds like little kids on the playground: "yeah, well I'm so strong I can lift infinity swingsets!" "Oh yeah, well I can lift infinity + 1!"

29. Debate between Sam Harris and Chris Hedges

Comment #50695 by krogercomplete on June 19, 2007 at 1:32 pm

It really does seem like Sam's arguing here that because we observe a disproportionate number of "well off" suicide bombers we "know" that poverty is not a factor in these attacks. It might in fact be true that poverty is not a factor in these attacks, but he is making a poor argument. The American Civil War provides us at least one example of non-Muslim people sacrificing their lives to correct a perceived injustice even when they themselves are not the ones suffering from nor even threatened by the injustice they are fighting to correct.

Is the suggestion here that suicide bombers are benevolent freedom fighters, giving their lives to correct social injustices that they themselves do not experience but rather perceive to be affecting others? Also, I think the civil war analogy is going to need some fleshing out.

30. Debate between Sam Harris and Chris Hedges

Comment #50548 by krogercomplete on June 18, 2007 at 5:53 pm

I wanted to stand up and cheer when Sam bitch slapped Hedges about not using NY Times correspondents to gauge public opinion in the middle east by moving in and "getting a vibe."

Also, Hedges' accusation that Sam was racist because he wrote about Muslim mothers celebrating suicide bombers was totally uncalled for.

31. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50479 by krogercomplete on June 18, 2007 at 11:30 am

Well if for somebody it's unthinkable to doubt that dogs talk to their masters then it is reasonable for him or her to reject any worldview that contradicts that. On the other hand no normal adult (which implies somebody with normal cognitive faculties) will find it unthinkable to doubt that dogs talk to their masters – so this example is of academic value only. It only shows that from the point of view of people who lack normal cognitive faculties it is reasonable to reject perfectly valid worldviews.

In the context of our discussion though I think it's a fact that many, or probably most, normal adults do find it unthinkable to doubt that gratuitous torture is wrong. For me it's difficult to imagine how it is like to be a normal adult and be able to doubt that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong.

So what is the argument here? It is reasonable to reject worldviews that conflict with our deepest intuitions, so long as lots of other people feel that way? Is this just an appeal to numbers? Or is it always reasonable to reject the conflicting worldview, but the rest of us know what is really going on (i.e. you lack proper cognitive function)? If this is the case, to what extent does the reasonableness of a worldview have to do with intuition? You separate the "dog is talking" case because that view aligns itself with observed cognitive disorders, but what if psychologists (I won't mention Freud here) were able to show that religious belief aligned itself with things such as wish thinking, the need for explanation and order, the need for consolation, etc. and social scientists could show exactly how such beliefs spread from community to community across the globe (how they became so pervasive)? Would this make you think twice about your intuitive justification? If not, is it a good reason for the rest of us to think twice?

As I have claimed in this thread my theistic hypothesis works better than the naturalistic hypothesis on several conceptual and experiential grounds. Now we found one more place where the God hypothesis works better: by asserting that we are made in the image of God it makes an epistemology about external objective reality possible. And, come to think of it, only a hypothesis of a self-similar reality can achieve that.

This is not an argument. Even if it were true that your idealistic theism provided an epistemology about external objective reality where others did not, this does not make it a reasonable worldview. In an earlier post you mentioned that some explanation is always better than none at all, and it feels like this sentiment is driving your entire thought process. Sometimes we don't know what is going on, and it is irresponsible to go cramming solutions into our perceived knowledge gaps. I think steve99 put it quite well:

All of your ideas are nothing more than arbitrary, and other ideas can be substituted that work equally well. For example, I could say that realist consists of an person of pure evil, who has given us consciousness so we can suffer life. You can no more prove that wrong than I can prove you wrong. That is why your hypothesis is useless - you have no way to determine its truth.

I imagine Dianelos' answer to this would be: "this is in direct conflict with the way I experience reality, and with the way that many others experience it." The obvious problem is that we could surely find many, many people who experience reality the way steve99 described. This is what happens when you let intuition and subjective experience shape objective reality for you. Inevitably, two different people will come to opposite conclusions, and each conclusion will be supported equally well by intuition, experiential gains, etc. Only one can be correct, so how do we distinguish between them?

The short answer to this question is that science uses only part of the data we have at our disposal. First of all observe that any data we have comes from our experiential environment (by which I mean the set of all facts of consciousness, or "anything one may claim as direct knowledge based on one's status a conscious being"); there is no other source of data. Part of our experiential data is our observation of physical phenomena which is the data that science uses. That's objective data (as we empirically find out). But our experiential environment contains much more data than physical phenomena, such as the qualitative data some philosophers refer as "how it is like" data.

Again, no one would argue that this is not "data," only that it is suspect data. It is data that leads us to the problem described above.

32. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50392 by krogercomplete on June 17, 2007 at 5:11 pm

We both very strongly believe that we are having conscious experiences right now, correct? It's unthinkable to doubt that we are having conscious experiences right now, don't you agree? Now suppose somebody would suggest to us a worldview (or a description of how reality is) that contradicts the very strongly belief of ours that we are having conscious experiences right now. Don't you agree that it's reasonable to consider that this contradiction represents a problem for the suggested worldview, and is a reason to reject it? And even if that other person insisted that our very strongly held belief "is an illusion", or "is just an intuition like many intuitions that were proven to be wrong in the past", or even "that science can explain why or how your brain produces the illusion that you are having conscious experiences right now" – that wouldn't really change anything, because it would still remain unthinkable to doubt that we are having conscious experiences right now.

This argument can be used to justify any conceivable belief. If I seriously believe that my dog speaks to me and someone points out that dogs cannot talk and that I am suffering from a delusion, then I am justified in rejecting this alternate worldview because it would simply be "unthinkable to doubt" that my dog cannot talk. This kind of rationalization does not get us anywhere.

33. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50283 by krogercomplete on June 16, 2007 at 10:49 am

All knowledge can only be justified on experience, and therefore one's own knowledge can only be justified on one's own experience. But I cannot make assertions about other peoples' experiences so I cannot claim that my justification must be valid for others too.

Chopping off science's legs and undermining the connection we have to objective reality in NO way gives credence to your particular beliefs. I think Sam Harris put it best in his debate with Andrew Sullivan: (paraphrasing here) "The discomfort induced in mathematics by Godel in no way makes the doctrine of Mormonism more plausible." Even if we can never know objective reality, not all claims to knowledge are on equal footing. There are degrees of reliability in terms of evidence and methodology. Other posters (and Dawkins, Harris, etc) have pointed out that the "conflict with science" is more about methodology than anything else. What you have done is set up is an entirely subjective method of obtaining objective truth about the universe. You say things like, "we can only ever know what we experience about the world," and "I can only know what my personal experience is." The result is that your worldview is buttressed entirely by subjective experience. Do you honestly expect to persuade anyone with this kind of reasoning? Let's not be coy: we are not just arguing about why Dianelos feels that theism works for him. We are trying to argue about whether God does in fact exist. Radical skepticism may put us in a bubble, but there are clearly better ways of thinking within that bubble.

I touched on these issues in post 590 and 682 (among other things).

34. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50173 by krogercomplete on June 15, 2007 at 1:11 pm

1. It's a fact that there is a group of people (including myself) who believe that gratuitous torture is objectively wrong. They don't justify that belief of theirs on argument, but on clear intuition. By "clear intuition" I mean an intuition that strong that the alternative is unthinkable. We all base some of our beliefs on such clear intuitions. (For example I trust you believe that you have conscious experiences; you believe that an external objective reality exists that causes your conscious experiences, and so on. And incidentally, you haven't clarified what your position is: Do you think that gratuitous torture is wrong because of personal opinion and convention, or because it is objectively wrong?)

2. The existence of objectively true ethical precepts contradicts the naturalistic understanding of reality.

A thought just occurred to me, but it may be only half baked. I may simply be splitting hairs or futzing around with definitions. Let me know.

p.s. you can come to me last, there are others in line.

I think you are giving your intuition far too much credit. What I mean is that you are attaching meta-ethical baggage to it that does not necessarily belong. When most people consider gratuitous torture of children, they have a gut level reaction against it. I believe that reaction is properly described at the "intuition." You have gone several steps further and assigned meta-ethical significance to that reaction. You call the entire thing your "intuition" because it fits well with the argument:

1. My intuition tells me there is objective morality.
2. One's worldview should be consistent with one's intutions.
3. Naturalism is incompatible with objective morality.
4. Therefore: reject naturalism.

The problem is that your gut level feeling is not incompatible with naturalism because your gut level feeling is not that there is "objective morality." A relativist has the same reaction, but they recognize that the impulse may just be a product of evolution and doesn't necessarily have anything to do with whether or not objective, "out there" moral truths exist. Here is a reformulation of the argument:

1. I have a gut level reaction (intuition) against certain practices.
2. Gut level reactions are perfectly compatible with naturalism--in fact, they are explained perfectly by naturalism.
3. therefore: naturalism is perfectly compatible with my intuition (with most peoples' intuition).

I am still milling over this observation and am not convinced it is correct, but even if it is not, I want to briefly point out some other problems with your argument: (1) there is no reason to think that a worldview should be consistent or depend on our suspect intuitions; (2) it is certainly not the philosophical consensus that naturalism is incompatible with objective morality; and (3) our acceptance of objective REALITY is not necessarily the product of "intuition," and even if it is, I am not convinced that this intuition is comparable to any intuition regarding objective or subjective morality.

So let's discuss data, and as Chalmers says subjective data are data too

Of course it is data. The question is how reliable that data is. Just because a foundation is cracked, doesn't mean it is not a foundation. It just means that no responsible person should build a house on it. Incidentally, even if a cracked foundation was the ONLY foundation available, that has nothing to do with whether or not the house is going to collapse.

Further you claim that there are a million other theistic hypotheses with no way to choose between them, but this even if true is irrelevant: I have often pointed out my goal is to explain how I justify the claim that my theistic worldview works better than naturalism. If it turns out that there are a million other theistic worldviews that work as well as mine the much the better.

WTF? This is clearly relevant if all those competing theories are mutually exclusive. If you are throwing up an alternative to naturalism that is on no firmer evidentiary ground than an infinite number of mutually exclusive alternatives, it doesn't speak well for your particular theory.

35. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #50028 by krogercomplete on June 14, 2007 at 3:36 pm

So, even if I am wrong on this particular (namely, that no normal human being can really doubt the objective wrongness of gratuitous torture) it does not all affect my basic argument which is that I am justified to believe that a theistic worldview is much more reasonable than a naturalistic one.

Dianelos must be channeling O'Reilly: its true for ME!



Sun goes up, sun goes down.

36. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49972 by krogercomplete on June 14, 2007 at 10:15 am

Dianelos, to piggy back on a comment made by steve99:

I know this may sound like a trivial question, but how then do you explain the removal of consciousness through things that change the brain, such as anaesthetics?

I am slightly confused too. Would you say that the brain is a necessary condition for consciousness, just not sufficient? Is the brain even necessary? Forgive me if I have missed an answer to this question in previous posts.

37. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49786 by krogercomplete on June 13, 2007 at 12:40 pm

The cheapest of all is the philosopher, they don't need the waste paper basket.

I know it was you Epeeist! You broke my heart. You broke my heart.

38. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49783 by krogercomplete on June 13, 2007 at 12:26 pm

p.s. I think the quality of discussion and debate here has been terrific, even if I think Danielos' posts are steaming piles of horse maneur :)

39. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49778 by krogercomplete on June 13, 2007 at 12:15 pm

Danielos, gracias for the response. As always, this debate has been extremely interesting.

Sorry, I don't have any justification for my belief in objective morality. It's just an intuition: it's intuitively obvious for me that to torture children is objectively wrong and not a matter of opinion or convention, and that's that.

Ok. I originally jabbed you with this question to make sure we were on the same page (i.e. your assertion that there is objective moral truth flows from your intuition that certain things are just plain wrong). Then what I was going to do was come over the top with my evolution right hook and totally KO your ass! I imagine your response would have been the one you gave USA_Limey in post #574:

There is an entire class of fallacious arguments with the following form: "The fact that one can explain on naturalistic grounds how some belief X that opposes naturalism has evolved implies that belief X is wrong". The fallacy should be obvious: the evolution of all beliefs can be explained on naturalistic grounds, so this cannot say anything about whether any one belief is in fact true or false, and of course some are true and other are false. One could call the entire class of such fallacious arguments "the naturalistic fallacy" (the term is normally used for the special case of ethical beliefs).

Allrighty then. I hate to go back to the statement I made in my previous post, but I think this highlights the problem we are having. If I had pulled out the evolution card and said, "yes Danielos, BUT your intuition is just a product of evolution (we evolved a basic sense of empathy because it had survival value) and there is no reason to think it actually indicates the existence of objective morality," you would have plopped the naturalistic fallacy on my doorstep with a nice ribbon tied around it. Of course the evolution argument does not eliminate the possibility that the intuition is actually true, and of course it is still possible that there is a supernatural source of objective ethics.

Where does this leave us? I think the problem is one of grounding: which evidentiary paradigm is one grounded in? I personally want to stay grounded in naturalism because it seems obvious that the tools of naturalism (more specifically, the tools of science) are the most reliable, even if they are in no way perfect. I find your appeals to psychology and subjective, experiental gains to be incredibly suspect. In the case of your ethical intuitions, I wonder why anyone would take the extra step of positing a supernatural realm based on highly suspicious evidence when a perfectly reasonable naturalistic explanation is available. I want to remain grounded in naturalism for as long as is possible. You see no need to remain grounded in naturalism as we have a very basic disagreement about what counts as proper evidence. Imagine my surprise if, right as I was winding up to KO you with my evolution right hook, you kicked me in the stomach? "Didn't you know Kroger, we're kickboxing, not boxing?"

Someone please grab a hold of me if I have destroyed some innocent villagers in my slash and burn attempt to get to the core of the dispute :)

Such explanations are not mechanistic but, rather, are contingent on God's psychology as it were. I can understand that people used to mechanistic explanations find such psychological explanations not impressive but they are still explanations, and some explanation is better than no explanation.

First of all, the idea that some explanation is better than none seems to be patently false. I hear a noise in my attic, and have no idea what it is, but a friend casually asserts that it must be a goblin getting ready to bust through the ceiling and open up a can of goblin whoop ass. Clearly that explanation is not more reasonable than my admission of ignorance. But again, your statement shows the grounding problem. I don't think you really believe that your worldview is more reasonable by virtue of the fact that it is an explanation. You think it is well supported, but you use a category of evidence I am suspicious of to support it. It feels like you are opening Pandora's box with your evidentiary liberalism, and that your ability to generate worldviews lacks proper restraints as a result. How many different worldviews can I fabricate that are merely uncontradicted by hardcore, empirical evidence?

Suppose a fundamentalist Christian would argue that God did in fact create the universe in 6 days about 6,000 years ago, and included much older looking geological strata and fossils (not to mention the background radiation) in order to test our faith in his holy book. There is nothing logically wrong with that worldview, and no objective evidence that contradicts it, but still I trust we both reject it because it is too implausible in comparison with other available worldviews.

If that is not an example of the pot calling the kettle black, I don't know what is.

40. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49428 by krogercomplete on June 12, 2007 at 12:27 am

My 'X' is God, and of course for me supernaturalism does not entail 'stuff that happens that we're incapable of understanding', but rather 'that we're incapable of understanding on naturalist/mechanical grounds but can understand very well or personal/psychological grounds. How do I support this? By the fact that a worldview that asserts a bigger supernatural (beyond naturalist thought) reality is free from naturalism's problems and offers much more explanatory power as well as experiential gains. In my judgment there is no contest.

I think this gets to the heart of the matter, and unfortunately, it may be where everyone here will have to part company. My guess is that even if one concedes "naturalism's problems," no atheist on this forum will accept personal/psychological/experiential justifications for any objective claim about the state of the universe. You argue that we are just trapped in our naturalistic bubble, and that the above justifications are only deficient within said bubble. We respond that those justifications are an entirely untrustworthy and unsatisfactory way of gaining knowledge about our circumstances, and that worldviews become stronger to the degree that they reject such justifications and insist upon independent and empirical evidence. We can argue on and on about whether or not naturalism is fatally flawed as you suggest, and we can try and dissect the particulars of your theistic worldview (i.e. how can God possibly be the source of objective morality?), but I think we will always come back to the problem just described: theism works for you, and it explains the universe to your satisfaction. What more is there to say?

41. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49336 by krogercomplete on June 11, 2007 at 2:20 pm

Will do next time for sure.

42. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49332 by krogercomplete on June 11, 2007 at 2:09 pm

Shit shit shit. My response to Danielos post #532 disappeared. I don't have time to reproduce it, but steve99 basically hit on the same points: (1) experiential gains give us no way to differentiate between conflicting worldviews; (2) the spread of a particular religion certainly depends on variables other than its truth value; and (3) "God did it" provides little in the way of explanation because it is potentially compatible with every conceivable set of circumstances, and because it is little more than source identification (i.e. point to the sky v. explain HOW the sky gets something done)

43. Can we really learn to love people who aren't like us?

Comment #49295 by krogercomplete on June 11, 2007 at 12:19 pm

I agree common sense is not a variable to be used in studying the laws of physics. But common sense does come into the equation when someone tries to convince me that a universe as complicated and orderly as ours came into being without an Intelligent Designer and common sense tells me that there has to be an Intelligent Designer behind the creation of our universe and the laws of physics that govern our universe.

[slaps forehead]. So, your intuitions and common sense have no bearing on technical questions about physical laws, but when it comes to the most difficult and complicated question of all, common sense is your guiding light?

44. Atheism is the absence of belief

Comment #49286 by krogercomplete on June 11, 2007 at 11:49 am

devolved,

Just to clarify, are you making a first cause/prime mover type argument or do you believe that God must be constantly involved in the everyday activities of the universe for them to not be accidental?

45. Can we really learn to love people who aren't like us?

Comment #49189 by krogercomplete on June 11, 2007 at 12:04 am

Robert Maynard, "Your claim that laws may, by definition, require some kind of lawgiver, is little more than an argument based on the connections drawn on a social level between 'laws' and their authoring by intelligent agents. It's pure wordplay."

I wrote, "The universe operates according to orderly laws and yet some scientists claim that it functions without a law giver." The word play is on your part Robert.

Wow. [devolved's hair flutters in the breeze as the point flies by undetected]

46. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49109 by krogercomplete on June 10, 2007 at 11:18 am

Danielos,

I am still waiting for a justification of objective morality other than: (1) my intuition tells me, or (2) I would not want to live in a world where morality was not objective. Or do you reason in the opposite direction and accept objective morality only because it is a component of the particular brand of theism you already embrace?

47. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #49004 by krogercomplete on June 10, 2007 at 1:36 am

Danielos,

Forgive me for being curt, but that all sounds made up. I had to pinch myself while reading your most recent posts, because they read like you just made a list of difficult questions and then crafted a worldview to fit (one that is, incidentally, immune from empirical verification or falsification). Bravo. Of course, one of the marks of a good theory is its explanatory power, but it feels like you place far too much emphasis on that factor and overlook the other critical piece: affirmative evidence for the theory. I can make up just about anything if my only goal is to explain the world around me (or to explain it in a way that is most palatable; several of your comments smack of the latter). I think if you presented your theory to a group of people whose memories had been wiped clean of the notion of God and the supernatural, you would see more than a few pained expressions; not because the idea is incoherent, but because it sounds just as plausible as any one of an infinite number of wholly fabricated explanations. It sits easier with people because it has been so popular for so many years.

Anyway, its late in my neck of the woods, just my initial reaction to your latest posts. Hopefully more to follow.

48. We of little faith

Comment #48953 by krogercomplete on June 9, 2007 at 5:53 pm

Not sure what is so crazy about Sam's article.??

49. Don't Know Much Biology

Comment #48926 by krogercomplete on June 9, 2007 at 3:48 pm

America is a failed experiment.

Single tear.

50. Richard Dawkins and Alister McGrath

Comment #48411 by krogercomplete on June 7, 2007 at 7:20 pm

A: I am an atheist:
B: What does "atheist" mean?
A: Well, it means I lack any beliefs about god(s).
B: How do you know that you lack any beliefs about god(s)?

Now how might A answer that question? To know that you lack belief in gods entails that you have some notion about what "gods" means. But if you have some notion of what "gods" means it's really not plausible that you have never wondered whether such beings exist. But if you have wondered about whether such beings exist then you have formed some belief about them, so you do not really lack belief about them.

The problem with your argument is the way you use "belief(s)." There is a difference between having "beliefs about God(s)" and having belief IN God. No one is arguing that to be an atheist you must be completely ignorant about God. Complete ignorance is certainly a sufficient condition for atheism (infants, disabled, etc.) but it is not necessary. What atheists lack is the positive belief IN God's existence that all theists share. Theists have it, atheists do not: they lack that belief.