1. How to abandon your God

Comment #140258 by stag on March 7, 2008 at 4:37 am

In other words, maybe you abandon God by realizing it's all God, it's all divine, all hot, thrumming, vibrating connection in all places in all things at all times. And hence, to try and parse it and restrict it and beat it into submission and claim it for one people, one history, one country or church or authoritarian body, is actually the highest form of divine insult.

Spinoza would be proud.

2. Morality and the 'new atheism'

Comment #119893 by stag on February 1, 2008 at 1:13 am

Good summary of the most salient points, though a little more detail on some of the more prominent secular moral philosophies (social contract, utilitarianism, etc.) would have been appreciated. I liked the bit on virtue ethics though, the most substantial counter to the "moral relativism" argument in my opinion.

3. Religion is not incompatible with Science: 'Non-Overlapping Magisteria'

Comment #82321 by stag on October 26, 2007 at 3:58 am

The NOMA argument works -- at least in theory.

Providing religion doesn't attempt to impinge upon the scientific magisteria in making claims about objective reality, NOMA works just fine.

Followed through to its logical conclusion (and avoiding cognitive dissonance), NOMA finds science perfectly compatible with Deism, Pantheism, certain forms of Buddhism, "Progressive" Christianity (ref: J. S. Spong) etc. (not to mention secular "religions", such as Humanism).

Unfortunately, many theists are willing to violate the principles of NOMA in making bold claims regarding the age of the universe, the origins of life, the occurance of miracles, etc., whilst (ironically) still hiding the NOMA flag.

So, ultimately I guess it depends on your definition of the word "religion".

4. In honour of Dan Dennett

Comment #77408 by stag on October 9, 2007 at 8:11 am

Clappers (Comment #77045),

Stag, can you be specific as to what you disagree with

I don't think this is really the place for a book review, let alone a critique of Evolutionary Psychology. However, I can recommend the following paper as a brief introduction to some the problems associated with this approach:

Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology, Panksepp & Panksepp (2000)

Pinker is not the only "sinner" by far (anyone remember this?), though he is certainly responsible for some proper howlers. The part towards the end of "How the Mind Works" where Pinker suggests our fondness for art - landscapes in particular - is down to some hard-wired, evolutionarily-selected attraction to verdant plains and babbling brooks is quite staggeringly dumb (I'm paraphrasing from memory here, please bear with me).

In terms of explanatory power this one is up there with the Freudian notion that men like to climb hills "because they look a bit like tits" (again, paraphrasing).

Stag

5. In honour of Dan Dennett

Comment #76993 by stag on October 8, 2007 at 4:48 am

Clappers Comment #76870

Another writer I would recommend it Steven Pinker
How the Mind Works
The Blank Slate

Nooooo!

Pinker is best when he sticks to language theory, but his evolutionary psychology stuff is just emabarrassing.

"How the Mind Works", in particular, might work as a piece of speculative fiction, but as a work of popular science it is an absolute travesty. "We don't need to know how the brain works in order to figure out how the mind works"... Just what the hell are you on about, Pinker?!

6. What do these atheists understand of religion?

Comment #67618 by stag on September 4, 2007 at 3:11 am

Robert Maynard (#67363)

I should try to resist mean-spirited jabs at fellow site-posters, particularly when such insightful explorations of incoherence are being penned by notable authors, but it sounds like sirs Bonzai and stag would get along swell with Mrs Alibhai Brown.

Ms Alibhai-Brown is most certainly correct when she says "knowing the science of why the moon shines is irrelevant to the experience." Her fatal error (in common with all theists) is to somehow assume that "God" is somehow more relevant.

The trap that both you and Yasmin seem to have fallen for is the age-old subjective-objective problem. Yasmin seems to think she's gotten away with it by making her "God" so utterly vague and nebulous that He fails to encroach upon objective reality in any meaningful way -- except to be wheeled out of the closet every now and then as a handy, catch-all explanation of everything and nothing, when it suits. This strikes me as a particularly deceitful tactic, albeit one that I imagine most religious moderates are quite familiar with. It is ironic that Yasmin calls out atheists for having "puny" imaginations when surely it is "God" that is the ultimate thought-terminating cliché.

7. The Sacrifice of Reason

Comment #66425 by stag on August 30, 2007 at 1:37 am

And it is astride this contemptible history of religious atrocity and scientific ignorance that Christianity now stands as an absurdly unselfconscious apotheosis.

Hardly. At least Christians aren't carrying out actual human sacrifices, that's a step in the right direction, surely? For my money, Harris' arguments have this unsettling tendancy to segue into hyperbole. Religion is a shit, we get the picture Sam!

8. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62488 by stag on August 10, 2007 at 1:13 am

Happy Hominid (#62360),

"As to what constitutes "good religion", that is another discussion entirely."

So I'd like to start that discussion. Can you give me two or three examples from the world today? Are they "good" because they don't make unverifiable claims of knowledge or because they do no evil or what?

In terms of NOMA a "good" religion would be one which respects the boundaries between the subjective and objective magisteria. A good example would be this quote from the Dalai Lama, which I heard mentioned at the Beyond Belief 2006 conference:

"If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims"
- Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom (2005)

Other examples would be secular "religions", such as Humanism, or the reformed Christianty envisioned by Rev. John Shelby Spong. All these religions provide their adherents with a universal narrative context for their shared values, all of which are amenable to the sort of "philosophical inquiry" alluded to by Russell Blackford earlier. For example, in humanism, this narrative takes the form of a belief in the unique potential of the human species, etc.

As mentioned by Dr Benway, Deism (and also Pantheism) would be compatible with NOMA, although these are more philosophical positions on the nature of God than de facto religions.

And if we do allow them to stand aside as a separate magisterium, should we also think of it as an equal but different way of "knowing"?

Well, it is a different way of knowing, albeit about a completely separate area of "knowledge". For example, how do I know that slavery is "bad", or that charity to the poor is "good"? It is the purpose of a religion (or a "life-philosophy", if you prefer) to provide a context whereby these questions can be answered.

9. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62254 by stag on August 9, 2007 at 6:03 am

Russell Blackford (#62244),

1. Religion as traditionally understood has never confined itself to the domain of morals and values.

Granted, but this is an argument against "bad religion", not NOMA. Your attack seems to be based upon the assumption that a religion has to make unjustifiable statements about objective reality (miracles, young-earth creationism, etc.) in order to fully qualify as a "religion". I see no reason why this should be the case. Taken at face value, NOMA is quite devastating to most religious claims about the universe.

. More importantly, the claims of religion to any authority in that domain are spurious.

Again, an argument against bad religion. As to what constitutes "good religion", that is another discussion entirely. Regardless of who or what you accept as your "authority" in this domain (religion, moral philosophy, etc.), it doesn't change the NOMA argument; challenges to the moral authority of religion are moral challenges, not scientific challenges.

3. Science does have important things to say about the domain of morals and values.

In all fairness, you had already realised the implicit weakness of this position by the time you had finished this paragraph, deflecting the onus onto "philosophical inquiry" and so shifting the focus from the objective, empirical realm to the subjective, experiential, introspective domain. There's nothing wrong with this, so long as we acknowledge the sleight of hand. Your own review of Gould's book goes on to say "... empirical statements alone, or assisted by purely logical statements, will not yield ethical conclusions." Where is the disgreement with what I've been saying?

10. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62236 by stag on August 9, 2007 at 2:37 am

Several points here,

TheCelestialTeapot (#62166),

In defence of NOMA. My understanding is that Gould introduced the term as a means of explaining how the evolution-creationism conflict need not be symptomatic of some greater intractable conflict between religion and science.

"The net of science covers the empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value."
- Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria , (1997)

Which seems entirely reasonable to me. We could argue that religion doesn't do a particularly good job of upholding its end of the bargain, but that's another subject entirely. In essence, NOMA describes the incommensurability between objective reality (empirically-derived knowledge) and subjective experience (values, meanings, "qualia" etc.) and this is the context in which I have used it. Far from justifying mysticism, NOMA offers a fairly robust rebuke of it. Subjective experiences do not equal objective reality -- If you hear "God" talking to you, this doesn't mean that God exists, objectively.

As for qualia, I think steve99 has already addressed this point. I agree that a more concrete definition of would be useful. However, since "qualia" is not an objective quantity, this may be difficult. As I understand it, qualia is a shorthand for the subjective quantity of perception. Why do we experience particular wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation (625-740nm) as "Red" - why not "Blue"? Is my "Red" the same as a hummingbird's "Red"?... and so on. We could hypothesise that qualia is an emergent property of how our brain is wired, I have no problem with this.

Happy Hominid (#62192),

With regards to your "apple simulation machine"; whether the "apple-taste" is created artificially by electro-chemically stimulating the brain directly, or by the old-fashioned method of electro-chemically stimulating the brain via the tastebuds, there is still a vast gulf between the electrochemical processes involved, and the first-hand experience itself.

Robert Maynard (#62169),

In terms of trying to understand objective reality, of course objective, empirically derived knowledge is going to be much more useful than subjective, first hand, experiential, knowledge -- this is the whole NOMA argument I've been making from the beginning. Conversely, if you want to know what it's like to taste some exotic fruit, fall in love or play golf on the moon, then you're actually going to have to experience these things first hand (or at the very least in a good simulation).

phil rimmer (#62193),

Subjective experience isn't knowledge of any kind. Its data.

I've already stated that I have no desire to play the redefinition game. I couldn't find any dictionary description of "knowledge" which excluded subjective experience. If I eat an apple, I then know what that apple tasted of. I know what Beethoven's 9th sounds like, because I have listened to it... and so on.

11. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62165 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 1:15 pm

Happy Hominid,

If nothing else, you will realize that we WILL have the answers and, like I think Robert said, We will know and already do in many cases.

Of course we can have the answers to subjective questions. It's just that they will be subjective answers. What does an apple taste like? Not difficult.

What's the point of subjective vs objective reality in regards to Black Sun's article?

As already stated, my issue was with the implication that the only knowledge worth having is that which can be empirically derived.

Subjective knowledge is a function of individual observation. It is personal and, to a large extent, non-communicable (except through allusions and metaphors). Objective knowledge on the other hand exists independently of any particular observer. By definition, they cannot overlap.

I have no doubt that certain subjective experiences can, or will ultimately be able to be, understood in objective terms. But this would an entirely different kind of understanding than the subjective experience itself. As Robert Maynard has already pointed out, it is a non sequitur. This is my whole point, one does not follow from the other.

12. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62145 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 10:25 am

Robert,

The very notion that I have suggested that understanding the mechanics of emotions is the same as actually experiencing them is ludicrous.

I never said that you did. So we agree then there is more to knowledge than that which can be dertermined by objective, empirical means?

Good, I need to go home and get some dinner.

13. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62138 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 9:56 am

Machines are what you make them. If we understood more about how awe and passion works, yeah, actually - we could program robots to do science, and even feel a sense of satisfaction when they did it well.

Again, programming a robot to do science, and knowing what its like to actually be a robot doing science are two different things. What is it like to be a bat?

14. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62130 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 9:39 am

But of course, no religion is composed entirely (or even mostly) of subjective beliefs. They all make claims about objective reality.

Indeed, the NOMA argument cuts both ways as I have said. It is rather ironic when religious types invoke it to suggest that science shouldn't step on religion's toes. Many of the problems with religion stem from it making bold claims to objective truth which would be better approached empirically.

Examples of religions making minimal claims to objective truth would be certain forms of Buddhism, secular "religions" such as Humanism and also the particular sort of Christianty as proposed by John Shelby Spong. You could also throw in Deism and Pantheism, though "religion" might be stretching it a bit in these cases.

15. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62119 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 8:31 am

Robert Maynard,

The distinction between different types of knowledge is a useful one, despite your protestations. The crux of the NOMA argument is that objective and subjective forms of knowledge are incommensurable, it is frankly absurd to assert that either one is somehow superior to the other.

I know what an apple tastes like, I also know the chemical formulae of fructose and the various volatile esters that comprise that taste (when interpreted by the tastebuds / nervous system). The latter information is objective, the former subjective. No amount of neurology or chemistry will tell you what the apple tastes like, unless you already have some sort of subjective knowledge to compare it to. A high fructose content would imply a sweet apple, but this means very little, subjectively speaking, if you have no experience of "sweetness". It's the old qualia problem, in other words.

It is entirely feasible that in the future we would be able to stimulate the brain in such a way as to perfectly recreate the taste of an apple. This has no bearing on the argument.

Two different types of knowledge, non-overlapping magisteria.

16. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62065 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 4:53 am

infidel_michael,

I don't believe that something is on this CD, because I don't hear anything when I play it. But there are people who say, that I'm kind of deaf, and there is actually a song.

Looks like the metaphors have gone off the boil a bit here. So long as we all know the difference between Beethoven, Metallica, or "nothing", we stand a fairly good chance of reaching a consensus on the contents of the CD (which is close enough to "objectivity" for our purposes). However, if the discussion turns to the relative merits of Beethoven or Metallica, we have ourselves an altogether different type of discussion.

I agree with the general thrust of this article -- claims of "scientism" are a blatent and crude tactic by the religious to shift the burden of proof away from themselves. My issue here is the implication that there is only one meaningful way of knowing anything, i.e. science.

17. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62055 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 3:19 am

infidel_michael,

Maybe, but nobody claims to have knowledge of the "only true way of composing a symphony", nobody tells you that if you don't like his symphony, you will suffer forever, etc.

Granted. The NOMA argument cuts both ways, and religious people who try to use it to shore up their own positions would do well to bear that in mind. Deriving claims of objective "truth" from purely subjective experiences is equally problematic. For example, "apples are better than bananas" is clearly nonsense, objectively speaking.

18. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62051 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 3:04 am

Jiten,

The point is one of subjective vs. objective "knowledge"; gnosis vs. logos. No amount of scientific understanding on how the brain interprets audio signals will ever replicate the actual experience of listening to Beethoven's 9th, for example. In a similar vein, analysing the chemical composition of a piece of fruit is not the same thing as actually tasting it.

19. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62040 by stag on August 8, 2007 at 2:07 am

Good article. However, you seem to be missing the broader point of "non-overlapping-magisteria". There are different types of "knowledge", and the empirical method is not amenable to all of them. For example; scientific / engineering knowledge may enable you to construct a musical instrument, but they won't tell you much about composing a symphony.

20. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #59871 by stag on July 31, 2007 at 1:17 am

Erik (59777),

I've already addressed your point about what a religion (or some sort naturalistic equivalent) could contribute to the field of ethics and morality.

Religion provides one means of representing and promoting the common values of its adherents. It should be obvious to most that we've already stretched Christianity beyond the point where it can usefully perform this function. Rather than acting as moral anchor, it now seems to act largely as moral brake -- The Anglican Church's foot-dragging over homosexuality, to give one small example. That this point isn't obvious to many is something we should be prepared to address.

Our society may have outgrown Christianity, but we'll still need some means of describing the things which are important to us, and presenting a standard to which we should aspire to -- this may or may not take the form of a secular religion. Humanism strikes me as a likely candidate, but it is by no means the only solution.

21. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #59704 by stag on July 30, 2007 at 10:15 am

Erik (59680),

Perceptions and experiences are not the same thing as facts. Everyone will have different reasons for why they think this is more important than that and vica versa. They may even have vast tables of facts at hand to back up their arguments, but the relative importance of this data will depend largely upon the values that person holds. Hence, two people can look at the same facts and draw completely different, but equally logical, conclusions.

If values were reducible to facts, there would be no such debate. Facts don't change, regardless of who's looking at them. It's erroneous (and potentially dangerous) to think that moral issues can solved by amassing and analysing lots of empirical data.

To make good ethical decisions, you need good facts and a good set of values. Science can tell us a lot about the former, and next to nothing about the latter.

As Christopher Hitchens mentioned in this debate, being an atheist says next to nothing about your values. One could quite easily go the route of nihilism, and hold nothing as having any value whatsoever. For the more optimistically inclined, a naturalistic alternative to religion (which may, or may not class as a 'Religion', depending on your definition of the word) would provide a means of representing and promoting the common values of its adherents.

22. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #59653 by stag on July 30, 2007 at 3:43 am

Erik (59458),

The often unspoken value judgement made in social contract theories of morality, such as you have described, is the decision about who gets to be included in the contract. In other words, whose concerns do we consider to be of equal value to our own? This is especially important when we consider those who for whatever reason might be unable to reciprocate on the contract. Do infants get to be included? What about unborn foetuses, the mentally handicapped, other species, etc.?

23. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #59184 by stag on July 28, 2007 at 1:15 am

Ricey (#59158),

The Humanist Manifesto (in any of its incarnations) is hardly coy or 'round-about' in its rejection of supernaturalism or irrationality. This however is not Humanism's main focus, which is to represent a set of values based upon our common humanity.

As a representative of both the American Humanist Association and Americans for Religious Liberty, we should hardly be surprised that Doerr is playing a cagier, more political game than the delightfully outspoken Hitchens, whose main goal here is to sell his book.

24. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #59021 by stag on July 27, 2007 at 1:51 am

Erik (Comment #58915),

The reason you shouldn't impinge on others is that someone may come along who is stronger than you.

You could just as easily derive the morality of "only pick on people smaller than you, or whom you vastly outnumber" from this observation. Not all our morality can be reduced to a quid-pro-quo social contract (don't stab my back, and I won't stab yours). At some point you have to say that, as a society, we should try to live by certain shared values; all people are born equal, hurting animals is bad, helping the poor is good, etc., etc.

The point about slavery is that 400 years ago, most people in our society would have found it entirely acceptable. Clearly there's nothing 'hard-wired' about finding slavery abhorrent. Indeed, themes of domination are writ large in our genes. Social Darwinism may be considered a particularly unpleasant philosophy today, but there's nothing inherently irrational about it. Slavery didn't ultimately come to an end because someone uncovered some new facts; it ended because of a shift in society's values.

25. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #58908 by stag on July 26, 2007 at 4:12 pm

Erik (Comment #58871),

There is a gap that needs to be bridged between factual statements such as "Pain is neurological response to tissue damage" and ethical judgements like "Pain should be minimised wherever possible".

Your own utilitarian ethos of "people should be free to the extent they do not impinge on others" requires a certain 'leap of faith'. Why shouldn't I impinge on others, if I can get away with it?

Slavery, for example, is a perfectly rational way of distributing labour, especially if I'm the one cracking the whip. If the power structures are in place, such a system is perfectly stable -- so why do we find it morally abhorent today?

26. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Edd Doerr

Comment #58761 by stag on July 26, 2007 at 3:58 am

Erik (Comment #58610),

I see too many atheists fall back on the naturalistic fallacy once God is out of the picture. Observations of the natural world give no indication of how we ought to behave.

Rationalism alone cannot mediate ethics, we need a standard to aspire to. A naturalistic religion based upon shared values and meanings would have much to offer our post-faith community (depending on what those values were, of course).

27. Face to faith

Comment #58516 by stag on July 25, 2007 at 4:42 am

Which claims do you refer to?

For example, Harris's assertions about the de facto motivations of suicide bombers is one area that comes under particular criticism by Atran for lacking empirical evidence. Justifiably so in my opinion.

Well it isnt Sam Harris' website so I wouldnt expect it to be.

You're right, this isn't Harris's site, nevertheless it does seem to have become something of a focal point for this 'new atheist movement' and this all-too-easy dismissal of dissenting voices strikes me as something of an oversight.

28. Face to faith

Comment #58470 by stag on July 25, 2007 at 2:00 am

I thought Atran did a fine job of highlighting the weaknesses in Harris's arguments, such as the lack of any substantive evidence behind many of Harris's bold claims. If these criticisms have been adequately addressed on this forum, I've yet to come across them.

29. Face to faith

Comment #58466 by stag on July 25, 2007 at 1:16 am

#58463 Psypro

My agreement with Bonzai was regarding his / her appeal for a more nuanced approach to religion on this forum. If the whole point of this site is to get together and mouth off about how stupid and irrational religion is, and generally have ourselves a good old laugh, then fine. Everyone needs their catharsis; just let's not pretend that we're doing anything else.

30. Face to faith

Comment #58237 by stag on July 24, 2007 at 5:17 am

#58153 Bonzai:

Point well made. Scott Atran's criticisms of Sam Harris' arguments are wholly legitimate and do not get discussed frequently enough here.

There is a personal, subjective element to religion which is entirely compatible with rational inquiry. Unfortunately, most religions are not content to leave it at that.

31. Is Christianity Good for the World? A discussion between Christopher Hitchens and Douglas Wilson

Comment #55701 by stag on July 12, 2007 at 2:51 am

Wilson seems to have fallen for the familiar conceit of equating atheism with nihilism. That somehow, without "God", life becomes meaningless.

Haven't we already been through this a million times already?