1. Sam's Flea!

Comment #32894 by Stephen J. on April 18, 2007 at 4:13 pm

"My point is, rather, that, absent God, if someone decides to live that way, what can an atheist use to appeal to him?"

Actually, I agree with your implication, though you can be sure that it is a minority view among my fellow atheists. I highly doubt that there is any sort of objective moral law to which you could appeal.

I differ from you, however, in failing to see how a god resolves this issue in any way. Surely a scholar such as yourself is familiar with Plato's argument in the Euthyphro: Is it immoral to rape people because God says so, or does God say it's immoral because it actually is immoral, independent of what he says? If the former, why should we care about God's subjective opinions more than Ayn Rand's, or, for that matter, Hitler's ? If the latter...well, I would claim that the idea of an objective moral code is in itself incoherent. Even if it's not, the existence of an objective moral code makes God even more superfluous than he already is. I wonder what your thoughts are about this issue.

2. The God Debate

Comment #29122 by Stephen J. on April 1, 2007 at 6:16 pm

Not to mention that if any one of billions of people across space and time are right, or if there is some perverse god who punishes belief in the absence of evidence, or if any one of an infinite other possibile deities exists, then when he dies he's lost everything. So really the only way he comes out on top is if his particular brand of Christian god is actually the one that exists. I'm not willing to make that gamble.

3. The God Debate

Comment #29113 by Stephen J. on April 1, 2007 at 5:27 pm

Another thing I've wondered about, though, is what would constitute sufficient evidence for an atheist to believe in God, since people like Dawkins tend to define God in such a way that it is less probable than any natural phenomenon. Consider the fine-tuning argument. It seems inconceivably improbable that the universe arose by chance--but surely God is even more improbable/complex. Now, all observable phenomena can be explained in naturalistic terms, if only with recourse to a brain in a vat scenario. So if you follow Hume's ideas on the testimony of miracles, you could never find, or even conceive of, a piece of empirical evidence that would convince an atheist to believe in God. (I suppose the opposite would hold for someone who believes all atheistic explanations to be less probable than all theistic explanations.) Thus you have to wonder if people are right when they call Dawkins a fundamentalist.

4. The God Debate

Comment #29111 by Stephen J. on April 1, 2007 at 5:10 pm

"What would you say about this revised version of your statement: "These ideas (of science, mathematics, morality, . . . whatever) has been shaped by biological forces, and thus are inappropriate as statements about what is true.""

Since the analogy between epistemology and moral philosophy is rather tenuous, I don't think this really succeeds as a reductio ad absurdum. Nevertheless, you may be correct in objecting. I think a better way of putting my position is to say that our moral judgments are fundamentally based on evolved biological instincts, and since one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", it would then be inappropriate to say that our moral judgments are valid. As I asked previously, is there any reason that pain is morally bad and pleasure is morally good? Why not the opposite? Why not say that orange is good and the smell of roses is bad? I doubt that there are rational answers to these questions. Instead, I would say that they are instinctive judgments and morality insofar as it relies on them is invalid.

5. The God Debate

Comment #29090 by Stephen J. on April 1, 2007 at 3:21 pm

A fair enough job by Sam Harris. I think a dispassionate reader would have no question as to who came out on top. The one criticism I have, which I have mentioned previously in this forum, is the response to the question about morality. Some remarks that Harris makes ("the golden rule is not unique to the Bible or to Jesus; you see it in many, many cultures—and you see some form of it among nonhuman primates" and "Empathy and compassion are our most basic moral impulses") seem inconsistent with his stated belief in an abosolute moral code. As I have argued previously, these moral intutions are shaped by biological forces, and thus are inappropriate as statements of what ought to be. I understand the need for a quick answer to this question in a debate, and I also understand that the argument against morality may lie forever beyond the comprehension of some people, but still I feel that here Harris and other atheists commit themselves to a gross untruth.

6. Why there are almost no genuine atheists

Comment #24630 by Stephen J. on March 7, 2007 at 5:46 pm

regarding post 99: I'm tempted to remark that I am confident in my understanding of Hume the naturalistic fallacy. I'm also tempted to remark that not all nihilists are ornery. Indeed, as a Hume scholar such as yourself must know, an intellectual stance such as nihilism is more likely to flow from the passions than to impact them. Sometimes, however, it is better to use concrete examples.
In the hypothetical dilemma you propose you demonstrate that you have misunderstood my position. Morality is not decided by who thinks about matters the hardest. Rather, a valid moral judgment is one that does not rely on dubious premises. So I must point out that neither person makes a "valid, mature, moral decision." Each relies on a premise which there is no reason to believe: for the first person, that the holy book is correct, for the second person, that "the probable consequences of her actions, the improbable consequence of her actions, her feelings and the feelings of those around her" have any bearing on rational morality.

regarding post 101: I am glad to see that someone agrees with the claim that morality is sentimental and not rational. It seems, though, that we differ in that you prefer not to distinguish between our moral impressions and objectively sound morality, while I would claim that objectively sound morality does not exist and that we should be mindful of the fact that our moral intuitions are just that--intuitions. What does it matter? Well, in this view nothing matters too much anyway. One should hesitate before calling a person or deed immoral, and be aware of the limitations of this statement. Indeed, whenever using the word should, one must remember that no state of affairs is in an objective sense preferable to any other. To the extent that they rely on the purportedly rational discussion of ethics, politicians and moral philosophers may find themselves in a conundrum. Those on one side of a heated argument (abortion, say) must abandon the pretense that they are debating rationally.

7. Why there are almost no genuine atheists

Comment #24570 by Stephen J. on March 7, 2007 at 10:29 am

"This is where the subjectivity of morality comes in. In a sense, of course, the utilitarian ethic stemming from the above is arbitrary and subjective. But ethics are about principles of conduct, how one should act."

I agree that "the utilitarian ethic [like any other]...is arbitrary and subjective." It would seem from this that you are claiming one ought to act on the basis of arbitrary and subjective principles. It is a pretty short step from this to the claim that the terms "ought" and "should" are entirely vacuous. So I am a little confused to find that you proceed to analyze utilitarianism. It seems a little like agreeing that God does not exist and then asking whether or not transubstantiation occurs during communion.

8. Why there are almost no genuine atheists

Comment #24564 by Stephen J. on March 7, 2007 at 9:46 am

"The objective moral code says to kill anyone who works on the Sabbath, but our brain recognizes such a rule as unduly cruel and frankly insane"

My point is 1) there can be no such thing as an objective moral code, even one stemming from a deity (as Plato noted in the Euthyphro), and 2) that just because the brain of a certain primate believes something to be wrong does not mean that it is actually wrong. As I noted, the fundamental assumption shared by most, if not all, moral systems is that causing pain is generally bad and causing pleasure is generally good, all things being equal. Obviously this assumption is most obvious in basic utilitarianism, but similiar arguments apply to other systems. The question, then, is if this assumption can be justified on rational grounds. If it cannot be, then we should abandon the idea that morality is rational.
OK, so what is wrong with saying that morality springs from our intutions or emotions? The problem with this view is that while it is no doubt true that the illusion of morality arises from these intutions, these emotions are natural products of evolution. To say that they are valid moral judgments is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. Indeed, in some ways to make this claim would be like saying that because there is (let us suppose) a human intuition to believe in spirits or deities, such deities must actually exist.
The realization that morality is an illusion would not make people rape and kill their neighbors, since the strength of moral intuitions remains intact even after any sort of rational justification has crumbled away.

"Once you consider this, then utilitarianism follows pretty naturally. The only assumption, really, is that everyone's happiness is just as important (all other things being equal). So, in my opinion, utilitarianism is a moral system that is pretty rational."

Hopefully the flaw of this claim is now evident. The real assumption, which seems so obvious that it is not even stated, is that acting to maximize happiness is good. Without the truth of this premise being known or even suspected, this ethical argument and others like it are invalid.

"But don't I have a responsibility to the future generations, who have every right to a life as myself?" Again, there is no reason to assume that depriving someone of a good life is morally wrong.

"Atheists say "ought" because they recognise the things that are in the interest of humanity as a whole, and the interests of their community, as well as any personal interests they have. Just like all people, in fact." And why do the interests of humanity have some privileged position in rational ethics?

"...as though rationality is some kind of ethereal paradigm of 'rational truth' that we lowly apes have to work to tap into, and not an explicit consequence of our cognition." The sense of rational used (until lately) by economists is of the sort you prefer. But economists are not moral philosophers, who apply "theoretical reason." As the discussion concerns meta-ethics, I am using the latter sense of reason, which is indeed the sort you deride.

Regarding comment 71: I think that you will find it rather difficult to show that fairness is better than unfairness. It is not hard to see how this intution, like that regarding pain and pleasure, could be a part of a moral grammar. Your next argument relies on a sort of practical reasoning, which I have no problem with. Certainly it is beneficial to humans to live in a society with certain rules, and our sense of morality provides many such rules. However, from an objective viewpoint, it doesn't matter if humans prefer to live in fear or comfort. I then would question the deductive validity of your argument. Finally, you conclude with an appeal to emotion even more stark than before. I would in fact claim for any argument you make that you ought not to rape, murder, or torture my hypothetical daughter, I can provide an equally valid (or invalid, as the case may be) argument that says that you should.

I appreciate the responses to my argument, but I think the question has been more avoided than answered so far. Perhaps it should be kept in mind that there is nothing wrong with being amoral if that is the most plausible view, as it seems to me to be.

9. Why there are almost no genuine atheists

Comment #24476 by Stephen J. on March 6, 2007 at 8:39 pm

"The unsupported declaration that "ought" statements don't make sense without belief in God shows that the writer is stupid.

When are the primitives going to throw someone intelligent against us?"

Ought statements don't make sense with or without God, for the reasons noted above.

10. Why there are almost no genuine atheists

Comment #24470 by Stephen J. on March 6, 2007 at 7:46 pm

It is no doubt true that much of what is generally termed moral behavior is (at least) as accessible to atheists as it is to theists. As we know thanks to people such as Professor Dawkins, this sort of ostensibly altruistic behavior has its foundations in biology. Nevertheless, I think that the author makes a fair point, one which I regret to say is often neglected on forums such as this--the incompatibility of atheism with a purely rational moral philosophy.

Take utilitarianism, which I suppose is the preferred moral philosophy of atheists (similar arguments could be made against other ethical systems). It is quite clear from experiments and common sense (the innate "moral grammar") that humans consider inflicting pain to be bad (this is a case where the exceptions prove the rule); conversely, all things being equal, causing pleasure is generally viewed to be good. Utilitarianism shares these assumptions--but does it have any rational basis for accepting them? If it does not, it commits the naturalistic fallacy and is invalid. Another way of putting this is asking why utilitarianism is better than the ethical system known as "anti-utilitarianism" which claims one should seek the greatest pain for the greatest number. Or how about rhodotarianism, which seeks to maximize red colors (a conscious experience like pain) while minimizing yellow ones? It is not at all clear to me that this fundamental assumption can be defended rationally. Rather, it seems likely to be etched in our so-called moral grammar--but in an objective, purely rational sense, there is no morality.

Such a conclusion no doubt strikes many falsely, as if they had been told that they have no reason to expect the sun to rise tomorrow. This is only to be expected, for animals are selected for survival and reproduction and not for philosophical analysis. Perhaps someone can provide a justification for the belief that our intutions are rationally valid, but I rather doubt it.

It seems, then, that many atheists are too quick to scoff at Dostoevsky's remark that without God all is permitted. I think we can safely abridge this statement to "All is permitted."