851. Fleabytes

Comment #163762 by MPhil on April 19, 2008 at 2:13 am

A belated thanks to MPhil for the reference to the fundamentals of human neurophysiology. I've found a site which acts as a good synopsis of the book and will be buying it as early as possible.

No problem, but either you misspelled, or are thanking me for recommending a book I didn't recommend... :)

I recommended a book on "....neuropsychology", not neurophysiology :)

Anyway - both very interesting topics :D

852. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #163760 by MPhil on April 19, 2008 at 2:09 am

Steve,

you know me well enough my friend... I never mind you commenting :)
_________________________
@all:
There are serious philosophical attempts to back up theism - like Plantinga's modal ontological argument or the cosmological argument.

They have been shot down - but they are to be taken serious and aside from the fact that they are wrong, methodologically good philosophy....
but what we get to read on here mostly is not, and Steve's criticism is entirely appropriate.

853. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #163756 by MPhil on April 19, 2008 at 1:50 am

you're the most logical thinking atheist I've ever encountered.

Thanks, but you'll forgive me for saying this is somehow strange coming from someone who

1)Thinks that morality is impossible without intrinsic moral values - and that therefore they must exist

2)Presupposes the authority of the bible (To me no different than someone presupposing the veracity and authority of the Iliad)

and

3)presupposes (thus) the existence of a god, and has an at least partially contradictory concept of that supposed entity.

854. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #163469 by MPhil on April 18, 2008 at 11:45 am

Styrer,

what I meant was that jumping from the fact that he has covered this up big time and such to the assumption that he doesn't care about the children - I think that's at least a little malicious without qualification and further evidence - and not entirely rational.

You have explained your position, and now that you have laid your reasoning out - I can say I don't find it completely irrational and malicious.

I'm sorry for offending you and wish to apologize hereby.

I do however still stand by my interpretation...


anyway - MrTicketyBoo.... you're not seriously claiming that there wasn't large-scale child molestation by catholic priests? You're not seriously claiming that the church didn't try to cover it up by figuratively playing the shell game "Where's the paedophile, find the paedophile". They were moving the paedophiles to other communities without telling the people there - who entrusted their children to these paedophiles because they didn't know.

All this is documented - my goodness, there even is a document by the vatican ordering them to keep quiet and play along.

[...]your god, Richard Dawkins[...]

How old are you? 8? Or just seriously infantile?

855. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #163456 by MPhil on April 18, 2008 at 11:24 am

I apologize for the above post being so late - I had to travel 4 hours by train today..

856. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #163453 by MPhil on April 18, 2008 at 11:20 am

thisisme,

I still don't agree with your argument - your formal logic looks fun (I like the look of that sort of thing :-) but it has no real bearing on the question. Obviously, if God is God there are going to be no properties of God which are not properties of God. I'm sorry that my argument is still not clear - maybe even using the term 'self-defining' is too confusing as it seems to require an action of being defined, as you've pointed out about universals. Self-sufficient might be more appropriate.

It does have a bearing on it - and Steve pointed it out again: nothing can define its own attributes. The formal logic which I employed comes down to the law of identity, which in effect leads to: "no entity without identity" and "To be is to be the value of the bound variable"(Quine), and to the fact that nothing can determine/define/whatever its own attributes.


If you had understood my arguments, you would have seen that these two sentences are contradictory:

As for the laws of logic, they don't follow on from God's nature, they are God's nature.

God's nature is necessary

I think there's a deadlock - but I think its because you don't seem to understand the arguments, and just repeat what I have already shown to be impossible, which I'm afraid won't do.

Also, this is just unsubstantiated:

I don't agree that TMA is a refutation of universals as I don't agree with the 'no self-sufficiency' premise as I've said above.

That has nothing to do with anything. There is no such premise in metaphysical universals. The Third Man Argument is a logical argument - and you will have to do what no philosopher has been able to do and shoot it down completely. Also, you would have to shoot down my other fatal argument to realism (that the Great Line of Being cannot be crossed)


Look up "Trope Nominalism"... the finer points are hard to get, so you might not be able to evaluate the position.

And as I said - I'm not sure the Problem of Universals is a real one, and not just a result of the trappings of language.

Hume's deconstruction does not threaten my position - as my position is based on the control of the universe by an unchangeable God with a uniform character over time. Ok, you don't agree with that premise.

You're right I don't - but it doesn't matter.
As I have already shot down the god as necessary argument (and there are other ways to take it down - as to even establish that, and you have just presupposed it, you would have to contruct an ontological proof that does not fall prey to the weaknesses of that of Anselm, Descartes and Plantinga - you would have to do what has been shown to be impossible), that can no longer be presupposed, and thus even if any sort of god existed, he might not tomorrow - since necessary being is shot down.

Also, I'm sorry but you do not get the point about ethics at all... as evidenced by this:

What you don't seem to realise is that Hume's deconstruction of induction threatens not only absolute but also conditional and probabilistic knowledge of the future.

Boy oh boy... not "conditional knowledge" - conditional statements: "If we want y, and x is necessary for y, we have to do x" - nothing to do with induction. This is deduction.

Also, pragmatically necessary assumptions are made in awareness of the problem of induction. But this is not the only thing. No science is pure induction, it's very deductive - and even where it is inductive, it is not purely inductive. Pure induction does not exist. Why? Because every observation is theory-laden.

You say that 'If we want to have a stable society, we can work out what behaviour is necessary'. Certainly not!

Oh yes we can - we can construct a temporal modal not projected on the future, and work out logically what is required for it to be stable.

Also, there is a wonderful tool called the "original position" -

something else for the reading list:

John Rawls: A Theory of Justice

very very hard reading, very complex, absolutely brilliant.

He has shown that it is possible to work out conditions for justice (namely as fairness) and stability by making use of the original position.

This model then can be employed under the pragmatically necessary assumption that the future will resemble the past. The problem of induction is a general one - and a theoretic one, not a practical or pragmatic one.

This I will repeat only once: Everyone always presupposes that the future will resemble the past in the most basic ways - and all your planning, all your thinking about what you should or will do, all your deliberation falls prey to that - your entire life would be worthless if you want to stick to stating that the problem of induction as an argument against my position. If it is, it is an argument against everything concerning the future - and you shoot yourself in the foot.

you are just shifting the problem one step back, to why we assign value to the stability of society.

No I'm not - and I have answered this. You are presupposing an 'ad infinitum' problem where there is non. The chain terminates at the deliberate assignment of value of something. This can be entirely grounded without any problems on simple intersubjective agreement. It is just a fact - seeing a problem in this shows that you are still firmly locked inside your box.

But as I said, we can know conditions for stability - and rationally derive those for fairness, by making use of the original position as Rawls did.

This means that this is wrong:

But that's beside the point. You can't know what will make society stable. So any action is just as 'right' as any other.

I keep shooting your arguments down - and you just reiterate them... once more: you have to think outside the box.

Ok, ethics. I've dealt with that above. I see you're saying there are no 'oughts' only 'values'.

errr....no. In ethical theory, any moral imperative (ought) is so because of the values it expresses.

There are moral imperatives - once we assign moral value(s) to things and investigate (philosophically and scientifically) what is compatible, helpful and hindering in the bringing about of a state of affairs in which these values are exemplified.

Also... see what the others have said, they've also provided answers.

And Irate is completely right - what I am doing is taking your position and deconstructing it - showing where it is logically contradictory and where it is simply inadequate.

This is important - but even if I hadn't laid out the logical errors - that would only imply non-contradiction, not actuality... which is what you are presupposing. I have shown that you can't do that because your position is logically contradictory where it comes to god's necessity and "self-sufficiency" and factually wrong where it comes to universals and ethics.

But your presuppositions are in any case too huge - it won't do to say "well, that's just how it is"... If you take these huge assumptions to be true without evidence, without proof - you again have to face the charge of being irrational.

Okay, now that I've said that - we can take a reading break... I think it will do you a world of good to study some ethical theory - and since you don't believe what I assert about working out conditions for a just and stable society, I've recommended Rawls as well.

again, - have fun.


And to the others - good job!

857. Yoko Ono, Filmmakers Caught in 'Expelled' Flap

Comment #163001 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 7:51 pm

As I said - all ethics is assigning value to processes, intentions and actions. I am a proponent of contractualism, which is a form of consequentialism.

We agree that we all want a certain outcome - and then we can logically derive, philosophically and scientifically investigate what is necessary for that - and the assignment of value from the outcome is transitive and thus extends to the necessary actions and such.

So thus, science can help us in defining our ethical theory - but it is never in itself ethically normative in any way.

I don't agree with your last paragraph however. It does not encourage rational debate - it spouts false propaganda. Would you say that "mein Kampf" is not all bad because it has encouraged debate over the issues?

Furthermore, even if that was not the case - a movie with so much clearly, demonstrably wrong creationist propaganda, with such falsehoods will have no positive influence over the ones who don't already know where it is wrong - it will rather have an indoctrinating effect on the gullible and strengthen those seeking to confirm their dogma.

Therefore, I don't agree with you on that point.

858. Yoko Ono, Filmmakers Caught in 'Expelled' Flap

Comment #162990 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 7:16 pm

Gould was certainly brilliant - but punctuated Equilibrium? Not true as far as I know...

And I'm sorry, but the analogy with the gospels doesn't hold.

Science - as I explained above - does not forward moral judgments and commandments. The gospels do. And there are obviously moral statements about the jews in the gospels - very negative ones.

Not to mention such people as Luther, who argued that the property of jews should be seized, they should be stripped of citizenship and expelled and the synagogues burned to the ground etc etc

859. Yoko Ono, Filmmakers Caught in 'Expelled' Flap

Comment #162988 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 6:59 pm

No moral imperative can be derived from an observation of facts - but moral value can be assigned to processes, actions etc... which is what the Nazis did, and why Evolution has no responsibility whatsoever.

860. Yoko Ono, Filmmakers Caught in 'Expelled' Flap

Comment #162984 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 6:47 pm

I'm tentative about all of this--I'm just suggesting that it is not cut and dried. Let's keep talking and thinking.

Indeed, that's what I think as well.

But the one thing we do know is that Darwin and the theory of evolution in general is as much responsible for Nazi Eugenics as Newton is for artillery or ICBMs.

861. Yoko Ono, Filmmakers Caught in 'Expelled' Flap

Comment #162977 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 6:35 pm

From what I have seen, Santi is simply careful and considering (not affirming) opinions which people on here (including me) dismiss.

I honestly think the accusation against Santi are uncalled for and sometimes downright indecent.

Keep calm guys - Santi isn't spewing creationist propaganda: The following statement:

Evolution and eugenics needs to be thought about, and not summarily dismissed as a question beneath contempt. It does need to be talked about.

...is entirely reasonable - as long as we take care not to imply any conclusion. Investigation is always a good thing. I even think we should think seriously - medically, sociologically, ethically - about population control, assisted suicide and such things.

However(!), I agree with Steve at al. that Expelled is honestly not to be taken seriously in its self-professed "investigation" into the relation.

I have a pretty good idea about Nazi idelogy, having had a thorough education in history at a German Gymnasium - and believe me - they do take care to inform the children about Nazi-Germany.

It was artificial selection - breeding, together with ideas about a common descent from an arian race, which subsequently was "tainted" by infusion of "bad blood" some crazy ideal about some supernatural (mostly Norse) mythology.

The ideology and the conclusions would have been the same without the idea of evolution - the idea of breeding would have sufficed.

So while I do think that Santi is wrong about expelled, and sometimes implicitly close to the position of creationists concerning Nazi ideology and evolution - we should not resort to insults and slander.

I will stress again, however that the question about Hitler and Evolution is pretty much answered - and not by "Expelled".

862. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162954 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 5:52 pm

Styrer,

It appears to me that Ratzinger wants to eradicate it because he is concerned with it, but wants to do it internally. I don't think this is proper, in fact I demand for legal prosecution.

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (Inquisition, of which Ratzinger was the "CEO") does conduct trials for pedahile priests.

It is evident that the pope beliefs that god's law is higher than man's law.

It is evident that the pope beliefs that the Roman Catholic Church is the wordly government of God.

It is evident that the pope does believe in the sacredness of the holy office to the last detail (at least there is abundant evidence for that).

It follows that he believes that the ministrants are fulfulling a holy office under the priest in his holy office, that they are under the care of the priest and that he has the duty to treat them according to the katechism.

It follows that the pope beliefs that the church dealing with this according to its divinely revealed laws is sufficient, and it wouldn't be sufficient if secular courts dealt with this (well, you know what I think of this, but that's not what I'm talkink about right now)

It is a fact that the pope is bright enough to know that in the end, you cannot suppress this forever, and that any such incident harms the church.

It is a fact that the pope has expressed his condolences and his deep worry about this.

Alone, all of these don't mean much, but I think we can infer that he is concerned for the children (who are gods children doing holy work after all) as well as for the church.

Furthermore I opine that the pope made the appalling judgment of something along the lines of "Well, we have to find a way to sort this thing out ourselves while minimizing an image loss, and the best way to do this is to keep this secret until we have a plan how to deal with it effectively."

I think the evidence - which you pointed out correctly - in connection with the knowledge that the pope does indeed believe in the doctrines of his faith, in the church and in the katechism, is by far more compatible with the hypothesis that he made appalling, disgusting, wrong choices while still being concerned than not being concerned.

863. Sexpelled: No Intercourse Allowed

Comment #162871 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 3:57 pm

..."an ignorant fool"

*grinningfromeartoear*

It's not an intrusion into his privacy, so:

It's not slander if it's true!

864. Sexpelled: No Intercourse Allowed

Comment #162867 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 3:53 pm

Wonderful - especially the section where dear Richard's "statement" is pieced together...

... I needed that laugh, thanks!

865. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162866 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 3:46 pm

Well, I think we shouldn't exceed the limits of reason here. I have no doubt that the pope is genuinely concerned, deeply troubled about pedophilia, and does want it to stop.

No matter what his responsibility is (and I'm sure it's huge, making wrong decisions about keeping things secret)- we should not brand him as someone who has no problem with people molesting children, especially people "under his command". That would be both irrational and malicious.

866. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162860 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 3:27 pm

I'm just watching the news, and they say the Pope has met with victims and their families - and prayed with them.

Great - just don't admit that the church has made grave errors in dealing with these priests.

867. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162855 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 3:04 pm

Podaar,

okay then: re-elect them - knowing about the Patriot Act for one thing.

Styrer,

thanks. Well, it is a long shot - especially since I guess one could argue that the church and the theocratic state are different aspects. So he would have immunity as head of state, but not as head of church... weird.

868. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162854 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 3:00 pm

I'm sorry fdi50 - but I don't buy into your superficial attempt at wanting to understand this seriously.

All the points you list are textbook ID/creationaism propaganda and have been dealt with time and again.

Best examples:
-"element of faith" - absolutely not. It's application of the scientific method, no faith at all required. Evolution is as well established as anything in biology. And that's saying a lot

-Thermodynamics: The principles of thermodynamics apply to closed systems - such as the universe as a whole. The entropy in a closed system will rise - the disorder will rise. For disorder to remain constant or decrease, the system has to receive energy from outside. The earth is not a closed system. Ever heard of this thing called "sun"? Huge, constant infusion of energy every day.

-Your guess is as good as mine. Again, absolutely not. The scientific method, peer review - nothing will survive in a well-maintained scientific community that doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Science constantly seeks to disprove its theories - making the tests harder - thus, theories can be improved, or completely wrong theories abandoned.
Parsimony prior knowledge and logical inference lead to the formation of hypotheses from data. These are then subjected to scrutiny, the hardest tests possible.
No wild guessing involved.
And the guess of a non-scientist is certainly not as good as that of a scientist when it comes to science.
What would you say is the value of the fine-structure constant alpha - without looking up the science? Would you even come up with the idea? I doubt it.

I advise you to look up more detailed answers to your questions at talkorigins.

Especially the FAQ and the Index should be of help to you. That is if - contrary to my assumption - you want to learn and not just post propaganda and attempt to strengthen your preconceived idea.

http://www.talkorigins.org/

869. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162846 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 2:48 pm

is their Constitution.

For many that is certainly true - but I doubt that it is true for the majority, otherwise they wouldn't vote for a president and in general a government that doesn't give a shit about it. Torture, wire-tapping, undermining of civil rights in general etc.

But what does the establishment clause have to do with the immunity of the pope as the head of a foreign nation?

870. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162837 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 2:32 pm

Well - that is general policy for the head of state of a foreign nation with which one has friendly relations.

But immunity can be revoked - and should be.

We had a similar in Germany when for the Soccer Worldcup Mahmud Ahmadinejad wanted to visit.
But of course he was not the head of a friendly state...

871. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162827 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 2:10 pm

That's true Steve...

...but at least the environment has been covering up such behaviour. But you're right - they're not pressuring them into such activity. Although from the anecdotes I've heard (including especially those of my former teacher) - they may have a network of people who have such desires and express them.

872. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162818 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 2:00 pm

One should also remind oneself that sadly, morality is just a thin fabric, easily torn entirely apart by circumstance.

"Ordinary people", ordinary "nice guys" who wouldn't harm a fly can be turned into murderers, torturers, people who rape.

The Germans in WWII for example - those who were followers, who didn't speak up. The allies after the invasion who raped the women - soldiers in wars shooting innocents, torturing them...



The Milgram experiment...

The Stanford Prison experiment...

...it's sad, but what these facts and especially the controlled experiments show is that morality is a very thin fabric, torn apart by circumstance.
Thicker in some, thin in most.

873. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162807 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 1:41 pm

I think constant oppression of sexual urges, induced guilt about one's sexuality in combination with the pomp and the rituals, and the easy access - only a slight predisposition to pedophilia that otherwise wouldn't have developed might be enough... so it might be a delayed trigger for some people.

Also, a former teacher of mine said he began to attend a priest seminar - study catholic theology - but he was appalled by what the other students did to each other - and what they talked about (expressing urges for pedophile actions) that he left immediately.

He had no problem with homosexuality as far as I know - but with catholic students in priest seminars turning the evenings into something like an orgy - and with their statements concerning their sexual desire for children.

874. Victims: Pope Benedict Protects Accused Pedophile Bishops

Comment #162795 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 1:22 pm

Just heard that wonderful line by Stephen Colbert he made on Wednesday:

"Here is the Pope greeted by President Bush:

The leaders of the two most powerful theocracies..."

:)

875. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162785 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 1:02 pm

Oh alright then, Steve :)
..and thanks!

876. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162783 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:59 pm

And then the poor guy got burned on the stake for blasphemy by the catholic church... And people say philosophy lacks action and danger :)

What shall I say - I study under a professor who holds a chair where the catholic church needs to give its okay for the candidate to fill it - a chair in philosophy, not theology mind you. ... in a country where "Reverence for god" is the highest goal of education - as laid down in the constitution.
This is the reason why I won't write my dissertation on philosophy of atheism... not under this professor.
I plan to participate in an essay-compition on "Faith and Reason - A contradiction?", held by the chair for Christian Worldview, the holder of which used to be the chairman of the German Catholics Committee...

I won't get burned literally - but I'm certainly not given equal opportunity, and expect to be burned figuratively :)

877. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162781 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:51 pm

People who deny the obvious and try to use ad hoc metaphor interpretation, combined with recursive logic are just useless for a rational discussion.

Sadly yes - but to be fair, only if and when they are really fixed in their presupposition and only when it comes to that. Discussions that don't come down to this can be quite rational - and we have to give credit to thisisme for not being totally irrational. Concerning platonism, he has admitted that this can account for objective moral values as well - and not only theism. He seems to be rational where he can - which is a start, and I commend him for this - and even more for the willingness to study the ethical theories of Mill and Kant (and possibly others).
That's at least something.

878. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162775 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:43 pm

Frankus, Al:

You are correct - but more specifically, it's the ventromedial prefrontal cortex :)

There's a wonderful book:

"Fundamentals of Human Neuropsychology" by Kolb and Whishaw... has tons of such stories and the theories to explain it, including the evidence... also has lots of pictures of CT scans, PET etc (me like pictures) :)

879. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162774 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:42 pm

it has been shown that any useful system of logic is either inconsistent or incomplete (Godel's Theorem)

This is just a minor thing, but I think this could be phrased better:

"...any sufficiently powerful logical system..."

It's not just predicate logic with identity, it's also peano arithmatics and ZFC etc.

Generally, any system powerful enough to encode its own syntax afaik.

Predicate logic without identity, or even just logic without quantifiers are not sufficiently powerful for Gödel's theorem to apply.

880. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162771 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:37 pm

Oh, I forgot:

Even if - counterfactually - natural laws needed a lawmaker, the god hypothesis would be nothing more than a "virtus dormitiva" hypothesis... (which it is anyway, in many cases) - entirely without value.

____________

("virtus dormitiva" from the play "Le malade imaginaire" by Molière, a joke. The doctor asks his student "Why does opium make one sleepy?", to which the student answers "Becuase it has a sleepy-making spirit/power".)

881. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162768 by MPhil on April 17, 2008 at 12:31 pm

Hey there - sorry for being late - I wasn't gone, just busy talking on the phone to my girlfriend and writing my response.

I see gr8hands, Al and Steve (et al) have already done a very good job at responding. Some of the arguments they advanced will be found in the text below (not as concise though, great job btw) - some won't, so here goes:

Thanks for the links too - I will certainly try to follow them up, when I have 'time' (I have booked myself a month off in June - should get some reading time out of that :-) Will see if I can get hold of the others you've mentioned too

Excellent. As I said - prepare yourself for some seriously complex thinking, especially in Kant.

Now, for the points of argument - I have to say that the arguments you forward have been shown by me before to be wrong... so I will only go through them again very briefly.

God, as an eternally existent ultimate being must be self defining.

I have already shown this to be logically impossible. Nothing can be self-defining.
I have already laid out the argument, so I will do this just one more time:

Entities are defined by their properties.
If x defines y, they cannot be the same, because of this: formally:

let x, y be variables for individuals, let P be a variable for properties.

P1:FOR ALL x, y: ((FOR ALL P: Px AND Py) AND (NOT EXISTS P: Px AND NOT-Py) AND (NOT EXISTS P: Py AND NOT-Px) <-> x=y

There's just no way around this.

It is furthermore not true that universals (meaning universals in the metaphysical sense - if they exist, I opine that there are no universals in the metaphysical sense) must be self-defining, that would imply action (that of defining). They can just be said to simply exist, no need for anything to define them. But then, universals must not be necessary, so they need no laws that make them necessary. Since god cannot define his own attributes (nothing can, as proved logically above) and since he is nevertheless taken to be necessary - and because necessity requires laws - that means god is dependent on laws logically prior to or higher than him.
But then, as I said - your presuppositions about god do not constitute a philosophical position - they are unwarranted assertions.
If you want to claim that the laws of logic follow from God's nature - and that God's nature is necessary - that is circularity and itself contradicts the laws of logic.

And no, you're still not using "a priori" correctly. Again: a priori and a posteriori mean "known without empirical observation" and "known only through empirical observation" - the terms refer to attributes - the laws of logic aren't attributes. But they are themselves presupposed because of the way our brains are hardwired, and they are thus hardwired through evolution because this reflects or approximates reasonable the way things can be.

Now for universals: I'm sorry, but saying that realism (ante res or in rebus) is the only viable position is just plain false. It's the most unwarranted position of all. It is defeated even by an argument that was advanced by Plato himself - the Third Man argument. Certain varieties of conceptualism and nominalism do fall prey to simply postponing the problem - but not all. Realism on the other hand is immediately defeated by it. Any form of realism.

Then the position is defeated by the argument I have advanced - instantiation is itself a relation and thus must be a universal, and thus must be entirely metaphysical - so the "great line of being" cannot be crossed and universals cannot have a connection with the world.

In rebus realism is easily defeated by showing that it depends on a misuse of the word "in" and collapses into ante res realism when taken seriously.

Finally, everything but conceptualism or nominalism is defeated by occam's razor.

I myself think there is no definitive answer, but we can exclude property nominalism and realism. Trope nominalism is my favourite candidate, but generally I am not sure the question makes sense at all.

When you start talking about Hume - it appears you are not clear what "universal" means. A "universal" in philosophical language refers to a metaphysical entity. Talking of universal laws etc does not presuppose any such thing. (as I have said before) - all that is needed is uniformity. Only when you already presuppose platonism does this require universals - but that would be begging the question.

The problem of induction is of course a serious one - but it threatens every position - including yours. If you cannot know that the future will be like the past, if no amount of certainty exists - then your position is also threatened - everywhere.

But my position does not need absolute knowledge about the future. It works with conditionals, my friend and thus avoids the problem altogether. Also, you seem to have absolutely not understood what I was talking about when I explained consequentialist ethics - evidenced by your remark

wanting societal stability is an 'is' not an 'ought'

Again, conditionals my friend! If we want to have a stable society, we can work out what behaviour is necessary. If we assign value to the former, it also applies to what is necessary to achieve it. Values are made, not discovered. You are still inside your box of criticizing an argument that denies your premises for not sharing your premises... not applicable.
Furthermore - what will be necessary for a stable society will also include reasonable extrapolations on the plasticity of society and changing facts.
But that is a pragmatic problem that any theory has to face that does not have the impertinence to claim that one code of behaviour is all good in every situation, every society, at any time - not knowing what will come.

Moving on, I did say that internal coherence is important, but not sufficient.... you might want to reread my last post.

You simply assert that the Bible is neither without any evidence to prove it. If you want to go down that route then you need to provide the evidence. A real internal critique not just 'it doesn't make sense to me'.

Right, that's why I said that this is an entirely different discussion. But you will forgive me for not going into that for the following reason:
I - and many many others - have done so in the past. Showing clear internal incoherence as well as inconsistency with known facts. Wanna know what we got? Concerning the first: ad hoc reinterpretations to avoid the obvious contradiction that would make even Derrida ashamed. Twisting phrases so far away from the meaning they obviously express for the sole reason that they "cannot be allowed to contradict each other". Concerning the second: claims to metaphor. Strangely, the metaphors and reinterpretations are only ever found once inconsistencies or incoherency with known fact is discovered.

Thus I hope you will forgive me for not going there again - someone whose presupposition is that the Bible is correct is not open to evidence - and would not be able to admit to being wrong even if he was. So there's no point.


Finally, concerning ethics - as I said, all that is needed to criticise others is a shared goal (like a stable society, survival) when they act so that they violate this interest which they themselves explicitly or implicitly have - or when they are members of a society but do not share its goals - they can be criticized from that because of the rational interests of society.
Furthermore, there is uniformity in humans - all are initially capable of emotions and of empathy for example - and have the same basic drives.

Deliberately assigning to some consequence or some standard moral value is not the naturalistic fallacy because there is no inference, no deriving an ought from an is - there is deliberate assignment of value - a world of difference. After all, that is what ethics is - assigning value to something - specific behaviour for example.

It would be far too much work to make explicit the case for contractualism for example - Scanlon has written a long book about it - so I direct you that way for this.
The form (not the content in any way) of the argument is however somewhat similar to that of Mill. Suffice it to say it is entirely tenable.

Furthermore, it is entirely possible to critize the behaviour ethics of others for non-ethical reasons as well.

So, finally:
An entity defining its own attributes is impossible. Full stop. No way around that. Logical impossibility. You have been shown the proof - now if you do not want to be irrational, you have to abandon the belief that this is possible and actual. (not to mention that unless you can show how god and his supposed attributes are necessary, your belief in that is irrational - same goes for the authority of the bible)

Concerning laws, we can assume universality (which does not require metaphysics, only uniformity) pragmatically - we do and it works. This is an entirely reasonable extrapolation for past and present. Furthermore, if spacetime is fixed, this would make the problem of induction meaningless. But even if that isn't so - we all, always make the pragmatically necessary assumption that the future will be like the past - so you shoot yourself in the foot if you want to make that a point of critique. If it was - all your planning, everything you think and do concerning the future would also fall prey to the problem of induction. As I said - the future resembling the past in certain aspects is a pragmatically necessary assumption which can be justified retroactively.

Realism concerning universals is defeated by various arguments.
This and the points above show your position concerning laws of nature and logic to be fallacious.

I think that covers all: God, necessity, laws, universals, ethics... yep.

882. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162227 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 12:02 pm

I still say Kant was the best read from a Moral perspective. Although I zoned out from time to time and woke up 5 pages later.... but I got the important stuff out.

I know what you mean - about zoning out while reading Kant... sometimes it just too complicated.

While I don't buy into his idealism at all - he is absolutely brilliant.

I agreed more with Mill, and finally most with Mackie - so from that perspective they were the "better" reads for me.

But I found Kant absolutely fascinating, well laid out and from the perspective of knowing about the history of moral theories the most important.

Concerning the paragraph about muslims as an example - I think you are presupposing a certain moral position (and I agree with these judgements), but I don't think that's the point. Independent of the actual values claimed by certain varieties of theism, I was arguing that the mere idea of theistic morality is flawed and unsubstantiated. And the claims that only the truth of theism can account for objective moral values or even make morality possible altogether is entirely impertinent, blatantly wrong.

You're points concern a slightly different issue - but I think you're certainly right.

883. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162225 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 11:50 am

Or maybe you will want to read the wiki entries on them first:

Utilitarianism:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism

Kant:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groundwork_of_the_Metaphysic_of_Morals

The "Categorical Imperative":
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative

884. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162223 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 11:43 am

thisisme,

I'm sorry, but it seems you're not getting the points of my arguments... let me try again:

First - Justification of Christian moral objectivity
I believe that God is abolute, thus the values which are part of his character are also absolute. I believe that the laws of God's nature, the laws of logic, the laws of morality, are *defined* by his nature. They don't make his nature necessary, they are necessary because they are his unchanging nature.

As Quetz stated, this is an assertion without evidence, but that's not my point.
The question whether moral values are absolute is the question whether they could not have been different, and are unchangeable in principle. Thus the concept of "absolute" is fishy, and means only "complete" and "without restrictions"... which isn't relevant here. What's relevent is necessity and contingency/dependence.

If the values are "part of his nature" then they are contingent on his nature, and not necessary. The question now is whether god's nature is necessary. Only if this is the case are the moral values "absolute" - necessary in the sense that they are not relative. But if god is necessarily the way he is that means that there must be laws which are thus - since they are required for god to be necessary and necessarily the way he is - prior to or higher than god.
If god's nature is not necessarily the way it is, then the moral values are relative to his non-necessary nature, and thus not necessary - not absolute. God could have been different, then moral values would have been different... and you're only "following orders".. you have no absolute yardstick of morality, just a relative one. This is simple logic.

And you don't seem to understand the point that nothing can determine its own nature - an entity is defined by its attributes. The laws of logic cannot be created by god if they are part of his nature. That would be logically circular.

where are we going to get any absolute rules from? You can't go out and pick up a Law of Logic (or morality) from the supermarket, or any other part of the universe.

Wrong. There are fundamental universalities in a completely material universe - the laws of physics for example. Some are basic - simply there - no lawgiver needed... others arise, emerge.

There is a fundamental universality in the general ways things can behave - and how minds can work. These are the laws of logic - they are universal, absolute (complete, without restriction) - but do not require anything more than a material universe - all that is needed is universality.

Furthermore - there is methodological and pragmatic necessity.
The question mustn't even be whether the laws of logic are absolute (they are univeral - by virtue of the way things can be - ontology - and by virtue of the way minds can work)... the thing is that concepts of arguments, of justification - in fact anything to do with communication, discussion etc presupposes the laws of logic. And thus I can critizize anyone who engages in argument for not conforming to these standards - since they are presupposed by engaging in an argument.

But when we criticise the logic or morality of others we are a priori assuming the existance of an ultimate standard by which we can judge them.

Wrong again - at least partially. First, you're not using "a priori" right. A priori refers to conditions of knowledge - a truth is known a priori if no information about the outside world is required to know it.
Anyway - no, we can criticize the behaviour of others from any ethical position. If I think that utility is the standard of morality, then I am justified in criticizing others for not conforming to that standard. Furthermore - there is intersubjectivity - and necessary moral imperatives given a certain consequence we agree on.
So if someone wants to live in a stable society, and stability of society necessitates certain behaviour, and yet that person does not conform to this, I am justified to critize him for failing to meet a moral standard.

All you are doing is judging from within your moral 'theory' - and that can be done from any other moral theory.

I do have to say - it will not do to discuss ethics without basic knowledge of ethical theories, I'm sorry.

Any ethical theory gives the person holding it justification for critizing the behaviour of other where it doesn't conform. Absolute justification would mean that it could be known that one ethical theory is "true"... but I deny that there is such a thing as non-relative, necessary moral truths. We have - as I have shown - no justification for assuming that there are.

Anyway - all that is needed is necessity given certain shared goals. All that is needed is intersubjectivity. Meaning - if we want the human race to survive, that implies certain moral values and imperatives - for example not to let a global thermonuclear war to happen.
If we agree that human beings are capable of emotions and empathy, and that suffering is something that should be avoided- certain moral imperatives follow.

All the above answers the following, and shows that it is wrong:

In an atheist universe where does this come from? Where is the ultimate law of logic that we reference when we say that P AND NOT-P -> TRUE is a logical contradiction? We're sure it is a contradiction, but only because we assume the unchanging laws of logic. Where is the ultimate law of morality that we reference when we say that it's wrong for film-producers to lie? I've never heard a satisfactory atheistic explanation for the existance of universal laws, nor a reasoned attempt to live our lives without assuming them
Second - justification of moral objectivity
Here we're getting to the heart of the issue. Do we really live as if there's no moral objectivity? If there is no objectivity, why do we criticise others? This is the point I've come back to time and again and not had answered. This was my original point - *if* there is no moral objectivity, why does RD criticise someone for lying? How can we say that anything is wrong for anyone else? How can we say that anything was wrong in the past, or will be in the future, or is wrong in a different society?.

This is where I *am* going to bring in scripture. That's the basis of my worldview, my presupposition.

Then you're not really evaluation your reasoning. Especially since that is a presupposition that is very very much open to rational criticism. It involves so many huge assumptions - and they need to be justified if you do not want to be irrational.
The bible contains contradictions - both in historical accounts, in perscribed moral values and contradictions with known facts.
That's not philosophical glasses - that's not philosophical at all. It is an unwarranted assumption - and it has to be open for evaluation.

The only way to compare them is how well they make sense.

If you mean by "make sense" internal coherence - then no. If you mean "feels right to me, satisfies my needs", then no.
If you mean "how well they conform to established fact, to analytical and a priori known truths as well as their coherence" then yes... and I'm sorry to that's where scripture fails abysmally.
Neither is it internally coherent(and thus doesn't conform to analytical and a priori known truthts), nor does it conform to established, intersubjectively accessible facts.

But that's a different discussion.

is the only view I've found that makes sense of the need for moral objectivity, hence by the impossibility of all contrary views proposed I assume its truth.

But that's entirely beside the point. Your feeling that moral objectivity is necessary is irrelevant. It isn't - and your need for it has no bearing on the matter. If you are going to be dogmatic about that, there is no discussion - and you're not really seeking out other possibilites.

Furthermore - as I have already told you - not only theism assumes objective moral values. Since they are supposed to be metaphysical entities, they don't need a causal explanation - you can just posit their existence (whether warranted or not). If all you want is objective moral values, then you might as well be a platonist atheist.

But that is beside the point. There is no evidence of any kind, no justification for believing objective moral values to exist or even be possible.

Third - do we need to believe in objective morality to be moral?
No we certainly don't. I've said already that atheists may be just as moral as theists. The difference is that I can make that judgement. I have a measuring stick which I can line up against Atheist A and Theist B and compare them. Without objective moral values you don't. Unless you want to borrow mine.

As I have explained above, that's not true. You don't need an absolute measuring stick to judge - you just need one. Intersubjectivity and consequences which are explicitly or implicitly agreed upon are all that is needed.

Your position is equivalent to saying we can't measure length because we have no yardstick for infinity.

You are making awefully dogmatic claims about what moral theories can do and what they cant without having a knowledge about ethics and the various theories.

As epeeist says - you have to think outside your box. Go ahead and study some of the great moral theories and metaethical theories - Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Mackie etc.

In summary objective moral values are needed,

Both untrue and beside the point. If they were needed for something to be justified doesn't mean they exist - maybe it just isn't justified. But they aren't - as I have shown above.

and my worldview can account for them.

Not quite true - as shown above - theistic morality is either not "absolute" because the values are contingent on the nature of god, or unneeded because if god's nature is necessary then there have to be laws which make his being the way he is necessary and then the values do not in the end come from god, but from what makes his nature the way it is (supposed to be).

But even if, it would be by far not the only theory that can account for objective moral values.

Take Mill for example - who argues that the principle of utility is absolute without invoking any metaphysics. Thus he says there is an absolute standard of morality, namely that of utility - and that this can be proven to be absolute - universal.

I think there might be universal moral imperatives - universal because of the way we are "wired", because the behaviour in accordance with them is evolutionary stable. But that does not require any metaphysical entities. But even if that wasn't so, the following would still be wrong:

I just don't think your philosophy can provide a basis for making moral judgements.

Any ethical theory does that - it's just that you - from within your theory think it insufficient. But that is just "thinking inside the box".

Really, do go ahead and read some ethics... it's not necessarily atheistic.
The point is that it's got nothing to do with that - many of these authors were theists... but they thought independently about morality, about what morality is rational and coherent with the facts about life and living... and that's what you should be doing if you don't simply want to be "following orders".

"why should this and that be done" - "because it's written in this book and this book is authoritative" is no philosophy at all. It's (sorry) blind following.

As I said - many moral philosophers were and are theists - and still thought and think independently about ethics. Only that way can you approach the subject rationally - which seems to be what you want to do.

I really do suggest you study some ethical theories before making bold claims about ethics:

These two are probably the most important since the classical greek philosophers:

John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism (free online here: http://fair-use.org/john-stuart-mill/utilitarianism/ )

Kant - Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ( free pdf here: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/kantgw.pdf )


Both assume universal morality - the latter as metaphysical, the former not.
In comparison to any real ethical theory - theistic morality is utterly simplistic. So it is hard work to think about a foundation of morality - but it's really worth it.

Once you have gained some experience in thinking rationally about ethics and metaethics - you might want to move on to the more daring Mackie, who argues (as do I) that there are no metaphysically objective moral values - but that ethics doesn't need them anyway.

Also do get some experience in ethics before you open a discussion on the forum... it is really helpful. After all, you're thinking about a subject of philosophy here - so it would be wise to learn something about it first. To learn how to think rationally about the subject.

Good luck - and enjoy.. these texts are fantastic, highly intellectual, were absolutely groundbreaking and are two of the absolutely greatest works (whether you agree with them or not - I don't agree with either) in ethics ever written!

885. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162051 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 4:23 am

I'm extremely interested in thisisme's response to my answer to him... not expecting much, though... without wanting to toot my own horn - I've studied this stuff and had discussions with some very bright people about this... and have yet to see any argument that positively shows that Mackie is wrong about the lack of justification for assuming the existence of metaphysically objective, intrinsic values.

886. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162029 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 2:42 am

ADDITION:

the problem of

POSSIBLE: p AND NOT-p

is not the only one when it comes to god's nature, necessity and laws:

why are logical tautologies necessarily true? Because of the axioms and inference rules of logic.

Necessity requires laws.


An entity determining its own nature is impossible. Entities are defined by their attributes, so if there is an entity, it must already have attributes - and thus cannot create them itself, because 'itself' already implies having attributes.

But that's all idle - since the clam that god's nature is necessary would require a logical proof to be taken seriously - mind you with no contingencies in any of the premisses...

good luck I say :)

God - as Steve put it rightly - has a serious bootstrapping problem.

887. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #162023 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 2:28 am

all right, thisisme:

First: theistic morality doesn't belong to moral objectivism.

The values are dependent on god, so they are not absolute but contingent. Unless of course you want to say that all of god's "nature", his "character" is necessary - in which case god has no free will and all of his commandments are dependent on the laws that make his nature necessary. Necessity requires laws to make some necessary - at least those of logic... but the laws of logic won't suffice, they even make god impossible (trinity is obviously logically contradictory and omnipotence is covertly. etc).

So in that case the moral commandments are in the end dependent on the laws that make god necessary and thus you might as well cut out the middle man.

If moral values are absolute, then they are logically prior to or higher than god - and you don't need god. If they are dependent on god but god itself is not dependent on anything, then they are not absolute and not objective. Universal may be, but not objective and absolute.

Saying god made the laws of logic won't do either, because that would imply that they could have been different, which implies the statement:

POSSIBLE: p AND NOT-p

which is a logical contradiction, thus rendering the entirety of the beliefs of anyone who even implicitly believes this meaningless via ex falso quodlibet.

Second:

Objective, intrinsic moral values would be
1) something so extremely strange, so different from anything we know that we cannot imagine how they could possibly work. They are supposed to be metaphysical, but somehow connected to actions, intensions, judgements etc as giving them a certain quality (of being morally right or wrong). No one has ever advanced any concept about how this should be possible. They are supposed to be universals, and the things (actions, intentions, judgements etc) to which they apply are supposed to instantiate the universals. But instantiation is also a relation - and as such (if you accept universals) a universal and thus metaphysical. This means that the "Great Line of Being" (Jubien) cannot be crossed.

Fact is invoking anything metaphysical to explain anything is a cheap trick, a cop out. Not a real explanation because it doesn't provide a mechanism by which this should be possible.

2)Metaphysically objective values are epistemologically not knowable. If there were such things - by which faculty could they be known? They cannot be seen, heard, felt (tactile), smelled, not proven by rationality - so how should be know of them?

Bringing in scripture won't help. Because even if the bible were true, you wouldn't know that these are metaphysically objective values, you would just believe it because you believe the authority of scripture - in which case that would have to be demonstrated first.

3) Metaphysically objective moral values are not at all needed to explain anything in the world. In fact, everything we see is much more coherent with the theory that there are no such values, that values are intersubjective, social constructs.

Thrid:
They are not needed to be moral. It's incredibly simplistic and black-and-white thinking of theists that 1)objective moral values need a god (ask Plato, they don't) and 2) they are required for morality.

Philosophical Ethics is the study you want - not theology. There you can learn about all kinds of ethical theories and metaethical theories. The concept of ethical justification exists in all of them.

You may not like a theory - and think it is insufficient because there are no metaphysical moral values. But that is -strictly speaking- your problem. They are not needed for ethical justification.

Any consequentialist ethical theory is consistent with materialism. Utilitarianism for example, or contractualism (which I endorse - see for example "What we owe to each other" by T.M. Scanlon).
There is ethical justification in all ethical theories. And you not being satisfied with any such theory is not an argument against it.

So, fact is that everything we know points towards the conclusion that there are no metaphysically objective moral values and that even if there were, we couldn't know. Theistic morality is either subjectivist, in which case moral values are not absolute and that's bad luck for you - or it is superfluous because if moral values are absolute, no god is needed.
Also, ethical justification is possible without absolute moral values - in any consequentialist theory for example.

888. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161991 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 1:18 am

I always feel sad when a person abandons rationality... nothing personal.

889. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161989 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 1:17 am

We await the inevitable gloating comment on this site from David Robertson.

I think Robertson does have the capability to be emotionally a nice person - especially to people with whom he agrees... so the gloating will be submerged in understanding for RM and possibly some pity for those who can't see the "truth".

What it came down to was: Well, it suddenly made sense to me and fulfills my desires... so it's true. Existence claims, claims to interference, to historical events - claims that violate the laws of physics and the laws of logic. Evidence? This is beyond evidence... asking for it is impertinent - it's a "higher truth"... Therefore: Materialism is wrong and rationality doesn't apply...

...it's all I could do to keep from crying.

890. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161983 by MPhil on April 16, 2008 at 12:58 am

Well thank you Quetz... reading that post of RM's just ruined my day.

I will have to ask him if he can put up the music again - I still need to download the one his son wrote for me - it was brilliant...

...I'm really sad right now.

891. School bars same-sex partners at formals

Comment #161959 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 9:25 pm

Maybe this is not such a bad thing - maybe it will get more people to acknowledge the BS and intolerance that religion is spewing.

I think the likely consequence is less people in confessionally bound schools - not less tolerance :)

892. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161953 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 9:11 pm

Karda,

But actually, there are already proposed mechanisms within our current understanding of physics for time travel. Try again.

You're missing the point. This is about the epistemic probability of the statement to possibility, but to a specific instance of actuality, ie - there will be a culture that will find a method to (for example) keep open wormholes through negative energy/material with negative density and find a way to determine spacetime trajectory of the possible travel, and to find a way to actually travel etc etc.

The epistemic probability is very very low indeed - and as such any of your beliefs that depends on this is unjustified.

Steve,
thanks, I think I understand what you mean now :)

893. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161939 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 9:00 pm

Correction: not only existence claims, but any claims about states of affairs or the existence of entities.

also.... what Steve said :)

894. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161937 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:57 pm

Karda,

We went through this before, Steve. First of all you are in a poor position to make assertions about what will be technically possible a billion years from now.

Yes we did go through this before - and I will repeat myself:

We can speculate what future science might be, and might be capable of. But unless these are strict logical inferences from our current knowledge, they have no certainty whatsoever, and the epistemic probability will be extremely low.

This means that when you use them to justify existence claims, this is unwarranted, and the existence claim - if it is dependent partly or wholly on a speculation that has extremely low epistemic probability, then also has extremely low epistemic probability. It is unwarranted.

895. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161932 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:49 pm

#161917 by Steve:

I agree, but I am increasingly sceptical that the brain really is intrinsically complex. That complexity is effectively programming. Quite simple hardware can contain complex software.

I'm not quite sure what you mean by intrinsic complexity...

I think we have to distinguish complexity and functional complexity. The brain of a newborn human is at first developing far more synapses than needed, and as such has more complexity than at some later stages. But it's not functional complexity then. From all these synapses through training of the neural net (learning), the synaptic bias gets 'tuned'. Synapses that receive next to no synaptic bias vanish, and those (synapses of collections of synaptic pathways) that have the functional complexity to transduce information in the appropriate way (I guess that's what you meant by "Software") get strengthened. So the functional complexity increases for while through a decrease in mere structural complexity and increase in complexity of distributed synaptic bias.

896. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161924 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:38 pm

Oh well - Bonzai was faster, and much more concise :)

897. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161923 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:37 pm

Steve

but what I objected to is any implication that our knowledge was somehow relative to us. This seemed very much like a post-modern attitude.

I don't think that's entirely correct. Our knowledge and especially our understanding of this knowledge is relative - the information that's out there is not. If we wanted to say that our knowledge is not relative, we would have to have second order knowledge, which is impossible.

But as I said, the information out there is not relative and is accessible (denying that would be post-modernism) - but we can never be 100% certain that we have got it completely right (even if we should have).

If for anything (other than our own existence and matters of logic) we have enough justification of saying that we truly know it - it is science. But I think we only have the highest incomplete justification of anything here, not complete justification.
The problem of induction, the need to get around gettier examples, the reliance on our senses, the theory-ladenness of perception... these are the things that make the justification less than complete.

Also, science has the knowledge that its claims are provisional in that we can never say "this is so", but "given the available data, this is currently the best theory explaining it".

This is true recursively also for some of the data itself, because it is gotten from instruments that when we simply read off them we also make huge implicit assumptions about the correctness of theories (namely those that say that this instrument picks out such and such)...

But "given the available data, this is currently the best theory we have to explain it" - nothing but science can even begin to approach that kind of justification for statements about the world.

898. Lying for Jesus?

Comment #161910 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:26 pm

just a small point:

Steve:

I am using complexity in terms of what information is required to produce an organism

Absolutely, and when it comes to genetic information you're correct - but don't forget how information from the environment also determines the complexity of an organism (depending on the organism's plasticity).
The human brain is so incredibly complex mostly because of synaptic connections that form in childhood learning - through conditioning of the neural net. And through culture and the increasing complexity of information in culture, through learning through language(s) - this is increasing in complexity as well.

899. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161890 by MPhil on April 15, 2008 at 8:13 pm

I think what the whole knowledge things comes to basically this:

1)As Humans - and as Humans with certain languages, we understand the world around us through certain relative concepts. The universal languages such as mathematics help to reduce this locality of understanding immensely.
Notice it's just the locality of understanding, not of knowing itself, ie (for this argument 'true belief to which one came through a reliable mechanism').

2)All science (figuratively speaking) throws a net over the world to 'capture' the facts - and attempts to tighten the meshes. What this means is that it might never be perfect - but is constantly (thought not necessary linearly) improving the approximation.

Finally, even if we had perfect knowledge even of only one certain, very confined aspect of reality - we can never have second order knowledge that this is so (partly because the problem of induction)

Radesq:
to continue your story...

the epistemologist says: "those swans are white on at least one side given that our sensory apparatus is reliable and that those are actually swans and we are not being cleverly deceived" :)
See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

900. For sale: 13-year-old virgin

Comment #161133 by MPhil on April 14, 2008 at 10:21 pm

I will add it to the list of books I plan to get through eventually. Though, it is a large list.

Tell me about it... you do not want to know how many books I "plan on buying/reading/finishing"... one lifetime isn't enough... :)

But while you're at it, add John Ralws "Theory of Justice" as well. Absolutely brilliant (so are his other works).

Though, I felt that Nietzsche was by no means a nihlist,

Quite true - he wasn't.

and took the position that only the weak minded succum to nihlism after loosing their faith in absolute moral dictates.

Not exactly. Nietzsche thought that mankind is only a rope tied between animal and superman - and to cross the "abyss" over which the rope is tied, one first has to abandon all values, even the most basic and essential ones - to make oneself completely free. Only then can one look at the world as it is - and reevaluate all values - erect new ones.

Nihilism to Nietzsche thus was a stage, a step on a ladder - something to be overcome.

Ethical philosophy interests me the most.

I used to feel the same way - especially metaethics is highly interesting. But after reading Mackie, this has shifted a bit. Since I think he's right - that means that there are no metaphysical ethical truths to be discovered. However, that does not mean that the study of ethics is now useless - as the brilliant work "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" by Bernard Williams shows by example.

I find the most fascinating subject to be philosophy of mind - as it addresses what I find to be the most fundamental meaningful questions that can be investigated.

When it comes to ethics - the most interesting question to me is that of a just and stable society... and I find no one has addressed this more rigorously than John Rawls. I don't agree with everything he writes (I don't know of any philosopher with whom I agree 100%). He has produced an idea for investigating the question of what the principles of society should be... the "original position" - using this to determine the principles, the structure of society is one of the most striking ideas I have ever encountered.

(see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/)

I find it troubling that a meaningful discourse is not being persued about ethics and morality, because it appears to me that one large percentage of people are absolutist, and don't think it makes sense to discuss it, because they already know what to do, it has been dictated to them. Then another large percentage think that it is arbitrary and relative, and thus also doesn't make sense to discuss.

I think a very large part of the people on this planet either don't have the leisure to reflect philosophically about ethics - they're busy trying to stay alive.

Then there's the naively religious who just think it's all answered, absolute and final...

Then there's the huge part who just goes about their lives not reflecting much on anything - (probably also a large proportion of the people who would call themselves religious)

While I see no reason why it can't be treated like a system of logic. I see no reason why moral decisions cannot follow from our collective interests, and values, as a culture, as a people, as a species, and ultimately as living things.

Well, you gotta be careful not to commit the naturalistic fallacy - but yes, I think ethical decisions can and should be made logically - while taking into account facts about emotions, society, ecology - facts about living and living as human beings in a (specific) society.

So, today's recommendations for the reading list:

-Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong (John Leslie Mackie - his "The Miracle of Theism" is also probably the most wonderful book arguing against theism)

- A Theory of Justice (John Ralws)

Gotta try to catch at least an hour of sleep now - have to be at university in 3 hours... :/