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Comment #140056 by MPhil on March 7, 2008 at 12:17 am

Reality - science - philosophy - religion.

Good philosophy is on the same level as science, as it contradicts none of it but incorporates its findings - so I take a little offence at that :)

Damn, I wanted to go. Will do that now.

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Comment #140050 by MPhil on March 7, 2008 at 12:11 am

I'm leaving this discussion alone now - gotta watch the new episode of Lost and have a cocktail (It's nearly bedtime for me). Maybe that will lift my spirits. As I said, it depresses me when people I respect, like and sometimes even admire seem to feel that what I do, what is hugely important to me - has no justification for its existence, might even be something bad.

Talk to you guys later.

Short P.S.: In response to the post directly above - there have been true paradigm shifts resulting in incommensurability in empirical sciences - so that first statement isn't entirely true. The same observable effects are explain by a new theory, but the old isn't necessarily incorporated. Vitalism or phlogiston-theory, anyone. Internal consistency is of tantamount importance in philosophy.

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Comment #140042 by MPhil on March 7, 2008 at 12:07 am

Feynman - although I greatly admire him - was one of those people who do lots of philosophy without realizing it - and then slander philosophy.

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Comment #140040 by MPhil on March 7, 2008 at 12:05 am

Every observation is theory laden because we automatically, even unconsciously categorize what we observe. And more, for example when we search for Higgs-particles in the LHC, the observations me make by that already depend on all the theory that is behind the LHC and how to interpret the output of the apparatus.

Investigating how and why observation is theory laden, and what this tells us about reality and our comprehension - is also philosophy.

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Comment #140033 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 11:59 pm

Also, for just observing the world by investigating it - Asking ourself questions about nature, not simply accepting a position upfront... it is important that we refine our questions, ask the right ones. Another part of what philosophy does - no matter who does it.

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Comment #140032 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 11:57 pm

Add to that - we all do philosophy of religion on this site. Some more intuitively, some more technically, all from more or less different perspectives.


The point about methodological naturalism and "not worrying about labels" makes me think of one of the most important realizations I've ever had (not that I came up with it, I got confronted with it):

"Every observation is theory-laden"

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Comment #140027 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 11:53 pm

I just hope I don't end up with a person whom I value and respect very much thinking that what I do and chose as a career is useless, worthless production of hot air. That would be really depressing.

This isn't meant as an argument (I have already produced some), merely as an expression of my feelings.

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Comment #140023 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 11:49 pm

Nothing alone does justice to the full strangeness of reality, probably not even all human thinking about it combined.

I also disagree that It is like saying "You can't think that because it contradicts the idea that the world is flat."

We know with maximum possible certainty of anything about the empirical realm that the earth isn't flat. It's more like saying "You have no justification for thinking that because it contradicts the idea that the world is not flat. Unless you can produce evidence that demonstrates that we are justified in thinking that the world is flat, your argument is unsubstantiated."

The -isms and -ists are only meant to simplify discourse for those who use certain well-defined concepts extremely often in discourse.

I fully agree with cartomancer - it's not about the signifiers. But I don't think any of my arguments genuinely give the appearence of that.

When I say "Well, that's dualism" I could as well say "P stricly implies the following statements: Q, R, S and at least for one of them we have no sufficient justification. Therefore by modus tollens we have no sufficient justification for believing P".

If Q, R or S (or a combination) are generally referred to as dualism, using that term makes things easier.


And I agree, I too sometimes push an idea with a lot of effort just so as to see where it leads and how justified it is.

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Comment #139989 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 11:04 pm

But words - or more generally Symbols - are our only way of referring to things. And languages, whether natural or formal - are what we use to formulate, manipulate and communicate ideas.

The laws we assume in empirical sciences are formulated in a language. Every observation is when it becomes data. We evaluate things through it... and we can use it properly or improperly.

None of the philosophers I know investigate reality simply by using words and thinking about it. The data and findings of empirical sciences almost always play a very important role.

Part of philosophy is to investigate the questions we ask - and refine them. Separating the meaningful from the meaningless statement.

We won't get very far without thinking and evaluating our thinking - and that is exactly what philosophy does. The term "labels" is very often used as if putting names on things was a bad idea, and sometimes it is - when it limits our thinking.

But terms, labels, names all fulfil a very important rule... without them much of what we call thinking would be impossible. They are our way of referring to things. And they don't need to limit our thinking. Philosophy is always also about clarifying our thinking.

As I said before on this thread - every time you move to the meta-level of any science or investigation, what you're doing is philosophy. Philosophy was the mother of all modern sciences - and not for no reason at all.

When you talk about science vs pseudoscience, about mind-brain relations, about what numbers are, about what properties are and what nature is, about why theism is untenable - what you do is philosophy. All of science can be included in its arguments. It can attempts to unify thinking.

So, no. I am not infuriated. I am saddened and disappointed that you are beginning to dismiss something because you think certain labels and terms are useless. You're throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

You don't need to use labels, they just make communication more effective. Instead of asking "Are you really the one whose DNA structure contained in a sperm cell recombined with that of another member of our species of the opposite sex, in an ovary, whereupon..." You ask "Are you really my father?"
Not to mention that even the first, long, statement contains a huge number of labels.

Could it be (and this is not an accusation but a genuine question) that you are beginning to dislike philosophy because it requires that fuzzy, intuitive ideas be put into arguments with a logical structure and well-defined terms - and you can find none that do justice to your intuitions?

Well, this is only a problem if you think intuition is somehow more valuable than real arguments and critical thinking.

Whenever we evaluate ideas - criticize or praise, we are doing not only what philosophy does, but also what philosophy studies. And it can be studied with all the level of clarity and exactness that can be achieved anywhere. Of course many don't do so - just as many people make bogus "science".

Interestingly, what you're doing in that post is also philosophy - metaphilosophy to be exact. And I fear that not thinking critically about how precise or fuzzy we use our language won't do much good.

Languages, whether formal or natural - are our way of formulating, modifying and expressing ideas. They are meant reflect what's out there. In them we construct arguments, which can be valid or not and sound or not. Investigating this will - I think - always be required.

But I hope that in the end you won't throw out the baby with the bathwater, I hope you will find that critical thinking about ideas is valuable, which is what philosophy is at its core.

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Comment #139983 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 10:15 pm

I wouldn't even have gotten as far as playing LARPGs if what you described hadn't had an immense appeal for me :)

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Comment #139973 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 9:30 pm

Had a glimpse into Cthulu once - wasn't my thing back then, neither was Warhammer. Don't know "Five Rings"... but Masquerade - that was my kind of thing (as I used to be - and for this I am ashamed - a big "Interview with a Vampire" fan).

Aah, the memories...

Oh yes, indeed... especially the memories of the live-rpgs are extremely vivid. Walking through dark forests in a winter night, clad in chain mail... a few comrades, a lantern and our trusted latex swords :) - searching for a band of dark wizards and their myrmidons, about to do an invocatio daemoni.

And the nights sitting by the fire, drinking mead and bear...

...to be 16 once again.

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Comment #139968 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 8:53 pm

Oh, I forgot: On the English-speaking market, "The Dark Eye" is also known as "Realms of Arkania".

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Comment #139966 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 8:43 pm

Nothing to be ashamed about...

I was an RPG freak for a few years as well. I played "The Dark Eye" (perhaps you know it), the most prominent German RPG, and altogether an improvement upon D&D. I did some sessions of Vampires and Shadowrun and even participated in 3 Live-RPGs.

For one of those Live-RPGs we rented several square kilometres of forest, including a building from the 1850s... in winter. Minus 14 degrees Celsius at night. For another, we rented an entire castle from the 17th century for two days. It was great fun.

Add to that that I'm a science-'freak'. I loved to read Hawking when I was 14. Also, I have been a Star Trek fan since I was 7.

So I have a very large amount of geekery in my blood as well. But I balance it with long hair, a motorcycle (this model: Hyosung GV 650)
and being a singer and guitarist of classical and spanish music as well as rock and metal (mostly progressive)
Oh, and I did also practice kickboxing for 8 years... :)

A good balance I think - but still, geekery is very much a part of me.

Anyway, it was just meant to be a joke.

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Comment #139963 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 8:20 pm

Podaar,

a moving story.
My girlfriend happens to be from a deeply religious family as well. She was indoctrinated ever since early childhood - and is a choir member, works with children-groups at church and whatnot.

It took about two months of being together with me until she became an atheist. But she hasn't told her family yet. I know them and think they're generally very nice people. I even was a classmate of her older sister for 3 years.
She has a very loving relationship with her family - but she thinks (and sadly, I believe her) that they could never accept her being an atheist. She thinks they would be so immensely disappointed, enraged and sad that they couldn't accept it.

One night she lay in my arms - and cried for an hour because of this.

I cannot tell you how much I hate religion for that!


Maybe your story might help - how did your wife handle that?

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Comment #139961 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 8:12 pm

Hmm...

"Gavin Cartomancer", what a name!
;)

Straight out of a bad session of D&D :)

1116. A New Pope

Comment #139956 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 8:04 pm

Absolutely brilliant. saw this on pharyngula two days ago... laughed so hard I cried. To an alien visiting earth, this would be no stranger than what's really going on.

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Comment #139947 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 7:28 pm

Bonzai,

now that information is really, really sickening.
My goodness! More reason to "give it everything we got".

And "Baby Bible Bashers" is even worse than Jesus Camp... have you seen it? If not, do so - but only if you have a stomach strong enough for something worse than Jesus Camp.

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Comment #139938 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 7:11 pm

black wolf,

you reminded me that there's a difference I forgot to mention:

Germany is a federal republic... so the education policy and curricula are different from state to state. And in Bavaria, where I live, it's worst - the Christian Party has had a 2/3 majority in every state election, although the capital city, Munich has had a middle-left local government ever since the end of the war.

I live in a rather moderate part of Bavaria, but still religious education-curricula are made by the Bavarian government and the teachers are trained by the churches. RE is split into lutherean protestant and catholic.

Until a few years ago, there were crosses in every bavarian classroom - now they must get removed if a parent complains. But in many rural areas the religiosity is so high that this isn't done and RE can be taught as indoctrinating as possible.

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Comment #139936 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 7:06 pm

MPhil,

Is the religious education in Deutschland done with a historical slant or with intent to make "believers" out of the children? I think more of a religious history approach to things may have some positive aspects... maybe that religious education is related someway to your society being highly secular?

(Trying to give you some reason to hope... is it helping?...If not, may I suggest kicking back a Paulaner Hefe-Weizen? That always makes me feel better!)

Thank's!

I don't drink beer, though (only the occasional Kilkenny :)

I think I'm going to make myself a nice Cocktail - A Cuba Libre or Touchdown maybe. Although if the level of despair rises, I might need a Long Island Iced Tea or a Zombie. Fortunately, I have all the ingredients here :)


On the topic of Religious Education - yes, for the most part it is indoctrinating. I have had religious education in school for 7 years. The teachers have to be approved by the church - that alone says something. They mostly tell biblical stories, discuss how god did this and that, what and who god is etc.

They do however also take a look (a glimpse) at other religions. And only in the highest grades (10-12) is criticism of religion discussed. The test of course reflect the curriculum. But grading is often very dependent on the teacher - much more than in other subjects.

In the lower grades, you must write tests about what the bible and the dogmas say, in the grades where criticism and other religions are discussed - you have to present and evaluate their arguments.

But since the teacher is religious and the indoctrination has been done from grade 1 to grade 9 at least - you can imagine what that looks like.

Although, there have been students who were agnostic or atheists and who took RE nevertheless - and they mostly passed the tests. Still, I find it depressing.

The society is highly secular because the central European brand of Christianity is very benign and mostly not political at all. Although there are certifiable nutjobs, they are a minority. Sadly, a growing minority.


....gonna make myself a cocktail now.

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Comment #139931 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 6:55 pm

Well, McCain has pandered to the religious right. He was criticized by his party-members for distancing himself from them earlier - then he gently approached them again. Still, I think he would keep them under control, yes.

However, that doesn't mean the last statement of your first paragraph is correct. Some aspects of American religiosity you just don't get in central Europe. For any political candidate, the maximum they could get away with and still be elected would be "Mosques should be no higher than churches because of our Christian cultural heritage" - and the only ones who would even make that a topic in the election are the far right candidates.

Also, here in Germany, anything like Jesus Camp or Baby Bible Bashers is frankly unimaginable and would be frowned upon by everyone. In fact, even the evangelical protestants say about Jesus camp "That is so far out it doesn't represent our position at all".

Also, biblical literalism is almost entirely unheard of - in fact, I have never even heard of ANYONE claiming absolute biblical literalism, with Young Earth Creationism and all that.

Also, there is not a substantial percentage of people who believe that Jesus will come back to earth in their lifetime. In fact, never heard of anyone claiming that as well.

No one would claim that their nation has "God's chosen people" living in them.


Look at the numbers of what percentage of people believe in evolution, unguided evolution, biblical literalism etc.


There IS a substantial difference. And I for one think it has a lot to do with population-density, education-system, and the fact that in the US, religion is free market enterprise and uses all the advertising techniques and psychological advertisement-tricks they can.

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Comment #139917 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 5:59 pm

Great, now please can we have the same in Germany?

Doubt it will happen - after all, the strongest party in Germany is actually called "Christian Democratic Union", and it's Bavarian local counterpart (even more conservative) is the "Christian Social Union".

They would never approve. Another obstacle is that our blasphemy law is linked to "disturbance of the peace".

It forbids insulting or slandering any religious world-view in a way that is "apt to cause a disturbance of the peace".

This way the religious can always argue that this paragraph protects not the religious world-view, but public peace.

This is ludicrous, ridiculous, it's insulting and maddening! What this paragraph we in Germany states is nothing less that "Well, you cannot trust the religious not to resort to disturbing the public peace when their religion gets insulted, but we won't punish them, we'll punish whoever does something that COULD make them disturb the public peace"

I mean, does it get any more ridiculous, patronizing, condescending and insulting?

Sadly, there's currently NO PARTY that even plans on doing something against that.

Oh, and of course - religious education is part of the mandatory curriculum at public schools here (although you can take Ethics or Philosophy instead - but only if you're over 14 and officially declare that you no longer want to participate in religious education. If you're under 14, your parents get to decide.)

And all this although we have a very secular society.

Sometimes I really get desperate and depressed.

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Comment #139915 by MPhil on March 6, 2008 at 5:47 pm

Dr. Benway,

just so you know: You are responsible for my resurfacing addiction to LOLcats...

thanks!

:)

________________________________


Steve,

I just sent you a PM.

Furthermore... you made a Star Trek reference! You've made my day!

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Comment #139440 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 8:49 pm

Although, when we consider going about our day-to-day activities, ignorant of 99.9% (sorry, no reference for that figure) of factors that cause us to act the way we do, this feeling of 'freedom' keeps us moving 'forward' and all is 'well'.

I think that knowing the exact causes would also take up much to much computational resources (if it isn't impossible - it seems to be a self-reference problem) and thus render us incapable of action.

The phenomena don't change when we have the knowledge that free will in the classical sense is impossible - so yes, "all is well" :)

robotaholic,
I agree - although sometimes arguments can be fun. Destroying the concepts that are god's supposed attributes always produces interesting responses - it's sort of a "what ridiculous excuse will they come up with next". But the thought that people actually think their arguments are sound is worrying.
I never liked the concept of worship as well - sure, as a kid you worship idols - and many adults do as well, but I think genuine worship requires the most blatant black and white worldview. Affection, respect, gratitude, even honouring someone - all okay with me. But worship? That excludes even the possibility for critique.

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Comment #139424 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 7:37 pm

Damn, Goldy

I would love to see that. Can't anyone record it?
Or do you happen to know online resources for that research... ?

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Comment #139414 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 7:01 pm

I think the point about hypnosis actually supports my argument. The fact that we behave in a way that we assume free will (and don't even know what that's supposed to be, since it cannot be uncaused causality) doesn't mean that we aren't determined on various levels.

As a fellow eliminative materialist, I guess you have read Churchland. If not - it's really worth it. Highly informative.

And I'm glad someone else enjoyed RoboMary :)

Gonna go get my mind off things by playing some FPS now... be back later.

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Comment #139411 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 6:56 pm

Addendum:

"Could have done otherwise"

This is assumed to mean "If a was in the same situation again, could I have acted differently"?
What does this mean - what is held fixed here?
The exact same conditions? Every molecule in the same place with the same impulse? Every neural activity the same? The same motor-neuron activity? The same reasons to do what you did? That would be impossible - as in any way there must have been a sufficient cause, otherwise we deny causation altogether.

So, what else could it mean? "The same hard facts about the past, but not the same 'inner states'"? Same problem as above.

Free will as uncaused causation is an idea that cannot be taken seriously.

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Comment #139407 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 6:48 pm

Yes, the links are necessary for the action/decision.
We as a spatio-temporal entity (that area of space-time that is us) are where certain other causal chains branch off - some of which through our conscious actions. In that sense (and in that sense only) we are the originators.

You are still attempting to argue against compatibilism by presupposing incompatibilism.

Do we have free will? If you're an incompatibilist, the answer is "no"... and the fact that we "feel" otherwise is not an argument against that, since we principally (from a hypothetical position of far more advanced neuroscience) could explain why we do so. So we can account for that, too without assuming indeterminism.

If you're a compatibilist, the answer is "yes".

Still, the main point is: A concept that requires "free will" to be uncaused causation is impossible, so it must be false.

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Comment #139406 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 6:42 pm

Ah, the old "could have done otherwise" requirement.

I really do suggest you read "Elbow room" - Dennett deals with that problem, in short he says "could have done otherwise" is not really important, because it is not necessary or sufficient for giving us anything that we would in the end want from free will.

Our faculties enable us to avoid certain events that wouldn't be avoided without them. Imagine someone throws something at you and you duck away from it. You avoided being hit by it, - and your nervous system has to perform extremely intricate procedures to do so. Would they not have worked, you couldn't have avoided that. But we are "future producing machines"... our rationality enables us to make predictions about future events and enables us to devise strategies and thus act in a way so as to bring about certain states and avoid others.

The problem here is our perspective. We are always looking backwards.
Kierkegaard has a wonderful quote here:

"Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards".

When we reflect on our actions and decisions, we always reflect backwards (that's after all what "reflect" means). But what would "could have done otherwise" mean here? It would mean changing the past - which is impossible. However, through our predictive faculties, we can avoid possible future events. Once we have done, there is only one actual past. But I see no problem with this.

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Comment #139404 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 6:33 pm

The question "do we have free will" depends on what you think "free will" means. Uncaused, spontaneous causation? Then no, plus it wouldn't be what we want. If I go on the roof, strip naked and recite a prayer and you asked me "Why did you do that?" and I would answer "There was no cause, therefore no reason, it was sponateous. A true act of free will." You would think that would be a sign of genuine madness, rather than a prime example of free will.
What we want from free will seems to be
1) being the originators of our actions and
2) By virtue of that being responsible.

Both can be gotten in a deterministic universe, since we are a functional system, and it is the exact functional composition of atoms that is us that determines our actions. So while we are also caused, none of the things in the causal chain that culminates in my physical body before that physical body could have brought about that action. The links in the temporal chain of causation that happen in us are necessary.
So in that sense, we are the originators - and by virtue of our faculties of reason, we can be held responsible.

Plus, of course - uncaused causation within spacetime is impossible.

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Comment #139401 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 6:22 pm

robotaholic,

I don't think there's a real problem here once we accept classical and/or stochastic determinism. We don't 'know from experience' that we are free - it is just part of our modus operandi because we don't know the future.
I also think this is a problem of language - or more precisely of the supposed ontological implications of the everyday terms we use to describe and understand our consciousness and actions.

Also, compatibilism seems viable - we just have to revise our concept of "freedom". With that concept, acting under the assumption of free will is no longer a contradiction.

Anyhow - the "free will" of our unrefined everyday concepts, the underlying assumption for our unrefined reflections is impossible.

It would be "uncaused causation"...violating the first law of thermodynamics.

Have you read "Elbow room" by Dan Dennett?

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Comment #139396 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 5:57 pm

Frankus, I am in Germany... but I have a skewed sleeping rhythm at the moment...I went to sleep at one in the afternoon, and got up at seven... So sadly, I'm not tired at all right now.

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Comment #139390 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 5:41 pm

Do you agree that you will never have the experience of anyone else as physical brain structures are unique?

I might have something similar where structures and inputs are similar (such as you and me seeing the same red rose), but not identical unless a compelte functionally identical process could be made to occur in my brain - which just might be possible in a super sci-fi future.

But that would just be a single identical sensation - since the context is important, and determined by your past experience which is also coded in your brain structure, it wouldn't have the same effect in me as it would in you.

So basically, yes - I agree. Just as every physical process is unique, though many might belong to the same type and thus be similar.

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Comment #139388 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 5:27 pm

Addendum: And it's not merely about thoughts, but about sensations.

I say that a sensation is identical to (type of) process in the brain, while Steve says it can't be because if you have a description of the process, you don't have a description of the sensation.

My answer is that this argument begs the question. If they are one and the same thing, and thus if his experiences and reports of them can be correctly predicted from observing his brain (in a hypothetical world where we have complete knowledge of the brain), there is nothing left to be explained.

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Comment #139386 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 5:23 pm

Frankus,

I think you are correct, because the qualitative experiences are identical to the processes. And having them described is not going through these processes.

The qualitative nature of consciousness is another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour.

That is what Steve and other property dualists are denying. I say either we don't need to assume them at all - or they can be described as such.

Steve thinks that the fact that a complete description of these processes given to me doesn't make me go through these processes is an argument that the experiences supposedly described by describing these processes are in fact not describable.

I have likened this to saying that the fact that I am not fusing hydrogen to helium while being given a complete description is somehow taken to be an argument for the incompleteness of the description.

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Comment #139380 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 5:06 pm

Not sure they even would get that from the data. But if the data correctly predicts all of your behaviour - including your having and reporting certain experiences, then there is no gap - then the explanation is complete.


Seems that this and the "is property dualism materialistic" is where we disagree. To me, it is exactly like vitalism. If it cannot possibly be described completely by any future language of natural sciences, it's not naturalistic. Emergent phenomena such as temperature, or mitosis can.
Alright then, good night.

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Comment #139369 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 4:41 pm

No amount of pointing at the mapping would, it seem to me, be able to convey the experience.

Hace you read the RoboMary paper? It's not as good as others, but it is an outline.

I think the problem is not insoluble. Even assume that there are such experiences, I think that either we wouldn't need to be able to make others feel what it's like just by getting the physical description - they would just have to be able to deduce from the data that you would report such and such an experience. This would be proof that such a complete account also includes the behaviour you ascribe to these experiences.

The other option is explored briefly in RoboMary.

But if you genuinely think it impossible to map talk of these experiences to talk about the physical processes - than this is genuinely property dualism:

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Whereas predicate dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of predicates in our language, property dualism says that there are two essentially different kinds of property out in the world. Property dualism can be seen as a step stronger than predicate dualism. Although the predicate 'hurricane' is not equivalent to any single description using the language of physics, we believe that each individual hurricane is nothing but a collection of physical atoms behaving in a certain way: one need have no more than the physical atoms, with their normal physical properties, following normal physical laws, for there to be a hurricane. One might say that we need more than the language of physics to describe and explain the weather, but we do not need more than its ontology. There is token identity between each individual hurricane and a mass of atoms, even if there is no type identity between hurricanes as kinds and some particular structure of atoms as a kind. Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there. The irreducible language is not just another way of describing what there is, it requires that there be something more there than was allowed for in the initial ontology. Until the early part of the twentieth century, it was common to think that biological phenomena ('life') required property dualism (an irreducible 'vital force'), but nowadays the special physical sciences other than psychology are generally thought to involve only predicate dualism. In the case of mind, property dualism is defended by those who argue that the qualitative nature of consciousness is not merely another way of categorizing states of the brain or of behaviour, but a genuinely emergent phenomenon.

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Comment #139351 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 4:20 pm

Thanks for the discussion... I expect I will need your help with other debates soon, if you don't mind :)

Thanks be to you, too. And no, of course I don't mind, as long as I don't have to help compose arguments for something I don't believe in ;)

I certainly don't want you to be all tired and thus not being able to enjoy the return of your husband... it's enough that I'm a having a completely inverted sleeping rhythm than my girlfriend - no need to make you suffer through that as well :)

Good night!

My wife never listens to me when I try to do that. What's your secret?

Good one!

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Comment #139348 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 4:17 pm

No, as it is a result of, and follows, natural law.

That's the crux. In that case, it would have to be possible to describe it as such - and that would mean the possibility of mapping.

What is the problem with saying that "that which it is like for you to expereice x" is also describable as neurphysiological states?

Your mental states are just physical states and processes, but they are there.

Wouldn't that be a viable compromise for you? You get to keep your experiences while I get to have them be mappable to physical processes and states and thus not a different non-physical property?

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Comment #139344 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 4:01 pm

I feel you still need to deal with the solipsism issue - where is this certainty that other minds exist, and it isn't illusion?

If you can't provide irrefutable evidence, then surely you have to concede that you can conceive of only first-person experiences - yours!

See above - your concept of "mind" which is essential to that argument already presupposes that every account I gave is inconclusive because it leaves out the first-person perspective.


The thing is, my position does not say that there isn't a first person perspective - a complete neuroscience would explain why this "observer perspective" comes about, because it is identical to certain processes. What I am denying is that there are things this perspective picks up which cannot be observed from third person, because the first person perspective is certain neurophysiological processes.

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Comment #139338 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:53 pm

The problem of solipsism doesn't disappear unless you can prove beyond any doubt that another mind exists, and that would require evidence that was beyond question.

And yet again this argument presupposes a conception of the mind that denies my position. That is what begging the question means.

But you don't seem to be able or willing to acknowledge that there is a presupposition here.

Let's compromise. You can call my position what you like, as long as you don't call it supernatural :)

I'm afraid "first-person only"-access phenomena - something outside the grasp of any possible future empirical science qualifies as supernatural.


I have arrived at a position where I think it's useless to further restate our differences.

But what I would be interested in is knowing what changed your mind, since not so long ago you mentioned in a PM that the discussions with me and the papers I referenced had "helped to eradicate the qualia-based non-materialism" (or something to that effect)

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Comment #139333 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:44 pm

We have private experiences, not accessible by others.

I don't think we do. And from your perspective, "who are you to tell me what is or is not going on in my head" :)

It is again presupposing. I don't have these experiences, I don't make these observation.
You can call me a liar or ignorant, just as a theist can call me a liar or ignorant when I say that God has not privately revealed himself to me.

Furthermore - observation means that there is something that can be observed. If that something is physical, it can be observed from a third-person perspective. If it cannot be thus observed, it isn't - and you have (in your case property) dualism.

I disagree. That is only for evidence of phenomena that we want to demonstrate to others. It is quite reasonable to experiment with one's own mind and draw (careful) conclusions from that without reference to anyone else

I'm sorry, because I know this reply will very probably disappoint you, but this is a classic example of begging the question. This is not an argument against my position, but a simple presupposition of yours.

Look at all the empirical sciences - is there anything that gets to be called data or evidence which is not even in principle accessible by more than one person? No. Your statement just claims that there is something like that and it gets to be called data or evidence - an observation.


We are getting absolutely nowhere. I have made my case and presented my evidence - ie that we do not have evidence of what you claim you observe.

You say that we cannot, because it's private. No discussion possible. You cannot produce evidence to me, I cannot convince you since your position ex hypothesi does not allow evidence to the contrary.

Let me ask you the question you have been asking a lot on these boards: What evidence would you have to be presented with by anyone to convince you that you are wrong?

That's right - assumption of entities or phenomena solely accessible from a first-person perspective can per definition not be challenged by evidence as it is understood by empirical sciences.

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Comment #139328 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:30 pm

Steve, there are certainties - namely just the ones you are assuming to prove your point: conceptual necessities (which you assume to show that a position is self-contradictory).

I don't assume anything. I just try and explain observation.

I think you do assume, by claiming that there is something you observe going on in you which I cannot observe going on in you.

We have experiences which we assume are the observation of the effects of physical processes.

I could just rephrase that and the problem - including that of the supposed possibility of solipsism - would disappear: We are just carrying out processes that are complex representations - which can differ in accuracy - of the effects of physical processes.

What this shows is not that any one position is correct, but that the way you conceive these things does in fact presuppose the correctness of what you are trying to show, just as the above presupposes its fallaciousness.

What this means is that we do indeed have to use science. But according to your view, the observations you make are not accessible by science, since they are only observable from a first-person perspective.It is thus unscientific in the same way as "personal revelation of god".

Doesn't mean it cannot be true, just that no one but you can have sufficient justification for assuming that god has revealed himself to you - or that you have private, ineffable, intrinsic qualitative experiences.

Reverting to everyday language, the reason why I say that we generally can and must assume the reliability of these representations is that they are about intersubjectively observably phenomena that directly influence us. If they were generally unreliable, they would have gone extinct in evolution.
But introspection is not in that way crucial to survival.


What I have been attempting to do for dozens of posts now is make you realize that your position is property dualism, and not materialism as you claim.

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Comment #139321 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:16 pm

Bonzai,

You are the one who is spreading propaganda. You obfuscate the issue with big words and use dismissive terms like "magic" to attack others who disagree with your philosophical dogmas.

Most definitely not.
And actually, I have absolutely no quarry with the second part of your post. In fact it kind of what I'm trying to say.

You're absolutely right - it's a mapping problem.
Yes, I accept biology/psychology (just let me use this term to denote a field of inquiry that uses terms about the 'mental') as a valid field. But I do think it is principally reducible to physics/neuroscience. The point about the complete language was that you cannot map biology on physics unless your language of physics includes the means to provide a description onto which the biological descriptions can be mapped.

The point about identity was, and I stand by it - is that this mapping, this reduction means that are not two classes of phenomena, two different kinds of things (properties or substances), but only the physical. Different phenomena of it are being described by different languages (biology, chemistry, psychology), but if we had a complete science of physics, we would have to be able to map talk about the 'higher-level' phenomena such as in chemistry, biology and psychology, top talk about physical processes.

The identity of phenomena is there. There are no two different kinds of substances - the physical and the biological, no different phenomena. There's just different ways of describing the same kind of phenomena.

My only point - and this is not dogma - is that what gets to be called evidence or data and therefore phenomena needs to be observable from a third person perspective. This is what all the empirical sciences have in common.

If the mapping can be done (which in materialism it would have to), then there would be a very very long tuple of statements in the language of physics that would describe a phenomeneon such as maiosis, the description of which in biology would be much shorter.

So I do agree with you completely - but I think you draw unwarranted conclusions from the facts you correctly assume:

The possibility of complete mapping means that there is only one thing, not two things. The entities studied by biology are not of a different kind than the entities studied by physics - they are physical entities and phenomena, observable from a third person perspective. And that is what I meant by identity.

So the claim that qualia are not reducible denies the possibility in principle of this mapping.
Saying that there is something which cannot be observed from any third person perspective is a non-falsifiable hypothesis - the analogy with the theist claiming personal revelation from god as evidence is correct.
This is what I was attacking.

As for concepts, the short version is they are areas around prototype points in the activation space of the output coding vector room of neural networks. Maybe Steve could send you the neurosemantics-article by Churchland I sent him. It would be a little much for me to explain that here in detail.

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Comment #139305 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 2:42 pm

Do you think that we will ever reach a point where it would be impossible to be a solipsist, as there will be sufficient unquestionable evidence of the existence of other people's experiences?

We already have. We know part of what goes in someone's brain that is identical to experience.
We know that the same type of processes go on in every working human brain. Solipsism means that only my mind exists, and I cannot even be sure that my body does.

This is again question begging - it is a consequence of the impossible cartesian dualism, and thus presupposes it.


Think about it this way. You assume qualia - surely they have effects? Your experience, your "what it is like" has a functional role, it influences the information processing, doesn't it?
Information processing is a physical process. But if qualia aren't identical to physical processes and yet influence them, there's a violation of the 1st law of thermodynamics.

Of course you can assume epiphenomenal qualia, but that would mean "Well, it's there - I have qualia, you cannot observe them, but they're there. What? No, you cannot observe their effects either you big silly - you can only observe effects of physical processes, remember the first law of thermodynamics? Why you would need to assume they exist? Because I know they do - immediately, intrinsically, ineffably, privately."

It is a claim that something exists which I could never even in principle observe - a non-falsifiable hypothesis.

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Comment #139303 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 2:32 pm

Bonzai,

you are producing propaganda, not arguments - and certainly not evidence. You are name-calling and making vapid assertions to defend magic. It's absurd.

The analogy with biology and physics is faulty - yes, all processes are physical processes, so from a hypothetically perspective of perfect knowledge about physics, statements in these other sciences would have to be reducible to statements in the language of physics. But we don't have a complete language -

But you see fit to therefore introduce magic. This is the absurd position, not mine.

Let me say it again - in materialism, everything that exists must be principally (but not necessarily practically) observable from a third-person perspective. Biological phenomena are, chemical phenomena are - quantum phenomena are.

There is data there. You cannot call something "data" or "evidence" if you cannot 'show' someone. It's just like the theist saying "Well, god revealed himself privately to me - in fact, he privately reveals himself to you, so your position that he doesn't exist is absurd, you just deny that there is evidence."


Are you high again? - Your propaganda and derision make it seem like you are.

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Comment #139300 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 2:21 pm

Allow me to present you with this billion-page description of the neural firing patterns of a bats brain when it senses a moth using sonar.

So now you know what it feels like to "see" that moth using echolocation?

No, because there is no such thing as "what if feels like". But if I do speak the language of this description perfectly, ex hypothesi I have complete knowledge of how bats recognize things through echolocation.

I know you will want to say that you do experience that there is something it is like - but you too have made the point that our introspective sense is no more, perhaps even less reliable than our other senses.


Going back to the temperature analogy and emergence. It still seems you are missing the point of my argument, at least your objections make it look like that's the case.
I really think there is an aspect you're missing. I will try to reformulate it again.

Temperature can be completely identified as a a certain physical process, and thus completely described in the language of physics. It is accessible from a third person perspective.

The property you ascribe to a certain type of information processing, unless - and this is what I have been trying to say all along - it is a property that can be principally observed and described from a third-person perspective (which identity would provide)... is incompatible with materialism.

I'm sorry to say it appears that you have been avoiding this all along.
If it isn't at least principally observable and describable from a third person perspective - it is not compatible with materialism.

Temperature is, entropy is, information is. We can observe a system and determine and completely describe it's information and temperature.

There is a real category mistake if some property not determinable from a third-person perspective is ascribed to a physical system, as physical systems per definition are.

The 'Mary' thought experiment - as Frank Jackson himself realized at some point - the argument you used (and which I quoted above) assumes from the outset that there is something that cannot be explained from a third person perspective. The existence of something that cannot even in principle be observed and described from a third-person perspective is genuinely incompatible with materialism.

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Comment #139027 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:39 am

MaxD,

I am at the moment too tired and exhausted from my very entertaining debate with Steve to compose a rebuttal of that email you posted. If you're interested, I could PM you my thoughts on it when I get around to it.

-Michael

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Comment #139026 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:31 am

(by the way, although I think this is more on topic than some discussions on this thread, perhaps it is time to take a vote to see if anyone else is interested in reading this. If not, it may be more appropriate to continue by e-mail)

True, so let's hear it...

Still going to answer that post though :)

It's only stimulus-response between different nerve cells.

I think you're simplifying here. The structure and medium of inner feedback mechanisms is different that inter-personal communication. For inter-personal communication, there have to be two distinct 'processors', each with internal feedback. For internal feedback the individual participants aren't 'full processors', they are parts of system, and thus don't have the functional structure of the entire system.

The structure of 'inner' signal-communication is routing in neural networks, the structure of inter-personal communication is the form of the communication (chatter, formal debate etc), the medium is synaptic in one case, air, electrons or paper (etc) in the other.


Furthermore, in 'inner communication' between two unique participants, not every response is again a stimulus for the other participant.

Also, even within one complex system, information doesn't have to be processed in the whole system. My graphics card doesn't process the sound-signals - my visual centre doesn't process the information in my Broca's area.

Most importantly - the information flow between you and me is incomplete. Since you receive different stimuli than me and the structure of your brain is different from both mine ans everything in between us - you process other information differently. There is no neuronal pathway between your Broca's area and mine. So there really is no mystery here.

One particle is simple. Add a few more and you "suddenly" get "temperature". Something new appears, but there is no magic.

That analogy does not address the central issue. In the case of temperature, it is the interaction in a system that has the property 'temperature', which is a property of physical systems.

What you seem to claim is that suddenly, a physical system has a nonphysical property, not reducible to physical properties. You seem to be disregarding the fact that this is a huge category mistake.

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Comment #139011 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 3:02 am

For computers, it doesn't. The company Sun Microsystems has a slogan: "the network IS the computer".

Okay, then for the sake of argument, assume a computer not connected to the internet.

What interests me is what it would feel like to have some kind of "network" between two brains.

Well - in a less literal sense, you have this every time. There is a connection of stimulus-response between me and someone I'm talking to. His response is my stimulus and vice versa.

I believe qualia are to do with information processing, and "fusion" isn't that.

Unless you really do want that "And then a miracle occurs"/"Here's where the magic ingredient is added", information processing would generally have to be qualia.

Why should there be anything it is like to process information - my digital watch has qualia?

If with a certain kind of information processing it suddenly 'becomes like something' to do that, that would be exactly "And this is where the magic ingredient is added". But we don't believe in magic.

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Comment #139003 by MPhil on March 5, 2008 at 2:49 am

I mean qualia is private in the sense that the conditions, contained within a certain timeframe, that caused the qualia, once had, has passed. And any description will be incomplete or attempt to recreate that specific qualia be futile. All the information and material that alligned at that moment in time is unrecoverable, therefore is private to the brain that experienced that moment of qualia.

Again, that would just be "unique" - like every instantiation of a physical process is.

Then, either all physical processes are private, or qualia aren't, because in materialism, qualia must be physical. Saying that there are mental processes that have attributes which physical processes cannot don't have (being private) would deny materialism.

So, if you want to maintain 'privacy' for qualia - this privacy would be the privacy of a fusion reaction in a star - not something intrinsic to minds, as that would deny materialism. This is analytically true - you cannot get around this.

If you want to maintain that every instantiation of a physical process is somehow private - that's your prerogative, I would think it an odd use of the word - but in that sense I guess it would be true.

If however you do want to deny this, please adress the real issue - how this is compatible with materialism, as it cannot be non-reductive.