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Comments by MPhil


1201. Fleabytes

Comment #138774 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:16 pm

I think the problem with a lot of religious thought is in that it creates a disfunctional feedback loop onto reality.

I pretty much agree. Religious thought hijacks standard thought functions.


Agreed. And that's just in addition to the religious beliefs coming from a not reliably truth-producing mechanism (indoctrination or non-indoctrinated delusion).

1202. Fleabytes

Comment #138771 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:14 pm

Addendum to my last post:

The sensory inputs which together with our genes determine the exact structure of our brains is largely uniform and systematic. And it is furthermore not merely nonintentional - ever since civilisation and especially language arose, a large proportion of the sensory inputs that structure your brain intentionally condition for specific outcomes: You are being taught things. And even the nonintentional stimuli (as for example when you just mimic behaviour of other humans without them specifically wanting you to) conditions for things like language, reason, artistic behaviour etc.

1203. Fleabytes

Comment #138762 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:07 pm



Why 'non-specifically' aren't genes and genetic code conditioned specifically by the environment in which they exist? If one says non-specifically at a certain level then isn't that implying some sort of 'ghost in the machine'?


Well, that's not what I meant.
What I meant was that the DNA by far doesn't contain enough information to code for every synapse and every synaptic weight, even if all of the genetic code was only coding for that.
The DNA codes for the ability to make synaptic connections and to weigh the synapses, but it's the environmental (the sensory) input that determines what connections are made and what their weights are.
The synapses and their weights are the structure of our brain, and thereby also the structure of our mind, since they are identical.


No magic, no ghost in the machine.

1204. Fleabytes

Comment #138758 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 7:04 pm

It's just how you came by that belief and whether it's supported by chains of evidence or taken as an article of faith that matters.


That's one epistemological theory.

For the diversity of views (non of which are unproblematic), see the wonderful reader (filled with original papers by all the greats) "Knowledge: Readings in contemporary epistemology":

http://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Contemporary-Epistemology-Sven-Bernecker/dp/019875261X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1204685784&sr=8-1

I personally think that the belief must have been arrived at by a sufficiently reliable mechanism (but many things can count as that, even mechanisms we don't understand).

Furthermore, while I think that we can actually have knowledge, meaning justified true beliefs (wherein 'justified' is the concept to be specified), but we can never know that we have, ie never have second order knowledge.

The reader I linked is truly amazing.

I had read a few works of classical philosophy dealing with epistemology, but I couldn't have imagined what an immensely problematic, diverse and deep field it is, - very technical, too.

Reading that book was exhilarating and enlightening, but it did put me in my place.

You read the first paper in there and think "Yes, that sounds reasonable, a good position, seems to be true."
Then you read the second paper, criticising the first and proposing another view, and you go "Oh! He's right, the position defended by the first paper is wrong. This one looks much better."...
And it just goes on like that, and all the time you get more and more enlightened about knowledge.

Wonderful!

1205. Fleabytes

Comment #138748 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:48 pm

By the way - I do wonder if David read my posts... and what a person thinks of these posts who honestly believes that an immaterial deity has moved particles (contrary to the conservation of energy) in a way so that a specific amount of currency would find its way to him.

I guess it's an entirely different world.

1206. Fleabytes

Comment #138745 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:41 pm

Brian,

I think we don't really have a substantial disagreement, merely some semantic confusion and talking past each other.

Can we agree on that? :)

1207. Fleabytes

Comment #138742 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:39 pm

Brian, seems we're using 'reason' in a different way - to me, the brain unconsciously implementing a successful survival strategy adapted to the sensory input by relying on its conditioning is in way unconscious 'reason'.

I don't deny that the structure of the brain has evolved, by goodness! I merely state that the synaptic connections and weights are determined by conditioning rather than genetic coding. However their potential to non-specifically do this is genetically coded.

1208. Fleabytes

Comment #138738 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:35 pm

On a side note:

There is a dispute between Dennett (et al) and Churchland (et al): Denentt thinks the brain is a hardware that needs software to run, while Churchland thinks that the synapses and their weights are all that is needed. And the science backs up Churchland. Neural networks themselves need no software - the information is in the way the hardware transduces signals, neural networks (no software) can recognize faces, distinguish gender, parse language, sort out spam mail, even "fill" the blanks in a partially obscured picture of a face with which it was trained.

The links (synapses) and their training (conditioning, the adjusting of synaptic weight) is everything in neural networks.

1209. Fleabytes

Comment #138731 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:31 pm

The cost to benefit ratio is what's important in evolution's terms


I know, but the penalty for being wrong is usually far higher than the penalty for a false positive.
This is why generally, being right (again: about something consequential) is more effective, and thus we can, do and indeed must rely on reason (whether consciously or unconsciously).

1210. Fleabytes

Comment #138730 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:28 pm

MPhil. I agree. One thing though. If you don't have the hardware, you can't run the software. To have a morality, you need certain brain functions. These must have evolved.


I was not disputing that, at least not under some specific reading:

But not all brain functions evolve per se - the information in our DNA lacks several orders of magnitude to account for all the synapses and synaptic weights (which in neural networks is the functional structure, no software needed - it alone is sufficient). Ask a developmental biologist, or a neuroscientist - the synapses and synaptic weights form throughout life, most in early childhood. They biological potential of doing is in a certain way is genetically determined, but the specific synapses and synaptic weights are conditioned, not genetically determined. Of course the uniformity and systematicity of inputs (some universal, some culturally dependant, environmentally dependant or even locally dependant) effects the large uniformity of minds.

1211. Fleabytes

Comment #138727 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:23 pm

Well, yes, but the problem is, if irrationality, or indeed simply holding false beliefs about anything consequential can be evolutionary beneficial and stable, we have less reason to assume that our faculties of discerning what we take to be truths are reliable.

As I said (alongside others, most notably on here Steve Zara), being wrong about anything consequential leads to death very often in nature.

1212. Fleabytes

Comment #138724 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:21 pm

And on the subject of morality - the evolutionary perspective, including game theory and ESS is highly interesting, but not the only one.

I think research into its basis on empathy qua mirror neuron activity is highly interesting as well.

Not to mention the ethical and metaethical theories - emotivism, prescriptivism, error theory (to which I subscribe - John Leslie Mackie has me entirely convinced, see "Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong"), cognitivism... and on the object, or first level - utilitarianism, contractualism, virtue ethics, prima facie duty ethics etc... - the entire side of "which approach can we rationally justify". Immensly important if you ask me, especially since through our reason and the part of culture dependent on it we can at least to some extent move outside of narrow evolutionary determinism concerning ethics.

1213. Fleabytes

Comment #138721 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 6:15 pm

I don't think any healthy human can be an uber-rationalist. Sometimes the best adaptive strategy is to be irrational


We really have to be careful here, or we open up the door to Plantinga's argument against the reliability of reason in a materialistic world.

I think being irrational about something consequential would nearly always be detrimental to survival.

And in the subject of memes and religion: I think for the angle from which Dennett looks at religion, the phenomena he wants to raise awareness of, the meme analogy fits. The morphology and dynamics of religion don't contradict that view, because it is viewpoint-specific.

At least that's my opinion.

1214. Fleabytes

Comment #138663 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 5:03 pm

David Robertson,

you might want to look at the following comments of mine:

http://richarddawkins.net/articleComments,2285,Fleabytes,Paula-Kirby,page50#136661

and

http://richarddawkins.net/articleComments,2285,Fleabytes,Paula-Kirby,page62#138081


-Mike

1215. Fleabytes

Comment #138556 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 2:06 pm

Oh, and Al-rawandi...

it's "Immanuel" :)

1216. Fleabytes

Comment #138550 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 2:01 pm

Yes, I know about the problems of a 'mind' being a fine-tuner... it's impossible if you ask me.

What I was trying to say was that the problem of fine-tuning (or maybe just supposed problem) at first weighs in on the issue of a deist god... but then the problems arise and the hypothesis can be discarded.

1217. Fleabytes

Comment #138533 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:34 pm

Well, the only evidence for a deist god could be conceptual necessity or likelihood - I see the latter, but only as stemming from lack of knowledge and misunderstanding... and possibly the fine tuning of the constants. The former - only from false concepts.

1218. Fleabytes

Comment #138452 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 11:06 am

And now you get one guess as to what determining whether a concept is meaningful is...

*Jeopardy melody*

"Is it part of philosophy, Alex?"

Correct!

G'Night.

1219. Fleabytes

Comment #138189 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 3:35 am

Geraint,

see here


(and the entire page including some of its links)

1220. Fleabytes

Comment #138187 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 3:30 am

Thanks, Steve.

Sounds like a better idea that way, but I still doubt I'm up to maintaining a blog. A few articles, all right - but I doubt I could post something of value every day - or even every other day. I'll have to sleep on it I think.

1221. Fleabytes

Comment #138153 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 2:14 am

LorienRyan,

thanks. I think I'll do either that, or ask Josh first... right now I'll take a small break and do some reading. I'll see what others think once I come back.

1222. Fleabytes

Comment #138148 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:59 am

Steve,

I must say, I never liked the idea of having a blog myself. While I think I may have something of value to contribute now and then, I don't think it warrants a blog - I would feel vain. This is not meant as an argument against blogs... it's just a personal issue.
It would be too sporadic.

An article on here would do more good I think, as it would raise awareness on these issues more than a blog, and would be more accessible and formatted. Of course this may just be a fluke and not worthy of that much attention, which is why I was inquiring as to the opinion of people in this community.

1223. Fleabytes

Comment #138138 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:36 am

could end up with a Journal here....


Indeed.
Taking up an idea (only half in jest) developed in the comments section here, we could do "Which God we don't believe in this month"

I could start the first article with:


"The God we don't believe in this month is an omnipotent God. Nothing specific, not one who is male, or had his 'better third' father Jesus; just your garden variety omnipotent deity..."

1224. Fleabytes

Comment #138131 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:17 am

I would certainly like to do this... and I think (without wanting to sound arrogant) that I would be up to the task.

It would of course take a while - researching the best theists' defences I can find, developing counter-arguments, expanding on the introductions of the concepts, possibly summarizing the relevant 'rules of logic' first, refining the style...

But of course I'd have to have an idea what the likelihood would be of it being published here...

Does anyone know where I could inquire concerning this? Should I PM Josh? Paula, what do you think?

-Mike

1225. Fleabytes

Comment #138128 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:12 am

epeeist,

the atheism 'wiki' sounds like a good idea... an online resource of public license arguments for atheism / against theism from all sorts of fields.

I mean we have historians, philosophers, neuroscientists, various types of biologists, physicists, psychologists and whatnot... it sounds great!



Verylee,

yes, I think I could take some more time introducing the various concepts - which would make it more accessible. Good idea - would also help the reading flow.

1226. Fleabytes

Comment #138123 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 1:05 am

I could definitely add a small discussion of the problem of evil (omnibenevolence) and expand upon omniscience and omnipresence, having dealt with omnipotence in quite some detail I would say.

Of course I could expand a little on omnipotence as well... estimated total word-count for the entire article: 5.000 - 7.000 words

1227. Fleabytes

Comment #138117 by MPhil on March 4, 2008 at 12:56 am

Well, I've only been using the internet for about a decade, but I can certainly subscribe to that.


Say, what would you (directed at all) think of me combining, refining an expanding my posts on The impossibility of omnipotence and the impossibility of omnipresence for God, so as to apply for it to be published as an article on here?

Please don't get me wrong, this is not vanity of any kind. I just think that an article about this might benefit the community, and since philosophy is my field of study, I would volunteer to write it based upon the posts mentioned above.

-Mike

1228. Fleabytes

Comment #138092 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 10:37 pm

Well, once you assume a physical god, the speed-of-light-limitations apply, and make omnipresence and omniscience impossible - but that's not what the Christians are assuming - I was demonstrating that even assuming what they do is either inherently contradictory, logically inconsistent with known facts or both.

Turning to omniscience it gets trickier - but something can be said for this being logically impossible under the standard concepts, knowing all truths would be like constructing the set of all sets that do not contain themselves (Russell's paradox). But I think that can be evaded by the theist.

Omnibenevolence raises the problem of evil of course, to which the only answer by theists can be that suffering is not gratuitous if there is a greater good which could not be achieved if it wasn't for this suffering, and that this exists and is intended by god.

Of course this is a ludicrous assumption for which there is no evidence at all.

But in the end, what good would a deity be if it isn't omnipotent, nor omnipresent, and generally cannot interfere in the world, even if it was omnibenevolent?

Case closed, I would say.

1229. Fleabytes

Comment #138081 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 9:40 pm

Morgen Roland.

Why 'Omnipresence' cannot apply to God

I have already demonstrated that neither an omnipotent god nor an interventionist god can possibly exist.

Omnipresence itself is I think not quite as interesting to discuss, since it is not an inherently contradictory notion - and since I have already demonstrated that an interventionist metaphysical god is impossible :)

So I am going to deal with omnipresence in fewer sentences than I did with omnipotence (thank goodness):

Being omnipresent means being present everywhere. We must assume that this refers to the universe, in a tiny corner of which we live. Being present somewhere means being within the boundaries of a spatial area. I am now present in my room, in my house, in this street, in this city etc.
But I am also present in the exact spatial area that is defined by my body. In fact, I am omnipresent in that area of space, for I am everywhere within that area - actually, I am what is in that area.

The logical problem is that the term "omnipresent" relies entirely on concepts that apply singularly to object with spatial (and/or temporal) extension. On a side note, I for one also deny that we can coherently say of anything not physical that it properly exists. Or to be more precise, using an expression suggested by Quine: I deny that any predicate that assigns a non-physical attribute can be properly fulfilled by any value for the bound variable that is linked to that predicate.

But even assuming that metaphysical entities exist, the problem remains: How can we say of something that isn't physical that it is somewhere, that it is present within a spatial area - even the spatial area that is the entire universe?
How could predicates assigning spatial (or temporal) attributes apply to something non-physical?

Let us counterfactually assume that dualism is true. So, your mind, the thoughts you have, the feelings etc would be non-physical. Surely you wouldn't say your thoughts are everywhere? You would say that they are somehow "in" you. But what other boundaries do you have except for your spatio-temporal boundaries? The boundaries of your nonphysical mind? How could the term "boundaries" apply. What would constitute such a boundary?

For physical objects larger than 2 dimensions, these are surface areas - but what would they be for nonphysical objects? The nonphysical realm would have to dimensions, and the things within it extension so as to have boundaries. And somehow those specific boundaries of your immaterial mind would have to be linked to your body. Furthermore, the thoughts would have to have distinct boundaries within the area of your mind, perhaps intersecting with the boundaries of your feelings.

Descartes distinguished between "res extensa" - substance with extension, and "res cogitans" - thinking substance. The terms even suggest that the latter has no extension (yet somehow is called a 'substance'!).

But the problem is: the concept of metaphysical entities would need a lot of physical attributes (having boundaries, being somewhere, changing, affecting and effecting things etc) to be coherent - but physical attributes apply only to physical things.

An omnipresent metaphysical god might be omnipresent in the metaphysical realm, which would have to have physical attributes - like extension. But this would be a prime example of a category mistake - it is a ludicrous idea.
Furthermore, only physical things can be present anywhere within the physical universe (this can even be seen as a conceptual, thus logical necessity) - so either god would have to be physical, in which case there would be no room for anything else than god if he is to be everywhere, or he couldn't be anywhere in the physical universe, which would be another instance of the impossibility of an interventionist god.

So, in short: the concept of 'omnipresence', while not inherently contradictory (I am omnipresent in the area that is defined by my body - because I am my body) makes no sense when applied to metaphysical entities, except in a hypothetical metaphysical realm that would have to have spatial attributes and would thus be just like another physical realm - another concept which makes no sense!

1230. Fleabytes

Comment #138070 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 8:54 pm

Indeed, Quine is definitely one of my greatest influences in philosophy.

The Quine-Duhem thesis, the underdetermination of theories, the inscrutability of reference, the underdetermination of translation... all of these are worrying - but I think true, and very thought provoking.

And, he has proven that the only abstract entities one needs to assume at minimum are sets.

1231. Fleabytes

Comment #138065 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 8:45 pm

The latter one is called Quine's paradox (I love Quine - the philosopher of the second half of the 20th century, not the poster on this site, though he seems to be good, too :)

1232. Fleabytes

Comment #138063 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 8:39 pm

Lorien,

yes - the two "this"s is the one error... but the sentence states that it contains two errors. Yet there are no two errors, so the sentence is false.

But then the claim that there are two errors is the second error, and the statement is true.

:)

1233. Fleabytes

Comment #138059 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 8:34 pm

And another one:

'Yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation' yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation.

1234. Fleabytes

Comment #138055 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 8:32 pm

I've got a harder one - extra points for correct analysis:


There are two errors in this
this text.

1235. Fleabytes

Comment #137920 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 3:26 pm

Wonderful, Dr. Benway... ticket as evidence and the spelling accounting for its value as scientific methodology... absolutely brilliant.

Sadly, we materialists don't only get that from religious people, but from non-religious dualists as well... "but it can't account for the way things feel to me" drivel...it's quite maddening, but you gave me a very good laugh. Makes it all seem half as bad.

Thank you!

1236. Fleabytes

Comment #137770 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 1:10 pm

Nice one, Dr. Benway... will copy that.

Richard Morgan,
I finally answered your PM - sorry, had been a little busy.

1237. Fleabytes

Comment #137605 by MPhil on March 3, 2008 at 8:44 am

Cartomancer,

I didn't know that Prof. Dawkins took on Craig... do you have a link?

-Mike

1238. Christopher Hitchens on Real Time with Bill Maher

Comment #137261 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 3:12 pm

Steve,

so my puzzlement was justified... good, thought I had missed something important. :)

1239. Christopher Hitchens on Real Time with Bill Maher

Comment #137245 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 2:54 pm

Steve,

reincarnation necessitates something that transcends the body... I suppose the Buddhist variety of "soul", so that would be a graver error than postulating a mere non-transcendent self. However, I'm not sure how "soul without self" would work... after all, a soul is the unique transcendent part of your being (that can be reincarnated)... wouldn't that somehow include a form of "self"?

1240. Fleabytes

Comment #137071 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 9:56 am

robotaholic,

then I apologize.

"I am an eliminative materialist - there is no qualia & my response is vapid"

Sorry, but that last part seemed like mockery.

1241. Fleabytes

Comment #137033 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 7:35 am

Steve,

but that intrusion would then come from some other space-time (of a parallel universe), wouldn't it?

If so, God would still have to be physical, namely inside the intruding universe.

But wouldn't such an intrusion violate the conservation of energy, or is the conservation law just broadened to include all universes, all dimensions, all branes?

1242. Fleabytes

Comment #137031 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 7:10 am

Roland_F,

essentially good summary. But it wasn't just against Aquinas, but against all after him with various "omnipotence"-defences.

And not only would an extra-universal god be unable to interfere - an agent (a consciousness, a person) cannot coherently be conceived to be without material substrate - the concept of a mind without matter (or in fact a mind that isn't matter) is flawed - outright wrong.

1243. Fleabytes

Comment #137022 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 6:40 am

some of the axioms in some theology are not just unreasonable, they are just plain wrong - they go against our scientific understanding of reality.


And not just that - some are inherently contradictory, so what they postulate cannot even possibly exist (what my article was mainly about).

1244. Fleabytes

Comment #137004 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 5:43 am

Just because we can philosophise our way to deep and complex theoretical explanations of why a god would be required, doesn't for one moment mean that the theory must reflect reality.


Actually, if they were to demonstrate that concepts and theories we do use (premises we actually have) do necessarily require a god, then that would mean that for all we know they must reflect reality.

Conceptual necessity cannot just be waved off - it is a matter of logic, and it must be dealt with by showing that either the premises are flawed or the inferences are not drawn correctly - which is what is being done when we talk about why dualism is flawed and why theology is flawed.

1245. Fleabytes

Comment #136931 by MPhil on March 2, 2008 at 3:40 am

AtheistAspy,

indeed. Theists can only use philosophy, ie critical reflective thinking about reality where it supports their case. The theists philosophy is much like the theists biology, not free inquiry but constrained to having to strengthen a specific position. Since philosophy naturally is all about rationality, it has to be twisted and abused to produce that. Really sad.


Paula,

thanks for having taken the time read the comment. I appreciate it. And I do think we should be careful to make clear that we only play their game to show them how that is incompatible with reality - and demand for evidence to the contrary before we take it seriously.

Steve,

eliminative materialism does indeed state that at least certain mental states claimed by folk psychology do not exist, while others are merely very much off the mark.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/

1246. Fleabytes

Comment #136836 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 7:47 pm

robotaholic,

are you? last time you mentioned it, you seemed to be making fun of it...

Actually, I'm not sure... I'm somewhere in between teleofunctionalism and eliminative materialism.

1247. Fleabytes

Comment #136825 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 7:25 pm

Brian,

well, so do I - but when have they ever played by the rules of rationality?

1248. Fleabytes

Comment #136821 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 7:20 pm

Russell Blackford,

I agree with your post #136804... (and yes, I had discussed this)...


But there are two things I'd like to add:

"We are too limited to know" is definitely not a good answer. We can speculate about what exists, but we can generally never have sufficient justification for positively assuming that something exists which we cannot comprehend.

This is for several reasons:
1)A problem of referring: Entities are defined by their properties - if we cannot comprehend something, we cannot specify the properties of that assumed entity. We thus have no means of picking that entity out from the set of all things by referring to it, because we can only refer through a sufficiently definite description (even if implicit). It doesn't matter whether god exists or not for this - we can never even potentially refer to something if we cannot comprehend it.

Even if we have some attributes, if we don't know the nature of the thing, we do not know if they are sufficiently definite to pick out only that object in referring. I can say "That entity which has a mass of X"... but this will pick out extremely many entities. The description has to be known to be sufficiently definite.

2)A problem of inconsistency: The theists say god is basically not knowable... yet they assign a large number of properties to him - a contradiction.

3)A problem of epistemology: We can speculate that something exists which we cannot comprehend, but we can never have sufficient justification for assuming that something specific does, because this would exceed the limitations of our knowledge - the assumption is in any case unwarranted.

__________________________


Okay. But we are also too limited to specify what it's like to be a bat - assuming that bats have some kind of consciousness and that there's something that is like to be a bat.


Ah yes, the famous paper by Thomas Nagel - he is somewhat a mystic though concerning consciousness.
He thinks it is forever incomprehensible.
I think Dennett and Churchland have much better points. We need not assume that qualia exist, that there is anything it is to be like a bat, or indeed to have qualia at all. But if we do, we can access that from the third person view, as Churchland has demonstrated - from a neurocomputational perspective: We can even predict phenomenal experiences (see his wonderful paper "Chimerical Colours").

But this is off topic... the first part of this comment is at least somewhat on topic.

1249. Fleabytes

Comment #136793 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 5:13 pm

Russell Blackford,

I think if you reread my original post, you'll find that I deal with the topic in your second paragraph... but I get your point, and I don't disagree. Your aim of challanging the cognitive and moral authority is mine as well, primarily but not exclusively.

I know about the other philosophers of religion, and they do have good arguments - better ones than the theists... but I fear there's no one of Mackie's calibre among them... but they still are very good... and I think I'm not doing bad either :)

1250. Fleabytes

Comment #136787 by MPhil on March 1, 2008 at 5:07 pm

Brian,

it's more "physicalism means no intentionality, no qualia, no mind... but minds exist... and minds need god, therefore god exists"... drivel.

Oh, and just today the hopeless Plantinga-argument: "rationality could not have come about through evolution"

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