Comments by Dianelos Georgoudis
151. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #84996 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 4, 2007 at 12:59 pm
The transcendental argument for God (TAG) is not one argument but a type of argument, and it does not argue positively for God but negatively against worldviews that are not based on God. Normally TAGs argue against classes of non-transcendental ontological theories, i.e. non-transcendental theories about objective reality. Their form is:
1. If non-transcendental theory T is true then X is false. (premise)
2. X is true. (premise)
3. Therefore non-transcendental theory T is false. (from 1 and 2)
The logic itself is impeccable, for example the well-known argument from evil uses the same structure:
1. If an all-powerful and all-good God exists then no gratuitous evil exists. (premise)
2. Gratuitous evil exists. (premise)
3. Therefore an all-powerful and all-good God does not exist. (from 1 and 2)
As the logic of TAGs is solid, one can only object to one of the two premises. Normally the first premise is solid, unless it misunderstands the theory T it refers to. So, in practice, one must attack the second premise.
Today TAGs are used to argue against the typical non-religious ontological theory which is "scientific realism", namely the theory that the concepts that science uses (such as spacetime, matter, electron, force, etc) do not only refer to specific parts of models of the physical phenomena that science studies, but also, and at least to some degree, refer to the objective reality that produces these phenomena. The basic idea then of scientific realism is that science not only describes phenomena but also the objective reality that produces them.
If one uses T="scientific realism" under any of its specific guises, then a series of X can be used to falsify it. Some cases are X="objective morality exists", or X="free will exists", or X="consciousness exists", or X="meaning exists", or X="rational humans exist", and others. Now the existence of some of these X can in fact be denied, so there are atheists who emphatically deny the existence of free will (free will is incompatible both with deterministic and non-deterministic versions of scientific realism), or the existence of objective morality. Here we encounter interesting state of affairs: One can of course deny the existence of these and therefore maintain the viability of scientific realism (it's a free country after all). But at least equally reasonably one can affirm the existence of these and therefore deny the viability of scientific realism.
The case of "X=consciousness exists" is more difficult to deny by a scientific realist. Here there exist two strategies: 1) bite the bullet and deny the existence of consciousness at least under revised definitions of what it exactly "consciousness" means, or 2) deny the premise that scientific realism implies the non-existence of consciousness. In the case of consciousness I think most scientific realists follow #2 and claim that even though today nobody is offering any explanation of how consciousness could be produced by a mechanical system (all systems described by science are mechanical) such an explanation will be forthcoming in the future. Or else to argue, as David Chalmers does, for some sort of dualism in which consciousness is a fundamental and irreducible principle of an objective reality amenable to scientific research.
The case of "X=rational humans exist", which is the case the OP used, is more difficult to understand. Indeed it would seem that the theory of evolution explains the evolution of rational beings, but it turns out that natural evolution cannot in fact explain rationality because there is no selective mechanism for rationality. One must not confuse rationality with intelligence: natural evolution can explain why we have evolved the intelligence which guides the sophisticated kind of behavior that has allowed us to become the dominant species on the planet, but cannot explain why we should evolve any cognitive capacity that does not lead to any survival advantage for our genes, such as to device theories about how the objective reality that produces phenomena is. But scientific realism is just such a theory. So that's where scientific realism's incoherence lies: if scientific realism is true then we don't actually have the cognitive capacity to justify its truth. That's the crux of Plantinga's argument against naturalism. As far as I am concerned the only possible response is for a naturalist to have faith that despite there not being any evolutionary reason for it we do in fact possess the cognitive ability to think about objective reality. (There's an entire book about Plantinga's argument: "Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism".)
Finally, how does all that work as an argument for God and not only against naturalistic non-transcendental theories of reality? The general idea is that once only transcendental theories of reality remain viable, the same style of argument can be used to falsify such ontologies which do not postulate that reality is ultimately based on a rational and good person. But why not? Why not postulate a non-naturalistic transcendental reality not ultimately based on a rational and good person? Because both objective goodness and rationality appear to not be possible in such a reality, as both objective goodness and the emergence of rational beings appear to only make sense in the context of an ultimate consciousness which is good and which has intentionally created rational beings.
Of course the atheist may reject all that, namely deny that free will exists, deny that objective morality exists, deny that human rationality exists, leaving open in what sense consciousness exists, and so on. In the end of the day and once one has really studied the issues what matters is which ontological theory strikes one as more reasonable. The idea behind TAGs is to convince people how unreasonable non-theistic theories about reality really are.
152. The Transcendental Argument for God
Comment #84993 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 4, 2007 at 12:50 pm
Bitbutter (post 13 or #81636):
But the primacy of consciousness always loses out to the primacy of existence. Since any consciousness (even a god's) has to exist, we have to conclude that existence is primary. This being so it follows that things (even gods) are, ultimately, contingent on non-rational forces.Ontologies around the concept of God postulate that God is the most fundamental or ultimate aspect of reality, so the idea that God is contingent on something else makes no sense. Be careful not to beg the question. So it's not: "Here we have a true theory of how objective reality is and we only have to discuss whether to assume that God exists in that reality makes any sense or is useful for anything", but rather "Here we have two alternative theories about objective reality, one that postulates that reality is ultimately material and ultimately driven my mechanical laws, and one that postulates that reality is ultimately personal and ultimately driven by free will".
153. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #84380 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 2, 2007 at 12:18 am
Epeeist (post 186, or #84003):
Speaking of books, I recommend "Naturalism in Quesition" by Mario de Caro and David MacArthur, as state of the art compendium of what philosophers today think about naturalism. Here is a quote from the introduction: "The papers collected here discuss such issues as intentionality, agency, freedom, meaning, reference, rationality, and personal identity in the belief that all attempts to reduce, eliminate, or re-conceive these concepts in terms of supposedly more scientifically legitimate notions do not just fail – they entirely miss the kind of importance that these notions have in our lives and experiences."
You know Hegel's idea of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. I think what's happening is that after the popular thesis of a demon-haunted world, and the popular antithesis of a mechanical world, a synthesis is now being formed that transcends them both.
154. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #84378 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 2, 2007 at 12:07 am
Corylus (post 187, or #84019):
I recommended the book that Craig co-authors not because I agree in all particulars with Craig but because I think books with written debates are a much better avenue for understanding the issues than oral debates (that sometimes resemble catfights of wit) or books written by well-meaning but quite ignorant authors, such as TGD.
As for command ethics I think they make no sense at all and therefore deeply disagree with Craig. What I find remarkable in the article you linked is that Craig actually starts pretty well, reasonably arguing that the slaughter of the Canaanites is probably a nationalistic myth, that God would not order such a thing, and that a literal understanding of the Bible is probably not viable. But then, for some reason I cannot really fathom, his goes on to defend a literal understanding of this passage in the Bible, and to claim utter nonsense such as that God is not bound by the same ethics we are. (Which, incidentally, contradicts one of the most beautiful passages in the Gospels where Jesus calls us to be as perfect here as God in heaven is perfect.) So, again, I deeply disagree with him. But please try to sympathize with Craig: as many an Protestant apologist he has not only to defend a religious understanding of reality, not only theism, not only the Christianity of Jesus's message, not only dogmatic Christianity, but even a Bible-centered Christianity which comes perilously close to Biblical literalism.
Anyway, thanks for that link. It was a rather shocking read for me. And quite instructive too, for it shows what happens when one believes in idols, even idols built of paper and ink.
155. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #84094 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 1, 2007 at 6:39 am
BAEOZ (post 605, or #84012):
Thanks for engaging. You write:
Logical reasons for atheistic morality:First of all I want to say that trying to avoid feeling bad (or conversely trying to obtain a good feeling) is a perfectly logical reason for choosing some particular behavior. But here is the problem: In most, if not all, real world situations where we confront an ethical dilemma the state of affairs is such that there is a conflict between what would make us feel good or bad on moral grounds and what would make us feel good or bad on selfish grounds.
I can feel pain and suffer in a real way due to evolved human nature.
I see others feeling pain and share their pain (sympathy) or feel their pain (empathy) in a real way.
I know that it is bad when it happens to me, so therefore I don't wish suffering on others and try to avoid it else I feel bad.
Let's take the example I have been using in this thread: When confronting the moral dilemma of whether to pay one's fair share of taxes or else to take advantage of an unjust law and avoid paying one's fair share, it's true that it would make one feel bad if one were to choose not to pay. But on the other hand not paying would leave one with a large surplus of disposable money which can be spent or invested in many ways that will make one feel good, such as buying a better car, or making an interesting trip, or affording one's children a better education. In the typical case the latter weights clearly more than the former, so logic in the typical case demands that one do what's wrong when in balance doing so is to one's advantage.
Now your case above is more specific and deals with our relations with other people, and perhaps my rather impersonal example of paying taxes is not that relevant. So let me raise another example: You are the owner of a company and have to decide what raise to give to an employee. You are prepared to give her a competitive raise, but the company is doing so well that you can easily afford to do better than that, but if you do that you will earn less profit from your company. The employee has less money than you, and surely getting a larger raise will result in more good feeling for her and her family than not giving that larger raise will result for you and your family. But on what logical grounds should you care about that? Also not giving her the extra large raise will not really make you feel too bad, at least not as bad as the extra money for you and your family will make you feel good. So, again, logic demands that you do not do the right thing in this case.
You see my point? Realistically, if one believes that this life is all there is then in most ethically challenging situations logic will demand one do the wrong thing. But if one believes there is an afterlife such that it never pays to miss doing the right thing no matter how it may appear to us here, that by doing the right thing one creates "treasure that thieves cannot steal and moth cannot destroy", then one has a logical path towards ethical behavior, and at the very least one has one more reason for doing what's right.
156. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #84001 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 1, 2007 at 1:28 am
Diacanu (post 183, or #83981):
What debate were you people watching?!?!:-P That's really funny.
And it's amazing how posters' judgment of who won the debate changed once you alerted them in post 156 that D'Souza is actually reading this thread.
But I will agree that debates of this kind evidence more the debaters' quick wit, or even their having done their homework, rather than how solid their thinking is. Nevertheless the fact that atheists are not clearly winning (to put it mildly) their debates with theists as evidenced by the various debates linked to in this site, is clear evidence that the theistic position is not as moronic as atheist mythology would have it.
A much better format I think are written debates. There are at least two book length cases: "God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist" by William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and "Does God Exist" by J.P.Moreland and Kai Nielsen. I have not yet read the second book, but I can recommend the first (and don't worry, the theist does not clearly win the debate), and I believe the second is a good book also and, interestingly enough, in the end includes some other thinkers commenting on the debate.
157. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #83996 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 1, 2007 at 1:15 am
But I thought you believed that reality flows from god who is a person.You are conflating phenomenal reality and objective reality. The distinction should be clear to anyone who knows the first thing about ontology.
158. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83988 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 1, 2007 at 1:00 am
Correct, these are all good reasons that partly explain peoples' moral behavior, but they are all intuitive/emotional reasons. My point is that as far as moral behavior is affected by thinking atheism offers no logical path towards moral behavior (and even fails to offer a logical path away from immoral behavior).My question is what logical reason would motivate an atheist to do the right thing when doing so would not be to their advantageMy personal answer to this is that my conscience won't allow me to lie, cheat, or act unethically in any way. It's a matter of being able to live with oneself and be proud of one's behaviour, whether it is observed or not.
Sometimes not answering speaks as clearly as answering, and you'll have observed that nobody in this thread has produced a logical reason for an atheist to pay their fair share of taxes in society when there is a legal way to avoid doing so. So I stand by my claims: 1) When other factors are equivalent a non-religious person is apt to behave less ethically than a religious person; 2) The more influenced by reason and less by emotion a non-religious person's behavior is, the less can one expect ethical behavior. There is already some significant but not conclusive body of scientific studies that confirms the former claim, but none I know of that confirms the second. I agree with Sam Harris that peoples' ontological beliefs do affect their behavior to an appreciable degree, so this is an important issue of public policy and much more scientific research is in order.
159. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83984 by Dianelos Georgoudis on November 1, 2007 at 12:44 am
Epeeist (post 570 or #83411):
So I take it you judge Paul's study to be scientifically valid. Fine. I on the contrary judge it to be nothing more than a glorified version of the harebrained "look at how good people in atheist Sweden are" which apart from being selective evidence also grossly overlooks the various factors that apart from ontological beliefs also affect human behavior. Paul's study by the way is mentioned more than 100 times in this site, which goes a good way to explain how atheist mythology is shored up: when there is no evidence clutch at any straw and declare it solid, it's like constructing a strawman in reverse.
160. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #83739 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 31, 2007 at 5:18 am
Steve99 (post 168, or #83730):
Well, my understanding is that Buddha taught the way to escape from the suffering of continuous rebirth, so this seems to me is a central ontological belief of Buddhism. Not to mention the belief that Buddha in his previous incarnation was a Bodhisatta. But I do not know a lot about Buddhism, so let me quote from the Wikipedia:Well, as I have explained in in comment #83567 I think it's unreasonable to call "atheist" a religious Buddhist monk praying and chanting in some monastery and fully convinced that after death they may well reincarnate as supernatural gods.Nonsense. They aren't praying *to* anyone or anything, at least not in any sense common with monotheisms, and they certainly don't believe in reincarnation as 'gods'. Buddhas are not Gods.
In the original theravaddin Buddhist schools, there is no concept even of a 'self', so there is no soul or person that reincarnates - nothing supernatural.
From the article about Bodhisattas in the Theravada Buddhism you prefer:
The term Bodhisatta was used by the Buddha in the Pali Canon to refer to himself both in his previous lives and as a young man in his current life, prior to his enlightenment, in the period during which he was working towards his own liberation. (my emphasis)
From the article about Rebirth (Buddhism):
In traditional Buddhist cosmology, these [reborn] lives can be in any of a large number of states of being, including those of humans, any kind of animal, and several types of supernatural being (see Six realms). (my emphasis)
From the article about the Six realms:
The Six realms are six divisions of the possible states of rebirth in traditional Buddhist cosmology. They represent all the possibilities, good and bad, of life in sansara. They include rebirth as a deva, an asura, a human being, an animal, a hungry ghost, or a being in Naraka (hell) according to the individual's karma. [snip] The Deva realm is sometimes also referred to as the gods' realm, because its inhabitants are so powerful that, compared to humans, they resemble the gods of Greek or Roman mythology. (my emphasis)So, in Buddhist ontology we have rebirths, supernatural gods resembling the gods of Greek mythology, not to mention hungry ghosts. These beliefs look quite supernatural to me, but if you prefer to call Buddhism atheist because it does not have the concept of God the three great monotheistic religions share then be my guest. But I wish to point out that the existence of gods and hungry ghosts is not compatible with atheism in the way that I (as well as I dare say most atheists in the West) use the term. And if anything traditional Buddhism's ontology strikes me as even more supernatural than traditional Christianity's.
161. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #83729 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 31, 2007 at 4:12 am
Epeeist (post 165, or #83720):
And for all of you who haven't seen DG before - he is an idealist theist who believes that the mythos of the Norse gods, the matriarchal triune goddess and the Celtic Cernunnos is as valid as his belief in Jesus, that there is an objective morality that derives from theism but that there is no objective reality.Misrepresenting other people to such a degree does not speak well of your intellectual honesty Epeeist. I anybody wants to know what I have said about ancient peoples' beliefs being as valid as mine, as well as that I do believe there is an objective reality, read comment #83524 I posted to Epeeist only yesterday.
162. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #83722 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 31, 2007 at 3:47 am
Steve99 (post 163, or #83714):
Well, as I have explained in in comment #83567 I think it's unreasonable to call "atheist" a religious Buddhist monk praying and chanting in some monastery and fully convinced that after death they may well reincarnate as supernatural gods. But, anyway, as you seem to put great importance on this issue, let me restate the above thus: Similarly theists can argue that there are contradictions between the proposition "only the physical world exists" and other propositions we strongly believe are true, and thus falsify the atheistic worldview (or at least the atheistic worldview of Richard Dawkins and of those atheists who agree with it).Similarly theists can argue that there are contradictions between the proposition "only the physical world exists" and other propositions we strongly believe are true, and thus falsify the atheistic worldview (or at least the typical atheistic worldview).There is no typical atheist worldview, and you damn well know it. Atheists can range from mystical Buddhists to pure rationalists. Count up numbers and you will find that the mystical Buddhists outnumber the rationalists, and so the majority of atheists may well believe that more than the physical world exists.. as usual you bring out one of your hundreds of carefully made straw men.
If I see any more posts which are just going over the same old ground, ignoring past discussions, I will be sorely tempted to flag as troll (or perhaps spam is more appropriate?).On the other hand, if I see any more posts where you just keep insisting that Buddhist monks are atheists I won't be tempted to flag you as a troll. Believe what you wish if that makes you feel better, and defend your beliefs any way you like.
163. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza
Comment #83706 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 31, 2007 at 2:10 am
I think D'Souza was wrong in the following arguments he made:
1. He argued that it is an article of faith to think that physical laws are absolute and hence miracles cannot happen, implying that similarly to believe in miracles is a valid article of faith. He argued that we can't really know if or when or how exactly physical laws apply. Now, first of all, the physical laws we know about do allow for all (or virtually all) miracles in the Bible even if they are absolute. For example quantum mechanics does allow for water suddenly turning into wine or for dead people resurrecting. But miracles are miracles not because they break the laws of physics but because they break the laws of probability.
2. He argued that the theory of evolution cannot explain the origin of life (true), nor the origin of consciousness (as far as we know also true), nor the origin of morality (almost certainly false). He claims that Darwinism can explain perhaps 1% of moral behavior, namely that moral behavior that benefits the genes of the person who displays that behavior, but that the rest of moral behavior cannot be explained by Darwinism. I think that's false, as sociobiology has convincingly shown. Even though human behavior is a very complex subject matter, I think by now it's clear that all moral behavior, including the most self-sacrificial one, can at least in principle be explained on purely naturalistic grounds, and hence without recourse to God.
3. He was terribly confusing when he contrasted knowledge to belief, saying something like "I can't have knowledge about this, therefore I have belief in it". In all of philosophy the meaning of "to believe" is "to hold true", no matter on what grounds and no matter whether one is in fact right. Contrasted to that, the concept of "knowledge" turns out to be very problematic. Knowledge is normally defined as "justified true belief", but one of the various problems that definition has is that we can only check if there is good justification for a belief but we can't really check whether it is in fact true. There is no such thing as an absolutely certain proof of truth, not even in mathematics (for mathematics too depends on some axioms that are presupposed to be true). Strictly speaking the only knowledge we can have are subjective experiences, because what we right now experience is the only thing we can be absolutely certain about. So when we use the concept of knowledge outside of the context of subjective experience we are simply expressing our confidence that our respective belief is true.
As for Hitchens what disappointed me most is how, when somebody made a very good question (at about min 5:00 of the 7th video), he completely avoided answering it. The question was that if, as Hitchens himself has stated, morality has merely evolved, i.e. has evolved anthropologically, and hence one can transcend its current state, then what standard can one appeal to. Instead of trying to answer Hitchens just spoke of how imperfectly designed our bodies are, and that you can't make people sick and then order them to be well, and that's why God is totalitarian, and whatnot. But the question was challenging Hitchen's views on morality and had nothing to do with theism.
Another thing that struck me is how Hitchens at some point proclaimed that the world is exactly as it would be if no God existed. I have always wondered about this popular atheistic claim because it's so obviously question-begging. If theism is true then the very universe we observe around us is created by God, so that atheistic argument makes as much sense to a theist as saying that Beethoven's music would be exactly the same if no Beethoven existed. The only reasonable atheistic argument works the other way around, namely to point out that if God existed then the world we observe would be different than how it in fact is. In other words the atheistic argument is to find contradictions between the proposition "God exists" and other propositions we strongly believe are true, and thus falsify the theistic worldview. Similarly theists can argue that there are contradictions between the proposition "only the physical world exists" and other propositions we strongly believe are true, and thus falsify the atheistic worldview (or at least the typical atheistic worldview).
164. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83694 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 31, 2007 at 1:05 am
Lauregon (post 562 or #83238):
These right-wing Christians who put BushInc in office believe that charity should be confined to voluntary contributions, and that government social benefits thwart "God's" will by allowing the undeserving poor a safety-net,This seems to me to be quite an extremist view.
I think that many people vote for the Republican party simply because of greed: they expect the Republican party to lower their taxes. But greed is not motivated by religion; quite the contrary in fact. If people took seriously any of the great religions they would be less greedy.
165. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83693 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 31, 2007 at 12:59 am
Alovrin (post 553 or #83049):
:-) Well, you know it's not like theists must be dogmatic and are not allowed to develop their beliefs; indeed all reasonable people continuously think critically about their own beliefs and try to improve them. And if you think that I am the only theist doing this you are very mistaken, see for example Alfred Whitehead or John Hick, not to mention the many millions of liberal Christians. As for Jesus he has certainly and mightily influenced my thinking, but so has to a lesser degree Dawkins, and even you my friend.idealistic theism is free of paradoxes, especially in comparison with scientific realism.)Thats right I temporarily forgot about your new improved doctrine, you mini jesus.
Oh so Im a nihilist now.Well, if you really think that the question about the meaning of life is pointless as you say in point #2 of post 517 then you are; but perhaps you don't really think that.
166. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83685 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 11:56 pm
Lauregon (post 552 or #83046):
No, that's not what I am claiming. I am claiming that the best theistic worldviews are more reasonable than the best atheistic worldviews, because when compared one to one under the same criteria the former work better than the latter. Further I also claim that religious worldviews are more conducive to morality than non-religious worldviews. Finally I claim that to those for whom the world seems to be religiously ambiguous, and who therefore cannot decide on other grounds whether to adopt a religious worldview or not, the fact that a religious worldview offers various experiential benefits including ethical empowerment is sufficient reason to choose a religious worldview.You see where I am pointing at? Ethics without some transcendental ground in a religious worldview is apt to go seriously wrong. - DianelosYes, I see. What you're saying, Dianelos, is that, whether a "God" person actually exists or not, the "God" person must be made to appear to be a fact---and a scientific fact at that---which renders your entire argumentation utterly UNBELIEVABLE.
By the way, you are correct to write about my speaking of the "God person", but please note that it's also the "God reality". God is the whole of reality, and the whole of reality is a person.
167. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83680 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 11:25 pm
Lauregon (post 550 or #83040) (cont):
Indeed. You see, I don't consider any text written by humans infallible, and hence pick what I find good and reject what I find bad, no matter whether I am reading the overall sublime Christian gospels, or the sub-mediocre TGD (which still has some good bits, for example his description of the Darwinian understanding about how religious beliefs might have evolved).Well, unfortunately we read the gospels very differently. For me the substance of John 13:34-35 is clearly and explicitly about how we should live our lives. - DianelosWhat's clear is that you read the gospels as cherry-picked proof-texts.
That's funny but immaterial. My point was that reasonable people do believe in existents that are not-proven and not-visible.As far as I'm aware, there have been no bloody wars fought over disputes concerning the existence or nature of electrons, or dogmatic claims of there being only One Perfect Electron.Unfortunately, the idea that "God" is "perfect" is a dogma that has no means of being proven or even observed. – LauregonNeither has the idea that electrons exist any means of being proven or observed. But many atheists believe electrons exist. – Dianelos
168. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83585 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 1:26 pm
Lauregon (post 550 or #83040):
Well, however Spong may be using the concepts of "religion" or of "theism" it's clear that Spong believes in God (as his statement you just quoted evidences) and hence is clearly a theist according to how all atheists and (for all practical purposes) all theists use this concept. And I suppose by "supernatural doctrines" he means the various miracle stories, which most liberal Christians do not believe either.Well, yes, I know of that language, but it's quite misleading because Spong is not an atheist; in fact he believes in the existence and presence of God and calls himself a Christian. – DianelosI didn't say Spong was atheist, but he does refer to himself as non-theist, of theism as dying, and he does call for a new, non-theist understanding of both Jesus and Christianity; he completely rejects theism's supernatural doctrines. And, as I said earlier, people who come to reject those supernatural doctrines do find their way to Spong and his new vision of a "religionless Christianity." See his latest book for verification, "Jesus For the Non-Religious." In it he writes, "Theism isn't God; it is rather, a human coping mechanism."
169. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83581 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 1:23 pm
Nice story, but I don't see where it teaches us to love our enemies, after all it's not like the rabbit is Buddha's enemy.The Buddha also said "love your enemies" centuries before Jesus.There is a Buddhist fable that goes like this. One day a wolf and a rabbit came to the Buddha. The wolf wanted to eat the rabbit and the rabbit asked the Buddha to intervene. The Buddha chastised the wolf and told him to leave the rabbit alone. "But", the wolf protested, "if I don't eat the rabbit I will starve to death, why is the rabbit's life more precious than mine?" The Buddha saw that the wolf did have a point. He thought very hard for a while but still couldn't find a way to resolve the conflict. Finally the Buddha said to the wolf, "OK, you can eat me instead and leave the rabbit alone."
You probably have heard of this before. If "love your enemy" and "turn the other cheek" are indeed virtuous doctrines to emulate the Buddha was way ahead of Jesus.I don't see in the fable above any of the two precepts. And, in any case, it's not like there is a competition between Buddha and Jesus you know :-) That's not at all how it is. I don't know enough of Buddhist ethics to be able to judge, but I think it's excellent also and in any case very close (or possibly identical for all practical purposes) to Christian ethics. And the fact that both religions focus on the right way, and then point out the same way, belie those who claim that there are huge disagreements between religions. I think that all major religions are very close in what really matters, which is about our true response to the transcendental. That objective reality is such that the meaningful way to live our lives is to follow this path.
170. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83567 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 12:52 pm
Just a point of information you may find useful here. The Buddha also said "love your enemies" centuries before Jesus.Very interesting. Can you give any links to validate this claim of yours?
Although highly spritual in nature, early Buddhism was certainly atheistic by any modern definition. So, I am afraid that even this phrase, whatever you think of its value, fails Hitchens' test.Well, I think new atheists say that we don't take our morality from religion in general, not from theism in particular. Hitchen's book is subtitled "How Religion Poisons Everything", he speaks of believers (and surely it's not like Buddhists do not hold beliefs without objective evidence), and his challenge clearly tries to show that ethical thought is just as viable in the naturalistic understanding of reality he shares with the other New Atheists as in any religious understanding of reality.
Also I object to your calling Buddhism an atheistic religion, in the following sense: It's true that according to Buddhism reality is not based on a person who has designed us and our environment, and hence is not a monotheistic religion. On the other hand according to Buddhism's ontological belief in the reincarnation, people reincarnate as people but also as animals and as gods. So it's not quite correct to say that that Buddhism is atheistic by any modern definition; after all it accepts the existence of gods as supernatural beings not subject to physical laws (even though I understand they are not supposed to be eternal). Anyway please correct me if I am wrong.
171. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83553 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 12:06 pm
Phil Rimmer (post 542 or #83008):
I think you are contradicting yourself here. On the one hand you deny the weasel exceptions, including that one may kill somebody if that would save several lives (i.e. for the greater good), but then point out that you would kill for the greater good. But if you mean that you accept the "love your enemies" precept as long as it does not contradict any of the other ethical precepts you consider stronger, then you are not really accepting it, are you? I mean by that measure anybody can claim to accept any possible precept, but then point out that they accept even more strongly other precepts that contradict it. Such language does not make sense I think.The ethical precept is not "return no evil except in the following cases: a) if brutally attacked, b) if by killing somebody you save several lives, c) etc. etc). Neither is it "love your enemies, or at least their children after you eliminate their parents".
We agree. The ethical precept is "Love your Enemy". I reject out of hand all your proffered weasel-worded alternatives.
We surely agree, that other ethical precepts are in play also? It is the simple fact of the existence of these that subverts the first precept from being simply a Pacifist's charter. I WILL fight and kill for the greater good. But I know I will also have my heart broken.
172. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83548 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 11:34 am
The answers to your last four questions are: there are no strangers for we are all siblings, exactly what it says, yes, in all appearances not.So let me restate my answer to Hitchens's challenge: "The ethical statement that no atheist can reasonably make is that we should - literally, truly, and without exception - selflessly love our enemies and act on it."As I asked in #334, is "love your enemies" really an ethical statement? You never did answer. Enemies, by definition, hate us and seek to harm us. Is it really ethical to accept that kind of attitude from someone who has proclaimed him/herself your enemy and intends to harm you and your family? Not to put too fine a point on it, but what exactly is ethical about allowing someone, probably a complete stranger, to threaten and harm you and yours and only respond by saying "I love you" and acting on it? What does that mean? Should I give him a hug and a gift, maybe a freshly baked pie? More importantly, does it work?
But your general sense that "love your enemies" is not even an ethical statement only evidences that I am right: that's a statement that makes no sense in an atheistic worldview.
173. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83545 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 11:27 am
Steveroot (post 537 or #82972):
Bravo! And I honestly mean that. To my shame it's a couple of years since I last donated blood. But here we are discussing averages and not individual examples.
174. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83539 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 11:08 am
But in this life very often good actions do not result in good consequences for the one who commits them. Haven't you heard the expression "nice people finish last"? So it's not like doing the right thing can be justified by pointing out the good consequences it is apt to have for the one doing it; in fact it's very often the case that doing the right thing is what clearly is not apt to have good consequences for one's life. Sometimes when I discuss morality with atheists I get this impression they have in mind some kind of idealized world which is not how the real world works. If there is nothing after death then in the real world it often pays not to do the right thing; that's why I say that atheism fails to offer a logical path away from immoral behavior.I meant consequences to the one who makes these actionsSo did I, but I meant in this life, not in the hereafter sitting around God's throne!
That's far from typical, for in many cases immoral behavior is to one's advantage in this life, short-term and long-term. In fact in those cases where what you describe is typical we don't normally speak of moral behavior but of smart behavior. So, for example, we don't say that it's moral to study, but that it's smart.atheism offers no logical path away from immoral behavior where such immoral behavior is to one's advantage.How about these? Immoral behavior might gain someone temporary advantage in the short term, but in the long run they usually end up paying for it.
I still don't understand your point about how studying and looking before crossing the street are pertinent to a debate about ethics and morality.I meant this in the sense that it's entirely reasonable to take into account the consequences of one's actions. I personally do not believe in anything like that God will punish us for our sins in the afterlife, but I do believe that all our actions always have consequences for ourselves, so that reality is such that it always pays to do good and it never pays to do evil. For me reality can be compared to a path through a wilderness: to stray from this path hurts (us, as well as others) and to stay in the path brings us forward (individually and collectively).
I think what I claimed has two implications: 1) That all other factors being equivalent a non-religious person is apt to behave less ethically than a religious person. Now it's possible that atheists (or rather non-religious people) on average behave more ethically than religious people today: perhaps they live in better societies, or perhaps they are better educated, or perhaps have more money, or in general enjoy on average more of the various factors that also predispose people not to behave unethically. 2) That when non-religious people behave ethically they do it because of intuitive or emotional reasons, and not because of logical reasons.I never claimed any such connection at least as far as taxes is concerned. I only claimed that there is no logical path that would lead an atheist to pay their fair share if they can get away without paying it. If you or anybody here can see a logical reason for an atheist to do the right thing in this case I would very much like to know about it.You didn't claim it in so many words, but the inference of your original question is that there is a connection between unethical behaviour and being an atheist.
Epeeist already answered it and so did I in #508!I never saw Epeeist's answer :-( but you in post 508 only point out that you are an atheist and you pay your taxes, and that society has evolved in ways that its members do their part. But this does not answer my question at all. Again atheists may do the right thing for intuitive or emotional reasons which can be explained on evolutionary grounds. My question is what logical reason would motivate an atheist to do the right thing when doing so would not be to their advantage, for example pay their fair share of taxes when there is a legal way to avoid doing so. It's a simple question, and I don't think anybody has answered it. I think there is no answer, because there is not such logical reason. If so, atheists should deal with this implication of their worldview.
175. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83524 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 30, 2007 at 10:13 am
Epeeist (post 533, or #82954):
I am not sure what you mean by that; I wish you were less cryptic and more clear in your statements. But, anyway, yes: I consider everybody's beliefs as "valid" as my own as far as personal beliefs go, for everyone tries to do the best they can to understand the world. But when compared to ancient peoples we today have the benefit of thousands of years of philosophical and scientific thought and can presumably do better than they thinking about ontology. But perhaps we have some comparative disadvantage too: modern education tends towards technical overspecialization, and the modern world makes us run so much we often don't have the time to actually think about our condition, to actually contemplate life and what it tells us about objective reality. So there may be some ancient wisdom forgotten or misunderstood today, and it's good to study what ancient peoples thought about the great questions, which by the way haven't really changed at all. Reading Plato, for example, one discovers an ancient person's thinking about the same questions we face today – which is kind of interesting.The god concept that interests me is not the one believed by ancient peoples, but the one that best explains the whole of my experience of life.So you aren't dismissing the beliefs of ancient peoples, you accept that they are as valid as your own.
176. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #83150 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 29, 2007 at 4:49 am
Epeeist (post 522, or #82605):
Now if I was an unethical atheist I would just post the following link with no comment - http://moses.creighton.edu/jrs/2005/2005-11.html However, it was actually posted in another thread by kraut, it just seemed apposite.OK. You like being cryptic, but as you quote this study I assume you agree with it. So let me comment on it.
First of all one of the main theses of New Atheism is that religion is immoral, but New Atheist authors are reduced to using as their evidence for that bits and pieces out of an ancient document written by the priestly class of a nomadic people three thousand years ago, or by using some of Christianity's two thousand years old and rather simpleminded dogmas which were obviously concocted to explain Jesus's humiliating crucifixion within a primitive theistic worldview according to which everything that happens is controlled by God. Or else they are reduced to using the extremely selective evidence of the religious suicide bombers (while conveniently overlooking the evidence of non-religious suicide bombers, not to mention all the great crimes against humanity in the 20th century perpetrated be non-religious people). Don't you think that if there were good scientific studies that evidence that religion (or specifically theism) conduces to immoral behavior they would be using that evidence to the fullest of its capacity? Doesn't the fact that Dennett, Harris, and Dawkins with all their scientific sophistication do not (to my knowledge) ever mention Gregory Paul's study says something? And I wonder about how scientifically adept the reviewers who approved its publication in the good but relatively minor "Journal of Religion and Society" are.
And who is Gregory Paul? Well, he is not a social scientist as one would have expected, but a free-lance paleontologist who, as far as I could ascertain, does not even hold an academic degree. So here we have one study by a non-specialist pitted against a whole series of studies by various academic researchers. Now I know all about the appeal to authority fallacy, but clearly under the circumstances one should be a little more careful with this "scientific" study. But let's take a critical look at it on its own merits:
We have been discussing the relationship between religiosity and moral behavior. Paul's study only measures homicide and suicide frequencies in "prosperous democracies". Suicide frequencies do not result in any correlation, so his whole argument rests on homicide rates. Now two issues should immediately raise our suspicion:
First of all why only use data from these few "prosperous democracies"? There are data for many more countries than that, and indeed, contrary to what he claims, pretty reliable data (both basic religiosity and homicide rates as relatively easy to measure). So why not use that information too? Because had he used it the correlation between religiosity and homicide rate he was clearly looking for would probably disappear. (Other of the many methodological errors of Paul's study are documented in this paper written by academic researchers: http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2006/2006-1.html ) Paul did not even include the various quite developed ex-Soviet countries, which, having both a relative high homicide rate and low religiosity, would be sufficient to mar his statistics. The use of selective evidence appears to be a popular tool of New Atheism and this speaks volumes about the strength of its intellectual underpinning.
Secondly, why not use crime statistics (including white crime) in general instead of just homicide rates? My guess is that had he done that the correlation he was looking for would have disappeared also. After all it is a well-known fact that homicide rates correlate especially strongly with other factors, and in particular with the availability of hand-guns, whereas crime in general is more independent.
Beyond his obvious cooking of the numbers, let's discuss some basic statistical principles. At the beginning of his paper he downgrades several other studies, which contradict his, by pointing out their "smaller sample sizes" whereas his sample was "800 million" adults. Well, anybody who knows anything about statistics is aware that what's important is "statistical significance", and there are many other factors beyond sample size that are critical for achieving statistical significance; indeed in the real world it's not the size of the sample but the neutrality of the sample that is difficult to get. A thousand good data points are often quite sufficient to demonstrate statistical significance; to wave the "800 million" number is an obvious red herring. In fact he is grossly misleading when he writes "The cultural and economic similarity of the developed democracies minimizes the variability of factors outside those being examined". In fact factors such as availability of guns, non-availability of social safety net, non-availability of good education, poverty, and unfair distribution of wealth, are all important factors when one studies crime in general or homicide rates in particular. And Paul's star witness, the US, fails in four out of these five factors when compared to the rest of his sample (namely Western Europe and Japan). As for his secondary star witness, Portugal, it's the poorest country in Western Europe.
In other words even if a good scientific study were to show a positive correlation between religiosity and homicide (or crime in general) in various countries this would not amount to a causal link between religiosity and immoral behavior, simply because there are many other factors to take into account which probably correlate stronger and hence are better explanations. Compare Paul's results to the results I quoted in post 432 or #81155 above: that a religious family earning the same amount of money and living in the same society (and thus the strongest outside factors are eliminated from the sample) on average gives significantly more money to charity, gives more blood, and gives more time to help others, than a non-religious family.
The rest of Paul's study discusses issues of health (child mortality, life expectancy, STDs, teen abortions), but here, obviously, factors such as the quality and availability of medical services and of education are the main explanatory factors. And when such factors are normalized, several other studies show a positive correlation between religiosity and physical and mental health.
At the end of his study Paul mentions that the US society has less health benefits even though it pays more for health. However that is to be explained (and out of the top of my head I suppose this has to do with the absence of national health insurance in the US which would raise average health, America's pork barrel politics, or even America's culture of medical malpractice premiums), the whole issue of the efficiency of the health services in the US has next to nothing to do with religiosity. Once again it seems an atheist has gone to a fishing expedition to find something - anything - to say against religion.
I am rather disappointed with atheists' lack of critical thought; I mean how could anyone even a little versed in statistics take this study seriously? You Epeeist like to use long words when discussing statistical issues, but it seems you were nonetheless suckered by Paul's study. Luckily, the question of whether religiosity is conducive to moral behavior (or alternatively whether non-religiosity is conducive to immoral behavior) is a plainly scientific question, which can and I think will be properly investigated until a conclusive result is reached – especially now that new atheists are making so many waves.
177. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82969 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 11:38 am
Goldy (post 521, or #82584):
You said "fact". No "observational" or anything else. Just "fact". And you didn't mention "maybe" or "might" or "it is my belief". Just "fact".Well, I think I used "observational fact" quite often, and I thought this meaning was clear. But anyway, what's your point? Virtually all (if not absolutely all) facts I know of are observational facts. Do you know of facts that are not observational facts? If so, which? But if you don't know of any facts that are non-observational, then what difference does it make if I wrote somewhere "fact" alone, and not "observational fact"?
178. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82967 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 11:28 am
Phil Rimmer (post 518, or #82546):
You miss that an atheist may love his children, care for their happiness, which will in turn possibly depend on children of their own. Bringing children into an unsafe world is a great motivator for self-sacrifice. (The childless, too, may well invest emotionally in adopted, fostered or otherwise related kids.)Not at all; I am quite aware of course the atheists love their children and other people as fully as any religious person; most of my friends are atheists after all. And understand this very well because I believe that we are all made in the image of God and hence have access, if you will, to objective transcendental truth, including the value of love and the meaning of ethics. Moreover I am confident that there is naturalistic explanation of the same. So I have absolutely no problem with atheists behaving morally as a matter of fact.
My problem is that I cannot see what logical sense the ethical precept "love your enemies" can make to an atheist. I believe, and in fact it is required by my own worldview, that atheists too intuitively realize that there is some deep truth in that precept. (For example Dawkins in his article "Atheists for Jesus" speaks with admiration about Jesus's ethics.) What I fail to see is what logical (as contrasted with intuitive or emotional) sense can that precept make to an atheist. You argue that if people followed that precept we would create a better world for our children. I agree, but not on logical grounds I can see. Logic appears to tell me that if (whether few or many it doesn't matter) people started really loving their enemies the world would become a more dangerous place as other people would take advantage of that kind of behavior which they will perceive as weakness. In my own life, when I was actually nicer to people than the call of duty as it were, the results were ambiguous at best.
Perhaps we should clarify our terminology here. "Love your enemies" does not mean "avoid hating your enemies too much", or "avoid taking revenge on your enemies", or "avoid hitting back except when absolutely necessary" – or any of these things. It's a much more radical idea, which says that one should actually empathize and try to help one's enemies out of love and, as love always is, without any expectation of getting something in return from them.
Further, you completely fail to acknowledge that I gave two rational reasons why, if one's enemy becomes the mad-axeman, the more moral action (given the issue of time and the number of others at risk) may be to kill him.Oh I see. Well, in that case we were talking past each other, for in my mind to kill the attacker even fails the "return no evil" precept, never mind the "love your enemies" precept. So, you see? It seems these ethical precepts make no sense in an atheistic worldview after all.
I think you just stubbed your toe on the uncomfortable fact that an atheist (a Pod Person, for chrissakes!) had a fully logical reason to hold moral convictions you thought only possible for a Christian.But it seems you don't really hold the same moral convictions. When you mentioned the mad-axeman example, I thought you were talking of Hitchens's thinking, but now I see you were talking of yours too. The ethical precept is not "return no evil except in the following cases: a) if brutally attacked, b) if by killing somebody you save several lives, c) etc. etc). Neither is it "love your enemies, or at least their children after you eliminate their parents".
So let me restate my answer to Hitchens's challenge: "The ethical statement that no atheist can reasonably make is that we should - literally, truly, and without exception - selflessly love our enemies and act on it."
179. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82951 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 10:42 am
Alovrin (post 517, or #82540):
What is the meaning of life?Well, I disagree, and would like to point out that those who see no point in that question are normally called "nihilists". But I wonder, do you really believe that your life has no meaning?
This has to be the most pointless question ever asked.
A "hideous picture of reality" sez you dyke boy.Well, actually I took that expression from something Dawkins said in his debate with Lennox.
religions "free of paradox's" since when?Since one seriously studies them I suppose. (And to be precise what I claim is that idealistic theism is free of paradoxes, especially in comparison with scientific realism.)
180. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82946 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 10:27 am
Lauregon (post 509, or #82453):
Those people eventually become admirers of Bishop Spong, and abandon the concept of theism altogether,Well, yes, I know of that language, but it's quite misleading because Spong is not an atheist; in fact he believes in the existence and presence of God and calls himself a Christian.
Nor have I heard that the Pope or the Archibishop of Canterbury have abandoned creedal beliefs.I was not speaking about what the Pope or this or that archbishop believes or teaches, but only pointing out that a significant percentage of Christians are liberal (and hence openly non-dogmatic) and that in fact there are very few Christians who really believe that every word in the Bible is true. The contrary view is one sold by new atheists to shore up their Christian straw-bogeyman.
If the creeds are strawmen, Christian belief is what's frail.If the creeds are wrong then indeed dogmatic Christian belief is frail. And I think it is. Obviously, Spong agrees, but in my view he goes way too far and throws away the baby with the bathwater.
If it ever happens the Pope, the A of C, and the prelates of Eastern Orthodoxy, etc., announce to their congregations that the creeds are obsolete, and that the resurrection will not celebrated any longer, maybe we can revisit this discussion.:-) So you think that the truth of theism is contingent on what the Pope et al say?
The substance of John 13:34-35 is that Jesus is about to offer himself as scapegoat in a blood sacrifice. And what's a scapegoat for?Well, unfortunately we read the gospels very differently. For me the substance of John 13:34-35 is clearly and explicitly about how we should live our lives.
Unfortunately, the idea that "God" is "perfect" is a dogma that has no means of being proven or even observed.Neither has the idea that electrons exist any means of being proven or observed. But many atheists believe electrons exist.
181. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82941 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 10:08 am
SRWB (post 508, or #82404):
I never claimed any such connection at least as far as taxes is concerned. I only claimed that there is no logical path that would lead an atheist to pay their fair share if they can get away without paying it. If you or anybody here can see a logical reason for an atheist to do the right thing in this case I would very much like to know about it.So, again, on what logical grounds would an atheist decide to pay their fair share in society even if they can get away with not paying it?What possible connection do you see between those of us who are atheists and not paying our fair share in society?
182. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82940 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 10:03 am
Epeeist (post 507, or #82395):
I expressively talked of a legal loophole, so I am not sure what equivocation you mean here.Or let's take a less inflammatory and more realistic case. Suppose you own a company and your accountant proposes to use a perfectly legal loophole in order to avoid paying taxes. I think you'll agree that to do so is immoral, because even if it's not against the letter of law, it feels clearly wrong to avoid paying one's fair share in society.A little bit of equivocation here - you are conflating avoidance and evasion. Avoidance is legal, evasion is illegal.
But yes, one should pay one's fair share towards building a civic society since man is by nature a political animal.Right. So my question remains: On what logical grounds would an atheist do the right thing in this case?
183. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82938 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 9:58 am
Epeeist (post 506, or #82387):
I really want to know how you can dismiss the gods of one bronze age people for that of another bronze age people.The god concept that interests me is not the one believed by ancient peoples, but the one that best explains the whole of my experience of life.
By the way, given your Greek background I am amazed that you are not aware of the matriarchal society and its mythos that preceded Zeus and his pantheon.Not all Greeks are experts in ancient Greek mythology, sorry.
184. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82935 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 9:52 am
Irate_atheist (post 503, or #82372):
Yes, very serious. When you read popular books (such as TGD) you get the impression that a) atheism and science are practically synonymous, and b) that theism is practically what the Bible says. But it isn't so. And if you study and compare the best theistic worldviews (which are philosophical and non-dogmatic) with the dominant atheist worldview (naturalism, or more specifically, the so-called "scientific realism") using the same set of criteria you'll be surprised to find that in all cases theism works much better than atheism. There has been a very long discussion about this in the debate between Dawkins in McGrath thread (starting with post #48459 there, see:Theism is an entirely different way to understand reality, one that postulates that reality at bottom is not physical and governed by mechanical laws, but rather is spiritual and governed by personal will. And it turns out that the latter way to understand reality works much better than the former.WTF? Are you serious?
http://richarddawkins.net/articleComments,1212,Richard-Dawkins-and-Alister-McGrath,Root-of-All-Evil-Uncut-Interviews,page7#48459 )
185. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82930 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 28, 2007 at 9:40 am
SRWB (post 501, or #82367):
I meant consequences to the one who makes these actions; I thought that was clear. And, no, if death is the end of our life then neither our bad actions have bad consequences, nor our good actions have good consequences – not always and arguably not typically. As Lennox said in his debate with Dawkins, if death is the end then there is no justice. Or, in other words, if death is the end of one's life then in many situations it pays to behave immorally. Which is the problem of practical morality I have been discussing: atheism offers no logical path away from immoral behavior where such immoral behavior is to one's advantage. Which is typically the case: the typical moral dilemma is whether to do what is to one's advantage in this life, or to do what one feels is the right thing.…a maybe subconscious pull of atheism is the wish to believe that our actions do not necessarily have consequences,Of course our actions have consequences, just not the supernatural ones you ascribe to
Your comparison (post 479) between what you call the "ignoble morals gambit", i.e. belief out of fear and reward, and the examples of studying to get into university and looking both ways before crossing a street are hardly pertinent. The last two are issues that are relevant to living in modern civilizations and are very important to surviving and thriving where most of us live and work.I don't understand your point here; my examples are indeed pertinent in the case of modern civilizations. And if theism (or rather religion in general) is true, ethics is pertinent always and in all cases, because objective reality is such that our actions always have consequences.
We know intuitively that to do the "right thing" makes it easier to get along with our particular societal group, and that has nothing to do with being "made in the image of God".We speak of morality precisely in those cases where the right thing to do is not what is to our advantage. If to do something makes it easier to live in society or gives us any other advantage then we don't speak of being moral but of being smart. For example, the consequences of the immoral action of legally avoiding to pay one's fair share of taxes produces obviously many more advantages than disadvantages. (Even if your actions became known to your peers they are apt to admire you for it, and if you do the right thing they are apt to think you are being stupid.)
I don't know, I find it so obvious and so easy to demonstrate that atheism is conducive to immoral behavior that this line of argument strikes me as not particularly interesting, and sometimes makes me feel like I am beating a dead horse. The fact that new atheists go around in each of their books and each of their speeches drumming up theism's immorality evidences their maybe unconscious intent to obscure the fact that atheism has an obvious disadvantage as far as morality is concerned.
But perhaps I am not being fair here. Both Harris and Dawkins strike me as honest people, and it's probable that new atheism is a genuine reaction of moral indignation in respect to religion's many excesses. But they have committed two huge and, considering their intellect, inexcusable errors:
1) In virtually all cases where religious people behave immorally they do so contrary to their religion's basic teaching against violence and greed and against its ontology of ultimate justice. So to suggest as a solution for the immoral behavior of religious people the removal of religion is like suggesting as a solution for criminal behavior the removal from society of law and order. I mean, if human nature and conditions are such that despite religions' teaching many religious people behave badly, to remove that teaching can only makes things worse. (Which is the same that I have been arguing here: non-religion makes immorality logical.)
2) They fail to put theists' misbehavior in perspective. Indeed the common strand of criticism of Dawkins's TGD is the blatant use of selective evidence. He focuses in cases of theistic mischief, and airbrushes away the much more significant atheistic mischief. Have you watched the recent debate between Hitchens and D'Souza? D'Souza makes the point that the Spanish Inquisition during 300 years has killed as many people as Pol Pot in one afternoon. I know that atheists counter that Stalin, Pol Pot, Hitler and so on were not primarily motivated by atheism but a) I think that's a little naive because certainly atheism played an important role in their belief system and as Sam Harris insists one's belief system affects one's actions, and b) if one can explain away atheists' crimes by arguing that atheism was not the prime motivator, by the same measure and quite easily one can explain away theists' crimes by arguing that theism was not the prime motivator either. So, unless one wants to keep one's eyes tightly shut, the fact that most crimes against humanity in recent history were organized by atheist leaders, and that most great ethical advances in recent history (from the abolition of slavery to the non-violent liberation of India) have been spearheaded by religious leaders and have obviously been inspired by religious teaching – that fact is clear and present historical evidence that theism is ethically superior to atheism. As is evidenced too by the various scientific studies. This state of affairs may say nothing about whether theism is closer to ontological truth than atheism, but it does say something important about atheism's dangerousness as well as, conversely, about religions's attractiveness.
But perhaps new atheism's argument is more subtle: that religion is immoral because it teaches people to be unreasonable. I think that's true in general because people on average hardly learn any science, or formal logic, or critical thought at school. Whether theists are on average less reasonable than atheists I don't know. It may well be so; I suppose theism can easily degenerate into superstition.
Anyway I am happy with the New Atheism phenomenon: By being so shrill and combative it pushes the issues to the surface, and thus forces both theists and atheists to take a better look at the failing of their respective worldviews – conceptually and in the praxis. I think in the end atheists will discover that atheism is not such an obviously superior worldview (not the least after observing that atheists do not clearly win their debates with theists, to put it mildly), will slowly discover the great conceptual problems of their worldview, and also will have to think about the issue of atheism's logical path towards immorality. And theists will have to deal with the clearly unreasonable/immoral aspects of some of their dogmatic beliefs as well as with the behavior influenced by these beliefs, including – and I wish new atheists would point this more strongly – their policies in respect to contraception which are having a very negative impact in the Third World, particularly in Catholic countries.
It's only "deeply meaningful" because human societies have, over thousands of years, evolved certain norms of behavior that have become the "right thing".It's true that ethical behavior and beliefs can be justified on evolutionary grounds; but to suggest that that's all there is to ethics is wrong on two grounds: a) It doesn't really say anything whatsoever about what we actually should do, in other words to lean how ethical beliefs and behavior evolved teaches us zero about ethics, and b) it can justify ideas that can only be called fascistic. Take for example the famous scientist and famous atheist James Watson who recently opined that blacks are less intelligent than whites (see: http://news.independent.co.uk/sci_tech/article3070583.ece ). Now suppose it were true, or even better, suppose science one day proves beyond reasonable doubt that the Chinese race is genetically significantly superior than all other races both in intelligence and morality. Suppose further that an atheist would then suggest that in order to maximize human happiness (which according to Sam Harris in his "The End of Faith" is the goal of realist ethics) one should enact laws that prohibit Chinese people to marry people of other races, and prohibit people from other races to have more than one child – in order that one day Earth is inhabited exclusively by that genetically superior race and hence happiness be maximized. It's quite logical, isn't it? You see where I am pointing at? Ethics without some transcendental ground in a religious worldview is apt to go seriously wrong.
186. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82376 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 7:44 am
Philip1978 (post 499, or #82356):
I don't see the point of bbqing virgins, but if one get can away with violating virgins it certainly makes excellent evolutionary sense. Now I know that you wouldn't violate virgins even if you could get away with it because of many obvious emotional reasons, but I can't see any logical reason why you wouldn't do it.So, again, the more logical and knowledgeable an atheist is the less one can expect moral behavior from themOh great, so the more I learn and become logical the more I am likely to be a complete bastard, cheers mate! Well, as is now my wont, I am off to bbq some virgins, who is with me?
Or let's take a less inflammatory and more realistic case. Suppose you own a company and your accountant proposes to use a perfectly legal loophole in order to avoid paying taxes. I think you'll agree that to do so is immoral, because even if it's not against the letter of law, it feels clearly wrong to avoid paying one's fair share in society. So can you point out any logical reason why an atheist in such a real world situation would move away from this immoral course of action?
A possible answer would be: "Because if everybody avoided paying their taxes then society in general would suffer, which indirectly would hurt one's own interests also". But that answer has two errors: First, as a matter of fact, everybody (or almost everybody) does avoid paying taxes when they can find a legal way to do it, i.e. when they can get away with it. And secondly, to take advantage of tax loopholes does on balance offer much more direct gains than indirect losses; after all the government will collect the same amount of taxes it needs for society by simply pushing more burden to others.
So, again, on what logical grounds would an atheist decide to pay their fair share in society even if they can get away with not paying it?
187. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82368 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 7:10 am
Epeeist (post 493, or #82295):
[Dianelos] hasn't given me any reason for dismissing Zeus or the triple goddess as yet.You mean your question in post 461 (#81776) above? I thought that post were meant as humor, and found it quite good too; I did not realize you meant it seriously. Anyway here goes the answer: The reason I have for dismissing Zeus is that a worldview based on God works much better than a worldview based on Zeus. (For one my wife has climbed mount Olympus and tells me she did not find any palaces on its summit :-) The same goes for the case of Emperor of Japan. And the same goes for atheism by the way. As for the "Green man" and the "triple goddess" I don't know what you mean by that.
188. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82366 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 6:58 am
Philip1978 (post 492, or #82293):
:-) Surely you are not saying: Here we have a worldview that is full of paradoxes and ever-increasing gaps and does not really explain anything of our condition (not to mention paints a hideous picture of reality and is conducive to immoral behavior to boot), and there we have a worldview that is coherent and free of paradoxes and explains our condition very well (not to mention makes our life better and is ethically empowering) - but - the former worldview is more reasonable because we like mystery in our lives. You are not saying that, are you?Because both the number and size of gaps in the atheistic understanding of reality are growingTHAT'S HALF THE JOY OF IT ALL YOU SILLY SOD! Mystery is a great part of life, if we knew it all, or even claimed we knew it all, it would be highly dull and boring!
This whole "you have gaps in your knowledge so it must be my god stuff" has got to stop unless you can prove it matey.Well, it's not like "atheism is full of gaps, and I can fill them all up with goddidit" – that's only how atheists who don't study serious ontology (or who read books by authors who have not studied serious ontology ;-) think. Theism is an entirely different way to understand reality, one that postulates that reality at bottom is not physical and governed by mechanical laws, but rather is spiritual and governed by personal will. And it turns out that the latter way to understand reality works much better than the former (for example it does not have these gaping gaps to begin with). Which, if I am right, people will find out sooner or later. We shall see.
189. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82351 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 6:06 am
Juleofdenial (post 491, or #82290):
Bribery and extortion are good things? Because that is how Christianity gets people to behave.It's true that Christianity teaches that all our actions have consequences in this life or the next, as do all major religions, including Eastern religions. McGrath in his debate with Hitchens suggests that a maybe subconscious pull of atheism is the wish to believe that our actions do not necessarily have consequences, which is a basically infantile wish. In any case, the argument that religious beliefs about the consequences of one's actions somehow make less "noble" the ethical behavior of religious people, does not hold water (see post 479 or #82259 above).
The atheist, on the other hand, is ethical purely for the sake of being ethical.The atheistic worldview does not offer any logical reason for not behaving unethically (see post 488 or #82278 above), so the incontrovertible fact that atheists do often behave ethically can only be explained on emotional grounds. Which is quite fine, as far as I am concerned: We are all made in the image of God, and therefore we all intuitively know that to do the right thing is deeply meaningful – and many atheists simply do not let their logic get the upper hand. Some atheists point out the evolutionary explanation of moral behavior, but they don't realize or fail to mention the free-rider problem that Dawkins himself has discussed, a consequence of which is that once one understands the evolutionary explanation for moral behavior one realizes that it pays not to follow that behavior. So, again, the more logical and knowledgeable an atheist is the less one can expect moral behavior from them.
190. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82278 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 1:42 am
Diacanu (post 485, or #82271):
atheism - offers a clear and logical path towards immoral behavior.Present it.
Have done so already in the Lennox thread. See for example posts 266 (#77989), 273 (#78123), 285 (#78183), 291 (#78228), 308 (#78320), 336 (#78396), 366 (#78525) and 634 (or #80487)
starting here
191. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82267 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 1:16 am
Diacanu (post 478, or #82258):
Because both the number and size of gaps in the atheistic understanding of reality are growing (see post 466 or #81919 about this).I find it pretty evident that atheism, being such a frail worldview,How so?
By constantly drumming up the various stupid bits in the Bible or by fishing up the most titillating anecdotes of theistic mischief around in order to argue – against reason and scientific evidence – that religious belief conduces to immoral behavior, atheism is blowing a lot of smoke to hide the fact that it is its own house that is conceptually shaky and besides offers a clear and logical path towards immoral behavior.
192. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82261 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 12:55 am
Goldy (post 470, or #81991):
I think you are confusing the concepts of "observational fact" and "irrefutable proof". An observational fact proves nothing beyond itself. So, for example, the US had some observational facts about Iraq's program of weapons of mass destruction (say a document here, a satellite photo there) but these obviously did not amount to irrefutable proof that Iraq had such a program.
193. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82259 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 12:44 am
Epeeist (post 455, or #81614):
I call it Dawkins's "ignoble morals gambit": Dawkins in his debate with Lennox argues that religious people must fear punishment by God or else desire reward by God in order to be good, and that "neither of these two is a noble reason to be good to say the least". But then again people study in order to enter the University, and nobody says that the expectation of that reward renders studying "ignoble". And if one before passing a street carefully looks to the right and to the left out of fear of getting hit by a car, that isn't "ignoble" either. The reality we find ourselves in is such that our actions have consequences; those who ignore that are not called "noble" but rather anything between "frivolous" and "foolish".But why would these results surprise you? It's easy to see that all other things being equivalent a religious person has one more reason to act ethically than a nonreligious person, namely the belief in the afterlife in which one's actions in this life have relevance.Ah, the fear and greed gambit.
To open it up further, in the region where I coach there are a couple of coaches who are Methodists, I am an atheist. Of the others, I wouldn't have a clue as to whether they profess any religion or none. Given this is in the UK I would guess that many would be CofE of the hatch/match/dispatch variety. How therefore would you decide whether their efforts are to be placed in the religious or secular camp?No idea. You asked for evidence, and I gave you both logical argument and objective evidence. I quoted books describing the results of dozens of scientific studies made by various academic researchers. Now there is no absolutely conclusive evidence (there is no such thing as the "irrefutable proof" that Goldy demands); one can always find something to doubt in any evidence. For me the evidence is more than convincing, but if you have so much faith in atheism's positive effect on a person's morality then that's ok with me. In fact if the atheistic worldview works best for you and makes you a better person then you should keep it as far as I am concerned. You really do not risk burning in hell you know :-) Actually I believe that people who follow their reason into atheism are better off than people who are theists against their better reason.
194. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #82257 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 26, 2007 at 12:29 am
Lauregon (post 450, or #81381):
Yes. You appear to be surprised, but not all Christians, not by far, are dogmatic. Haven't you ever heard of "liberal Christianity"? In fact, as far as liberal Christians go, I am pretty orthodox. There are Christians who don't believe in the incarnation, nor in the resurrection, nor in the Trinity.If you mean "condone of" in the sense of "agree with" or "approve" then surely it's not like God agreed with Jesus' torture and crucifixion – surely nobody in their right minds thinks that, do they? How could God agree with violence done to anybody? – DianelosOops. There goes the entire doctrine of salvation from "God's" wrath by means of Jesus' vicarious atonement,
What's more, there are very few really "Fundamentalist Christians". There are many millions who pay lip service to the claim that every word in the Bible is literally true, but they obviously do not believe it as evidenced by the fact that they, for example, work on the Sabbath without giving it a thought, even though according to the Bible doing so is a terrible sin punishable by death. That all Christians are dogmatic or that many Christians are fundamentalist is one more figment in the imagination of popular atheism I am afraid.
I find it pretty evident that atheism, being such a frail worldview, must find ways to trivialize theism and build up strawmen in order to shore up its own viability. I am not implying that atheists do this on purpose; I am only saying that if they didn't do that they wouldn't remain atheists for long. Dawkins in his TGD argues that agnosticism is not a viable intellectual position. I on the contrary think that if one studies the issues agnosticism is the only viable non-religious intellectual position.
[the entire doctrine of salvation from "God's" wrath by means of Jesus' vicarious atonement is] the whole substance of Christian orthodoxySRWB in the next post shares your sentiment. But the dogma of atonement is not the whole substance of Christianity. What is, is the belief that there is a God of perfection and that we come closer to God by following the way of Christ as described in his "new commandment" in John 13:34-35. Or, as Jesus elsewhere in the gospels says, if we try to be in this life as perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect. That's the substance of Christianity.
195. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #81947 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 25, 2007 at 12:41 pm
Phil Rimmer (post 448, or #81340):
C.S.Lewis's idea about how to achieve to love one's enemies may or may not be a good idea, but it certainly has nothing to do with our discussion about whether "we should love our enemies" is an ethical precept that can make sense in an atheistic understanding of reality. The Wildean paradox is motivated by one's desire to annoy one's enemies, so I think it's quite irrelevant too. Maybe we can drop this line of thought.
Another point I would like to object to is the idea that to love one's enemies is based on the principle of reciprocity. You argue: "I wish to be loved. I will hate my enemy. This is reciprocal?" But even though it would be obviously fine and good to get one's enemies to love one, what in reality is often practically feasible is at best to get one's enemies to fear one, and at worse to get one's enemies to die. Imagine for a moment a policy meeting in the G.W.Bush administration after 9/11 with somebody suggesting that the reciprocal reaction would be to try to get the Taliban to love America. I think it's quite clear that reciprocity is what the Old Testament teaches, namely "Love those who love you and hate those who hate you; an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth". (The latest bit of reciprocity in practice often translates to ten eyes for an eye – but never mind.)
Reading the rest of your post I think you try to show that if people followed the "love your enemies" precept then the consequence would be a better society (in a broad sense of "better" with which all reasonable people – religious or non-religious alike – can agree with). Actually I sympathize with what you are trying to argue there, because as a matter of fact I agree with you: I too believe, or rather trust, that if people (even if only a few) were to love their enemies the consequences would be good for society and not suicidal as Hitchens figures. But I really don't think you are making a good argument there, and I don't think I would be able to do any better. In any case, I still don't see how the "love your enemies" precept can make sense within the atheistic worldview, especially considering the objective standards of reasoning that that worldview demands.
Anyway, thanks for openly and seriously describing your moral thought; I found it quite instructive.
196. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath
Comment #81919 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 25, 2007 at 11:47 am
Teratornis (post 444 or #81194):
My view is that science is the only tool which has notably succeeded at much of anything.Let me see: philosophy, mathematics, architecture, art, engineering, politics, the exploration of our planet, and human culture itself – all of these as well as the tools they use - they have all not notably succeeded at much of anything?
Scientists did not discover all these previously unknown things by "presupposing" anything.Nevertheless the fact remains that scientists presuppose things all the time and without having good evidence. And while looking for such evidence they sometimes discover contrary evidence, which then moves them to new scientific discoveries and sometimes to scientific revolutions. Famous examples are the presupposition of the existence of the luminiferous aether, or the presupposition that space is absolute, or the presupposition that energy is a continuous quantity, or the presupposition that spacetime is local – to mention just a few. So presuppositions not only exist in science, but actually play a positive role it.
Back then, the habitat for the God of the Gaps was much roomier than it is now. It seems a good bet that further progress of science will further squeeze the God of the Gaps.Actually, it seems to me that the gaps in a naturalistic understanding of reality are not only failing to shrink but actually quickly growing, not to mention exploding. What, with the problems of the origin of life, the origin of consciousness, the origin of the fundamental physical constants, the origin of ethics, the origin of quantum phenomena – and of these only the first is a gap in scientific knowledge which science in principle can and will probably close; all others are gaps of the naturalistic understanding of reality. And considering that atheism has not actually ever explained anything, I think it very unlikely that it will be able to close the other gaps.
So then, the question becomes, do you suppose there are some things which must forever remain outside the reach of science? Which is equivalent to asking, do you believe science must ultimately reach the point where it has discovered all it can discover?These two questions are not equivalent, for it's possible to answer yes to first question and no to the second. Perhaps the field of scientific investigation is infinite, and even so there may be many other fields of investigation that are not scientific. Reality is not one-dimensional you know.
If so, where do you draw your line in the sand?Well, obviously, in all the places where science has nothing to say. I mean Dawkins may not be the most philosophically knowledgeable person there is, but even he recognizes that science has nothing to say about ethics [1]. As it has nothing to say about art. As it has nothing to say about justice. As it has nothing positive to say about ontology (science can only falsify but not validate ontological theories). And so on. Incidentally the idea that science can in principle answer all questions is called "scientism".
[1] To avoid a common misunderstanding: The field of ethics discusses how we should behave – not how we in fact behave. One cannot use science to decide ethical questions. One can use science to evaluate the consequences of the various alternatives of action at hand, but in t