201. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81589 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 11:57 pm

Walk (post 430,or #81145):

Oops, sorry, here goes the direct answer. Your question again was:

If god is omnipotent, having more power than anything in the universe, how is it that our ultra-sensitive sensing equipment which can measure the most minute forces, somehow can't detect the greatest force that exists?

Consider again the falling of an apple. Science discovers that the falling of the apple can be described by specific scientific laws. As we saw in post 409 (#81038) above, the naturalist believes that the same laws not only describe that falling but actually make the apple fall this way, whereas the theist believes that God's will makes the apple fall this way. But science cannot help us decide who of the two is right. Why not? Because the use of ever more ultra-sensitive instruments can only help science discover ever more ultra-exact scientific laws, but both the naturalist and theist agree that these laws exist. The question if whether the laws themselves or else God's will make the physical world behave as it does. And to answer this question the use of scientific instruments is irrelevant, you see that.

202. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81195 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 11:43 am

SRWB (post 428, or #81123):

DG I think our wires are crossed. I am not talking about Abraham and Isaac,

Right, my mistake.

However, to my question "does your God condone torture of "children" for fun or any other reason, i.e. like saving the rest of mankind?" you answered "no". Are you sure?

Yes, quite.

I was referring to the scourging and crucifixion of Jesus. Wasn't he a "child" who was tortured?

Oh, I see. If you mean "condone of" in the sense of "agree with" or "approve" then surely it's not like God agreed with Jesus' torture and crucifixion – surely nobody in their right minds thinks that, do they? How could God agree with violence done to anybody? But if you mean "condone of" in the sense of "allow to happen", then of course God does allow for all moral as well as natural evil to happen (including the torture of crucifixion of Jesus), but this it seems to me is a different issue. Or maybe you mean that by allowing evil (including natural evil) to happen God is breaking the precept "you should not torture sentient beings for fun" – but then you see the problem: That God does allow evil to happen does not of course entail that God does this for fun. The key question of theodicy is indeed to explain why God allows evil to happen. I think the best answer is the Irenaean theodicy, which we may discuss if you wish.

And you do believe in [Jesus], do you not?

Yes, but the truth about Jesus is not the central issue of ontology. The central issue is whether the whole of our experience of life can be understood better by postulating a non-religious or a religious description of objective reality. More specifically what interests me to discuss is whether theism or naturalism are more reasonable descriptions of objective reality. If one thinks that naturalism is the correct description of reality then, obviously, all discussion about Jesus or Christianity is irrelevant. Nevertheless if you care to know about my personal beliefs about Jesus then let me know.

203. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81163 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 10:00 am

Diacanu (post 418 or #81066):

"But we are all free to understand the gospel message any way we like".

Well, if the gospels weren't such a sloppy piece of obfuscationist moosh, there wouldn't be all the arguments.

Well, taking into account that Jesus was teaching 2,000 years ago among simpleminded (actually illiterate) people, I think he did a great job. And taking into account that his teaching was recorded in writing many years after his death, and then edited and re-edited by many people with various motives, the gospels as a whole manage to convey Jesus's moral sense pretty well I think.

204. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81160 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 9:53 am

Diacanu (post 416 or #81057):

"the fact remains that theism is more conducive to moral behavior than atheism -".

Even if that were so (it's not) that isn't a point whatsoever in favor of it being TRUE.

I have already dealt with this point in post 345 or #80767 in this thread.

205. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81156 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 9:47 am

Goldy (post 413, or #81052):

the fact remains that atheism is more conducive to moral behavior than theism

Can you - or anybody else here - give any evidence for this assertion?

206. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81155 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 9:43 am

Epeeist (post 412, or #81048):

Secondly, whichever worldview turns out to be true, the fact remains that theism is more conducive to moral behavior than atheism - as is easy to see on conceptual grounds and is moreover evidenced by observational facts.

You have your mantra, I have mine
The burden of proof is always on the person asserting something.

Put up or shut up. Show us some evidence

Have done so already in the Lennox thread. See for example post 643 (or #80487) there.

And if you are asking for specific objective evidence, Harold Koenig's "The Link between Religion and Health" and Arthur Brooks's "Who Really Cares" quote dozens of scientific studies that document both the physical and ethical benefits of religious belief. Let me quote from page 34 of the latter book:

But the evidence leaves no room for doubt: Religious people are far more charitable than nonreligious people. In years of research, I have never found a measurable way in which secularists are more charitable than religious people.[snip] In 2000, religious people - who, per family, earned exactly the same amount as secular people, $49,000 - gave about 3.5 times more money per year (an average of $2,210 versus $642). They also volunteered more than twice as often (12 times per year, versus 5.8 times).

And, incidentally, I wonder: is that the royal "us" you are using? ;-)

207. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81140 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 8:40 am

Phil Rimmer (post 401, or #80970):

Thanks for the answer; I found that an interesting post. Nevertheless it seems to me you are not so much explaining what sense it makes for an atheist to believe that one should love one's enemies, but rather what sense it makes that one should not return evil, or maybe what sense it makes to pretend to love one's enemy. These are two different precepts: Indeed it makes sense to act in ways that would break the violence-begets-violence vicious circle, as you explain - even though it's not clear that not returning evil is effective in breaking that circle; some might argue that such behavior instigates violence; Hitchens would probably argue that only utterly destroying our enemies breaks that circle. But in any case, in order to break that circle you need not actually love your enemies. My question was what sense to love one's enemies has in an atheistic worldview, in other words what's the sense to actually love and therefore try to help one's enemies. And if somebody takes away our coat then offer them our shirt also – not out of fear or out of contempt - but out of love: this kind of loving behavior. I can't help but think that Hitchens was being candid when he called such behavior "deranged" and "suicidal"; indeed when I put myself in the shoes of an atheist and apply cold reason to the issue it seems to me that what he says makes sense. Can you explain where he and I are wrong?

Some specific comments to your post:

so I am really curious to understand how two atheists could arrive at such diametrically opposed moral beliefs.

Your God, you're right! How is it people unfettered by dogma and proud to be free thinkers could arrive at a different set of moral beliefs?? Is it possible that atheism isn't actually a set of beliefs after all??

Well, I see what you are saying here, but atheists pride themselves that they decide all their beliefs by following objective reason, scientific principles, and corroborative evidence (in contrast to religious people who let emotions or even self-contradictory scripture affect their beliefs) – so I think I am justified in being surprised that atheists would arrive at such diametrically opposed moral beliefs.

I see also from the tone of your post that you doubt my sincerity. That speaks volumes....

To challenge the reasoning behind your assertions does not imply one doubts your sincerity you know. People do mistakes all the time without being insincere. For example I believe that many of Harris's and Dawkins's thoughts are fallacious but I also believe they are both eminently, perhaps admiringly, honest people. So what I challenge you to do is to explain why an atheist would follow reason to conclude that they should lover their enemies – for I really cannot understand that (and neither does Hitchens). But if have given offence then I apologize.

It is a Wildean paradox that smacks you in the face and sticks in the brain.

The Wildean paradox is "Always forgive your enemies, nothing annoys them so much." – but I fail to see how this explains why we should love our enemies; at best it says why we should pretend to love them.

Its roots lie in the live-and-let-live, reciprocal philosophies of Epicurus and Confucius.

There is nothing "reciprocal" in the precept to love our enemies. Reciprocal would be "love your friends and hate your enemies; help your friends and hurt your enemies".

I simply discovered that by imagining my enemies as friends they could often become so.

This sounds to me like a fine and effective philosophy Phil, but still imagining loving someone is not the same as loving them.

Killing my enemy makes my son his son's enemy.

Right, but here you explain what sense it makes not to return evil. To avoid killing your enemy (because of all the good reasons you mention) you don't have to actually love them.

Loving the man and hating the poison in his head makes perfect sense.

What sense? What logical sense does loving our enemies make within an atheistic understanding of reality?

208. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81086 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 3:27 am

Dr Benway (post 397, or #80935):

When I was a wee thing, my grandmum explained to me that when people talk about their feelings, what they like and don't like, they're talking about themselves.

But when I say that it is wrong to torture children for fun I am not talking about myself and not talking about the conventions of the society. Rather it is overwhelmingly obvious to me that to torture children for fun is wrong independently of how I am, or what I think, or what society's conventions are, or what philosophers think, or what is written in this or that religious book.

209. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81083 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 3:14 am

SRWB (post 396, or #80932):

Can you imagine any state of affairs that would make you change your opinion into actually believing that torturing children for fun is right?

No, but it's also an irrelevant question, as most (all) of us will not agree that torturing children (or adults), for fun or otherwise, is OBJECTIVELY right, wrong or true.

What I don't understand though is why you believe that's not an objective precept, or, in other words, that it only a expresses something about about personal opinion or social convention. And if you really believe it's only a matter of personal opinion or convention, how do you explain the fact that you can't even imagine a state of affairs that would make you change your mind? After all, in all other cases of beliefs about personal opinion or convention and which do not refer to something objective it's easy to imagine a state of affairs that would make us change our mind.

(indeed your God allowed the sacrifice of his only child after he was tortured). Now, while we can agree that being sacrificed to a god is not necessarily the same as torture, I would defy you to suggest that the individual, whose life is about to be extinguished, doesn't feel intense dread, and severe physical pain and mental suffering - the very definition of torture.

Well, it's not fair to call the God who asked Abraham to sacrifice his son, "my God", for I have never claimed that my understanding of God is guided by everything that's written in the Bible. But anyway let me tell you what I think about this particular story. Some of the writers of the Bible had clearly very little moral sense, and in any case were more motivated by the desire to create a nationalist mythology rather than to teach ontological truth. So in this story the writer's objective was clearly to convey the idea that God's commandments must be obeyed blindly and no matter what - with the clear implication that the commandments of God's representatives, namely the priestly class to which this writer almost certainly belonged, should also be blindly obeyed. So we have this morally repugnant story in an ancient and in many places very primitive document, and we can easily explain how this story came to be written there by noting how clearly self-serving it was. So why exactly should we give that story so much relevance? Surely not because religious fundamentalists give it much relevance. After all, since when should reasonable people follow unreasonable people in their judgment of what is relevant?

In short, it's obvious to anybody having just a tiny bit of intellectual freedom to realize that the God as described in many parts of the Bible does not exist. So, that idea of God is easily discarded. Why then should people interested in truth waste so much time bringing up the same old dusty bits out of the Bible? I mean who cares? The truth of theism does not in any way shape or manner entail the truth of every word written in the Bible. That's an obvious strawman, and it does not evidence atheism's strength when atheists constantly and predictably quote from the Bible.

Does your God condone torture of "children" for fun or any other reason, i.e. like saving the rest of mankind?

No. But I think atheist ethics would condone the torture of children for some specific reasons. Indeed, Sam Harris in his "The End of Faith" bravely concedes the difficulty he faces realizing that torturing not only suspected terrorists but even their family appears to be ethically justified.

210. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81070 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 2:22 am

Goldy (post 391, or #80910):

Quick check to see if DG answered my question...nope. OK then...

But I did: You asked if I can give "irrefutable proof" for an assertion I had made, and in post 351 (#80790) I answered your question with "No, I can't". I think that's a clear answer.

Can you, for example, provide irrefutable proof that you are a human being, and not, say, some extraterrestrial zombie visiting Earth for research purposes? Or that American astronauts walked on he moon? Or that Julius Caesar was a historical person? Or that the world was not made five minutes ago? Or that objective reality exists?

Yep, nope, the astronaut that came to my school was very convincing (though a total religious nut. Irving, think his name was) but I can read a conspiracy story like the rest of us, yep - more than one reference to him, nope, yes.
Proof - ask wife for first, sixth and seventh question, DON'T ask her about 2nd question (I hope she'd agree with me, but you never know!). Astronauts and JC I shall refer you to better sources than me because, funnily enough, they are available (these are silly questions, by the way)

I am confused. Is the above your idea of "irrefutable proof"? And which are the sixth and seventh questions? And if my questions are silly the more easier it must be to give irrefutable answers to them.

211. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81067 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 2:09 am

Phasmagigas (post 389, or #80905):

I mean torturing children for fun would not be something our ancestors would with any probability find themselves doing one way or the other, so I can't see what kind of selection pressure could have applied in this case.

im sure that activities like this are suprisingly common across time where groups are at war, its probably happening right now.

You are sure that torturing children for fun is common where groups are at war? Why do you think that?

212. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81063 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 1:59 am

Lauregon (post 388, or #80897):

As I have shown in the Lennox thread, what the Parable of the Talents teaches is that the job of servants is to serve the demands of avaricious murderous masters, and that if they don't, they may be slaughtered for failure to comply.

This is a parable, Lauregon. A parable is not supposed to be understood literally but metaphorically, that's why we call it a parable. Above you are suggesting that this parable teaches that God loves money, and in post #80613 in the Lennox thread you suggest it teaches that God wants us to love money :-P What can I say, I find that's really an extremely warped understanding of what I find a perfectly clear parable which teaches that we should actively invest the opportunities we have in our life to increase in virtue – to create the treasure that no thief can steal and no moth destroy. But we are all free to understand the gospel message any way we like. As they say somewhere, let those who have eyes see, and those who have ears hear.

213. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81054 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 1:32 am

Peacebeuponme (post 387, or #80896):

Incidentally, I am not sure ethical beliefs, such as that torturing children for fun is wrong, are based on our genes. Why do you think that such ethical beliefs are gene based? I mean torturing children for fun would not be something our ancestors would with any probability find themselves doing one way or the other, so I can't see what kind of selection pressure could have applied in this case.

So my imagination is restricted by probability for the purposes of your question. Sorry, I wasn't clear on that.

I am not sure what you are saying here. It's an observational fact that virtually all people believe that to torture children for fun is wrong. You claimed that this belief is based on our genes, and I objected to this explaining why. This at least is a clearly scientific question and we can use our knowledge of Darwinism to discuss it.

Just because consensus and our own minds cannot imagine ever condoning fun torture does not make anything objective, and in no way leads you to god.

Well, you don't respond to my argument that in all other cases of non-objective assertions we can easily imagine a state of affairs that would make us change our mind. Also the idea (which I find overwhelmingly obvious) that it's objectively true that we should not torture children for fun (i.e. its truth is not contingent on personal opinion or social convention) does I think lead us to God, at least in the sense that it leads us away from the kind of atheistic worldview that Dawkins described in his book "River our of Eden" and which I quoted in post 355 (or #80775) above.

Atheism does have a serious problem with the argument from morality. If you read the "God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist" you'll see that the argument that the atheist philosopher there has more trouble countering is that argument.

214. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81047 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 12:56 am

Diacanu (post 386, or #80895):

Dianelos Georgoudis-
"Sure, [theism is an invention] as is any other worldview about how objective reality is, including atheism. The question is which worldview makes more sense".

Okay, so you grant that theism may be a human invention, yet you ask if it makes sense.

Err, no, that's not what I am actually saying above, is it? :-)

It essentially says "I don't know about myself, but I'm pretty damned sure YOU won't behave properly unless you believe in these fairy tales".

Well, I understand what you are saying there, but two things: First of all it's not a given that theism is a fairy tale; perhaps atheism is a fairy tale. Secondly, whichever worldview turns out to be true, the fact remains that theism is more conducive to moral behavior than atheism - as is easy to see on conceptual grounds and is moreover evidenced by observational facts.

215. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81040 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 24, 2007 at 12:15 am

Lauregon (post 385, or #80889):

Sure, as is any other worldview about how objective reality is, including atheism.- Dianelos

False equation. I don't have to imagine that I've burned my hand if I've burned my hand.

Correct, we all, theists and atheists alike, burn our hands if we put it in a flame. The question is what kind of objective reality out there produces this particular experience, as well as the rest of our experience of life, including the very important subjective parts of our experience, as well as the fact that we are experiential beings in the first place. Atheism offers a class of such descriptions of objective reality which are all characterized by the absence of God; theism offers a class of such descriptions of objective reality which are all characterized by the presence of God. I don't see any particular difference as far as both theism and atheism being worldviews about objective reality goes. I suspect you see a difference because you assume or believe that all theistic descriptions of objective reality are "imagination", "deluded", "wishful thinking", "hypothetical", "convoluted", "fantasy", "inescapably obviously false", and whatnot – but what you assume or believe is irrelevant to the fact that both theism and atheism represent worldviews about how objective reality is. And so they are directly comparable. And my thesis is that when one seriously studies what the best versions of both worldviews actually say, and compares them one to the other under the same criteria, it becomes inescapably obvious that theism is much more reasonable than atheism.

216. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81038 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 11:58 pm

Walk (post 383, or #80886):

If god is omnipotent, having more power than anything in the universe, how is it that our ultra-sensitve sensing equipment which can measure the most minute forces, somehow can't detect the greatest force that exists? The answer, "Well, God exists OUTSIDE the universe" would be an acceptable answer for a deist god, but the theist god supposedly routinely reaches into the real world to manipulate things, and yet, unbelievably, no trace of this immense energy and these real-world interactions has ever been detected.

Ok, let me give you first the standard theistic answer:

God is neither inside nor outside the physical universe; God is what sustains the very existence and behavior of the physical universe. Let's first discuss behavior: We see an apple fall and accelerate towards earth following particular laws. The naturalist believes that these laws that science discovers do not only describe the apple's behavior, but also cause it. So the laws of gravity make the apple behave in this way. The theist on the contrary believes that what makes the apple behave in this lawful way is God's will. Let's now discuss existence: If you ask why the physical world exists the naturalist will say that the existence of the physical world is the fundamental given, it's the deepest fact of objective reality, it's where the buck stops. The theist will say that the physical world exists because God has created it, and that God is the fundamental given, is the deepest fact of objective reality, is where the buck stops.

My own answer is somehow different: I find that for a theist the objective existence of the physical world is a superfluous assumption. What we know is that our experience of the physical world objectively exists, and that this experience is orderly according to the specific laws that science discovers. A theist can explain the existence of that orderly experience as experience directly caused by God's will. This alternative worldview (called "idealism") is simpler and avoids many conceptual problems of the basically dualistic theistic view I described above.

217. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #81030 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 11:32 pm

Phasmagigas (post 377, or #80873):

Love your enemy I suppose is a nice abstract idea but just what does that mean???

Well, let's first consider the weaker idea that we should not return evil. This is an idea that predates the gospels, indeed it's found in one of Plato's dialogues[1] written five centuries earlier. What this idea means is clear: when somebody hurts you, you should not try to hurt them in return. It's a very powerful idea that we all deep down feel is right (well, not "all": Hitchens is an exception but then Dawkins isn't). But it's an idea that contradicts the behavior that would make sense from an evolutionary point of view, which is based on the optimizing behavior strategy of retribution.

Now, "love your enemy" goes much further still. It says that all people deserve our love even when they hurt us. So it's not only that we should not hurt such people in return, but we should actually sympathize with them (and actually pity them: to hurt others is self-defeating) and therefore try to help them. It's a remarkably revolutionary idea and it's interesting to note how Jesus in the gospels justifies it (see Matthew 5:43-48, and Luke 6:27-36). These are truly splendid moral teachings.

[1]: It's in his dialogue "Crito" where we find Socrates saying this: "Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him"

218. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80888 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 11:14 am

Peacebeuponme (post 375, or #80870):

I wonder this: Can you imagine any state of affairs that would make you change your opinion into actually believing that torturing children for fun is right?

No, I can't imagine a state of affairs that would make me now, having been born with these genes, ever make me change my opinion (on child torturing). How is that helpful to you?

I tried to explain this in the last sentence of post 374 (#80868) – but let me try again: In all cases of non-objective propositions I believe in I can easily imagine a state of affairs that would make me change my mind, and I don't see why non-objective ethical propositions should be an exception to this general rule. (In fact in many cases of objective propositions I believe in I can also imagine a state of affairs that would falsify them; so the fact that I cannot imagine such a state of affairs in the case of some ethical precepts is rather remarkable.)

Incidentally, I am not sure ethical beliefs, such as that torturing children for fun is wrong, are based on our genes. Why do you think that such ethical beliefs are gene based? I mean torturing children for fun would not be something our ancestors would with any probability find themselves doing one way or the other, so I can't see what kind of selection pressure could have applied in this case.

But even in the case of ethical precepts that are probably based on our genes, say sexual taboos such as incest, I can imagine some state of affairs that would make me change my mind. In other words it's not like our gene based ethical beliefs are subjugated to these genes: As Dawkins in his debate with Lennox made quite clear we can easily overcome our genetic programming; we do this every time we use a condom, and indeed we believe that using condoms is the right thing to do in most cases, our genes notwithstanding. So if you are arguing that you can't imagine a state of affairs that would make you change your mind about the ethics of torturing children for fun because of your genes, then your argument does not work even if it were true that this ethical precept is based on your genes.

219. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80885 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 10:39 am

Bernard (post 374, or #80866):

Is the precept 'love our enemies' widely admired? It doesn't even seem to be accepted across the abrahamic religions.

I meant "widely" in the sense of "a great many". In any case this issue is irrelevant; Hitchens's challenge was to find an ethical precept that only a believer can make. Do you think that a non-believer can honestly believe that one should love one's enemies?

220. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80879 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 9:56 am

Epeeist (post 371, or #80862):

I was discussing Goldy's demand that I provide "irrefutable proof" for something I claimed; I hope you are not saying that Goldy's demand is reasonable. For if you are saying that then I would like you to provide irrefutable proof for your assertion above ;-)

No you weren't, you were trying to divert the discussion using the variety of ad hominem known as a tu quoque. You assert "Atheism is inferior to theism both abstractly (atheism does not recognize objective morality), as well as practically". Goldy has questioned this.

No, Goldy did not just question this; in post 346 (#80769) he asked for "irrefutable proof of this". There is a clear difference between questioning an assertion and asking for "irrefutable proof" of it – as I am sure you are aware. In fact in my answer to him in post 351 (#80790) I offered to give him "both good arguments an objective evidence" for my assertion. So frankly it looks to me like it's you who is trying to divert the discussion.

221. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80877 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 9:46 am

Lauregon (post 370, or #80861):

Bottom line, theism is a human invention.

Sure, as is any other worldview about how objective reality is, including atheism. The question is which worldview makes more sense.

222. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80871 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 9:32 am

Dr Benway (post 363, or #80827):

The exigencies of our mammalian life unites us into one family, no matter the particular ideas in our heads.

Oh, I completely agree, and not only because of the exigencies of our mammalian life. Our common humanity unites us into one family too. So ideas are to be respected and only actions condemned. But maybe you should say that to "new atheism's" authors who loudly argue that the religious ideas in the heads of so many of our brothers and sisters are at the root of all evil, and represent the gravest danger to civilization as we know it and even to the very survival of humankind.

If Jesus were here, he'd give you a frowny face for trying to split the humans into good guys and bad guys on the basis of which heads house which ideas.

Interesting how you put it :-) Isn't that again what new atheism authors are doing in a loud, polarizing, and demagogical fashion? Anyway, I don't think Christ would object to my speaking up my mind, as I am sure Christ would not object to atheists' speaking up their minds. But I think Christ would object to me or them not using our reason to its fullest capacity. (Lauregon, if you're reading this, you'll see one more application of the Parable of the Talents.)

There's one truth out there; I am sure this is something we can all safely agree with. Very few people and certainly no faithful theist would ever argue that it's best not to search for truth to the utmost of our capacity.

223. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80868 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 8:58 am

Peacebeuponme (post 362, or #80824):

I don't think its objectively wrong to torture children [for fun], but I do think it is wrong.

I understand your atheistic worldview requires of you not to believe that any ethical precepts are objectively true, but I wonder this: Can you imagine any state of affairs that would make you change your opinion into actually believing that torturing children for fun is right? If you can imagine such a state of affairs then can you describe it (for frankly I can't imagine such a state of affairs)? But if you can't imagine such a state of affairs then in what sense are you saying that you don't think that torturing children for fun is objectively wrong? I mean if absolutely nothing could possibly convince you otherwise then it's fair to say that you believe this proposition is objectively true, and not just a matter of opinion or convention.

224. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80858 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 8:10 am

Vaal (post 356, or #80803):

Ask yourself where morality, ethics, empathy arose from, WITHOUT recourse to a supernatural entity.

If you are saying that moral behavior can evolve without recourse to a supernatural entity then you are of course right. Even automata evolving in computer simulations display in the end what we judge is moral behavior. That's not the point. The point is that some widely admired ethical precepts, such as that we should love our enemies, do not even make sense in a non-religious understanding of reality, and thus the origin of such precepts is religion.

Any society without morality will implode and decay.

That's factually false. One can build such environments in which the optimal strategy is behavior we would all call immoral. In fact some animals have evolved behaviors one can only call shockingly immoral. And in some human societies under certain circumstances behavior such as killing weak babies may well be optimal. If I remember correctly Dawkins explains all that quite well in his "The Selfish Gene".

225. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80855 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 7:56 am

Phil Rimmer (post 353, or #80793):

Hitchens challenge remains unanswered.

I, in effect, substitute love of mankind, love of my childrens children for love of God, and that gets me, personally, to the same place, to whit- striving to love my enemy.

Can you explain why you think that you should love your enemies? I mean the idea is not to have an atheist make a moral statement by uttering or typing the correct words, but make a moral statement that can reasonably be believed as an honest statement. So I am really curious: On what grounds have you concluded that to love one's enemies is a good thing to do? Hitchens in his debate with McGrath calls the same "a deranged idea", so I am really curious to understand how two atheists could arrive at such diametrically opposed moral beliefs.

226. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80853 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 7:44 am

Epeeist (post 352, or #80792):

But I wonder: Can you, for example, provide irrefutable proof that you are a human being, and not, say, some extraterrestrial zombie visiting Earth for research purposes? Or that American astronauts walked on he moon? Or that Julius Caesar was a historical person? Or that the world was not made five minutes ago? Or that objective reality exists? - Dianelos

The burden of proof is always on the person making the assertion or proposition. – assertion by Epeeist

I was discussing Goldy's demand that I provide "irrefutable proof" for something I claimed; I hope you are not saying that Goldy's demand is reasonable. For if you are saying that then I would like you to provide irrefutable proof for your assertion above ;-)

227. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80804 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 4:54 am

Peacebeunponme (post 348, or #80776):

Atheism is inferior to theism both abstractly (atheism does not recognize objective morality)

I'm sorry Dianelos, but thats just not right. You cannot ascribe inferiority of superiority on the basis of whether one recognises objective morality or not. Of the two positions:

1. I think there is no objective morality; and
2. I think there is objective morality,

what objective standard are you using to decide which one is superior?

I don't think there can be objective standards about that, until we all actually agree how objective reality is. But there is a basis to ascribe superiority on those worldviews that allow for objective morality, namely the fact that most people find it obvious that at least some ethical precepts are objective, for example that to torture children for fun is wrong. So any worldview that contradicts what many people find obvious can be considered inferior on the basis that it will strike most people as less reasonable. In my case I cannot even imagine myself doubting that to torture children for fun is not objectively wrong, and thus for me any worldview that entails the opposite is completely unviable, especially when there are other worldviews that not only allow for objective morality but also go a long way explaining it. I cannot really speak for others, but as far as I know human nature I claim that no normal (i.e. not psychopathic) human being can really believe that to torture children for fun is not objectively wrong. So, atheism has a serious conceptual problem there, which one cannot really effectively counter by claiming that our moral intuitions are illusory.

228. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80796 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 4:16 am

Diacanu (post 347, or #80775):

Okay, clue me in, what is this objective morality, and what is its basis?

Objectively moral precepts are those whose truth is not contingent on personal opinion or social convention. An example would be the precept "to torture sentient beings for fun is wrong". For most people it's obvious that such a precept is objectively true, namely would remain true even if suddenly all people were to start believing that to torture for fun is right.

The basis of objective morality (as is the case with all objective claims) is objective reality. In other words objective morality exists only if there is something objectively good in objective reality, indeed a good that an objectively true ethical precept tends to protect or to increase.

According to naturalism, i.e. the worldview of most atheists in the West, objective reality has nothing good or evil in it [1], so atheists cannot but deny the existence of objective morality. According to theism on the other hand, objective reality consists of or is centered in a person who is perfectly good (namely "God"), and thus theism allows for the existence of objective morality on that basis. A common misunderstanding is to think that according to theism a moral precept is objectively good because God saysis so. Of course it's not an easy matter to find out how God (or if you prefer how the deepest nature of reality) actually is, and hence the disagreements about what is right and what is wrong.

[1] Dawkins in his "River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life", succinctly describes the naturalistic view: "The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference."

229. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80790 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 3:48 am

Goldy (post 346, or #80769):

Atheism is inferior to theism both abstractly (atheism does not recognize objective morality), as well as practically (atheism offers one less reason for people to be moral, and indeed fails to offer a logical path away from immoral behavior). Which is moreover evidenced by actual statistical studies, not to mention historical facts.

And you can provide irrefutable proof of this?

I can give you both good arguments and objective evidence for this, but, no, I can't give you irrefutable proof. But I wonder: Can you, for example, provide irrefutable proof that you are a human being, and not, say, some extraterrestrial zombie visiting Earth for research purposes? Or that American astronauts walked on he moon? Or that Julius Caesar was a historical person? Or that the world was not made five minutes ago? Or that objective reality exists?

230. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80781 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 3:14 am

Dr Benway (post 333 or #80709):

Dianelos: Because if Hitchens is the model of a typical atheist (only more articulate and outspoken), then atheism is starting to look kind of ugly, not to mention kind of dangerous.

Dr Benway: Assholes occasionally speak the truth, baby.

I agree on both counts, grandpa :-)

Hitchens is an embarrassment to atheism, not to say to civilization and the current moral Zeitgeist. In fact he does not strike me as particularly smart either: you can't debate building the case that religion is immoral and then wrap it all up by effectively chanting "kill, kill, kill". And I found it embarrassing that so many (even though not all) atheist posters in this thread just gushed with admiration at Hitchens's performance in this debate. But no matter. I mean there are certainly Christian preachers who are even more morally embarrassing, and they have a large following too.

So let's discuss what is far more important, namely ideas. I agree that Hitchens spoke much truth in this debate. I think what he in effect said is this: Let's forget about the immoral bits here and there in the Bible, let's forget about the immoral things this or that perhaps fringe theist said or did, and let's concentrate on the immorality of two of Christianity's central dogmas, namely the dogma of atonement and dogma of eternal punishment in hell. Now McGrath is as knowledgeable a theologian as they come, and he even holds a PhD in biology from Oxford University, so in theory he should be a strong debater as far as ideas go. But in this debate he had a big handicap, which should be clear to all: He was not just defending the thesis that a theistic understanding of reality is more reasonable than an atheistic understanding, not even just defending the basic truth of Christianity, but, being himself a conservative Christian, he had to defend dogmatic Christianity - a fact that Hitchens used to his advantage. Indeed McGrath's answer to Hitchens's criticism of the dogma of atonement was lukewarm at best and followed the classical Christian line (after the fall humanity was incapable from saving itself from evil, and the incarnation and suffering of Christ somehow opened the way to salvation) which I agree makes little sense. (Incidentally McGrath did answer Hitchens's argument that God abandoned humanity for 98 of the 100 millennia of its existence by pointing out that peoples' virtue is measured in respect to the ethical knowledge they have; surely the meaning of the ethical teaching of Jesus would have made no sense to Homo Floriensis; even some modern people have a hard time understanding it ;-) But it seems to me that McGrath didn't at all answer Hitchens's criticism of the dogma of hell and how a perfectly good God would send a large proportion of the sentient beings he himself created to eternal punishment in hell. I personally found it shameful that McGrath did not come out to concede that the dogma of hell makes no sense at all, and maybe use some argument from ignorance to defend his belief in it. So I think the truth that became apparent in this debate is that atheism makes a good case not only when compared to Christian fundamentalism, but also, at least to some degree, when compared to Christian conservatism. Which, as far as I am concerned, is just fine. Let Christian conservatives in particular as well as Christians in general realize which of their beliefs do not stand the challenge of reason.

231. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80767 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 2:23 am

Smythe (post 332, or #80707):

The moral argument, which has been endlessly refuted in every possible form to the point where newborn babies are going to innately see it as vacuous from here on out, is not an intellectual argument.

On the contrary the moral argument is one of the most convincing arguments against atheism there are: Atheism is inferior to theism both abstractly (atheism does not recognize objective morality), as well as practically (atheism offers one less reason for people to be moral, and indeed fails to offer a logical path away from immoral behavior). Which is moreover evidenced by actual statistical studies, not to mention historical facts.

You may ask: Assuming that theism is superior in comparison to atheism as far as morality goes, how does this say anything about theism's truth? Well if the world is religiously ambiguous, i.e. if reasonable people can adopt both a religious and non-religious understanding of how objective reality is, then theism's superiority as far as morality goes will be reason enough for reasonable people to adopt a religious worldview. But is the world religiously ambiguous? I personally think a religious understanding works much better than a non-religious one, on the other hand it's an observational fact that some by all measure smart and reasonable people (e.g. some Nobel laureates in physics) are not religious, and that some others (e.g. other Nobel laureates in physics) are. So as a matter of observational fact there is some ambiguity there; one cannot really claim that either a religious or a non-religious worldview are obviously unreasonable. So the question of morality becomes critical.

232. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80753 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 1:17 am

Phil rimmer (331, or #80687):

"Love your enemies". Now Hitchens himself wouldn't make that statement of course, but why couldn't any other atheist make it? Because it only makes sense within a theistic understanding of reality, within a reality in which all people are loved by God and therefore deserve our love too no matter what, a reality in which all people are literally our siblings in spirit.

Oh Please!

I seem to have posted this a little over 24 hours ago on another thread-

Congrats :-)

So you agree that Hitchens's much ballyhooed challenge is easy to answer. Now have you thought why Hitchens produced that challenge? A basic premise of "new atheism" is that whatever the place we get morality from is, it's not religion. So when Hitchens asks for an example of a moral statement that a believer but not a non-believer could make, he is challenging us to prove that premise wrong. And by easily finding an answer (for example the statement "love your enemies") we disprove that premise of new atheism. In fact some of the finest and widely admired ethical precepts not only come from religion, but make sense only within a religious worldview.

So, if may say so, Hitchens shot himself in the foot there. But at least he showed how much faith he has in new atheism ;-)

233. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80751 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 23, 2007 at 1:02 am

Roach (post 324, or #80668):

Richard Dawkins made as slight error by calling atheism a belief system during an interview. It's almost as if he's a fallible human being! My world has been shaken.

Nice try, but it's quite obvious that Dawkins calling atheism a belief system was not some kind of slip of tongue. He really considers atheism to be a belief system, so Irate_atheist's claim in post 301 (#80100) that anybody who knew the first thing about atheism would know that it is not a belief system is in fact false.

So is atheism a belief system or not? To argue that the lack of a particular belief cannot amount to a belief, and much less to a belief system, makes little sense I think. Here is why:

Let's start with theism. Theists have some specific foundational beliefs: They believe that the ultimate explanation is God; that objective reality deep down is governed by God's will. These foundational beliefs about how reality is affect the rest of theists' beliefs, so for example they believe in the afterlife, they believe that our actions here have relevance beyond our life on Earth, they believe that to love our enemies is a great and eminently meaningful ethical precept, and so on. So theism is clearly a belief system. Now atheists do not believe that the ultimate explanation is God, nor that objective reality deep down is governed by God's will. But this fact does not imply that they do not believe something about what the ultimate explanation is, or about what governs the behavior of objective reality. Most atheists in the West believe that the ultimate explanation is the physical universe (or maybe the multiverse) and that objective reality deep down is physical and governed by mechanical laws. In turn these foundational beliefs affect the rest of atheists' beliefs, for example they don't believe in the afterlife, they believe that consciousness is produced by the brain, they believe that to love our enemies is an absurd concept, and so and so forth. So clearly atheism too is a belief system, and Dawkins is quite right to call it so. Those who shy away from calling atheism a belief system simply try to avoid defending their beliefs, which is not a very admirable intellectual stance I must say, and can only be called intellectual cowardness.

Incidentally knowledgeable atheists rarely if ever shy away from defending atheism's beliefs; in fact they write books doing so, in which they explain what they believe about objective reality and why they believe it. (Dawkins, for example, did so too and repeatedly.) Maybe the rest of you should take a clue from them.

234. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80684 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 3:46 pm

At the very end of the debate Hitchens claims that the New Testament is even more immoral than the Old Testament, and points at the "wicked idea of non resistance to evil and the deranged idea that we should love our enemies". He calls such precepts deeply immoral. He also says that we should learn to coldly dislike our enemies; and that we should learn to destroy them. When McGrath tried to point out, rather helpfully it seemed to me, that we should not dehumanize our enemies, Hitchens's response was that we need not dehumanize our enemies because they dehumanize themselves, thus evidencing that one way or the other he considers his enemies less than human. Dehumanizing one's perceived enemies was of course the mentality behind all the great crimes against humanity perpetrated in the 20th century. And I need not mention that the invasion of Iraq, which I understand Hitchens has always supported, has already resulted in the death of about half a million civilians and has destroyed the life of millions more. Now it's perhaps entertaining to watch Hitchens display moral indignation at some of the admittedly opaque not to say nonsensical Christian dogmas, but in this debate we also observe the moral character of a flesh and blood specimen of a widely read atheist. I wonder: do the various posters here who talk so highly of Hitchens actually agree with his moral sense? Because if Hitchens is the model of a typical atheist (only more articulate and outspoken), then atheism is starting to look kind of ugly, not to mention kind of dangerous.

I was also struck by the "challenge" he repeatedly mentioned and claimed no-one had yet answered: "Name an ethical statement made or action performed by a believer in the name of faith that couldn't have been made by an infidel". Is that really that hard a challenge? After all he himself gives us the clue: The ethical statement by a believer that couldn't have been made by an atheist is "Love your enemies". Now Hitchens himself wouldn't make that statement of course, but why couldn't any other atheist make it? Because it only makes sense within a theistic understanding of reality, within a reality in which all people are loved by God and therefore deserve our love too no matter what, a reality in which all people are literally our siblings in spirit.

235. Debate between Christopher Hitchens and Alister McGrath

Comment #80665 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 2:46 pm

As I've written, I totally respect atheism as a belief system. – Bluejway in post 300 or #80097

When you fall flat on your face at the first hurdle, (atheism is not a belief system), perhaps you shouldn't try to run the rest of the race. – Irate_atheist responding in post 301 or #80100

For too long atheism has been the belief system that dare not speak its name. – Richard Dawkins in the HardTalk interview of 27 July 2007

Go figure :-)

236. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80562 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 7:00 am

Epeeist (post 616, or #80125):

The burden of proof is always on the person making an assertion or proposition.

Agreed, even though I wouldn't so much say "burden of proof" but "burden of justification". For example I cannot prove the proposition "No teapot is orbiting the Sun" but I can justify my belief in that proposition. In any case I have assumed the burden of justifying my claim that idealistic theism works much better than naturalism as a description of objective reality.

237. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80558 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 6:50 am

Dr Benway (post 614, or #80123):

It's not like theism = naturalism + God.

Theism is naturalism + God. Your additional bit, idealism, is irrelevant, as an idealistic universe is indistinguishable from a mechanistic universe.

Very few theists are idealists, like I am. In fact the official Christian position is that the physical universe objectively exists. Even so it's not like theism = naturalism + God, because the official theistic position is not that the physical universe would exist, or indeed such existence would be possible, without God. The idea is that the very existence of the physical universe is contingent on God, in fact that the very existence of anything is contingent on God, sometimes expressed by saying that God is the "ground of all being". But I am happy to understand that so many naturalists think that theism is just about adding something supernatural to naturalism, because this may go a long way explaining their misunderstanding of theism.

Naturalism does not deny the existence of God, either as transcendent or immanent. – Dr Benway quoting from skeptic.com

Really? If there is one thing all naturalists agree is 1) that no supernatural beings exist, and 2) that all god-concepts describe supernatural beings. Perhaps you should read better sources Dr. Benway; the article you quote conflates methodological naturalism (i.e. the scientific method) and metaphysical naturalism in a most confusing way. It's interesting to see how naturalists are so busy blowing smoke. Maybe deep down they realize something is seriously wrong in their worldview that everything is ultimately mechanical.

238. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80550 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 6:24 am

Lauregon (post 608, or #80027):

I don't think the teaching concerning the lilies of the field contradicts the Parable of Talents, but rather that it says the same thing: That we shouldn't be afraid but should live according to our true nature and make use of our intrinsic goodness without worrying about the future.

Now it is evident that your and my reading of the gospels is quite different. In all I read, including the gospels, I assume the writer had some understanding and I try to discover it. It seems you assume that the gospels are evil so try to find exactly in what way it is so. Now suppose that the gospels include both good and bad - who do you think gains more from reading them? I who search for the good, or you who search for the bad?

239. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80543 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 6:02 am

Dr Benway (post 606, or #79932 cont.) :

I missed this bit:

And when I repeatedly tried to get your position in respect to Dawkins's basic claim in TGD that the existence of God is a scientific hypothesis (and hence falsifiable by science) you consistently avoided answering.

Epeeist answered many times, as did I. His said yes, it's scientific provided it is formulated thusly.

So, in the way that Dawkins explicitly formulated the God-hypothesis in TGD, I take it you agree that it is a scientific hypothesis, as Dawkins himself claims. So how exactly do you suggest can science falsify a particularly naive God-hypothesis namely that of young Earth creationism?

I noticed that Dianelos originally over-stated Dawkins' claim by using the word "all", i.e., "all God hypotheses are scientific." Perhaps he was fishing for a Dawkins criticism; otherwise I don't know why he bothered with this train of thought.

Dawkins's hypothesis as stated in TGD is general and covers all possible supernatural beings that have designed the universe and all in it. Actually Dawkins in TGD makes it explicitly clear that he means all possible designer gods and not only the Christian God, or only benevolent gods, etc.

As a salesman of Brand Y, it makes sense that he'd want to slander Brand X.

Well, as my claim is that idealistic theism works better than naturalism under all and each criterion I could think of, I often do point out naturalism's comparative shortcomings. I understand that this puts naturalists in the uncomfortable position of actually having to defend their own worldview instead of simply ridiculing theism's worldview using strawmen more often than not taken from a literal reading of the Bible (as if theism entails the literal truth of the Bible).

240. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80535 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 4:55 am

Dr Benway (post 606, or #79932):

Dianelos: [Epeeist's] claim that the non-existence of gods is falsifiable by science is not a rebuttal of my claim that the existence of gods is not falsifiable by science :-)

Dianelos deserves a spanking for that one. "Mom, I know you said I couldn't watch TV, but you didn't say I couldn't listen to TV."

Epeeist in post 523 (or #79604) complained that I am ignoring his rebuttals and used as an example his claim that the non-existence of gods is falsifiable by science. So I pointed out that his claim was not a rebuttal of mine, even if his claim were true. It seems you disagree. I think we can settle at least this point, because I assume we both agree with logic. Let's see.

For proposition R to be a rebuttal of claim C, R must be such that not both it and C can be true, correct? For example if I were to claim C= "(-1)*(-1)=1" for somebody to point out as a rebuttal R = "(+1)*(+1)=1" does not work because both are true. A rebuttal R works only if its truth implies that the original claim C is false. So let's see my claim C and Epeeist's attempted rebuttal R:

C = X is not falsifiable by science.
R = not-X is falsifiable by science.

Where X="the existence of gods". (Incidentally observe that the null hypothesis of C is not R, but rather R2 = "X is falsifiable by science"; and obviously R2 would work as a rebuttal.)

Now let's define F as the set of all propositions that are falsifiable by science:

C = X is not an element of F
R = not-X is an element of F

Epeeist claims that the truth of R implies that C is false:

R -> not(C)
(not-X is an element of F) -> not( X is not an element of F)
(not-X is an element of F) -> (X is an element of F)

So Epeeist's claim is obviously false, for it's not possible for both a proposition X and its negation not-X to both belong to the set of falsifiable propositions. (Although it's possible for both X and not-X to both not belong to that set.)

Let's put the same in plain English: Epeeist claims that the truth of his proposition, namely that the non-existence of gods is falsifiable by science, is a rebuttal and hence falsifies my claim that the existence of gods is not falsifiable by science. But if it falsifies my claim then it proves its opposite, namely that the existence of gods is falsifiable by science. But clearly the truth of the proposition that the non-existence of gods is falsifiable by science does not imply that the existence of gods is falsifiable by science, as it can't be the case that both the non-existence and the existence of gods are falsifiable by science.

Yet another explanation of the same fallacy: Epeeist claims R, namely that science can falsify the non-existence of gods, or in other words that there could exist some scientific evidence (or "objective evidence" or "corroborative evidence") that contradicts the non-existence of gods and hence proves the existence of gods. Of course we now do not know of any such evidence, but R only claims that such evidence could exist, so we could discover it tomorrow, and thus prove the existence of gods. Fine. Now Epeeist thinks R implies that C is false, and hence that science can falsify the existence of gods. Or in other words that R implies that there could exist scientific evidence that contradicts the existence of gods and hence proves the non-existence of gods. So what Epeeist is saying is that "There could exist scientific evidence that proves the existence of gods" implies "there could exist scientific evidence that proves the non-existence of gods" – which makes no sense.

241. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80499 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 2:06 am

Phasmagigas (post 605, or #79928):

A great many theists disagree [with my thinking that hell makes no sense], perhaps the majority. Which makes me sometimes wonder whether theists in general are really closer to ontological truth than non-theists.

DG, can you back this statement up please as its confusing me, right now the BS detector in my head is starting to flash but maybe im missing the point.

I meant this in the sense that in many ways non-theistic worldviews make more sense than the worldview of many theists. Here is why: One thing we can all safely agree is that objective reality is coherent, and the common theistic view that there is a perfectly good God who will send many of the sentient beings S/He has created to eternal torture in hell is as incoherent an idea as they go. I mean never mind "a perfectly good God", only a God who is morally worse than the worst imaginable human would do such a thing. So this common theistic worldview is even more incoherent than the common naturalistic worldview, and therefore one can hardly claim that it is closer to truth.

As theist, how do I deal with this state of affairs? Well, I myself am incapable of actually conceptualizing the idea of hell, and as I pride myself on my powers of imagination (I assume you all will agree with that at least :-) I suspect nobody really can. So my guess is that no theist really believes in the reality of hell: they move their lips saying they do, maybe they try to believe in it, maybe they are scared shitless it might be true – but I don't think they actually do believe in it. By which I do not mean to justify those theists; quite on the contrary: they fail the test of intellectual honesty.

it would be like saying that as scientists are unsure of the details of evolution (as an example) that its therefore more likely to be [not] true,

I agree, that's a stupid argument. As an explanation of the species natural evolution is as true and convincing a scientific theory as any can practically be. But Plantinga's argument that the theory of natural evolution only shows that the evolution of the species might have been a blind process and not that it has been a blind process – is basically sound. His point is that the theory of evolution adds a valid alternative to the design hypothesis but does not falsify it, and thus we must now deal with the question of which belief is more reasonable: "the species have been designed by God" or "the species are the result of blind natural process". Dawkins in his debate with Lennox calls naturalism's explanation more parsimonious, and I agree with him as far as the explanation of the species goes. But our observation of the species is not all there is; I find that when one tries to explain the whole of one's experiential reality the God hypothesis is by far the more parsimonious.

242. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80489 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 1:26 am

Alovrin (post 604, or #79925):

I think that if humanity is to survive the fundamental ideas of both Christianity and Marxism are here to stay.

If in your mind they are so interchangeable/ interconnected I'll just call you a Christian/Marxist/Anything that comes to mind from now on.

I never claimed that Christianity and Marxism are "so interchangeable/interconnected". I sometimes have this funny feeling people are not reading my posts, but somebody else's :-)

243. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80487 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 22, 2007 at 1:18 am

Russell Blackford (post 599 or #79913):

I can't believe that anyone in this age would defend theism for its supposedly superior ethics or morality.

Well, I do, and I think it's pretty much conclusive that theism is superior. My argument is this thread is based on Dawkins's idea in his debate with Lennox about the presence of "logical paths" towards evil behavior. So even though it's true that fundamentalist religion offers such a logical path towards evil behavior I point out that so do all forms of naturalism. And, more significantly, while all forms of religious belief offer a logical path away from evil behavior, naturalism fails to offer any such path. So the more logic influences a naturalist's actions the less moral behavior one would expect. Further I point out that beyond all the rhetoric actual studies have demonstrated that religious belief correlates positively with personal well-being as well as with benevolent behavior. Finally, the historical fact remains that atheists in the 20th century have committed by far more crimes against humanity than theists. Now I agree that the latter is a complex issue and arguably ontological beliefs are not the primary factor that explains that behavior, but I fear the absence of a sense of moral check and balances in the naturalist worldview is not completely irrelevant either.

What they call virtue - submission, piety, self-abnegation, asceticism, sexual modesty - I call vice. That's not to deny that cockiness and other kinds of undue pride, for example, are also vices ... but overall this is one area where religion definitely does not have the high ground. Religion asks us to feel awe at the wrong things (such as non-existent superbeings), rather the right things (such as the beauty of our lovers). It asks us to find the wrong things (and people) impure. In some cases, it relies on morally shocking ideas such as blood sacrifice for "sin".

Well, I have several problems with your sentiment here. First I find it, well, sentimental. I mean what exactly is the argument? Secondly, I think you are conflating here religion as a basic ontological worldview and the experiential reality of those who adopt it, with the actions, dogmatism, and rhetoric of some religious organizations. Thirdly, it's grossly question-begging, as when you accuse religion to ask us to feel awe at "non-existent superbeings".

I have a strange theory about what one might call "activist atheism", i.e. naturalists on a crusade. You see, in my worldview God is inescapable; we are all build from the same cloth that God is built from as it were. God is what we all deep inside are, and it's what makes us rebel against ugliness and wrongdoing. Now there is plenty of ugliness and wrongdoing in or associated with religious organizations including their dogmatic underpinning, and I suspect that activist atheism is when our natural aversion to these comes to the surface but drunk with passion and untempered by empathy. And, frankly, combined with some ignorance, the type of ignorance that makes one throw away the baby with the bathwater. In short my strange theory is that "activist atheism" is a movement driven by religious intuition away from the patent errors of religion, and thus is a step in the right direction as long as it does not become extremist.

I have just finished watching the Hitchens-McGrath debate and I see you have posted some thoughts in that thread. In my judgment Hitchens is an embarrassment to naturalism, but even so I found he was right in his main criticisms of Christian dogma; I mean I would have criticized about the same: the dogma of atonement makes little sense, and the idea of punishment in hell no sense at all. But I wonder what you thought about the very last minutes of the debate when Hitchens calls immoral the principle of not returning evil. And when McGrath rather meekly responded that we should not dehumanize our enemies, McGrath responded that they dehumanize themselves, thus evidencing that he considers his enemies less than human. Do you personally agree with Hitchens's moral sense?

244. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80260 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 2:51 am

Dr Benway (post 578, or #79818):

But the fact remains that the rights of gay men living in the UK, one of the richest and most liberal countries in the world, and with one of the most advanced Churches in the world on top of that, does not make it to the top 100 problems that humanity faces today, and probably does not make it to the top 1000.

She: "Honey, I think the waiter forgot to bring us our bread."

He: "Dearest, I'm afraid your lack of a dinner roll does not make it to the top 100 problems that humanity faces today, and probably does not make it to the top 1000."

Right :-) but then again I am sure you're not wondering whether waiters are at the root of all evil. Neither are you suggesting that we should make away with all waiters, even those who serve us well.

I've had countless experiences with patients suffering disorders of consciousness. I've participated in neurosurgical procedures with awake patients. The correlation between brain stimulation, observed behavior, and subjective report is far more convincing than any thought experiment you might describe.

Noted. On the other hand I (as well as Sam Harris) find these philosophical arguments more convincing.

245. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80259 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 2:43 am

Bonzai (post 577, or #79765):

For the 1000th frigging times "Ontologies" are worthless in advancing human knowledge unless they translate into something tangible.

That's your opinion, but not the opinion of many people, including some of the greatest scientists (e.g. Maxwell, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, von Neumann, Oppenheimer, Bell, etc), who thought and argued among themselves and wrote about ontology. They all wanted to know how objective reality is even if such knowledge would not produce "tangible" results, in the sense of helping us build better airplanes.

246. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80257 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 2:37 am

Bonzai (post 575, or #79761):

So I justify my idealism by arguing that idealism works better than either monistic materialism or dualism.

After 1000+ posts we are still waiting for the "justification".

So I take it you are not convinced by my arguments in the McGrath thread. That's quite ok.

247. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80256 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 2:33 am

Phasmagigas (post 572, or #79751):

Now I would like to make clear that I don't take my ethics from scripture; I take my ethics from some place within me, and under that light I judge what's written in scripture or anywhere else. And it is in this sense that I find the main body of Jesus' ethics as described in the gospels to be both coherent and really excellent, I mean so perfect that I cannot imagine any other ethical code being better than that

hang on. so what DG is saying is something like: my ethics come from within me, I then judge scriptural ethics and somehow the scripture matches? my morals so is excellent and better than anything else.

Where did I say that my morals are excellent and better than anything else? :-) I only said that I take my ethics from some place within me. As I hope you do too. You see, according to theism all people are made in the image of God and hence are fundamentally moral beings. Lennox clarifies this pretty well in his debate with Dawkins.

248. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80252 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 2:24 am

Phasmagigas (post 571, or #79748):

I don't know what you mean by "heaven" - Dianelos

DG knows exacly what i mean by heaven

No, I don't. People should not shy away from questions about what they exactly mean. To define one's terms is a really very good practice.

if he doesnt know what i mean by heaven (and im not the one asserting heaven is a 'real' place) he needs to jump to a christian formum and debate the intricies of the afterlife with them as it seems central to many peoples beliefs.

Have done that already. Christians have many different ideas of heaven; some even think heaven will be some place here on Earth. But here it's you who used the concept of "heaven" so it's up to you to explain what you mean by it.

249. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80249 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 2:16 am

Quine (post 567, or #79740):

Susan Blackmore wrote a very nice introductory text for a consciousness class she taught. Before you start going down this long and winding path, please do some reading so you know the history of so many arguments that have gone back hundreds of years, and the impact of modern scientific investigations.

I have read quite extensively about consciousness. I recommend Susan Blackmore's "Conversation on Consciousness" in which she interviews a dozen or so of the top people – philosophers and scientists – who have thought about consciousness. Blackmore is kind of a colorful character and has not very impressive academic credentials; but her interviews here are just fine and the resulting book maybe the best introduction on consciousness I know. Also John Searle's "The Mystery of Consciousness" which has a similar format as in each chapter he discusses some other thinker's ideas about consciousness; Searle by the way is considered a top philosopher. Finally David Chalmers's "The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory". Chalmers is widely considered one of smartest and most thoughtful people in this field, and is the one who differentiated between the hard and easy problems of consciousness, thus bringing some clarity to the whole field. In my judgment Chalmers has written the most insightful analysis of consciousness from the naturalistic point of view. Searle in his book criticizes Chalmers's ideas and there is a subsequent debate between the two. If you study about consciousness you'll realize how deep the disagreements among naturalists are. Actually there appears to exist even a problem of communication among them.

250. Debate between Richard Dawkins and John Lennox

Comment #80244 by Dianelos Georgoudis on October 21, 2007 at 1:35 am

Steve99 (post 562, or #79728):

Your view about what children should be taught is pretty much the one put forward by Daniel Dennett. He expresses this view in this talk:
http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/94

Thanks for the link. That was interesting; Dennett has done some serious thinking about the phenomenon of religion. Also I disagree so much with Dennett that it was good to find we agree on some things at least. I think his idea to teach at school religion, indeed all major religions, is great. But I found him a little vague: He appeared to mean to teach the history of religions, which is a good idea too, while my main idea is to teach the philosophy of religions alongside the philosophy of naturalism. Also he mentioned, but possibly did not mean it, to teach religion at primary schools; I think children that young have not the cognitive capacity to be taught ontology and are also too impressionable; so it's not a good idea to teach religion or naturalism at this early age.

I agree that religions are as natural as cows by the way. I think God designed our experiential environment so that we could make sense of all physical phenomena on mechanical grounds. (Religion as a subject matter of scientific study is a physical phenomenon too, i.e. is something objectively observable.)

I was truck by something else he sad: "The key to our domination of the planet is culture, and the key to culture is religion". He means that the key to the evolution of culture is religion, so maybe Dawkins should ponder this issue: even if religion is in fact wrong the idea to try to make away with religion may be a very bad idea indeed, because with it we would be removing a key element of the evolution of our culture too, with unpredictable repercussions. Even if one is a naturalist I think it makes more sense to argue for the removal of the various negative effects of religion, rather than of religion itself.

At the very end Dennett expresses a typical naturalistic misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding on which an entire chapter of TGD rests. But Dawkins knows very little philosophy, whereas Dennett is an academic philosopher, so I was very surprised and frankly a little suspicious that he would entertain the same misunderstanding. Anyway, Dennett mentions of sign outside of a church which reads "GOOD without GOD becomes 0", and he submits as a rebuttal that he knows many good people who do not believe in God. Lennox in his debate with Dawkins explained very well the misunderstanding: Of course people who do not believe in God can and do behave ethically. Even automata evolving in a computer simulation can and do display ethical behavior. That's not the point of the so-called "argument from morality" at all. The point is that a naturalistic understanding for reality renders the meaning of morality groundless. As Dawkins wrote in his "River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life": "The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.". But this implies that all our ideas about good or evil (including our judgment that the automata in our simulation evolve ethical behavior) are inventions. There is nothing really good or evil; and the logical implication is clearly that one shouldn't then really care about good or evil in the same way that one shouldn't care about anything that doesn't really exist.