Comments by Robert Maynard

201. Griffin's 'offensive' Emmy speech to be censored

Comment #69604 by Robert Maynard on September 11, 2007 at 9:03 pm

there's not enough [jokes] on this humouristically-challenged site!

I'm glad we have comedy gems like "suck it Jesus" to help fill that void.. such courage! Such piercing wit! Standing ovation!

I agree with Blackford that the only thing important about this is her right to blurt unfunny nonsense, and curbing the pathetic criticisms from Old Man Donahue and the Catholic League. The editing of the telecast isn't particularly shocking, and its false to cast the decision as religious bullying. It's business as usual, they can do what they want with their four hours of footage, consider demographics, yadda yadda yadda. It's E!, folks. They'd cut a legitimately profound acceptance speech if they could.

What is especially unimportant and unspectacular are the remarks following her (honest, progressive, non-joke) opening, and I hope the solution to this "clear-thinking oasis" being "humouristically challenged" is not to become a sycophantic crowd straight out of Oprah's studios whenever someone of minor celebrity makes a dismissive remark about a character/person not present, not even alive, but addressed as though they could hear it and be dismayed. (I hear she's also made some clever observations about how men and women are different)

I hope the solution (if there's even a problem) is more articles like that hilarious review of The Fascism Delusion.

202. Griffin's 'offensive' Emmy speech to be censored

Comment #69585 by Robert Maynard on September 11, 2007 at 7:22 pm

Celestial Teapot

..just a waste of time and just plain stupid.

Your description nails Kathy Griffin, her insipid reality show, AND the Emmy's.

203. Interview with Francis Collins

Comment #69469 by Robert Maynard on September 11, 2007 at 11:30 am

#143, Yorker,

Does this mean your initial remark in #138 was intended as a kind of challenge?

Well, no, that's why I said it isn't a throwdown/callout, and that you needn't have worried about what I would think of you if you didn't show up at the flagpole after school, because I wouldn't actually be waiting for you, because it wasn't a challenge. :P
I'm just attempting to frame the morality discussion in a different way at the moment. Establishing some premises, that kind of thing.

I changed the word rather than remove the section altogether because I wasn't changing the content of the sentence, just the phrasing.
I was worried 'callout' wouldn't have been as easily understood as 'throwdown', and both can refer to laying down the gauntlet, so to speak, so the switch seemed justified. I could change the word to 'challenge' to be crystal clear, if you like. I have a habit of thoroughly editing my posts after I submit them - but it is always for clarity.
...There we go.

204. Interview with Francis Collins

Comment #69428 by Robert Maynard on September 11, 2007 at 8:14 am

#140, Henri

Much natural behaviour is stifled by civilisation. We are controlled into not acting immediately on our instincts. Religion often imposes these controls.

Stifled, or substituted? The former description seems burdened with human drama. Would you really assert that human 'civil' behaviour, or things like the doctrines of religions, are not themselves evolved behaviour patterns, heritable (through observation and communication) strategies for interacting with other humans? If not, where did they come from? ..Revelation? :P

I do not think that 'elitist power structures' are akin to naturally dominant animals. The latter act instinctively, physically to retain their dominance. The former usually act consciously..

I didn't mean to imply their particulars or execution were comparable, but that they are both naturally evolved methods of exerting control (after all the latter animals do not act "consciously" in any sense, so I couldn't try to make comparisons of 'intent' and formulation accurately).

#141, Yorker
No worries, this isn't exactly a ~~callout~~ ~~throwdown~~ challenge, I just noticed you were making the same kind of argument.
I experienced the same server-side problem shortly after posting.

205. Interview with Francis Collins

Comment #69308 by Robert Maynard on September 10, 2007 at 1:09 pm

Just probing here Henri (and perhaps Yorker?), this was briefly touched on before.
You've talked about natural morality (better termed as "behaviour") in culture as relativistic and fluid, evolved human configurations of interaction, and contrast this with prescriptive morality, artificial elitist power structures which impose on the individual. Because morality in practice can take so many forms, it is necessarily impossible to rationally render morality in universal terms without treading into prescriptive territory, so it doesn't actually exist, and all we're left with are varieties of behaviour patterns. Right so far?

I was mainly wondering how far you'd be willing to agree that evolution has the capacity to enforce complex natural dimensions of value, which are not necessarily one-dimensional or absolutist notions of 'good' and 'bad' (or 'evil') but do involve various kinds of generally positive and negative experience. For example, if there were a selective pressure to adapt to external threats, the organisms which were equipped to act as though their death would be a bad thing, a negative thing, something to avoid, would have an advantage over organisms not so self-preservative.
Further down this path, would you agree that populations of replicating organisms acting on algorithm (no need to think of humans yet) would reach similar conclusions about what would be a "negative" experience, and in that sense have a valid, empirically-based (raw-experience-based), and shared concept of what was (at least) "bad"? I'm obviously not saying they'd be consciously affirming a system of right and wrong, but I am suggesting that their patterns of interaction would be tempered by natural selection to try and reject patterns with negative outcomes, with positive patterns enjoying better heritability. I don't want to take those lines any further until you agree or disagree. :P

Moving a bit further ahead on this path, would you agree that because human cultures are simply complex evolved patterns and protocols of interaction, shifting multi-idea organisms in a social meme pool, that they are not equally "fit" or well adapted?

Finally, I was wondering whether you would agree with the notion that prescriptive "elitist power structures" are products of evolution of the same variety as the patterns of human culture mentioned above, virulent strands of sophisticated social dominance patterns similar to the sexually selective behaviours found in social animals like, say, lions or elephant seals.

206. Interview with Francis Collins

Comment #69208 by Robert Maynard on September 10, 2007 at 2:25 am

Aw, come on Quine..
Point of Inquiry isn't about pinning people down and making them uncomfortable. Dude's just trying to have a inquisitive conversation, help the guest introduce or explain his- or herself to the listener.
The best time for discussions and arguments and generally rolling up your sleeves always begins post-interview, when you can separate the guest from the ideas, and dissect the ideas without making the guest uncomfortable.
Point of Inquiry couldn't maintain such a quality, well-connected podcast if it came to be recognised as some bully-pit run by a confrontational, under-qualified assface.

207. Review of Richard Dawkins' new book 'The Fascism Delusion'

Comment #69203 by Robert Maynard on September 10, 2007 at 2:11 am

I lol'd.
That was some seriously great stuff. :D

208. Interview with Francis Collins

Comment #68841 by Robert Maynard on September 8, 2007 at 11:04 pm

I thought it was a really really weak explanation, actually, especially coming from the former head of the Human Genome Project.
The argument begins by accepting the individual evolutionary advantage of behaving altruistically based on genetic proximity. Then it moves on to argue that species-level genetic similarity is too hazy to explain altruism. The argument completely avoids discussing how organisms recognise one another in the first place, and pretends that we have perfect, evolved apparatus for precisely measuring our genetic similarity to strangers. This is false. There is no magical "genetic sense", we have nothing to base our appraisals of genetic proximity on but our evolved perceptual equipment ("in the wild" at least).
It is not the case that your sense organs can exactingly discriminate genetic similarity. We can discriminate between humans and non-humans, and even sorta-almost-humans (like primates), but it doesn't seem to get much more precise beyond that. We can probably be genetically biased towards certain traits, but this must be pretty generalised.
For example, if a mother meets a daughter she gave up for adoption at birth as a stranger in the street, she will not recognise her as close kin without the aid of circumstance and records, and she has no more reason for acting altruistically to her then anyone else.

EDIT: and of course, as Ramirez pointed out, the genetic component of civil altruism doesn't hold a candle to the taming power of social contract theories. I think perhaps Collins would've been served better by reading something like Hobbes' Leviathan instead of Mere Christianity..

209. The Fleas Are Multiplying!

Comment #68657 by Robert Maynard on September 8, 2007 at 2:48 am

Good grief!
I knew Vox Day was involved with writing, but I'd only heard about him when Pharyngula linked to critical eviscerations of the arguments in his blog posts; I had no idea he could actually get books published.

That's kind of.. dangerous. :|

210. Bible Belter

Comment #68214 by Robert Maynard on September 6, 2007 at 11:21 am

Giskard: Actually, in Latin that would be:
Nullius pueri anus praetermissus

I had assumed he was referring to Latin grammar. Didn't it have a thing about putting the subject first and the action or description or what have you second? Something like that? I don't know much about latin.. :|

211. Christopher Hitchens on BookTV

Comment #68002 by Robert Maynard on September 5, 2007 at 2:40 pm

I don't think Gore has any political aspirations left, beyond pop statesman, the president-that-would've-been-a-whole-lot-better. His pronouncements are not for politics anymore than, say, Geldof's apparent belief that money and awareness is all we need to fix Africa.
Gore does sincerely believe in anthropogenic global warming, and the consensus as to its nature (which is obviously not to say that faith is any better than cynical politics).

As a citizen of "the other country that didn't ratify Kyoto" I can more or less sympathise with some doubts about that protocol, but its goals were pretty modest. Suppose the case for AGW becomes more solid in the future, and the so-called "deadline" doesn't change by very much - the longer it takes to start acting, the steeper and more ruinous the requirements will become with each successive protocol, once Kyoto terminates in 2012. Again, I think it's better to start moving decisively up now, because it may seem steep now, but it can only get steeper with time if AGW is correct (which I am fairly certain it is). :P

I wouldn't be surprised if most countries failed to meet their Kyoto goals by 2012, but then there'll be a new protocol, and things had better start happening then.

212. Christopher Hitchens on BookTV

Comment #67956 by Robert Maynard on September 5, 2007 at 11:18 am

Scooter,
I think ultimately our differences are not dramatic. I would hasten to join you in encouraging due skepticism of Al Gore's politicised declarations and rock concerts (regardless of how sincere I do believe he is), but I would not be so quick to stand up to, say, the IPCC, whose conclusions are very similar, simply because I know that I'm nowhere near qualified enough to begin commenting on their conclusions, let alone considering myself familiar and comfortable with the work of its critics, whichever payroll they happen to occupy.

Besides my status as an amateur enthusiast, I've avoided talking about the actual science because your initial beef was a mostly philosophical one. When you did bring in the science though, it seemed as though you would move from acknowledging evidence for AGW (however subtle), to reflecting on the implications that only a subtle, uncertain effect has for the reliability of the 'hockey graph', and then proceed to denial of AGW altogether, and comparisons to cults.

This three step progression was perfectly encapsulated in a single sentence you wrote,

Although there has been claims to such data as showing that anthropogenic global warming exists, it cannot say how much man is contributing, if at all.

It's like "It does seem as though there is evidence for it, but we don't know how much evidence there is for it, or even if there is any evidence for it. Wait.. what did I say at the beginning?"
From that kind of wandering, I think you may be behaving just a tad contrarian about the issue.

Al Gore is not nearly as deep green as some: he does stress the importance of global warming activism as an economically competitive movement, rather than a "You can't like, own money, man" quasi-socialist dismantling and revolution of "the way things are now".

The whole "trillions of dollars" thing is another thing I don't get. I mean, the investigation and implementation of alternative energies are the exact policies Gore et al recommend as a solution to their arguments about AGW. But you've said you support these policies. It's not like he's also advocating a return to hunter-gatherer lifestyles. Where is the disconnect, if the outcomes of your differing opinions ultimately end up in the same place? Exactly which of those trillions would be spent in ways you haven't already agreed are good? Are there plans for a giant gold Gore statue I don't know about?

213. Christopher Hitchens on BookTV

Comment #67896 by Robert Maynard on September 5, 2007 at 4:53 am

True, hungarianelephant, but I thought everyone understood that deep greens (at least the ones as "deep" as you're referring to) are unrealistic hippies. When someone can't understand that change is going to take place over years, decades, rather than months, they're not arguing for progress, they're arguing for standstill, for freezing in the headlights.

Everyone's got a different take, but besides improving and researching alternative energies I'm a big fan of pushing for nuclear power as a transitional alternative energy, while solar cells improve and we use biofuels to try and wean ourselves off petrochemicals.
Now, it'd be seriously great if everyone dropped everything and started building nuclear power plants now, but those things take over a decade to build, and deep greens seem to be even less fond of stardust-based uranium than corpse-based oil.

Ultimately I think we'll just move forward gradually and deal with the consequences of our policies as they come. We are after all the smartest things around, so if any non-bacterial organism has a chance of surviving a poisonous, irreversible (on geological scales) climate shift, its us. :P

Besides, if the earth is naturally warming you still couldn't argue that emitting less greenhouse gas would make things worse, and you still couldn't argue that shaking off our reliance on finite resources is a bad idea. With issues like peak oil riding alongside, easing into new forms of energy around now would be a good idea even if the Earth wasn't also heating up.

214. Christopher Hitchens on BookTV

Comment #67820 by Robert Maynard on September 5, 2007 at 12:16 am

scotternyc: "Playing it safe" is no different than "act as though god does exist just in case".

So you have decided to equate all notions of self-preservation in the face of a speculative threat with intellectual cowardice. Fantastic.

To re-iterate, I already addressed this attempt at equivocation in my initial response, because Pascal's wager does not "account for the true range of outcomes", and is therefore not comparable to, shall we say, Gore's Wager, just to be cheeky. :P
I say again, the contemptible nature of Pascal's wager does not lie in its endorsement of playing it safe. Playing it safe is, in general, a really smart idea, which is what makes Pascal's wager so seductive to anyone who becomes impressed by it. The problem lies in the false analysis of the 'game' (there is more than one god to be wrong about, so belief in Pascal's Christian God is as far from safety as atheism, rendering the wager meaningless), and a bad understanding of how one can play it (people don't generally change their minds on important issues without some serious convincing).

What is more important about Gore's Wager, and its incompatibility with the threats of religious ideology, is that beliefs regarding global warming are not a matter of differential outcomes for individual policies. It is not the case that people who believe different things about global warming will come to experience different worlds as time passes. So policy regarding the issue must be considered with everyones best interests in mind, and we must devote resources to pursuing the safest options.
It is a wager, and it's the sort of wager you really wouldn't want to be wrong about.

Let me use an example we're all familiar with.
Imagine Bertrand Russel's celestial teapot. We can't see it, but we can't disprove its existence, so we have to be agnostic about it. But in a sense, there are celestial teapots out there - millions of them, the mineralised remnants of a solar ejection billions of years ago - they're quite difficult to detect if you don't know where to look, because they're non-luminous and don't reflect the suns light very well, or very much of it.
Despite this, NASA devotes a portion of its budget to developing solutions should a rather large teapot, say the size of India, someday found itself on a collision course with our planet. Why is that? Why should we spend money on a threat that may never materialise, which we aren't responsible for, and which we may not even be able to solve, when there are already so many solvable problems on Earth? Why don't we leave aside our plans for averting extinction-event teapot strikes until such a nightmare is unambiguous and imminent?
Because while we must be agnostic, it is ultimately a matter of probability. We know they're out there, even when we can't see the majority of them. And no matter how much room there is in space, in the fullness of time there is bound to be one which will otherwise randomly careen into Earth.
There are currently no meteors known to be on a collision course with Earth, but there have been several spotted which in the next few decades (if calculated correctly) will pass very close by our atmosphere. To echo your calls for skepticism over climate modeling, what if those calculations are wrong? What if, indeed? What if these exaggerated models of climate change were still not extreme enough?

Where there is uncertainty in matters like this, we should be modestly aware of our circumstances, and plan for the worst. It's smarter to play it safe when the environment is at stake, because the cost of being wrong is seven billion amazed people slapping their forehead hard enough to die. :P
The species does not move as one, and we can easily afford to pay different people to work on different problems at the same time. It is not as though pursuing policies to curb greenhouse emissions is going to stall research on AIDS, just as putting billions behind plans to counter global warming is not going to divert funds away from planning for a meteor strike or a terrorist attack.

Anyway, I've never seen your previous discussions about global warming, so I don't really know much about your positions. It's unclear whether you accept global warming but deny anthropogenic global warming, or if you just flat out deny global warming in general. I'm curious because Dreamer's quip about correlation and causation has me wondering if he doesn't even accept the greenhouse effect.

215. Christopher Hitchens on BookTV

Comment #67667 by Robert Maynard on September 4, 2007 at 8:56 am

scooternyc: Unfortunately this sounds so very much like the wager of believing in god just in case.

What it sounds like is insuring against a worst case scenario, in a physical world which is completely available to measurement.
Unlike Pascal's wager, in which one is encouraged to subscribe to a religious "philosophy" based on a threat assessment pertaining to a scenario which cannot be investigated, and supported by "lobbyists" with no evidence - the particulars of climate change are completely observable (though its predictive power has understandably large error bars at the moment), and the threat assessments are entirely derived from that data.
Also unlike Pascal, the outcomes of this wager will verifiably take place in an actual world, one way or the other.

The infamous wager isn't unsound because it's a bad idea to "play it safe", it's unsound because it doesn't account for the true range of outcomes, which if included would ultimately produce no wiser option than not gambling in the first place.

On the other hand, making a transition to low-carbon, renewable energies would be a good idea even if the Earth didn't seem to be dangerously heating up as a result of us burning the billions of litres of plankton and plant remains we found in the ground.

216. Christopher Hitchens on BookTV

Comment #67589 by Robert Maynard on September 4, 2007 at 12:34 am

Thanks, Zzyx1170

217. What do these atheists understand of religion?

Comment #67363 by Robert Maynard on September 3, 2007 at 6:02 am

Good Gravy - what a pile of puke..

"There are no experiments and tests to explain love, empathy, longing, the agony and ecstasy of the heart, the wild and wonderful creativity of the brain, that thing that happens to you when a full moon appears above the sea and is reflected in it. Sorry, but knowing the science of why the moon shines is irrelevant to the experience."

I should try to resist mean-spirited jabs at fellow site-posters, particularly when such insightful explorations of incoherence are being penned by notable authors, but it sounds like sirs Bonzai and stag would get along swell with Mrs Alibhai Brown.

218. Cartoons from Evolution: a journal of nature 1927-1938

Comment #67355 by Robert Maynard on September 3, 2007 at 5:41 am

#5, hcholm

Well, if you squint real hard, it looks like a smiling monkey, sitting in a tree.
oh wait..

I can't see anything editorial/funny either. Maybe it's some ancient biologist joke. :P

219. Review of Darwin's Angel: An Angelic Response to the God Delusion

Comment #66938 by Robert Maynard on September 1, 2007 at 3:33 am

This review feels rather like a vicarious review of The God Delusion, but then again that's because it's reviewing a book which seems to be little more than an extended review of The God Delusion.

Consider that for a moment. Negative reviews of atheist literature are in demand, enough that you can sell a BOOK (like, in a BOOKSTORE) which is actually just a review of another (ACTUAL) book, of the same caliber and substance to be found in the review column of a newspaper. Then some people stuck working for newspapers will favourably review this review, because not only do they agree with it, but they might get the chance to do the same thing one day (and likely get to use all the same arguments).
These are products which offer nothing but a brief respite from the arguments in atheist books, which will last until the next time you're unlucky enough to run into an atheist patient enough to disabuse you.

It's one of those things which is sad in a way that makes you smile.

220. Teresa, Bright and Dark

Comment #66466 by Robert Maynard on August 30, 2007 at 3:54 am

Quite a few of you are pushing your fellow humans up against the wall for statements they did not, in fact, make.

A strong distaste for something is not equal to a condemnation of the practice, nor is an endorsement of careful consideration. Although it may be his actual position, BigJohn did not actually articulate any position or personal policy regarding the carrying out of abortions, let alone misogynistic overtones of body control, as accused.
LeeLeeOne and Icculus hit the nail on the head: pro-choice is not the same as pro-abortion, because (and I think BigJohn would agree) the bottom line is that prevention is better than cure.
It's cheaper, it's cleaner, it's indicative of a responsible sex life (in societies where contraceptives are readily available to women, please don't confuse that statement with the situation in developing countries with draconian womens rights. And I also hope nobody is stupid enough to accuse me of calling rape victims "irresponsible")
Abortions should never be embarrassing or difficult to access, but they also shouldn't be anxiously anticipated as a quasi- rite of passage.

BigJohn merely conveyed the opinion "Honestly, killing babies kinda sucks."
Critically, he did not equivocate any particular stage of pregancy with human agency or the nebulous notion of "personhood", another thing he was accused of doing.

Regarding the whole ballooning of this pitiful digression, why the fuck should you care what Hitchens thinks about abortion, or anything?
"Oh, don't worry folks, I'm sure he didn't mean it!" "No, no, see, Hitchie's still cool!"

It is a bad idea to try and think of Dawkins, Hitchens et al as "representatives" of atheism. You will find that you are not of entirely the same mind, and if you're not a goddamn child, you'll realise it's okay to disagree with people you admire, and still admire them.
For an example off the top of my head, I recall reading an anecdote where Dawkins, innocently making conversation with a journo, outlined a scenario where you had to choose between killing the last surviving elephant or letting it trample a human baby, and arguing that the former choice was narrow-minded specieism, and I remember thinking "Well, that was a dumb thing to say. In that situation it's unlikely you'd act on a reasoned decision, and more likely act on instinct to protect the baby, as the result of adaptations for proximal gene altruism you outlined in your first damn book, and if it's the last elephant, saving it would just be prolonging the inevitable. Must try harder. C" :P

They are atheists, and they're great examples of atheists, but they do not claim to represent anyone besides themselves, just as you are very likely your best representative.
And if you do disagree with them it would certainly be likely to make conversation more interesting, should you speak to them one day. :P

Hitchen's opinions are not some coupon deal, a packaged philosophy which you must subscribe to entirely to comfortably count yourself a fan.
Ideas have no owners, and you can claim allegiances a la carte, by all means.

"Gimme a Build Up That Wall combo, hold the penchant for alcohol and cigarettes."

221. Enemies of Reason

Comment #66091 by Robert Maynard on August 28, 2007 at 2:36 pm

A fun documentary which should reach a wide audience. I updated my userpic to celebrate one of the one-liners in it.
It also featured many echoes of the chapter "Hoodwink'd By Faery Fancy" in one of Dawkins' older books, Unweaving the Rainbow. Because of this, I'm relieved he didn't try to articulate the petwhac in spoken words, even though it's a fun discussion about coincidence. :P

222. Fallen Pastor Seeks Aid to Pursue Studies

Comment #66089 by Robert Maynard on August 28, 2007 at 2:22 pm

To put it bluntly Mr Haggard, you don't deserve a red cent, you leering, two-faced sheister.

223. Open letter to Michael Shermer in response to his letter...

Comment #64933 by Robert Maynard on August 22, 2007 at 12:37 pm

Corylus: If you want to persuade people it is a good idea not to talk down to half your audience.

And what if she is, in fact, a totally cool chick? :P
I don't want to turn this into a debate about feminism, and I don't find myself using the term much, but I don't think "chick" is particularly sexist. I think the implicit meaning has drifted safely away from its roots as a variant on "bird", or whatever.
It seems on the same level as describing someone as a cool dude. *shrug*

In any case, Shermer is a cool dude, and so is Sapient.
I like to imagine folks like Sapient becoming what you might call "second-generation" "New Atheists", easy-going non-scientist super-arguers milked on the literature of their forebears, who'll be in the front line against the next generation of creationists, people like.. for example, Bizarro Dawkins.
I'm about 7 years behind Sapient, but I also like to imagine I'll be able to contribute something solid to this conversation someday too. :P

Atheism looks like it will have an exciting future. All we have to do is stay media-savvy, and our battle is half-won. To that effect, the RRS has been doing a fine job so far.

/rambling

224. Scientists should unite against threat from religion

Comment #64928 by Robert Maynard on August 22, 2007 at 12:13 pm

"There are bridges and there are gangplanks, and it is the business of journals such as Nature to know the difference."

Bickety-bam.
Tssss, ya burn'd!
etc..

Nice to hear from Sam again, even if only in letters to editors.

225. In Google Earth, a Service for Scanning the Heavens

Comment #64898 by Robert Maynard on August 22, 2007 at 8:40 am

I just tried Google Sky and downloaded Celestia. I think I prefer Google Sky for actually looking at things, only because I felt a bit better as a grounded observer. The simulation abilities of Celestia are really great though, especially (I imagine) for kids, and teaching. And by great, I mean "Holy cow, I can go anywhere and model planetary movement and mess with time and I wish I had this when I was a kid because it would have blown my little mind."

226. Poll: Which religion do you associate with?

Comment #64828 by Robert Maynard on August 22, 2007 at 2:15 am

Religion atheism is not.

Then again, if 12000 atheists were willing to acknowledge and accept the phrasing of the question in order to "win" a silly poll, perhaps it's not such a big deal? :P
I didn't vote, but the inclusion of atheism as a religion is understandable, even in more serious polling. If you're interested in the rise of the atheist demographic, it mightn't help your data to ask a question about religious association, and include "I am neither spiritual nor religious" as an option rather than atheism, because it could be argued you're muddying the waters with agnostics (a demographic which is then split apart between non-religious people who are spiritual and those who aren't), those who are entirely indifferent to these matters, but who don't want to identify themselves as atheists.
You couldn't have, at the end of every religious poll, something like this:

- I am non-religious (but spiritual)
- I am non-religious (atheist)
- I am non-religious (I seriously don't care)

It would be cluttered and silly.
There's no good reason for pollers to go out of their way to accommodate for atheism being a non-religion, when they're interested in religious demographics; we are an unmistakable minority. Pollers shouldn't have to take all atheists aside and brief them beforehand: "Look, we know you're not an actual religion, but we're interested in religious demographics, and most people are religious and approach belief in terms of religions, so please just play along."

We should be able to see this for ourselves and get over it, because this kind of nuance in beliefs will force the nature of the conversation to change over time, until the doctrinal nature of "religions" becomes so smeared and nominal and varied that it doesn't mean anything particularly different from "philosophy".

227. Poll: Which religion do you associate with?

Comment #64820 by Robert Maynard on August 22, 2007 at 1:40 am

Wow - it's almost as though it's explicitly a non-scientific poll, with a sample population of "Americans who are encouraged to flood a poll which doesn't adjust for the demographics of computer literate people who watch CNN and are involved in online communities, of which most are likely jaded secular liberals". Maybe Al Jazeera and Fox can do similar polls, and we'll make them duke it out in a pitfight.

Jon Stewart: ..That's news, baby!(?)

228. PZ Myers sued for a negative review in a blog post

Comment #64697 by Robert Maynard on August 21, 2007 at 11:19 am

"[N]o scientist holding the international reputation of any of Hazen, Sasselov, Goodwin or Tyson would endorse or review the work of a crackpot."

For those who don't actively read Pharyngula, and didn't see the funny story about some of Pivar's "endorsements", check out this short entry:

http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2007/07/a_little_more_on_lifecode.php

I never looked into what Sasselov and Goodwin said, but I think it's fairly safe to guess his endorsements are lukewarm at best.

Reading the actual wording of complaints always makes me more nervous than the mere idea of a frivolous lawsuit, because when you're staring at a looming edifice of careful legalese it's easy to imagine what might happen when the particulars of a situation are fed through its sharpened, labyrinthine machinery.
What's a good strategy? Play down Pharyngula's readership, and thus its ability to actually damage Pivar's reputation? Or demonstrate that Pivar is not endorsed by scientists, and is, as a matter of public-goddamn-record, a crackpot?

In any case, I too would be happy to be a drop in the bucket if PZ (or Seed, for that matter) needed some help dealing with the costs of this nonsense.

229. PZ Myers sued for a negative review in a blog post

Comment #64606 by Robert Maynard on August 21, 2007 at 1:59 am

Have a heart, PZ! Stuart Pivar is on the verge of tears! He gave you an advance copy of the book and asked you to give your thoughts; all he wanted was some kind words, and you had to turn around and rub your beard in his watery, crybaby eyes. For shame. Maybe next time you'll check beforehand if the author you're reviewing is an uppity little douchebag.
In the face of this monumental act of intellectual cowardice, I do hope you'll respond in turn, and rewrite your previously honest and scathing review to be cordial, accommodating, and entirely false.

230. Artificial Life Likely in 3 to 10 Years

Comment #64587 by Robert Maynard on August 20, 2007 at 9:03 pm

Overdose, glad to hear it. There are few things lamer than a nihilist. :P

life can be made without adding a 'soul' and thus all those 'special meaning' theories can finally be silenced with irrefutable proof.

However, I'm still not sure that that is what this would demonstrate. While just being able to achieve synthetic life is poisonous to the notion that life requires supernatural intervention, it is still nowhere near being able to demonstrate that life does not require any special intervention (ie. by a lab full of geniuses), but only certain sets of natural conditions. Abiogenesis is the still the big ticket, as far as I'm concerned.

Besides this, in Christian theology at least, only humans are given "immortal souls", so the creation of soulless bacteria isn't likely to ruffle any feathers.
I fear that none of these awesome things will blow their minds, even if we some day go all the way to building a friggin' human from scratch. It just doesn't seem to penetrate. I'd bet you any sum that when the first phylogenetic tests fully and confidently demonstrated our close cousinship with chimpanzees and bonobos, years ago, people were saying the same things we're saying now.
"Aha! Proof that our closest living relatives are chimpanzees! They won't be able to hold onto their silly beliefs about special creation now!"
But it didn't ruffle any feathers, just a huff, or a smirk, or a shrug.

It's really comparable to hoping you'll disillusion a person who thinks Elvis is still alive, by showing them autopsy photos, or digging Elvis's fucking corpse out of the ground and tossing it limply at his feet. *shrug* "What can I say, Robert? That's not The King."

231. Artificial Life Likely in 3 to 10 Years

Comment #64516 by Robert Maynard on August 20, 2007 at 11:17 am

Exciting article, but I don't see why a discovery like this would render life (any more) meaningless, unless you were resting on notions of special creation to begin with and had to adjust your philosophy.

Even once we have a formidable understanding of abiogenesis, and can set artificial parameters which will consistently yield compounds which will form varieties of replicating structures, the conditions from which any replicators can emerge remain fantastically fragile and rare within the scope of our Vast and very radioactive Universe. Even if it's easy for life to emerge in the right conditions, the right conditions themselves are clearly NOT easy to find.

So if we are measuring significance by rarity, replicators are always going to be important and special elements in the universe. Special to who? Well, special to a certain tier of replicators who have developed to look upon their own agency, circumstances, and operational imperatives and say "This is a neat setup, huh?"
What I mean is that we impute specialness onto life - we usually don't see a humans death simply as the cessation of atomic interactions, as Overdose glibly put it (mainly because it isn't, actually..). We can regard things like death how we want to. Actually, we might not even have much of a conscious choice - we seem hardwired for empathy, and grief seems an unavoidable "side effect" of death.

It's certainly illuminating to have some understanding of what life and death actually are, at the chemical and physical level, but this claim that life (as opposed to the Universe) is "meaningless" is ultimately just as subjective and emotional an assertion as the claim that life is a karmic journey woven by the stars.

232. Our Lives, Controlled From Some Guy's Couch

Comment #63539 by Robert Maynard on August 14, 2007 at 6:10 pm

One could never claim with absolute certainty that these kinds of scenarios are impossible (although they're fairly ridiculous), and the remarks here about so-called computational limitations are pretty rich, but this cracked me up:

"My gut feeling, and it's nothing more than that," he says, "is that there's a 20 percent chance we're living in a computer simulation."

Oh no! Please say you meant 15%, 20% is too high for comfort! ..What's that? That number is not based on anything?

Oh, okay.

..I mean, I personally try not to measure, let alone listen to, the ruminations of my gut.. but okay.

233. Interview with Richard Dawkins

Comment #63216 by Robert Maynard on August 13, 2007 at 2:22 pm

darwin2,
I wish I'd known posters like you would be so belligerent as to re-post comments you made months ago, practically verbatim, so I could keep my replies stored somewhere rather than waste time writing them again.

This has happened before, and you're still mistaken. If you're not willing to admit your version of the watchmaker analogy has been pulverised by multiple posters in the past, why should anyone give your dissonance (and senility) addled mind the time of day?

"Give me a break" indeed..

234. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #63058 by Robert Maynard on August 13, 2007 at 3:27 am

I find it astonishing that you cannot grapse the simple point that not all forms of cultural outputs are meant for "knowing things".

But.. I quoted you implying that "literature, poetry and art" help understand the human condition, that they are attempts to reflect, reveal, or otherwise understand things. It is exactly what you've been arguing this whole time. I never said all forms of cultural output were "meant for" knowing things, I was replying to your insinuation that they were, arguing that we can compare them on this measure and find all to be lacking in comparison to science.
Poetry, as I said, has its own rules, not geared for pruning the untrue. That it has not developed as a discipline of "knowing things" is exactly what I argued. If you don't think so either.. good?

Humans are not just information processing robots for Pete's sake,--at least most of us don't see ourselves as mere information gathering devices, with perhaps some exceptions such as you.

"Most of us"? So, truth is a democracy after all.. Your appeal to populism is self-defeating - precisely because public understanding of the mind sciences is so impoverished, and still wallowing in a weird quasi-dualism. You could also argue that "most of us" don't generally conceive of robots more complicated than a Dalek.

I will repeat a paragraph I previously posted for effect, because I will stand by it.
"We can say with a great deal of certainty that the human mind is a biologically constructed information processing machine. The parameters of this machine are shaped by what functions it needs to serve, and as such our minds are defined by the modalities of information that our sensory organs can produce, and the evolutionary conditions that selected for the differential processing of some stimuli over others. A human brain is an organ, like any other, which functions in harmony with the other systems of our bodies to yield physical and chemical behaviours that are conducive to our survival and replication."

It is also almost certain that our consciousness is entirely a product of this organs consistent operation.
I know you want to make it sound cold and emotionless, but .. I don't know, I honestly find that a little immature. A little Dalek-fixated, if you will.
Animals are machines, and we're animals. I don't see anything demeaning about being part of the most advanced set of "robots" so far found in the Universe, and if you do I think you need to get over it. I said that in jest before, back when I was assuming you had read The Selfish Gene without throwing a tantrum, and didn't really think conceiving of human beings as complex survival machines was demeaning.

As for whether I've ever been introspective.. this was a rhetorical question, right? It sounds suspiciously like someone arguing for the validity of a religious experience, or maybe something more hands-on.. "If only you were more contemplative, you'd see things my way. But you wouldn't know man, you haven't seen the things I've seen. I have climbed to the summit of my soul, and drunk from the chalice of love in my heart. When was the last time you did that? Listen to this song, it will change your reality." etc.
I suppose I should have kept your earlier cheerful references to drug use in mind.[/ad hominem]

I actually think you would find any experience of introspection - drug-induced or sober - more illuminating if you acknowledged that the details of your moment to moment experience take place through chemical reactions, and contemplated what your experiences of the world and your own mind reveal about the contents of your mind, armed with the awareness that it is an amazing 1kg flesh-computer, built from the ground up and primed with your childhood experiences. In a way you could begin to become your own sub-qualified psychologist.
You're much better equipped to understand your own mind if you have some kind of idea how it works. Science has granted us an accelerating rate of insight into matters of mind, and they can only serve to enhance our individual introspection.

The possible role of quantum mechanics in brain operation will be very interesting to learn about in the future, but everyone who talks about it now appears to be a crackpot. Beyond that possibility, there really is no metaphysical sanctuary in your mind which will not permit the access of third person inquiry.

I should stress that this is not a matter of science vs. subjective experience, in precisely the same way that parenthood is not a matter of adults vs. children. Science is there to illuminate subjective experience, with the benefit of being the rolling culmination of a couple of centuries worth of subjective experiencer's working together to figure things out.

"[empirical methodologies] are worthless if their interpretations are so flexible that they can be twisted and spun in almost any way you want. This is pseudoscience."
I agree.

"The point of bringing this up is to show that with all the big talks about how science is the only true way to "know", it has a very poor track record in the humanities."
To be fair, the humanities have an even worse track record in the sciences. I mean, did you see The Core?!

"The machine developed for studying nature works very poorly for human affairs, the remedies may require a lot more than mere tinkering and fine tuning the machine to a slightly different setting."
We seem above and beyond the most complex things in nature, so extra considerations would presumably follow, I agree. I have full confidence that psychology and other mind sciences will improve the methods of "social science" in years to come. I think the main issue is that you don't. In a sickening way I suppose it comes down to a matter of faith. :P

"When the "scientific method" mostly yields pseudo science and a numerical smog qualitative research and philosophizing at least are not worse."
You seem to be suggesting that qualitative research and philosophy are explicitly non-scientific methods. I have run into this distinction before in my tertiary studies. It does not compute with me (pun intended). Perhaps you could do a better job at outlining the distinction than I could.

Knowing the biological and computational origins of our heuristics doesn't tell us anything about how to apply them effectively, this is a separate kind of knowledge in and of itself mostly gain through the unconscious process of experience.

I disagree. A better understanding of how our behaviour and heuristics are developed in childhood could make for a revolution in artificial parenting. I figure you'll go all "Artificial!? What are you, some kind of robot?".. so perhaps a better word is "guided". We could improve the general experience of childhood, engender an enthusiasm for growth and knowledge, take steps to avoid dangerous concepts of relationships, media and food to avoid abusiveness, obesity, etc.
You might say "But then you're just engineering children! They should be free to experience life, to make mistakes and learn from them!", and I don't disagree. But mistakes can be engineered too. Children could experience life for themselves, and the controls on the particulars of their experience could be further loosened as they grew into adolescence, and their powers of perception expanded to understand complex systems/narratives. My terminology might sound Brave New World-esque, but the important thing to note is that WE ALREADY DO THIS, albeit in a clumsier, less informed, less rational, less systematic fashion, with our conception of parenthood itself grown in us by our experience and reflections on childhood and of our parents.
As I said to stag, you can call personal experience a different way of "knowing" if you insist, but it really does a disservice to the word, when compared with what we could achieve with a better scientific understanding of how our experience works.

This is just common sense and it is unbelievable that I have to actually spell it out.

Ah, the ol' "common sense" routine. If anything demonstrates the limitations of subjective understanding, it's the ability to impose personal opinions onto an abstracted buffet of cheap truisms within everyones grasp. Believe it. I think you're wrong! :D

235. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62868 by Robert Maynard on August 12, 2007 at 4:27 am

Bonzai: I find it astonishing that some of you actually try to argue that literature, poetry and art serve absolutely no function in understanding the human condition

I find it astonishing that you seem unable to agree that not all forms of cultural output are equally good at knowing things, or that some might be literally harmful to a clear understanding of things.
The scientific method is a selectively cultivated discipline, purpose-grown to figure stuff out. Poetry wasn't, and on the odd occasion it does yield insight which science later corroborates, it is by the sheer luck of it being expressed by a keen observer, and not by the power of the medium, which has its own rules, not exactly geared toward pruning the untrue.
That's all anyone should have to say.

Again with the social sciences, and your apparent worship of ambiguity. What is your point? You demonstrate clearly that the methods of science are limited in their application to human interaction, but you don't discuss the likelihood of the situation improving.
I ask again: Are you suggesting that there is a way to examine and form explanations of social groups which works better than the scientific method? Or are you happily clinging to the daft, baseless notion that humans and their interactions are entirely beyond understanding?

236. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62169 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 2:02 pm

stag: My issue was with the implication that the only knowledge worth having is that which can be empirically derived.

It seems to be the only knowledge useful for understanding things. I didn't say it was not "worth" having subjective experiences, or that we should aspire to fashion our conscious experience to be as empirically aware as possible (and I don't think BlackSun was arguing this either). Indeed, one can't avoid subjective experiences, and shouldn't try to - they're part of our wiring (then again, who knows what the future holds). What I have tried to emphasise is their fragile value as actual, or useful, "knowledge", given our observational paradigm as big-brained bipedal mammals. Understanding what that kind of thing is naturally going to enjoy gives you a fairly good idea of why you feel or think certain things, and helps you take your personal ideas with a grain of salt.

Our most useful knowledge has been repeatedly derived from revisable, mutually consistent and majoritively corroborated observations about how the world appears to work. Not "personal and, to a large extent, non-communicable" observations.

If you can't communicate it, in what sense can you really claim to know it, to understand it?
In what sense, then, is it actually knowledge?
We don't understand our emotions subjectively, precisely because they are chemical cues fed to us by our brains, plying us with the carrot and the stick to pursue directives that will sustain our operation and benefit our genes.
I didn't say that made emotions terrible (there's certainly no use complaining about them, and its not useful to imply some kind of submissive relationship dynamic, with our brains as drug-peddling dictators ordering us around for a fix, given that the sum of our experience is itself an effect of the brains chronic monologue), I just said it made them a really lousy way of understanding things, and nowhere near on par with the fruits of empirical inquiry.

237. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62150 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 11:04 am

stag: So we agree then there is more to knowledge than that which can be dertermined by objective, empirical means?

No. Arguing that two different things are not the same, as though I was arguing the opposite, is what I described as ludicrous. I would've gone on to describe it as "mind-explodingly idiotic" too, but I had a lot of other things to say.
Bonzai said "understanding that passion is codified in humans will not replace the experience of being in love", which is rather like saying, "Understanding why supporting walls are important will not replace the experience of building a house."
It's almost as though he was describing two different enterprises..

I don't agree if what you and Bonzai are essentially saying is "There are legitimate kinds of knowledge that are derived neither by observing the world nor reflecting on previous observations,"
This, near as I can tell, is untrue.
When you talk about tasting sweet fruit, and say it's a different kind of knowledge - okay, I'll let you put it that way if you insist (I hope your dinner is tasty), but you need to be aware that it is knowledge (as I've said consistently) which is nowhere near as reliable or useful or "good" as that available through empiricism. You need to understand, if you don't already, that your perception of reality is constructed based on the functions your sense organs have evolved to serve. It's only through empirical observation that we can observe and come to understand the limitations and even defects of our in-built modes of perception.
Subjective experiences shouldn't be considered a different "kind" of knowledge, in the same way that observing the world while inebriated won't give you reliable answers about your world or state of mind. Your experience of the world takes place through human-tinted glasses, and this does not yield a different kind of real knowledge - it yields shaky, ambiguous, evolved, artificial knowledge.

You both keep implying that emotional experiences like being in love or listening to a great song are irreducible units of untouchable "knowledge". They're not. They're processes, they're replicable in laboratory conditions, and empirical means are the way we will discover (and to some degree, have discovered) how.
Understanding love scientifically and being in love are two different things. This is a non-sequitur that's been repeated multiple times here so far.
I really want to know what would make you and Bonzai repeat that the latter is a non-empirical matter and a different kind of knowledge, if we were to understand all of its empirical particulars? We certainly wouldn't begin to experience love as an empirical matter (which is exactly why it isn't really knowledge - though our brains operate rationally, "we" are not kept aware of "its" designs), but we could understand that what we find attractive is deterministic, (likely based on a combination of genetics and upbringing), and we could reflect on what first attracted us to a particular person in rational terms. Where is the secret magic ingredient that makes it non-scientific?

238. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62149 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 10:44 am

1) you assume all levels of "knowledge" is reducible to "scientific knowledge",--epistemology.
2) You vastly underestimate the difficulties in applying the scientific method to most real life situations where ambiguities are really the way things are, not just because "our experience is ambiguous"

I have already discussed subjective knowledge, and the only time I've explicitly said it isn't knowledge was while setting up an argument in which I tried to demonstrate that it isn't a way of "knowing" in a useful (ie. corroborated) sense.
Beyond that, I'm not sure I understand what you're saying, but this should be easy to clarify:

A) You've hinted at kinds of knowledge besides "scientific" knowledge. Do you feel that "scientific knowledge" as you've defined it includes everything observable? If so, see B)

B) Are you suggesting there are metaphysical factors involved in our knowledge? If so.. jiggaWHAAA?? ..Did you read the article?

P.S.
I've only just worked up the nerve to read the rest of the lecture in #19 about how social sciences are not very good at finding out things, and how I'm just a pop science reader and you're a pot smoking research scientist, or something to that effect.
What exactly is your point, sir? That the scientific method is limited? That portions of social reality are simply unknowable? That there are ways of knowing more effective than the scientific method? Or that we simply don't know enough yet to use the scientific method effectively in the case of social science?
You have a real fondness for suggesting there are myriad ambiguities in "the real world" which I have either not encountered or not taken into account. I can almost hear you punctuating each sentence with "Junior!"

I say again, is there anything we can learn about social systems without observation, reflection and corroboration? If so, what is the nature of this mystical magisterium?

239. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62142 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 10:16 am

stag: Again, programming a robot to do science, and knowing what its like to actually be a robot doing science are two different things. What is it like to be a bat?

I can't understand this perverse emphasis you keep putting on the unique peculiarities of any subjective cognition.
If one were capable of measuring, constructing or modifying sets of neurons with such accuracy as to perfectly replicate the cognitive patterns of a living bat, could that collection of neurons experience precisely the sensations of being a bat? Of course.
Would it ever be useful, interesting, or even communicable to do so? No. Never.

So is your objection even relevant to what may be achieved through science? I think you know the answer.

240. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62140 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 10:10 am

Bonzai: Even if we do know how passion is codified,--even in humans,-- that will not replace the experience of being in love, either with idea or with people. In the same way knowing how to build a TV wouldn't enable you to make great TV programs and reading electronics textbooks will not create the experience of watching your favourite show. To say otherwise is blatantly absurd.

Urgh.. you are simply churning out non-sequiturs, my good man. You are not required to understand something for it to happen. To suggest as such, or to suggest that anyone thinks as such, is a contradiction of the whole idea of empiricism (which is in essence, observing things happening, in order to form an understanding of how it is happening).
The very notion that I have suggested that understanding the mechanics of emotions is the same as actually experiencing them is ludicrous. What I have suggested is that these experiences, once understood as causal processes, can be replicated, and perhaps even enhanced. There is nothing mystical about them, and if you think that cheapens them, grow the fuck up. (I really hope that isn't what you think)

It is difficult for me to come up with a more simple and obvious demonstration of the flaws in your reasoning than the very example you gave about televisions. But let me give it a shot.
What you're saying is the logical equivalent of this: You could look at a photograph of a beautiful sunset, and wish to have one of your own. Thus you learn about cameras, and use a rather improbable growth in expertise to masterfully understand and construct your own camera. At this point, you resign and claim "But it will never produce a picture of a sunset!"
Yes, it will, if you included all of the elements that went into the original.. like, oh I don't know.. a sunset.

Now as for your example, yes, if you replicate a perfectly functioning television set, it will not display high quality television programs.. yet. If you were to, however, also invest in the replication of video cameras, boom mikes, television studios, talented actors and writers, and transmission systems, it would.
You cannot declare that something is by nature impossible to replicate, if you refuse to consider all (or even most) of the factors that go into it.

Let us again consider the science performing robot. We can say with a great deal of certainty that the human mind is a biologically constructed information processing machine. The parameters of this machine are shaped by what functions it needs to serve, and as such our minds are defined by the modalities of information that our sensory organs can produce, and the evolutionary conditions that selected for the differential processing of some stimuli over others. A human brain is an organ, like any other, which functions in harmony with the other systems of our bodies to yield physical and chemical behaviours that are conducive to our survival and replication. Keep this in mind when you think about emotions and motivations.
There are centers in the brain (such as the nucleus accumbens) which are responsible for the pure phenomenological sensations of reward (or happiness) and repulsion (or suffering). The human limbic system (or indeed, that of any animal) is a set of adaptive, genetically predicated pathways and predispositions, which elicit differential experiences of happiness and suffering in response to different combinations of stimuli. In essence, they are the functional parameters that allow us to process the range of sensory input we are likely to encounter, in a manner that will promote the long-term survival of our genes.
Put simply, they are the necessary initial programming for a series of organic robots which we all happen to be members of. Precisely what part of such functional parameters that guide algorithmic processes do you think are NOT replicable (or for that matter, already replicated) in computers?

In this sense, science can only be, and only is, performed by some manner of "robot". Why then, is it so difficult for you to fathom that with more precise information regarding the details of how we do what we do, that we would be capable of inventing other machines of near identical function, to conduct scientific inquiry as well, if not better, than we do?

241. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62125 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 8:58 am

Bonzai: What if the purpose is not to gain "knowledge"? I don't listen to music or watch movies or get high as a means to attain knowledge in any objective sense other to enjoy the experience.

I will use your own words.
You have a very narrow idea of "knowledge".
Our experience IS "knowledge", or awareness if you like, formed by sensory data. You have a knowledge of your surroundings, as informed by your eyes, nose, ears, skin, and sometimes your tongue. When you listen to music, you have a knowledge of what you're hearing, what it means to you, whether you like it, etc.
When you read a book, you are not only learning its contents, you are learning about the book. Even if the content is not educational, you are engaged in a learning process. Same deal with music, and ..well, everything, actually (including "getting high", Cheech).

So, uh.. you misunderstood me there. One of the potential pitfalls of language, I guess. It's subjectively interpreted.

The problem, as I said, is that experience is not a very good form of knowledge - it is prone to ambiguities and manipulation, and shouldn't be considered in the same league as unambiguous empirical knowledge.
Intuitive (also known as "anecdotal") insights about human behaviour are valuable rules of thumb, formed at a young age in our development, but their insights are not worth the grey matter we childishly scribbled them on compared to good psychological research.

"You cannot program a robot to do science."
Again, to quote Jiten, you forgot to add "yet" at the end of that claim. Otherwise, someone might think you're just making baseless assertions.
Machines are what you make them. If we understood more about how awe and passion works, yeah, actually - we could program robots to do science, and even feel a sense of satisfaction when they did it well. I fear you are straying close to a silly kind of dualism, where you're accepting that things like emotions are physical in nature - chains of functions, calculations and reactions which are literally mechanical - but then turn around and say "OH, but we'll never be able to replicate or manipulate these completely causal phenomena, even if we understood them in intricate detail!" Why not?

242. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62110 by Robert Maynard on August 8, 2007 at 7:41 am

stag: The point is one of subjective vs. objective "knowledge"; gnosis vs. logos.

I don't think it's a good idea to look to the ancient Greek philosophers for a modern understanding of experience and knowledge. It's not a valuable distinction, and I think it's a mistake to elevate subjective "knowledge" to a level anywhere near approaching "objective", or empirical, knowledge. I don't think subjective experience can accurately be called "knowledge" at all. Empiricism is so valuable precisely because it can produce unambiguous and unequivocal results which take huge dollops of subjective "knowledge" to dismiss.

I also think that you've outlined a misleading analogy. I'm not sure many people have claimed that understanding a phenomenon can replicate experiencing that phenomenon. People didn't gain the ability to experientially conjure rainbows after Newton explained how they worked. BUT (this is critical), they did learn how to manipulate their environment to create their own rainbows. When we understand what goes into creating an phenomenon, we can try to construct our own, if only to make sure our understanding is correct.

No amount of scientific understanding on how the brain interprets audio signals will ever replicate the actual experience of listening to Beethoven's 9th

Let me outline a situation: One's individual experience of listening to Beethoven's 9th symphony is an electrical affair, the audio signals triggering waves of activity, a symphony (if you will) of chain reactions, electricity crackling throughout the brain. It can stimulate sections dedicated to remembering the experience of previous listenings, for instance, stimulating sections related to a sense of melody and rhythm, perhaps remembered images of Beethoven portraits (tangential split-second thoughts of what it took to compose anything while completely deaf), thoughts of similar composers or compositions in the Romantic period, memories of specific passages one is eagerly anticipating and memories of how much time is to elapse before each passage arrives.
Suppose we kept track of exactly how this electrical symphony played out in tandem with the audio symphony, several times, in a single subjects brain, and came up with an averaged "experience" session for that song and that person.
Do you think that if we sat that subject down, and stimulated their brain precisely for over an hour, in accordance with their "experience" information, they would very likely experience Beethoven's 9th without actually hearing it? I think they probably would.
The brain might even attempt to cover up the dissonance between experiencing a song while not listening to it by making the subject think (or remember on reflection) that he actually was listening to it all along.

[[ EDIT: The 9th actually presents an opportunity for a much simpler demonstration of my point: are you saying that Beethoven, while clearly understanding exactly what he was writing down in musical notation, was not capable of personally replicating the experience of hearing his composition, because he was completely deaf at that stage?
If you can use the language, you can send the message. ]]

The way you said it makes it sound like you're saying that sitting down and researching how brains interpret audio doesn't replicate listening to audio. That's a non-sequitur.
What it does do is allow people to use that knowledge to trick the brain into experiencing things it isn't actually experiencing. Studying experiences like this allows us to fully expose the gulf between knowledge and experience: Experience is deceit-prone, jerry-rigged artificial knowledge, full of ambiguities and with no guaranteed link to events in the physical world.

Understanding how brains and bodies work will be able to replicate the experience Beethoven's 9th. It may also allow us to create new experiences, like a mash-up orgy of your experiences of ALL of his symphonies put together, (one would hope) without a cacophony of noise.
I'm pretty sure scientists can already stimulate brains to the point of orgasm without sexual contact, so what exactly is the difference?

Understanding things enriches our experience, and lets us improve on it. That's the whole friggin' point. Your argument sounds like a skeptical caveman emoting something along the lines of "No amount of understanding how fire effects dead animal flesh can replicate the experience of eating that cooked meat."
Yes, it can, and more.

243. Atheist 'Metaphysics' and Religious Equivocation

Comment #62001 by Robert Maynard on August 7, 2007 at 8:54 pm

A thoroughly excellent treatment of an incredibly frustrating tactic I've run into repeatedly - particularly on these comment threads.
David Robertson, devolved, Bizarro Dawkins, your thoughts on this article would be appreciated.

244. Arrogance, dogma and why science - not faith - is the new enemy of reason

Comment #61811 by Robert Maynard on August 7, 2007 at 1:47 am

This has meant our society can no longer distinguish between truth and lies by using evidence and logic.

..Didn't you just say a few paragraphs back that this stuff is "demonstrable" nonsense? So which is it?

Science cannot explain the origin of the universe.

I don't see why not, and I eagerly await the day top physicists can retort with some degree of confidence, "Yes, actually, we can," or, "Hm.. if only it were that simple.. ya douchebag."

245. CNN Debate on Koran in Toilet

Comment #60603 by Robert Maynard on August 2, 2007 at 11:54 am

There are subtleties brought out in this debate that would have benefited from a more detailed discussion if it were long-form, but as it is I side with Hitchens and particularly Prager, in this case. Hitchens for upholding the first amendment, Prager for doing his part to help erode the intellectually sick notion that criticising ideas, especially cultural practices, can amount to a criticism of race - as though there are some ideas which are intrinsic properties of particular races.

However, the raving lunatic Hooper brought up some statements which were clearly racist, and unavoidably so. A good example is the term "Mecca monkeys," which Hooper brought up in the second video.
It's important to note when considering criticism of Islam in America, that there are (thankfully) small sections of the population who are white supremacists. It's also important to understand that for these people, their viciously negative opinion of Islam stems not from an intellectual appraisal of its terrible social policies, but from a simplistic conception of Muslims not only as Non-Christian (that should go without saying), but more importantly as non-white - a double whammy for white supremacists. Prager needs to accept that while criticising the ideas of Islam isn't racist, some people are criticising the people, and calling them monkeys, among other things.

Calling someone a monkey is an obvious derogatory remark about physical appearance (even moreso if you are a Christian who does not accept our close cousinship with apes and other primates)
I doubt that the people who make these kinds of remarks are suggesting that learning and adopting a set of ideas can alter you physiologically. The statement makes a direct connection between belief and racial caricature. I'd hazard a guess that this kind of confusion over culture and race has its roots in anti-semitism.

For a counter-example: if I were to say that Islam turns people into "murder-happy, tantrum-throwing man-children," this would not be a racist description, because it emphasises the capacity for ideas to alter personality and demeanour. Entirely detached from race, I think its ideas are so poisonous as to thusly affect anyone who embraces them, from Cat Stevens to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

While we should be very enthusiastic about promoting everyones entitlement to criticise religious ideas they don't agree with, in line with promoting everyones right to free expression, we should never be defending the statements and actions of ignorant racists who actually do conflate 'foreign' religion with 'foreign' ethnicity. We should be criticising them AND the Muslims. It's not even a case of racist "Islamophobes" being 'right for the wrong reasons'. They're just being bad people.
Vandalising Korans and Mosques is a thuggish and dimwitted approach to confronting Islam (just like Pisschrist was a banal and meaningless piece of schlock! Chocolate Jesus was a little more clever, though).
What that idiot thief of a student did was certainly not a hate crime, but it was also not an argument. It was a book in a toilet.

If it were a longer, calmer debate I would have been disappointed if Hitchens did not make that distinction. Prager was approaching it at the very end of the interview, by demonstrating that simply criticising how Islam operates is not a crime.

Anyway, very encouraging video, to see an atheist invited to a religious discussion.

246. The Out Campaign

Comment #60064 by Robert Maynard on July 31, 2007 at 6:11 pm

I am also an acolyte of rock bands, and I worship coca cola. Here's to making words lose all meaning! :D

You're quite right though - a rewording is in order:

I have to ask, seeing you didn't respond to me last time, to what extent are you glorifying independence? I take it you buy groceries and go to the doctor, so you must concede the benefits of human fellowship to some extent.
Given that you see dependence as a form of weakness, and a property of children and the elderly for example (as mentioned in another thread), what is your opinion on dealing with weakness?

247. The Out Campaign

Comment #60053 by Robert Maynard on July 31, 2007 at 5:14 pm

Henri: I agree with him that many of you are Dawkin ACOLYTES. Of course the flea's beliefs are absurd, but you help his cause by your herd-like behaviour.

Riiight. So if someone made a statement which was incorrect in very specific ways, and everyone seemed to reply to him and correct or scorn him in the same manner, that would be 'following'.
(Leave aside that people are less patient with him now, he has been corrected on all of these issues in the past by many individual people, and his latest was a dirty bomb of heavy stupid)

Oh, and apparently, the more people there are correcting his arguments or expressing exasperation, the better his argument becomes, because we're herding.
No, you say, in order to be truly "individualistic", everyone needs to develop unique opinions about everything, including the best way to make bread. Has anyone here tried including sand? Oh come on, don't follow the flour-herd!
In order to be "true" atheists (as you sickeningly declared yourself to be in another thread, at the exclusion of those present) we must all have non-overlapping, incompatible goals and beliefs!

This is false. It is as false as the notion (held in other social spheres) which demands individual fashion sense as a pre-requisite for a well defined self-identity.
Telling people to "become their own gods", or that you are "the true atheist here", is to call on people to be like you. "Once you are all like me, you will be true individualists!" Again, this is extremely silly and childish.

I have to ask, seeing you didn't respond to me last time, to what extent are you glorifying independence? And, given that you see it as a form of weakness, and a property of children and the elderly for example, do you think weakness is something to be protected or extirpated?

Ricey: At least the Flea has individuality on his side.

Ah, I see, so according to you, 'individuality' is a relative function which fluctuates depending on company and context.
SO, a minister for a religion whose general adherents are the most populous on the planet, and whose beliefs are in alignment with those of his faith, is an individual so long as he is alone on an atheist website, surrounded by atheists. Clever! Or not.

248. OUT Campaign Launched, 'Scarlet Letter' Shirts Now Available!

Comment #59625 by Robert Maynard on July 30, 2007 at 1:13 am

Small wonder that I see our species as the biggest pestilential species that this planet has ever known

No need to be so self-effacing. Despite all this, there is no species on Earth more worthy of preservation.
That's humanism.

249. OUT Campaign Launched, 'Scarlet Letter' Shirts Now Available!

Comment #59425 by Robert Maynard on July 29, 2007 at 3:01 am

Veronique: I can collect my own rainwater, install a solar hot water system, erect a photo-voltaic energy system on my roof (outrageous costs!) and grow my own veges:-)

This is admirable, money saving and environmentally progressive - my mother does the same things. :)

I used the example to explore why Henri is so intent on conflating independence with strength and even superiority. It seems to imply that societies are just another kind of wilderness, and that human fellowship only serves to drag the individual down. It's ..how should I put this.. completely childish? :P

250. OUT Campaign Launched, 'Scarlet Letter' Shirts Now Available!

Comment #59398 by Robert Maynard on July 28, 2007 at 11:40 pm